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“When we first started this process…agencies didn’t know what they 
didn’t know.”
Karen S. Evans
Administrator for E-Government and Information Technology, 
Office of Management and Budget, In testimony before the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, February 28, 2008
In the fast-paced and ever-changing world of cybersecurity, no one 
can afford to miss a learning opportunity. So no matter where or when 
such an opportunity arises, you and your team had best be ready, 
because how you handle it may play a critical role in how successfully 
you manage risk and protect your enterprise now and into the future.
Just such a learning opportunity presented itself to me in 1996. It 
profoundly affected not only my own perspective but also my team’s 
performance in managing information technology resources and ser-
vices. At the time, all federal departments and agencies were asked to 
create a website to make services available to the public online. It was 
when e-mail was becoming the norm and the World Wide Web was 
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bursting onto the scene. Our team was to take the “basement” opera-
tion of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Internet services and move 
them into a production environment.
The weekend before the move, however, the DOJ website was 
hacked. As we worked to restore services, we had to brief top lead-
ers, provide information to law enforcement, and figure out what had 
gone wrong and how we would fix it. The events shaped my views on 
risk management, policies, certification, and accreditation, as well as 
the ability of an agency to “respond” versus “react.” In that one week-
end, I learned the importance of backup, communications, response 
plans, configuration management, and policies.
Policies should actually carry a capital “P,” because I learned the 
importance of effective policies on a practical level cannot be under-
estimated. The DOJ had policies in place and we were duly pushing 
the necessary documents out in support of them. But we were essen-
tially producing drafts, not final documents, because we focused on 
the technology often to the exclusion of other critical elements of risk 
assessment. I learned that in order to develop policies that effectively 
and constantly assess risk, you have to use a more holistic approach that 
simultaneously studies all of the elements involved, including produc-
tion, technology, and risk associated with the services being provided.
All of this then begs the question: “What is risk”? What amount 
of security controls is senior leadership willing to live with in the 
process of providing services? Is there a compensating control? How 
will you respond when an incident occurs? For me—as the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Administrator for E-Government 
and Information Technology and as a manager and chief information 
officer—these questions were critical in evaluating potential services, 
programs, investments, policies, and statutes. Being able to articulate 
the technical risk to senior leadership is critical to success, whether 
you are talking to a department head in the federal government or the 
chief executive officer (CEO) of a company. They need to know that 
the risk has been identified, how you intend to manage it, and what 
plans you have in place if services are compromised.
The federal government has statutes that govern the development 
of information resources management, such as the Computer Security 
Act of 1987, the Government Information Resources Security Act 
(which later became the Federal Information Security Management 
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Act, FISMA), and the E-Government Act of 2002. These statutes 
have led to policies such as OMB circulars, memoranda, and guide-
lines, including National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) guidelines and publications. So there are enough policies 
out there to make your head pop, but the basic questions to guide us 
remain the same:
• What is the risk?
• Is there a control?
• Can you live with the residual risk?
• What is your response plan when services become 
compromised?
Depending on your environment, the answers can become com-
plicated and complex. But regardless of the enterprise or the environ-
ment, the service owner must sign off on the responses and strategies. 
In the certification and accreditation (C&A) world, this is known as 
the designated authorizing official who grants the authority to oper-
ate. Many have criticized the C&A process as a paperwork exercise. 
I have to admit, until I experienced my own “learning opportunity” 
event described above and saw my project on the front pages of news-
papers, I did not have a true appreciation for that process. I was com-
plying with the rules but not truly understanding the objective to 
reduce risk to a manageable level. Hopefully not everyone will have to 
experience a crisis weekend like the one we did in order to be able to 
apply their knowledge to their own situation. I believe that regardless 
of whether the risk affects the public or private sector, risk manage-
ment is the key to success.
There are other factors to consider in risk management such as scale 
and time to implement systems. I do not directly address funding, 
although this affects your plans and can obviously affect your ability 
to reduce the risk associated with services. However, you could have 
all the funding you need yet have a design solution so complex that 
the time it takes to implement it leaves you vulnerable.
In the public sector, you have to implement services that minimize 
the cost and provide the greatest amount of value to the taxpayer. The 
catch-as-catch-can information security model of the 20th century 
where everyone fended for himself or herself is over. Each department, 
agency, or program at the federal, state, and local levels can no longer 
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work in a vacuum, trying to create a perimeter is difficult at best, and 
the idea of preventing and stopping services is also fruitless. In today’s 
world, you are no longer dealing with stopgap measures—rather, you 
are trying to create an environment that attracts a computer-savvy 
workforce and ensures the integrity of your information and data.
During our major drive to implement the e-government ini-
tiatives, the issues were not ones of technology but of trust and 
accountability, of using the authority of your position to achieve 
maximum results. We used to say, “you will get the same level of 
service if not better, at the same price if not lower, while ensuring 
privacy and security.” The basic goal of providing that level of ser-
vice has not changed.
In closing, I return to the most fundamental of the basic issues: 
risk. Do I know who is who on my network accessing services and 
whether they should they really have access to all the services and 
data? Understanding and categorizing systems is a critical part of the 
planning for your enterprise. Using tools such as enterprise architec-
ture and the associated activities that support it can help you under-
stand the risk-management landscape and develop the necessary 
transition plans to put an effective system in place. Coupling this with 
your capital planning activities then helps you to decide the invest-
ment strategy that best supports a risk management system that will 




Global interconnectivity is spreading. The International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations 
(UN), estimated that two billion people were online by the end of 
2010; by 2015, the number will reach five billion. The ITU also reck-
ons that 143 countries currently offer 3G services, potentially provid-
ing Internet access through smart phones to a growing portion of the 
estimated 5.3 billion people with mobile subscriptions, 3.8 billion of 
which are in the developing world.
Unfortunately, the more we move online, the more vulnerable we 
become to cyber threats. This book examines trends and strategies 
from around the world in order to raise awareness and offer a primer 
of cybersecurity in the public sector, which can be defined broadly as 
the vulnerability of computer systems, including Internet websites, 
against unauthorized access or attack, or the policy measures taken 
to protect them.
To understand cybersecurity in the public sector one has to rec-
ognize the convergence of three underlying forces: globalization, 
connectivity, and the movement of public sector functions online, 
commonly referred to as electronic government (e-government).
The Internet offers a common platform through which anyone can 
virtually take part in globalization. It’s as easy to access a website in 
one country as in another, and people around the world are jumping 
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at the opportunity to do so. According to data in early 2011 from 
Internet World Stats, a website, the number of Internet users has 
increased by 445% over the past 10 years for a global penetration level 
of 29%. Given the benefits of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT), countries around the world are also working hard to 
get their remaining citizens online. According to a May 2011 report 
from the McKinsey Global Institute, a consultancy research arm, the 
Internet’s share of GDP is 3.4% across the G8, South Korea, Sweden, 
Brazil, China, and India. Among mature economies, it has accounted 
for 21% of GDP growth in the last five years.
According to Eurostat, the European statistics office, 39% of house-
holds in the EU 15 had Internet access in 2002; by 2010 the equiva-
lent figure was 68%. In 2000, 30% of South Korean households had 
broadband access; in 2009 the figure was 96%. In the United States, 
the figure rose from 4% to 64% in the same time frame, all according 
to the OECD, which also reports that the median broadband price for 
a monthly subscription in 2010 had fallen to about $40.
The time people spend online is also increasing. In 2010, accord-
ing to comScore, a digital measurement consultancy, the average 
American spent 32 hours per month on the Internet, despite the fact 
that about a fifth of the population remains completely offline.
Our reliance on the Internet is likely to increase. Development of 
radio frequency identification (RFID) technology combined with the 
introduction of Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), for example, has 
enabled a platform to create “The Internet of Things,” tech speak for 
connecting everything to the Internet, including everyday objects 
such as cars. And why not be able to unlock your car remotely in case 
of an emergency or install it with wireless technology for improved 
communication services?
Because of its benefits, the Internet is embraced by the public sec-
tor. A commonly cited example of increased efficiency is taxes. In 
2011, the Swedish tax authority expected 65% of people to file online, 
saving time, effort, and money for the government while making the 
lives of its constituents easier. As the UN World Public Sector Report 
plainly stated in 2003, “Governments are increasingly becoming aware 
of the importance of employing e-government to improve the delivery 
of public services to the people” (p. 128). But the online environment 
also extends beyond simple services and provides governments at all 
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levels with an opportunity to improve accountability, development, 
efficiency, and transparency.
Various international e-government benchmark surveys show great 
progress over the past decade, illustrated in part by the notion that 
most countries around the world are already “e-ready.” Hence, mea-
surement has moved from “readiness” to actual “development” in the 
case of the UN. The Economist Intelligence Unit, a consultancy, even 
changed the name of its 10-year-old report to reflect this trend, as its 
e-readiness rankings became the digital economy rankings in 2010. In 
an illustration of how rapid progress can be, the average availability of 
20 important online public services in the EU27 increased from 69% 
in 2009 to 82% in 2010, according to Europe’s ninth e-government 
benchmark report.
Although the demand for e-government (usage) has lagged avail-
ability (supply), governments everywhere are urging constituents to 
use their services and take advantage of online information. In the 
EU27, 42% of individuals between the ages of 16 and 74 currently 
use the Internet for interaction with public authorities. A key objec-
tive of the Digital Agenda, the EU strategy for using digital tools 
to develop the economy, is to increase that number by 2015 to half. 
Online inclusion, or e-inclusion, is also one of seven central pillars in 
the Digital Agenda, seeking to enhance digital literacy, skills, and 
inclusion. In the United States, 61% of all American adults looked for 
information or completed a transaction on a government website in 
the past 12 months, according to a 2010 survey by the Pew Internet 
and American Life Project.
Efforts to move government activities online, whether for external 
purposes to meet user demand for personalized offerings through a 
variety of channels, such as mobile government (m-government) and 
Web 2.0 tools, or for internal efficiency reasons, to share classified 
information or connect power plants to the Internet, are increasingly 
common at all levels of government and across the world. Although 
efficiency is certainly a driving force, the public sector is also under 
increasing pressure to use the Internet for transparency purposes.
The 2009 EU Ministerial Declaration on eGovernment in Malmö, 
Sweden, for example, called for the strengthening of online trans-
parency as a way of promoting accountability and trust in govern-
ment. In the United States, President Barack Obama promised “an 
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unprecedented level of openness in government” only to find him-
self confronted with the WikiLeaks cables of sensitive government 
information being leaked, at which time, the White House Office 
of Management and Budget sent a memorandum, on December 3, 
2010, according to CNN, prohibiting unauthorized federal govern-
ment employees from accessing the website to read the classified doc-
uments, an illustration of cybersecurity issues to come.
American federal chief information officers (CIOs) are simi-
larly excited about open government, but they too are concerned 
about cybersecurity, rating it as their greatest challenge, ahead of 
other concerns such as infrastructure, workforce, management, effi-
ciency, accountability, and acquisition, according to an annual survey 
of federal CIOs in the United States in March 2010 conducted by 
TechAmerica, an information technology (IT) trade association.
Globalization and the Internet have given rise to new opportu-
nities for the public sector to improve internal efficiency and better 
serve constituents in the form of e-government. But with an increas-
ing user base and ever greater reliance on the Internet, digital tools 
are also exposing the public sector to great risks, hence the impor-
tance of cybersecurity.
Enter Cybersecurity
In an interconnected world, as Walter Wriston, the former Chairman 
of Citibank, once put it, information networks are vulnerable to attack 
by anyone at anytime. The numbers prove his point.
“Several CIOs say they see millions of malicious attempts per day 
to access their networks,” according to the TechAmerica survey of fed-
eral CIOs, and participants alarmingly noted “growth in cyber attacks 
backed by countries looking for classified information or ways to con-
trol critical parts of our military and critical infrastructure” (p. 7).
According to the Fourth Quarter Threats Report from McAfee, a 
security company, 2010 “saw increases in targeted attacks, increases 
in sophistication, and increases in the number of attacks on the new 
classes of devices that seem to appear with regularity.” By the end of 
the year, the report said, malicious software (malware) had reached 
its highest level ever. In 2010, McAfee identified about 55,000 such 
threats every day.
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The 2010 state of enterprise security survey from Symantec, a secu-
rity company, of 2,100 respondents across 27 countries found that 
three-quarters of all enterprises had experienced a cyber attack in the 
prior year and all of them had experienced a cyber loss, such as theft 
of information, lost productivity, or loss of customer trust.
A 2010 survey of 217 senior-level IT executives from U.S. federal 
organizations conducted by the Ponemon Institute, a consultancy, 
showed that 75% of respondents experienced one or more data breach 
incidents in the prior year. According to the same survey, 71% of 
respondents said cyber terrorism is on the rise.
Cyber threats can be categorized in several ways, one of which is to 
look at those politically motivated (such as cyber warfare, cyber ter-
rorism, espionage, and hacktivism, the hacking for political purposes) 
compared with nonpolitical (typically financially motivated, such as 
cyber crime, intellectual property theft, and fraud, but also hacking for 
fun or retribution, for example, from a disgruntled employee). What 
is interesting about this classification is the realization that interna-
tional cooperation is difficult regarding politically motivated threats as 
someone is likely to protect the perpetrators, whereas there tends to be 
broad agreement in combating cyber crime as most governments have 
an interest in doing so.
Politically Motivated Threats
The aim of politically motivated attacks is generally to disrupt services 
with or without the intention to also cause physical damage. A com-
mon approach is to use a botnet, a collection of infected computers 
(agents) that allows someone to control them remotely, to launch a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which attempts to dis-
rupt websites by overwhelming them with traffic. A commonly cited 
example is the attacks on Estonia during its diplomatic standoff with 
Russia in April 2007, when several government websites were made 
inaccessible for up to 3 weeks. The botnet problem is likely to increase 
as the rise in broadband devices that tend to be “always on” are increas-
ingly targeted by bot networks. As early as December 2006, the most 
recent data available from the OECD as of this writing, an average of 
1.7 computers per 100 broadband subscribers were infected by bots.
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Attacks with physical consequences are rare given the needed 
sophistication; however, it is of increasing concern and likely to pro-
liferate as more things become connected to the Internet. In 2010, for 
example, Stuxnet became the first malware specifically designed to 
attack critical infrastructure in the form of Iran’s nuclear power reac-
tors, which it succeeded in disrupting. Critical infrastructure, such 
as power plants, are often essential to government operations but in 
many cases it is owned or operated by the private sector, hence early 
and frequent calls for public–private partnerships (PPPs) in regard to 
the protection of such systems.
Politically motivated attacks can also seek to gain publicity in order 
to undermine the perception of the public. In 2010, a group called 
“Anonymous” successfully brought down the websites of various orga-
nizations, including the Swedish prosecution authority, and the pri-
vate sector sites of MasterCard and Visa, in support of WikiLeaks, 
the whistle-blowing website. If sufficiently efficient, attacks on public 
sector websites can affect the trust of e-government to such a degree 
that public perception turns increasingly negative whereby people 
would be averse to make certain transactions online, be unwilling to 
share data, or be reluctant to believe the information provided. This 
is already a problem. According to Europe’s Digital Agenda website, 
only 12% of European users feel completely safe in making transac-
tions online.
Fake banking e-mails and websites that look like their real counter-
parts are common. It is likely only a matter of time before we witness 
their public sector equivalents, asking us for sensitive data or providing 
us with misleading information. To some extent this is already hap-
pening. The Internet was widely used in the 2010 to 2011 uprisings in 
the Middle East, and government websites often reported a different 
story than that from bloggers. On occasion, some governments, like 
Egypt, tried to shut down the Internet to stem the flow of information.
Politically motivated threats are also about the security of content 
and data, such as in cases of espionage or whistle blowing, both of 
which are increasingly common as a result of more information find-
ing its way online.
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Nonpolitically Motivated Threats
The motivation for nonpolitically motivated attacks is generally finan-
cial, and most attacks will be considered cyber crimes. As such, they 
tend to focus on stealing data, such as credit card information, while 
keeping a low profile. A common approach is to use malware, either 
by designing it from scratch, repurposing existing malware, or buying 
it on the black market. Malware can be spread in a number of ways, 
including via e-mails or through websites, and accomplish a variety 
of things, such as installing applications that can track key strokes on 
individual devices. It can also hijack computers and make them part 
of botnets, which can be rented on the black market to conduct DDoS 
attacks, or be used as a platform to distribute spam e-mails.
A common spam technique is phishing, an attempt to solicit sensi-
tive information from users by using an unsolicited e-mail that links 
to a malicious website. Even though people are commonly told not to 
provide such information, it remains a problem because of the sophis-
tication of these e-mails. According to data from Cisco, about 3% of 
all users click on malware links. To raise awareness of phishing in 
the public sector, the Taiwan National Emergency Response Team 
(TWNCERT) sent 186,564 fake phishing e-mails to 31,094 pub-
lic sector employees across 62 government agencies. Overall, 15,484 
(8.30%) of those e-mails were opened and 7,836 (4.20%) links within 
them were clicked, potentially leaving thousands of unsuspecting pub-
lic sector employees at risk as well as their employer, the government.
Yet another way to classify cyber attacks is whether the threat is 
external (as assumed in most cases above) or internal, such as current 
or former disgruntled employees. Again, WikiLeaks is an example 
where, purportedly, a soldier in the U.S. Army downloaded sensitive 
information to a USB drive only to later pass it on. But one could also 
use a memory stick to install a program or software on a computer 
for other various malicious purposes, such as monitoring keystrokes 
or installing a backdoor to access it remotely. In one instance, USB 
drives were blamed for the installation of Conficker, a highly advanced 
worm, on the Manchester City Council computers, an incident that 
cost it an estimated £1.5 million. The Council has since banned the 
use of such memory sticks and also disabled all USB ports. How to 
balance productivity against monitoring users and assigning them 
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appropriate access levels is a topic of concern for public sector organi-
zations around the world.
It is important to understand that every device connected to the 
Internet is a potential threat because it can be taken over and used as 
an agent by someone else, for example, as part of a botnet. Conficker 
is said to have taken over seven million computers around the world, 
including those of unsuspecting regular home users and those of the 
French Navy and the U.S. Air Force, among others.
Public Sector Responses
Because globalization, the Internet, and e-government will continue 
to flourish, the public sector must find a way to meet the cybersecurity 
challenge in an increasingly connected world. Every day, more people 
come online; every day, more things are connected to the Internet; 
every day, the public sector is increasingly leveraging ICTs; every day, 
the consequences of cyber attack are rising.
Cybersecurity is an organizational problem but also a global phe-
nomenon. As such, it must be dealt with at all levels, from the inter-
national arena to the regional, national, and local levels. The threats 
may stay the same, but the response can vary. Consequently, that is 
how the book is organized: from global trends and current policy to 
local approaches and practical considerations.
Section I: Global Trends
Cybersecurity is ultimately a global challenge. As such, the first section 
discusses worldwide e-government trends and their unintended conse-
quences, case studies of the types of cyber threats that are increasingly 
common, and a potential global solution from a global institution.
The first chapter illustrates some issues of moving public sector 
information online. In “The Global Rise of E-Government and Its 
Security Implications,” Jeremy Millard at the Danish Technology 
Institute suggests we treat security and data protection as the most 
pressing technical challenge, but at the same time approach the 
issue incrementally and proportionally given that there is a trade-
off between increased security and usage. The right approach, he 
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argues, is to build in security and data protection from the start of any 
e-government initiative.
In “Understanding Cyber Threats,” Deborah L. Wheeler at the 
U.S. Naval Academy provides the context for things to come by 
exemplifying cybersecurity issues globally through an assessment of 
emerging threats using two case studies: WikiLeaks and Stuxnet. She 
applies them to the new environment of IT for regime change and 
along the way identifies key vulnerabilities in this emerging, yet stra-
tegically important realm of engagement.
A well-known and highly debated cyber incident is the July 
2009 DDoS attacks against American and South Korean websites. 
Motohiro Tsuchiya at Keio University illuminates them from a new 
perspective in “Cybersecurity in East Asia: Japan and the 2009 
Attacks on South Korea and the United States.” He analyzes how 
the Japanese government responded to the attacks, in particular the 
cooperation and competition between intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies. The chapter concludes with an outline of the current 
online security landscape in East Asia.
In “Toward a Global Approach to Cybersecurity,” Marco Obiso and 
Gary Fowlie from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
argue that a globally secure cyber environment is necessary to provide the 
more than five billion people who will be online by 2015 with a platform 
to bring about economic growth. Given the global nature of the threat, 
this is not a problem any one nation can solve alone. In order to accom-
plish this goal, therefore, the ITU created The Global Cybersecurity 
Agenda, the elements of which are outlined in this chapter.
Section II: National and Local Policy Approaches
Global trends feed into regional, national, and local initiatives. The 
second section begins by describing what makes policy organization 
so difficult in the area of cybersecurity, followed by an overview of the 
current policy environment in the United States and Europe.
Elaine C. Kamarck at Harvard University offers insights into 
why cybersecurity is difficult from an organizational perspective in 
“The Cybersecurity Policy Challenge: The Tyranny of Geography.” 
The cyber challenge, she argues, is unlike anything government has 
encountered before. To help understand why, this chapter outlines the 
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history of the U.S. federal government’s steps in the area of cyberse-
curity and, along the way, details today’s challenges as they relate to 
both the United States and Europe.
Daniel Castro at the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation illuminates the current federal government organization 
in “U.S. Federal Cybersecurity Policy” and also briefly compares it to 
Europe. The chapter describes various challenges and efforts at the 
federal level including threats, the evolution of the policy framework, 
and an overview of how human and financial cybersecurity resources 
are allocated across the federal government’s civilian agencies. The 
chapter concludes with highlights of emerging policy challenges.
With its Digital Agenda, few places rely on ICTs as much as 
Europe. Yet, as if the challenge of cybersecurity was not difficult 
enough, imagine a community of over 600 million people in 27 dif-
ferent countries with various organizations and institutions at the 
national and regional levels trying to tackle the issue together. In 
“European Cybersecurity Policy,” Neil Robinson at RAND Europe 
explains how it is currently done. The chapter first describes relevant 
European organizations involved in cybersecurity, followed by details 
on various EU laws and regulations.
International and national cybersecurity incidents often grab the 
headlines, but local governments frequently find themselves in the 
trenches, illustrating that there must be a holistic approach that is as 
much bottom up as it is top down. The second section ends with a case 
study on how this can be accomplished and a forward-looking chapter 
on how local Southern California government agencies are balancing 
security with emerging Government 2.0 policy.
Taking the Spanish region of Catalonia as an example, Ignacio 
Alamillo Domingo at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Astrea 
La Infopista Jurídica SL, a consultancy, and Agustí Cerrillo-i-Martínez 
at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, show how a local cybersecurity 
plan can be created to supplement national (Spanish), regional (EU), 
and international (ITU) policies. “A Local Cybersecurity Approach: 
The Case of Catalonia” begins with an assessment of relevant policies, 
followed by an analysis of how the local Catalan plan supports them. 
The chapter concludes by discussing the role that subnational security 
policies can have within a global framework.
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In “Securing Government Transparency: Cybersecurity Policy 
Issues in a Gov 2.0 Environment and Beyond,” Gregory G. Curtin 
and Charity C. Tran at Civic Resource Group, a consultancy, argue 
that as more local government entities try to meet the growing expec-
tation for Government 2.0—open data, transparency, increased infor-
mation access and availability, and outlets for citizen feedback and 
interaction—they must also address the challenges of securing online 
information. To assess current trends at the local level, they present 
the findings of a micro-study from the innovative mega-region of 
Southern California.
Section III: Practical Considerations
The world has a long history of dealing with crime and war offline; it 
is likely we face the same challenge online. As the public sector must 
be prepared to respond to cyber attacks, the final section offers some 
practical considerations for doing so.
In “The Civilian Cyber Incident Response Policies of the U.S. 
Federal Government,” Chris Bronk at Rice University provides an 
overview of relevant federal cyber incident response policies in order 
to help public sector managers gain a better understanding of the 
operational cyber environment. The focus is on federal cybersecurity 
regulations, including requirements from the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) and guidance from the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the draft National Cyber Incident 
Response Plan (NCIRP).
In “Cybersecurity Health Check: A Framework to Enhance 
Organizational Security,” Shih Ming Pan, Pei-Te Chen, and Pei Wen 
Liu of the Information and Communication Security Technology 
Service Center and Chii-Wen Wu at the Research, Development and 
Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, in Taiwan, Department 
of Information Management, Huafan University, describe a frame-
work to assess organizational security. Based on business manage-
ment theories but applied specifically to cybersecurity, the proposed 
framework contains quantifiable indicators that can help organiza-
tions track and monitor their ongoing efforts toward strengthening 
security while lowering cost.
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A common response to the cybersecurity challenge is the forma-
tion of public–private partnerships (PPPs). But as Dave Sulek and 
Megan Doscher at Booz Allen Hamilton, a consultancy, point out 
in “Beyond Public–Private Partnerships: Leadership Strategies for 
Securing Cyberspace,” these rarely work. The first part of their chap-
ter describes the challenges for PPPs and outlines the emerging Cyber 
Domain before discussing the idea of overlapping vital interests. The 
second part identifies five key areas in which leaders from the public 
and private sectors, as well as civil society can take action to strengthen 
collaboration in cyberspace.
To conclude the volume, your editor takes a bleak view in “Is There 
a Conclusion to Cybersecurity?” Because it is an issue that is unlikely 
to go away, the first part of the chapter attempts to highlight some of 
the practical aspects to consider when thinking about cybersecurity 
from an organizational policy perspective. The second part provides 
an overview of two broad emerging trends that are likely to increas-
ingly affect the public sector and hence its cybersecurity efforts: the 
movement to mobility and cyber warfare.
Kim Andreasson
Sài Gòn, May 2011
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Introduction
The business of government is, at core, all about public sector data, 
information, and knowledge being created, altered, moved around, 
and deployed to meet the needs of society. E-government digitizes 
some or all of these processes and the outcomes produced, potentially 
transforming them in ways not always predicted or desired, whether 
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for the internal operations of the public sector or for the users of public 
services and facilities. These unintended consequences can be prob-
lematic. For example, they can pose profound challenges to cyberse-
curity in terms of unauthorized access to, or use of, data and public 
sector information. Public sector managers need to be just as aware of 
these unintended consequences as they are of those they expect when 
e-government is introduced.
Now, do not misunderstand me. E-government is a very good thing 
and has many clear and documented benefits. For example, there is a 
lot of evidence that digitizing back-office processes can lead to signifi-
cant cost savings for government through more efficient and rational 
processes, joining up administrations to share and save resources, bet-
ter design and targeted services, and more intelligent and evidence-
based policy development with greater impact. As illustrated in a 2011 
article in the European Journal of ePractice, e-government also has a lot 
to offer in tackling the financial and economic crisis. In the front-
office, e-government services undoubtedly provide users with better, 
more convenient, time-saving services, available 24-7. Digitization 
encourages transparency, openness, and participation, and provides 
tools for users to get involved in designing and consuming services 
more appropriate to their individual needs.
For example, a 2010 survey from TechAmerica, an information tech-
nology (IT) trade association, shows how federal agencies and depart-
ments in the United States have increased efforts to publish data sets 
and utilize social media tools as part of the Obama Administration’s 
push for transparency, yet continue to struggle with cybersecurity, IT 
infrastructure, and workforce issues. The shift toward a more open 
government has created threats as well as opportunities. According 
to the survey, some chief information officers (CIOs) see “millions 
of malicious attempts per day to access their networks”—from recre-
ational hackers to sophisticated cyber-criminals.
This chapter illustrates some of the issues of moving public sec-
tor information online, showing that these have both direct and 
indirect ramifications across the large canvas of e-government areas 
often not considered. For example, many governments are making 
the mistake of trying to set security systems too high for the func-
tionalities deployed, resulting in a waste of resources that could have 
been used to shore up more vulnerable systems. There have been many 
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failed attempts to introduce sophisticated Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) and digital signature systems when simple passwords or PIN 
codes would suffice. The lesson is to take security and data protection 
extremely seriously and treat it as the most pressing technical chal-
lenge, but at the same time approach these issues incrementally and 
proportionally given that there is always a trade-off between increased 
security and usage. The approach to take is to build in security and 
data protection from the very start of any e-government initiative.
Web on the March
Since 2004 the evolution of the World Wide Web has moved from 
Web 1.0 (consisting of Internet websites and webpages, e-mail, 
instant messaging, short message service (SMS), simple online dis-
cussion, etc.) to Web 2.0 that also allows users to provide and manip-
ulate content and get directly involved. Web 2.0 sites typically have 
an “architecture of participation” that encourages users to add value to 
the application as they use it, for example, through social media dia-
logue around user-generated content in a virtual community. There is 
also much discussion about the Web 3.0 evolution toward wide-scale 
ubiquitous seamless networks (sometimes called grid computing), 
networked and distributed computing, open ID, open semantic web, 
large-scale distributed databases, and artificial intelligence.
Some are also looking forward to Web 4.0 as the global semantic 
web (i.e., methods and technologies that allow machines to understand 
the meaning, or “semantics,” of information on the web), including the 
use of statistical, machine-constructed semantic tags and algorithms. 
According to Tim Berners-Lee, the “father” of the Internet, we are 
indeed on the verge of the age of the semantic web that exploits the 
Internet of data rather than the Internet of documents we now have. 
This will enable intelligent uses of the Internet like asking questions 
rather than simply searching for key words, as well as more automatic 
data exchanges between databases, data mining, and similar uses.
E-government is affected by the march of the web with increas-
ing focus on the Government 2.0 paradigm. This concentrates much 
more on the demand side, on user empowerment and engagement, 
as well as on benefits and impacts that address specific societal chal-
lenges, rather than simply providing administrative services online. 
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This is to be achieved by supporting the real transformation of gover-
nance arrangements away from silo and government centricity toward 
becoming more user centric and user driven. As noted by Millard in 
2010, users and other legitimate stakeholders are being invited more 
openly into a participative and empowering relationship with gov-
ernment in relation to service design and delivery, the workings and 
arrangements of the public sector and public governance more widely, 
as well as public policy and decision making.
To this effect, tremendous e-government progress has been made 
over the last 10 to 15 years during which time the use of information 
communication technology (ICT) in the public sector has moved from 
being largely a concern of separate ministries in digitizing their records 
and processes, to one where ICT is used to join up ministries, reengi-
neer processes, and offer many new services to citizens and businesses. 
E-government has become a top priority for governments around the 
world and a major focus of investment. This can be measured in the 
steady growth of the supply-side availability of e-government services 
across all countries since 2000. For example, according to ongoing 
benchmarking reports led by Capgemini, a consultancy, full online 
availability of a basket of the most common 20 e-government services 
in Europe increased from 20% in 2001 to 82% in 2010, while online 
sophistication increased from 45% in 2001 to 90% in 2010. Globally, 
the 2010 UN benchmarking survey “finds that citizens are benefiting 
from more advanced e-service delivery, better access to information, 
more efficient government management and improved interactions 
with governments, primarily as a result of increasing use by the public 
sector of information and communications technology” (p. 59).
These developments point inexorably in the same direction. As the 
web marches on and data of all types and qualities become increas-
ingly ubiquitous, the issues are not only about whether we can keep 
them secure but also about confronting profound issues about who 
owns the data, where they are, how accurate they are, and who is 
accountable for them.
The Known Unknowns of Cybersecurity
There is no doubt that the biggest operational challenge to e-government 
is cybersecurity, including threats to identity, privacy, and data systems. 
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Adequate privacy and data protection, and the trust these support, are 
crucial for reaping the benefits of e-government. If they are in place and 
work well, they can provide stable, predictable, and confidence-building 
frameworks. In fact, these are key for any activity using information and 
communications technology (ICT) across society, whether in the public, 
private, or civil sectors, so should not be seen in isolation. But if they are 
not, it can have negative effects on usage. According to the European 
Commission (2009, p. 1), “Only 12% of EU Web users feel safe making 
transactions on the Internet, while 39% of EU Internet users have major 
doubts about safety, and 42% do not dare carry out financial transac-
tions online.” Ongoing news reports about lost credit card data and pri-
vate information in both the private and public sectors are not likely to 
improve this image. For example, according to a November 2007 BBC 
News report, two password protected computer disks holding the per-
sonal details of all families in the United Kingdom with a child under 
16, 25 million people in total, went missing. The package had not been 
recorded or registered and has never been found since being physically 
transported between two departments. This has been one incident 
among many severely questioning the way government handles sensi-
tive data. There are also increasing numbers of malicious hacker attacks, 
financially motivated breaches, and even policy motivated efforts to shut 
off information, such as during the attacks on Estonia, the Iranian dem-
onstrations in 2010, and the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East. We 
know a lot about the main cybersecurity threats, yet a lot less about how 
to meet them. As the foremost duty of government is to protect its citi-
zens, the public sector must build highly effective and integrated systems 
to protect against crime, espionage, terrorism, and war in cyberspace.
Government’s response to cybersecurity issues has, however, 
generally lagged the private sector, despite it arguably being more 
important, and, according to a 2008 Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, there is limited 
availability of data on public sector efforts. Even in highly advanced 
e-government countries like Norway, only a minority of public 
administrations have been offering secure ways of communicating 
with their websites, despite many surveys showing that fears of data 
insecurity are perceived by users as the biggest deterrent to their use 
of e-government. However,  it is also worth noting that the cyberse-
curity response is highly variable, for example central governments 
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are much more likely to have adequate measures in place than local, 
obviously reflecting the size of populations involved and the resources 
available. But many e-government services are provided at the local 
or regional levels and the amount of information provided by these 
entities is rapidly increasing. One of the challenges of cybersecu-
rity in e-government is that the public sector is characterized by a 
large amount of operational independence and “siloization” among 
its various parts, something not seen in the private sector to the same 
extent.
Security in government’s cyberspace is thus of paramount concern, 
and it is clear that current systems, both organizational and technical, 
are not always meeting the challenge. Future solutions will also likely 
require solutions very different from those of today’s systems that are 
predicated on relatively stable, well-defined, consistent configurations, 
contexts, and participants in security arrangements. A new paradigm 
is probably needed characterized by “conformable” security, in which 
the degree and nature of security associated with any particular type 
of action will change over time, with changing circumstances and 
with changing available information. In this endeavor, it is likely that 
the public sector will have to deal with challenges in five areas: pri-
vacy, trust, data security, loss of data control, and human behavior.
Privacy
Cybersecurity initiatives need to consider privacy implications that 
in many cases can significantly compromise their likely efficacy. For 
example, privacy and data protection will need conformable security 
systems, adapted to the changing access needs and identities of peo-
ple and organizations. These systems will also need to operate across 
national borders, which will require not just political agreements but 
also data structures and standards that are compatible. Data secu-
rity will also be improved by giving users much greater control over 
their own data and their own (often) multiple identities, for example, 
through trusted third parties. For services that can operate across 
borders, well-functioning identity and authentication systems will 
be vital. Information assurance is also needed as a holistic approach 
incorporating risk management, given that no system can provide 
complete security. Long-term data preservation and access are also 
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important given the fast-changing technical formats and the huge 
increases in data generation expected.
Privacy needs to be upheld, for example, through regulation 
and international agreements like the European Data Protection 
Framework, including appropriate data ombudsmen, custodians, or 
trusted third parties. Care should be taken to avoid “mission creep,” 
when data are used for purposes not originally intended, or the “race 
to the bottom” in interagency or cross-border data sharing by a rever-
sion to the standards of the weakest member. User needs and trust 
must be built on an understanding of real human behavior when using 
data, as well as on technical requirements.
Trust
The technical aspect of cybersecurity may turn out to be the easy 
part. Clearly, understanding and catering for, what some call irra-
tional or schizophrenic, human behavior can be a real challenge to 
cybersecurity.
Trust is a critical issue and is built through information minimal-
ization (i.e., using as little data as possible to perform a task), and 
informing users or obtaining user consent when accessing and pro-
cessing their data by enabling users to trace, own, or control their 
own data. Trust is also built by properly managing, explaining, and 
minimizing the risks of data loss or leakage. Trust is notoriously dif-
ficult to build but can be very quickly and devastatingly destroyed by 
one single breach. This underlines the need to consider trust as mul-
tidimensional. Clearly, for maximum benefit, users need to trust their 
government or service provider, but it is also becoming increasingly 
important for governments to trust users, for example, by allowing 
them to deploy public sector data and engaging them in policy devel-
opment and decision making. E-government will also require person-
alizable and context-relevant ICT, customer (or citizen) relationship 
management systems, and decision-support and forecasting systems 
based on intelligent knowledge management and archiving. Personal 
e-governance modules/spaces are likely to become important that are 
context-sensitive, intelligent, and personalizable, also for tracking and 
tracing service progress.
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Although much of the debate about cybersecurity, certainly in the 
mainstream media and in everyday discourse, is far from rational, 
informed, or accurate, it is also very difficult to be dispassionate. Just 
as in the physical world also in cyberspace, one person’s terrorist is 
another person’s freedom fighter—literally, in the case of WikiLeaks 
and Julian Assange. On the one hand is the view held by many gov-
ernments that the more citizen data available the better citizens can 
be helped and protected. Compare this with the opposite view held by 
many citizens of fear of the surveillance state with nowhere to hide. 
If governments hold too much data, this intrudes into citizens’ pri-
vate lives. Moreover, governments have a poor track record of keeping 
data safe, and there are many examples of data misuse by government, 
either knowingly or unknowingly. However, at the same time, the 
same citizens who worry about “big brother” government, willingly 
provide private companies, which they know are only concerned with 
making money out of them, with much more personal data than they 
ever give governments. Many also scatter even more personal and 
often intimate details about themselves on social networking sites. 
Perhaps citizens perceive governments as so big, monolithic, and 
pervasive that any data misuse will have huge consequences, while 
the private sector or social networking sites are so differentiated and 
variegated in comparison that data misuse cannot be of much impor-
tance. Professionals know this is very far from being the case.
Data Security
Who owns data can be a deeply philosphical question, but it is of 
real practical importance when it comes to cybersecurity because it 
determines who can (or should) secure it. For example, do individu-
als or organizations own the data they give to governments or which 
governments collect, or does government own data once in its posses-
sion? Perhaps of greater importance is the right to use data regardless 
of ownership, especially if they have economic or other value. Recent 
studies in the United Kingdom, such as one by Newbery, Bently, and 
Pollock, and by the European Commission have shown that “public 
sector information” (PSI) has clear and significant economic value that 
can be sold to commercial or other organizations to provide revenue 
streams for government. This has been the norm in most advanced 
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countries for many years, but a concerted “free-our-data” campaign in 
the United Kingdom over the last few years has led to most govern-
ment agencies releasing PSI in machine-readable and easily accessible 
formats for free use by anyone. The main argument being that even 
greater economic value for society as a whole is thereby created when 
entrepreneurs of all types can develop new offline products (such as 
business services around economic data), as well as new online smart 
services (or “apps”) that may in their own right be given away freely. 
Freeing up data in this way is now part of a burgeoining “open govern-
ment” movement, such as the UK’s Transparency and Accountability 
Initiative 2010, although still only significant in a few countries.
Many argue that data security will be improved by giving users 
much greater control over their own data and their own (often) mul-
tiple identities, as they then take a direct interest in ensuring its safety 
and accuracy. For example, in 2003, a Data Protection Act was passed 
in Estonia covering information relating to an identified natural per-
son’s physical, mental, physiological, economic, cultural, and social 
characteristics, relations, and associations. On request, the natural 
person has a legal right to access all personal data relating to him or 
her, the purposes of these data, their categories and sources, and third 
persons or categories to whom transmission of the data is permitted. 
According to the country’s Personal Data Protection Act, the per-
son has the further right to request the termination of processing of 
their personal data, to correct in the case of errors, and to block or 
erase their data, through the Data Protection Inspectorate or courts. 
Issues surrounding the security of the person’s home computer when 
examining their data on the official website are not addressed in this 
legislation, as this is largely beyond the government’s control, but are 
felt to be of less concern as any data leakage would be piecemeal rather 
than wholesale. However, very few countries have data ownership and 
rights provisions as well developed as Estonia, and this is likely to 
skew the way governments implement cybersecurity and the attitude 
citizens have about the issue.
Loss of Data Control
There are burgeoning and very beneficial examples of outsourcing 
where cybersecurity does not seem to have been compromised, but 
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the very fact that data are widely shared, no longer under direct gov-
ernment control, and moved around increases the risks. These arise 
from technical incompatibilities and because of the often very dif-
ferent organizational and workplace cultures and intentions involved, 
where it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain common control 
and to monitor standards.
Introducing e-government implies the need to completely redesign 
both organizational structures (essentially, smashing the silos) as well 
as data architectures to enable the sharing of services and resources 
across and between public administrations. This is increasingly tak-
ing place in shared service centers and also covers ICT applica-
tions, e-government building blocks, information and data, as well 
as common business processes. This can also facilitate outsourcing to 
other actors, including outside the public sector, if costs can be cut. 
However, a major criticism is that costs may not be saved in the longer 
term, it may reduce quality, and certainly leads to loss of control by 
governments that are, in the final analysis, democratically accountable 
unlike private contractors.
It is clear, however, that significant disruptions do take place. 
According to Davenport (2005) we are on the edge of a major move 
toward the ICT-based commoditization of large numbers of business 
processes, and this will also profoundly affect the public sector, mak-
ing outsourcing as well as greater user involvement much more likely. 
All types of business processes, not just in relation to designing and 
delivering services, but also from developing software, through hir-
ing personnel to at least some aspects of policy modeling and develop-
ment through automatic modeling, scenario, and simulations, are being 
analyzed, standardized, and routinized, and this knowledge is being 
codified and facilitated by ICT. This could lead to process commoditi-
zation and outsourcing on a massive scale. The widespread use of ICT 
undoubtedly means that the public sector must grapple to avoid the 
simultaneous loss of knowledge and control over basic processes and 
over the competencies, decisions, and policies needed to support these 
and which lie at the basis of all public services. There is a need to better 
understand which aspects of the public sector’s activities can and should 
be codified, commoditized (e.g., through ICT) and outsourced or “net-
worked” with other actors including both private and civil sectors, and 
as increasingly seems likely, with users. The jury is still out on all these 
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issues, but in the context of the financial crisis their importance is dra-
matically increasing again as governments attempt to cut costs.
The Mother of All Known Unknowns—Human Behavior
Building in technical resilience with “graceful degradation” when under 
cyber attack, and ensuring rapid reconstitution of mission-critical 
functions, are key on the technical side. However, the main known 
unknown of cybersecurity, because we rarely stop to think about it and 
it is so unpredictable, turns out to be more important than the purely 
technical issue of how to make it work—human behavior. Most accept 
that security can never be perfect, but the reasons need greater scrutiny, 
especially when it also becomes clear that there is an inverse relation-
ship between the use of systems (which we obviously want to encour-
age) and the security of those systems. It is like the old adage, that if you 
want to be completely safe and take no risks stay in bed all day—though 
this says nothing about earthquakes, so even that is not risk free. But 
that is no way to run a society, develop an economy, let alone live a life. 
Human behavior, whether rational or not, lies at the core of cybersecu-
rity—how people think about their identity, data about their identity, 
who owns it, has access to it, and how it is used. We do know that a bet-
ter understanding of the relative risks of cyber insecurity compared to 
the benefits of system use is the core challenge, but we do not yet know 
much about achieving good balances. This is particularly the case in the 
government sector, compared to the private sector, where it is not possi-
ble or desirable to employ market solutions to find the balance. It needs 
to instead be explored through trial and error, evidence collection, as 
well as the conscious application of ethical and democratic principles.
Government Loses Control—Who Is Now in Charge and Why It Matters
With the adoption of Web 2.0 tools and approaches, many govern-
ments are moving into the “Governance 2.0” paradigm that enables 
“coproduced” services in which users actively cooperate with service 
providers, and “self-created” services in which it is mainly users who 
determine the service. This can also lead to “crowd-sourcing govern-
ment” where content and inputs are sourced from a wide range of 
users and others actors who have particular knowledge and interests 
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not possessed by the government. The cybersecurity concern for the 
public sector and for citizens and businesses is how these data are 
dispersed, shared, and used, as well as by whom. Perhaps of even 
greater importance, is it possible to find out who is using the data? 
Losing control is one thing, but not knowing who now has control 
compounds the problem. For example, specific parts of Australia still 
remain blurred on Google Earth. Google says that it removed the 
high-resolution photos due to a problem with one of the image provid-
ers, but IT Security, an online publication, point to fears that the maps 
could be used as a terrorist tool. Some of the blocked areas include 
(or have included at some point) The Garden Island Naval Depot, 
the Lucas Heights Reactor, Parliament House, and the Australian 
Defense Force headquarters in Canberra.
Less of a security issue but still of concern to the public sector is 
not only are the data secure but also can they be preserved and made 
available for authorized use in the long term, given constantly chang-
ing data formats and standards. Here again, the need for a trade-off 
between security and use is evident. For example, data preserved on 
floppy disks 15 years ago today require specialist intervention resort-
ing to museum artifacts to access them. Cloud computing may help as 
it potentially enables data and other resources to be dispersed poten-
tially in multiple servers somewhere on the Internet. But even if this 
solves the “where” challenge, long-term preservation still requires 
standards and formats to be accessible in the long term.
When data preservation is outsourced to a specialist private com-
pany, or when e-government services, for example, can be automati-
cally delivered from the “public cloud,” there are profound issues of 
control and ownership, including possible loss of accountability and 
democratic oversight. Another example in the Netherlands shows 
not only loss of government control, but also of usurpation of every-
thing a government does because others can access or even create 
their own data relevant to an erstwhile public function. This involves 
the combination of Web 2.0 tools and consumer electronics, like 
high-resolution recording equipment, sensors, and cameras that are 
increasingly available in the high street to everybody and not just pro-
fessionals. The complaints by people who live near Schiphol Airport 
in Amsterdam about aircraft noise levels were ignored or dismissed by 
the public authorities, leading to the residents developing their own 
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measurement system based on sensor technology linked to a com-
puter and the Internet. The system has been installed in the gardens of 
the protesters and records the level of aircraft noise. This is captured 
electronically, collected, mashed up with other data and applications, 
and published on their own website, http://www.geluidsnet.nl/en/
geluidsnet/. This illustrates an increasing trend whereby professional 
hardware and software are becoming commodities available to every-
one to design and implement their own “user-driven” services, in this 
case showing how public agencies can have their competence and reli-
ability both undermined and usurped. After some battles, the public 
authorities accepted that the residents’ system was more accurate and 
reliable, and this has now become the de facto service. Perhaps some 
backhanded benefits for government here could include the fact that 
by losing control they might also lose responsibility, both political and 
financial, although that remains a challenge to be negotiated.
Another aspect of loss of control by government is the fairly dis-
appointing use of e-government portals and growth of alternative 
user-driven tools. For example, the direct.gov.uk portal in the United 
Kingdom acts as a gateway to all public services and has often been 
praised as world class. However, citizen use has been admittedly 
low, according to William Perrin (2008) at the Transformational 
Government Unit in the UK Cabinet Office, and, as evidenced by 
several sources, including the European Commission, OECD, and 
McKinsey (2009), a consultancy, this is a common problem for e-gov-
ernment portals around the world. Instead, whether governments like 
it or not, access to public sector data is becoming dispersed, both by 
the rise of third-party providers, but also by governments. In fact, 
some countries are now moving away from the portal concept to 
multichannel service delivery methods that offer the citizens direct 
access to local services, simplifying the services and reducing the time 
taken to carry through a service request by eliminating the number 
of steps needed to complete a transaction. Such moves illustrate the 
“no-wrong-door” approach providing direct service access wherever 
the citizen might be on the Internet. In a recent unpublished survey 
undertaken by the author, experts and practitioners cited a number of 
reasons why the dominance of portals is coming to an end: “Why go 
to a portal first when I am already somewhere else on the web? I want 
to go direct to the service I need.” “Everything (services, applications, 
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platforms, infrastructure) is—or will be—in the cloud anyway as a 
‘service,’ so just use Google or other search engines to find what you 
need.” “Do we hang on to grandiose portals because they are a show-
case—just like an imposing town hall—but what do they really do for 
all that money?”
Loss of government control of data is also likely to lead, in the 
e-government services context as for other commercial and personal 
services, to organizations, enterprises, and individuals increasingly 
making their data (content and functionalities) available in the cloud 
rather than via a portal or even a website. This means that service users 
will be able to create their own content and services on their own plat-
forms typically through avatars or automatic electronic agents. Going 
through the “front door” of a website will probably be seen by an 
increasing number of users as an extra unnecessary step. There is also 
rapid growth of new ICT channels, like mobile and digital TV, all 
of which is leading to the proliferation of a multitude of channels and 
platforms, where portals and websites constitute one, probably small, 
part of the offering.
These developments are likely to mean that cybersecurity could 
become even more relevant, because even if the web is declining in 
importance, increased ICT usage across diverse channels makes it 
more important overall as well as more challenging for e-government. 
Alongside high-profile attacks on government websites (with the 
White House, the Pentagon, the cyber attack on Estonia, all being 
prominent examples), this could, in turn, scare off many users. This 
would further decrease trust in using e-government and might tempt 
users to demand a return to more traditional face-to-face services that 
in their view are more secure. The fact that this view is often entirely 
wrong, because paper records are more easily perishable, lost, or 
destroyed, and information much less accessible when needed, might 
be difficult to establish.
What e-government is good at doing is making data available as ser-
vices to users in ways never before imagined, and there are many good 
examples of this such as the FixMyStreet website, http://www.fixmys-
treet.com/, in the United Kingdom. However, it is not always govern-
ment doing it, as in this example where a third sector organization 
collected data from all authorities about their responsibility for main-
taining and repairing streets and local neighborhoods—everything 
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from broken paving stones to graffiti and rubbish. These data are then 
used to automatically direct complaints, simply accompanied by a post 
code, to the responsible authority, making this e-government service 
one of the most used in the United Kingdom.
Another 2011 example, also from the United Kingdom, is the web-
site availability of crime statistics on local maps, intended as a service 
to citizens. According to the Guardian, a British paper, immediate 
problems arose that had not been anticipated. First, there were fears 
that house prices in high crime areas would fall with some home own-
ers threatening to sue the relevant agency for their loss. Second many 
of the data were wrong or badly calculated or mislocalized, often giv-
ing completely inaccurate impressions. Scale is very important, not just 
of data presentation on the map but even more of collection and allo-
cation. Issues arose around how the data were collected, who did the 
data collection, and how they were recorded and where. The apparent 
objectivity of data showed again to be subject to the machinations of 
less than perfect human behavior that became magnified by ICT. The 
advantage of seeing these problems in the public sector does, how-
ever, raise awareness of similar problems that almost certainly exist 
in private commercial services that hide, or attempt to hide, them. It 
also makes us realize that such problems have always existed, and one 
advantage of digitization is that it makes them transparent even if it 
might magnify them.
Who Gets In and What Gets Out When Government Opens the Door?
As well as coordination and integration within the public sector, there 
is an increasing trend toward cooperation with other actors, from both 
private and civil sectors, as well as with users. All this is generally very 
beneficial to all involved. Although the private sector has for many 
years acted as an important partner to government, the civil sector 
is now also starting to become a significant and often new source of 
resources and expertise for undertaking public sector tasks and deliv-
ering services. So, in addition to public–private partnerships (PPPs) 
the trend is also toward public–civil partnerships (PCPs). For exam-
ple, the voluntary sector and social entrepreneurs, especially when 
they function as intermediaries between the government provider and 
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the constituent user, can contribute grassroots resources, knowledge, 
innovation, and even useful competition.
Government is thus becoming collaborative, open, and porous, in 
ways and to an extent not seen in other sectors, and this could lead 
to beneficial disruption of the way in which the public sector operates 
and the responsibilities it has. First, in order to deliver better services 
and better governance, technology is helping to turn the public sec-
tor inside-out, by exposing the way it works and pushing its activities 
out into society. For example, e-government enables civil servants and 
politicians to roam free of the confines of the town hall and engage 
directly with citizens on the streets or in their homes and with busi-
nesses on their own premises, while always being in touch with the 
intelligence and knowledge they need in the back-office. Second, the 
technology is helping to turn the public sector outside-in by invit-
ing commercial, civil, and constituent actors inside to participate in 
designing and delivering services as well as providing them with tools 
to join in the making of public policy and decisions.
All this generally brings many benefits, but there are also dangers or 
at least challenges that should make us stop and think. When govern-
ment is just one player among many in the public sphere, which now 
also legitimately consists of private and civil sector actors, new forms 
of accountability need to be found. A pair of researchers, Bovens and 
Loos (2002), addressed this issue when they described the shift from 
legality to transparency. A new form of accountability is needed when 
governments have to share data, power, and responsibility, for exam-
ple because of the processes of horizontalization, deterritorialization, 
and scalability. Horizontalization allows the partial shifting of the 
production of generally binding rules away from the traditional legis-
lative power to other regulatory parties that may have no democratic 
legitimacy, such as independent administrative bodies (cf. quangos), 
umbrella organizations, and interactive policy partners. The process 
of digitization can make it possible for all authorities, including those 
in the private and civil sectors, to move faster than legislators in the 
public sector and in parliament.
Deterritorialization refers to the fact that the many challenges 
and issues faced by government across borders (e.g., trade, pollution, 
migration, crime, etc.) can present the national legislature with accom-
plished facts over which it has no immediate control. Globalization 
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and rapid change and turbulence cause the formal legislature to lag 
behind and require new flexible forms of regulation. The 2008 finan-
cial crisis and crash were enabled if not caused by the “big-bang” in 
the mid 1980s when the financial services sector went digital enabling 
billions of dollars to be moved around the globe in a millisecond. For 
both horizontalization and deterritorialization, cybersecurity needs 
not only to cope with public sector or national data dispersion and 
systems but also with global threats increasingly in real time. This 
implies not just technological complexity but also political, organiza-
tional, cultural, and behavioral complexity on a massive scale.
The limits of government action are increasingly visible. Complex 
policy challenges ranging between international and personal levels—in 
such diverse areas as climate change, aging populations, and obesity—
cannot be “solved” by government action alone. Tackling them effec-
tively will require the concerted efforts of all actors in society including 
individual citizens. Governments everywhere are under pressure to do 
more with a lot less. Most are working hard to deliver effective policies 
and services at least at cost to the public purse; many are trying to lever-
age resources outside the public sector. Last but not least, governments 
are seeking to ensure and maintain high levels of public trust, without 
which government actions will, at best, be ineffective and, at worst, 
counterproductive. At the same time, more educated, well-informed, 
and less deferential citizens are judging their governments in terms of 
their democratic, policy, and service delivery performance.
The role of the public sector may be to retain competence and con-
trol over these high-level issues in the public interest and with the 
public good and public value in mind. The danger of not doing so 
could be that the public sector, as we understand it today, could dis-
appear or shrink to a rump of only doing things that the market is 
not interested in, while everything is commoditized, outsourced, and 
privatized, or passed to the whim and partiality of charitable organi-
zations. Such developments are already apparent in the United States. 
This could be one of the biggest challenges to public service and to the 
public service ethic as we know it today. In such a scenario, protect-
ing the public sector from cyber threats will be even harder as data 
will be dispersed. This can also mean that private sector entities, in 
practice, would need to protect public sector data. Would they have 
the bottom line as their prime concern or the public good? However, 
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despite the problems raised by loss of government control of data, 
some would argue that dispersed ownership, control, and use of pub-
lic sector data can be beneficial as it mitigates the concentration of 
power and increases responsibility, creativity, and innovation. This 
very dispersion may also improve cybersecurity because, although 
the risk of having a security breach clearly increases, any damage is 
likely to be much less and more manageable than a low-risk but highly 
catastrophic breakdown in security of a highly centralized system that 
controls most if not all data. Once again, it is clear that the core cyber-
security challenge is not technical (however, important and intrac-
table this is) but is the need to balance cybersecurity with system use 
in the context of often unpredictable organizational and individual 
behaviors and needs.
Back to Basics: Trust, Transparency, and Accountability
Trust, transparency, and accountability are arguably the three biggest 
challenges confronting successful e-government, and all are inextri-
cably interlinked. Without trust in the public sector, online govern-
ment will fail. It is a truism that trust is difficult to grow and easy to 
degrade, so it is imperative to find ways to reverse this trend. Trust 
and mistrust go hand-in-hand and need to be balanced. Trust reduces 
transaction costs, but a healthy mistrust encourages constructive criti-
cism and debate. The trick is to know the difference. Governments 
can assist in this by maximizing transparency and openness so citi-
zens can see how decisions are made, who takes them, and why. 
Suitable opportunities to challenge the decision-making process are 
also needed within clear rules.
As noted by the Hansard Society (2008), a UK nonprofit, although 
ICT, can be very important for increasing participation, it is crucial 
to have clear, transparent, rules-based accountability for all forms 
of participation in order to reconnect disaffected voters with politi-
cians. Apart from ICT being used to give access to public information 
(which is a very important aspect of e-participation), ICT can support 
moves toward much more extensive transparency as part of the con-
cept of open government. For example, enabling users to trace every 
interaction within the public administration right down to the name 
of the civil servant who is dealing with their query or case in real time. 
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In another example, as part of a move on from e-procurement, the UK 
government has recently set up a website showing the budgets and 
expenditure of all government agencies, and this is now being rolled 
out across local governments, following the lead set by Recovery.gov in 
2009, the U.S. government’s official website that provides easy access 
to data related to recovery act spending and allows for the reporting 
of potential fraud, waste, and abuse. Developments like this could be 
part of a move toward a situation, not just of transparency of infor-
mation and of services, but also transparency of the purpose, actions, 
processes, and outcomes of government. This would mean that all 
could potentially have access to (near perfect) knowledge about what 
is going on, and the impact this has or is likely to have. As noted by 
a pair of researchers, Blakemore and Lloyd (2007), this would make 
it possible to relate decisions and actions very precisely to the whole 
set of diverse (sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary) 
needs of all actors. The publication of heretofore confidential informa-
tion by the WikiLeaks website is a powerful example that this trend is 
happening whether governments like it or not.
System and data transparency could enable users and civil servants 
to trace and track requests and cases through the public sector in order 
to follow progress, know which part of the system is currently respon-
sible, and to better foresee and circumvent bottlenecks or roadblocks. 
The placing of responsibility (and intellectual property rights [IPR] 
where relevant) could be critical, especially in relation to users who, 
by way of their status or situation, may not be able to exercise their 
own responsibility, such as children, the elderly, the handicapped, and 
so forth. This will also allow users to become involved, to be better 
informed, and to be better able to exercise some control for their own 
benefit.
As noted by the European Transparency Initiative (2005), trans-
parency is often the basis for trust. Transparency in the public sec-
tor actually implies really being able to “both see and get what we 
pay for” and to make this visible to all. It should also imply the end 
of invisible, divisive, Kafkaesque bureaucracies not knowing what 
they are doing except for serving their own ends. Transparency can 
also save time and money through reducing errors, pooling resources 
and knowledge, reducing duplication, and promoting cooperation. 
Transparency also reduces corruption. It is important to emphasize 
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that although there is a continuing need to increase users’ trust of 
government across all public sector tasks, governments also need to 
increase their trust in users so that they, with support and within 
clear guidelines, will be able to participate responsibly. Such trust is 
potentially manifest in many ways. For example when governments 
make available local crime data including in machine-readable for-
mat for re-mashing, they trust society to use these wisely to inform 
rather than a scaremonger. Similarly, when governments open up the 
decision- and policy-making processes to citizens, two-way trust is 
required. Clearly there is a learning curve for both governments and 
citizens in how to handle and interpret freed-up data sensibly and 
responsibly, and how to avoid the dangers of misuse in the many 
forms this can take.
Although it is clear that the widespread release of public sector 
data can have immense benefits, there are almost certainly legitimate 
interests that should be protected from total transparency and open-
ness. For example, there are undoubtedly legitimate privacy needs 
and interests of citizens and businesses when their data are used by 
government. Just as important, however, are the interests of civil 
servants and politicians, especially during the decision- and policy-
making process, for example from intrusive exposure and monitor-
ing that could result from all their actions and decisions being made 
totally transparent. This could bring about stress and too much focus 
on measurement and performance at a personal level, and lead back 
to an overly bureaucratic stance, working strictly to rule-books rather 
than being flexible and prepared to take measured risk with policy 
ideas. It could also provoke an unwillingness to make decisions, or 
to take responsibility for them. According to a 2007 article in the 
Guardian, one top-ranking civil servant in the UK government is 
quoted as saying “I would never now write down advice to ministers,” 
and accuses the 2007 Freedom of Information Act of “impeding the 
effective work of government, not least because officials face ‘frivo-
lous’ or ‘time-consuming’ fishing expeditions from journalists, cam-
paigners and citizens.”
Accountability flows from responsibilities as well as from open-
ness and transparency. It is also related to ethical considerations 
that are, both in theory and practice, highly important in the pub-
lic realm. There are different types of accountability. First, political 
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accountability should be exercised by politicians and democratically 
elected representatives. Second, administrative accountability rests on 
civil servants individually as well as on the public sector as an insti-
tution. This also includes the likelihood of changing accountability 
when private sector and civil organization partners are involved in 
undertaking public sector tasks, such as policy making or delivering 
services. Third, there is user accountability in not misusing or abus-
ing public sector services or facilities, as well as in participating in 
legitimate and responsible ways. All these relate to responsibilities. 
Fourth is the general ethical and moral accountability of all actors, 
including citizens, businesses, communities, and the public sector. If 
things go wrong, the boundary of powers, accountability, and respon-
sibility between government and user becomes important, so there 
also needs to be an open and fair appeals procedure. Formal agree-
ments may need to be entered into, such as a Service Level Agreement 
(SLA) or citizen charter, both for individuals or groups of users, as 
exemplified by Burgerlink, the e-government citizens charter in the 
Netherlands (Burgerlink, 2006). Accountability needs to be clear and 
traceable, so that if things go wrong it is clear who is responsible and 
how the situation can be resolved. Simplicity helps all of these issues 
by increasing understanding and awareness of the democratic pro-
cess. However, as this chapter has shown, e-government often leads 
to increasing complexity and massive blurring between roles and tasks 
when so many actors are involved and so many voices are clamoring 
to be heard.
How to Swim in an Ocean of Insecure Data
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide answers for tackling 
cybersecurity threats to e-government, but five main challenges do 
emerge clearly from the issues reviewed in this chapter:
 1. The public sector is characterized by a large amount of opera-
tional independence and “siloization” among its various parts, 
which makes tackling cybersecurity extremely challenging 
and probably more challenging than in the private sector.
 2. Important public data are now being created, held, and applied 
by actors and individuals outside of government, so that the 
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definition of public sector security must be expanded and 
rethought.
 3. Human behavior, whether rational or not, lies at the core of 
cybersecurity—how people think about their identity, data 
about it, who owns it, who has access to it, and how it is used.
 4. There is an inverse relationship between the use of systems 
(which we obviously want to encourage) and the security of 
those systems, but we do not yet know much about achieving 
good balances.
 5. Users of e-government may be in need of just as much cyber-
security protection from government as government is from 
third parties, particularly where governance regimes are 
incompetent or corrupt, but the issue is more general and 
related to the proper role of the public sector vis-à-vis other 
actors.
The consequences of these challenges are that coordination and 
control become increasingly difficult and that the range of cyber-
security threats that need to be addressed have multiplied in scope 
and scale for all actors in the public realm. Some responses to 
the first four challenges are obvious. Clearly, government-wide, 
end-to-end strategies for meeting cybersecurity challenges must 
be developed and applied, working closely with the private sector 
that will provide some of the solutions, but also need to be agile 
and aware of the ever-changing landscape of threats. International 
cooperation and frameworks need to be negotiated and put in 
place, given that there are no political borders to such threats. 
Perhaps most important of all, cultural changes within organiza-
tions need to be driven through in relation to awareness of cyber-
security issues, responsibility for tackling them, and the working 
practices that underpin these.
Other responses flow from these general tenets, as noted by Booz 
Allen Hamilton (2009), a consultancy, and Fed Tech magazine, to 
include the need to improve the overall governance and coordination 
of cybersecurity, simplification of processes and rules, and the need 
to foster appropriate talent and skills in the public sector. The 2010 
survey undertaken by TechAmerica noted that “a high percentage of 
security breaches occur because internal users are careless or fail to 
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follow procedures” (p. 8). Local governments are probably even more 
threatened than central administrations due to their relative lack of 
resources and expertise, but even here much can be done. According 
to a nontechnical guide to cybersecurity published by the Multi-State 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center in collaboration with the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, this includes recognizing 
the problem; designating responsibility; protecting essential hard-
ware, software, and information; controlling access; improving train-
ing and awareness; and ensuring safe disposal.
Responses to the fifth challenge are less straightforward and may 
need a slowly evolving mindset change to tackle. However, as pointed 
out by this author in a 2010 article in the European Journal of ePrac-
tice; much evidence now points to the benefits of establishing neutral 
trusted third parties to stand between governments and data provid-
ers on the one hand and citizens on the other, and to ensure that the 
interests and rights of all stakeholders are fairly upheld. Such third 
parties could be commercial, civil, or even arms-length government 
agencies but need to be legally and operationally independent and 
seen to be so. They might advantageously perform some of the fol-
lowing tasks:
• Act as a “champion” and “watchdog” for users in relation 
to using data and engaging in policy and decision making, 
thus act as a sort of  “ombudsman” for users vis-à-vis the 
government.
• Agree and publicize a citizen charter of rights and respon-
sibilities for users in using public data and in public engage-
ment, building on what is there already in law or regulation, 
and open these to debate and amendment by users.
• Identify and implement frameworks for real motivation, 
incentives, and rewards for user engagement in service design 
and policy participation.
• Continuously monitor the potential risks and inform users 
about these, as well as offer possible solutions and assistance.
• Provide both proactive and passive moderation on Web 2.0 
media, as well as help frame debates in a neutral and balanced 
way, if requested and appropriate.
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• Monitor and uphold users’ privacy and data protection rights 
vis-à-vis governments and other interests. This would include 
preventing the misuse of personal data whether provided con-
sciously by users or collected automatically during service use.
• Ensure that all “public” services, whoever provides them, 
identify the provenance of all data and other sources used, 
while complying with other open source requirements con-
cerning relevant ownership and liability. This should also 
include monitoring and referral functions to ensure that any 
service developed for public use lives up to agreed standards 
of accuracy, quality, and the “public good.”
• Despite the immense potential benefits of releasing all types 
of public data, there is a danger of data overload and data mis-
use. Data, like statistics, can be seriously corrupted to mean 
anything anybody wishes. A trusted third party should moni-
tor and provide neutral and transparent guidance as well as 
intervention on such issues.
It is important to put in place safeguards like these to ensure that 
governments or any actors do not inappropriately manipulate other 
actors. This will also be facilitated by ensuring that public data and 
processes are open and transparent, as this balances power across all 
actors and mitigates misuse and corruption.
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Introduction
You can’t see it, taste it, smell it, or even feel it, unless you are sitting at 
a computer keyboard and staring at a screen. Even then, the vast laby-
rinth beyond your Internet Protocol (IP) address that makes up the 
ethereal world of cyberspace is a slippery, shape-shifting concept at 
best. Internet architecture is a misnomer; like taking the whole globe 
as a unit of urban planning. The Internet does not have an architect, it 
has architects galore. This would not matter much except that the sys-
tems that make up the network are integrated and dependent on the 
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kill switches, leaks and breakdowns—all of these factors and more 
can cause potential friction in the flow of bits and bytes and can lead 
to unauthorized trespassing, theft, denial of services attacks, and 
malfunctioning in any system dependent on the network, including 
a nation’s critical infrastructures. It is from within this context that 
threat and opportunity in cyberspace are defined and implemented.
According to Myriam Dunn (2005, p. 5), a security researcher, as 
computers “become part of the Internet,” every machine and the net-
works that link them become “susceptible to attack and intrusion.” To 
illustrate how and the potential consequences, this chapter examines 
two cases in which the Internet facilitates cybersecurity threats and 
opportunities in the 21st century: Stuxnet and WikiLeaks. These 
cases provide emerging examples of why our security strategies will 
be altered by global networked communications and human relations 
they shape and maintain. Through these case studies we are able to 
more carefully explore what Ronald J. Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski 
(2010, p. 15) call “risks through cyberspace,” in other words, “risks that 
arise from cyberspace and are facilitated or generated by its technolo-
gies, but do not directly target the infrastructures per se.” Each case 
study concludes with a list of lessons learned, and a conclusion applies 
them to an interpretation of the Arab Spring of 2011 sweeping away 
old regimes and weakening others in the Middle East as a region to 
watch in the future of cybersecurity studies. The same tools that can 
promote U.S. interests can also bring down friendly regimes, desta-
bilize oil prices, empower state repression, and place national critical 
infrastructures at risk. Navigating the pluses and minuses of this brave 
new security environment is surely among the greatest challenges for 
the 21st century.
Definitions
From cyber threats to cybersecurity to cyber opportunities and cyber 
vulnerabilities to cyberdefense and cyber power, not to mention 
cyber warfare in cyberspace, a new language is being created. A new 
realm and style of engagement is emerging. According to the U.S. 
President’s 2010 Cyberspace Policy Review, cyberspace is defined 
as “the interdependent network of information technology infra-
structures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
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computer systems and embedded processors and controllers in critical 
industries” (p. 1). The Internet has been with us as a public commodity 
and realm of engagement since the early 1990s. Why in the 21st cen-
tury are some wishing we could shut it down? According to Patricia 
Titus, VP and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) of Unisys, 
“in the past it was difficult for just anyone to play in this new game of 
cyber-espionage. Now with the low cost of computing resources avail-
able through the cloud, nearly anyone with some technical sense and 
a will to do harm can participate” (Masters, 2010, p. 30). Similarly, 
in the words of Richard A. Clarke (2010, p. xiii), the former U.S. 
presidential adviser on the matter, “If we could put this genie back in 
the bottle, we should—but we can’t.” According to an article in SC 
Magazine, a security publication, on “any given day,” IBM’s Global 
Operations Centers “monitors 140 countries and processes 5–10 bil-
lion security events” (Radcliff, 2010, p. 31). This impressive body of 
cybersecurity breaches gives a one-day snapshot of the global threats 
of the cyber era.
The overlapping layers of information technology (IT) capabil-
ity, dependence, and vulnerability are huge, complex, and central 
to national security in the 21st century. Cyberspace, according to 
Deibert and Rohozinski (2010, p. 16), “connects more than half of 
all humanity and is an indispensable component of political, social, 
economic and military power worldwide.” According to Nigel Inkster 
(2010, p. 1), Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risks at 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, 
“cyberwarfare is going to be a serious threat in the future; a threat that 
could have serious implications for all of us.” From our transportation 
networks, financial markets, telecommunications networks, power 
grids, to corporate, government, and individual proprietary data, to 
the military battlefield and intelligence, cyberspace provides the ways 
and means to secure (or destabilize) the daily lives and futures of 
states and citizens.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report, February 2010, “Although it is a man-made 
domain, cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activities 
as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air and space” (p. 
37). Driven by the importance of threats, vulnerabilities, and oppor-
tunities in the cyber environment, an interdisciplinary community 
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of scholars and policy makers, from Political Science to Computer 
Science and beyond, is trying to make sense of the meaning of 
cyberspace for the practice of politics, the business of war, and the 
securing of critical information infrastructures needed for daily life 
to function in wired societies. In spite of the growing awareness of 
the importance of cybersecurity, and, according to the IISS (2010, 
p. 2), “despite evidence of cyber attacks in recent political conflicts, 
there is little appreciation internationally for how to properly assess 
cyber-conflict.” The quest to better understand cyber threats and 
how to effectively respond to secure the networks that enable life as 
we know it, animates policy debates in the United States especially. 
As explained by Mike McConnell (2010, p. B1), former director of 
the U.S. National Security Agency, this is because the more wired a 
country is, the more vulnerable it is to cyber attacks, and in his words, 
“the stakes are enormous.”
The Global Context of Cyber Threats
Given the rapid global diffusion of Internet and social network-
ing technologies, the degree to which societies around the world 
are increasingly linked is on the rise. With each new participant 
in the information age added to the network, the possibilities for 
threats and opportunities increase exponentially. Unfortunately, 
much of our cybersecurity analysis is myopic and U.S. based. We 
assume (incorrectly) that the United States is the most wired coun-
try in the world, so it is the most vulnerable. But throughout the 
globe, countries are going digital at breakneck speed. We would 
be wise to understand information environments beyond the West 
so that emerging cyber threats and opportunities do not take us 
by surprise. To provide a snapshot of how global cyberspace is, see 
Table 2.1.
One of the reasons that cybersecurity challenges and oppor-
tunities must be conceptualized in a global framework beyond a 
U.S.-centric approach is that only 13.5% of all Internet users reside 
in North America. That leaves about 87% of cyberspace outside 
of U.S. sovereignty. The highest concentration of Internet users 
worldwide reside in Asia, which constitute 42% of the total global 
community. Within Asia, about half of all regional users, or about 
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420,000,000 people, live in China. This is 26% more Internet users 
than reside in the United States. Moreover, the United States is 
“increasingly willing to publicly acknowledge that China’s net-
work exploitation and intelligence collection activities are one 
of [the U.S.’s] most consuming counterintelligence challenges,” 
according to a report by Bryan Krekel of Northrop Grumman, 
an American defense contractor. As of 2007, for example, Krekel 
noted that the United States estimates that “China has success-
fully ex-filtrated at least 10–20 terabytes of data from U.S. govern-
ment networks” (p. 51). The United States is not the only target of 
Chinese cyber attacks. It is estimated that “60% of cyber attacks 
hitting Germany emanate from China,” according to a piece in The 
Weekly Standard and quoted by Krekel. A recent report on Chinese 
cyber espionage cites known cases of Chinese cyber attacks occur-
ring in South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and New Zealand. India 
claims, again according to the Northrop Grumman report, that 
“China is behind almost daily attacks into networks belonging to 
the government and India’s private sector” (Gartzke, 2007, quoted 
in Kevkel, 2009).


























Africa 1,013,779,050 4,514,400 110,931,700 10.9 2,357.3 5.6
Asia 3,834,792,852 114,304,000 825,094,396 21.5 621.8 42.0
Europe 813,319,511 105,096,093 475,069,448 58.4 352.0 24.2
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East
212,336,924 3,284,800 63,240,946 29.8 1825.3 3.2
North 
America
344,124,450 108,096,800 266,224,500 77.4 146.3 13.5
Latin 
America/
Caribbean 592,556,972 18,068,919 204,689,836 34.5 1,032.8 10.4
Oceana/
Australia
34,700,201 7,620,480 21,263,990 61.3 179.0 1.1
Totals 6,845,609,960 360,985,492 1,966,514,816 28.7 444.8 100
Source:  Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats.com).
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The U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit estimates that more than 70% 
of known cyber attacks originate from computers located outside of 
the United States, thus illustrating the ways in which cyber threats 
are global in nature. A 2010 article in The New York Times (Markoff, 
2010) states that “a secret cyberwar arms race is under way as a num-
ber of countries build sophisticated software and hardware attack 
capabilities.” According to Jeffrey Carr (2010, p. 1), “there are over 
120 nations leveraging the Internet for political, military and eco-
nomic espionage activities.” The first known act of cyber war occurred 
in 2008 when the Russian government, in addition to rolling tanks 
into South Ossetia, launched a denial of services cyber attack on the 
Georgian government’s communication and banking sectors, accord-
ing to a report in CNET News, among others.
In addition to China and Russia, the Middle East and North 
Africa, where the Internet is spreading faster than on any place on the 
planet, is another important location for cybersecurity knowledge and 
understanding. Both of the case studies analyzed for this chapter have 
a geographic link with computer networks in the Middle East. Each 
of these cases teaches us something about the nature of cyber threats as 
they emerge in individual, national, and international contexts. From 
these case studies, the public and private sectors, governments, and the 
international community can all learn important lessons about future 
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity Questions and Issues
Before turning to the case studies, this section provides a summary of 
the complex web of competing interests, explanations, and policy rec-
ommendations that animate the emerging field of cybersecurity stud-
ies. We can conceptually map this process in terms of those points on 
which there is agreement, and those places where agreement is absent 
within the emerging cybersecurity community.
There is relative agreement across disciplines and communities on 
the following:
 1. We (states, citizens, and the global community) agree that our 
lives as we know it are network dependent—that cyber is key 
to life.
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In practice, this translates into a growing recognition that dependence 
on critical information infrastructures to live life in the 21st century 
makes us increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats.
 2. We agree how serious the potential threats are, given 
this dependency on networks and known cases of cyber 
vulnerability.
The two case studies below indicate different layers of cyber vulner-
ability and opportunity, from critical infrastructures to international 
relations.
 3. We agree that we are currently not winning the war against 
cyber threats; attacks occur, with increasing frequency and 
consequences over time.
As the case studies and conclusion suggest, states are vulnerable to 
overthrow, nuclear energy programs are vulnerable to cyber attack, 
and states and their diplomatic relations can be damaged by leaks of 
information and coordinated Facebook revolutions.
 4. We agree that something has to be done to make our digital 
lives and interests more secure.
Although the case studies analyzed below do not provide specific 
answers with regard to solving cybersecurity challenges, they high-
light several real-world examples of what is at stake if collectively 
we do not act to better secure our digital future. Recognizing the 
nature and scope of the problem is the first step toward solving it in 
the future.
 5. We agree that cyberspace represents a “real” relatively new 
domain of engagement (locally and globally) as important as 
air, sea, land, and space. “Cyberspace” is not science fiction. 
It is deserving of all the rules of engagement, defense, and 
attention that the other domains receive.
The case studies below show how “real” cyber engagement, risk, and 
opportunity can be in the 21st century. Any asset that depends upon 
networked communications, from diplomatic relations, to nuclear 
centrifuges, to entire government infrastructures can be threatened 
by cyber attacks.
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Meanwhile, disagreement still exists in the following areas:
 1. Who/what organization(s) and individual(s) should be 
responsible for cybersecurity (both offensive and defensive)?
Geography has especially complicated this picture of responsibil-
ity. Who safeguards the network? The private sector? An indi-
vidual government? A community of states? Individual companies? 
International organizations? The case studies below show how global 
in scope cybersecurity issues are. Organizations, whether families, 
corporations, or states, will have to learn how to best defend them-
selves based on past attacks and vulnerabilities. In the cyber era, a 
single individual with an ax to grind can challenge the United States 
and all their allies in the Middle East (WikiLeaks). Disgruntled pub-
lics abused by bad governments can rebel, throwing off old regimes 
and wreaking havoc in the global economy (Middle East Facebook 
Revolutions). Cybersecurity strategies have to be flexible enough and 
wide enough in scope to account for these and millions of other even-
tualities as they emerge today and in the future. Determining who 
will best keep us (meaning the human race) safe and cyber secure is 
an ongoing debate.
 2. What exactly will make us more secure in cyberspace (pol-
icy/government/technology communities/private sector all 
debating this issue—no consensus yet—solutions sometimes 
violate privacy or proprietary issues and thus are delayed)?
The law and culture both get involved to make this issue very sensitive 
within the global community. The search for solutions is still ongoing. 
Is Julian Assange a criminal (maybe yes because of sexual indiscre-
tion) or a hero because he made public the sometimes seedy backroom 
discussion and gossip orienting how nations interact? This is the kind 
of question we can expect to encounter more frequently in the emerg-
ing cybersecurity field. How are Assange’s actions any different from a 
Google executive who uses a Facebook site to overthrow a bad govern-
ment in Egypt? There is a need for new ethics to govern cyber interac-
tion, similar to the universal declaration of human rights. There needs 
to be an agreed-upon set of cyber rights and responsibilities. Estonia 
has made access to the Internet a basic human right. We have laws 
against human trafficking and child pornography that govern certain 
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cyber-business transactions. Especially the issue of cyber-espionage 
needs legal consequences, as do cyber attacks on critical infrastructure.
 3.  What are the best policies for implementing cybersecurity?
Because the threats are so diverse at all levels, local, national, and 
international, it is difficult to know what strategy or set of strategies 
will make us safe.
 4. What legal frameworks need to be in place to (a) hold attack-
ers responsible for cyber operations and (b) to be able to 
respond even preemptively to a cyber attack or threat (real or 
perceived)?
The threats in or through cyberspace are emerging more quickly than 
the legislation to regulate cybersecurity. This makes the determination 
of such issues as when a cyber attack or leak is an act of war and how 
and against whom a state, company, or individual has a right to respond.
 5. How should the advent of cybersecurity issues change our 
thinking (conceptual frameworks) about the world, from the 
way we do science to how we train future generations to how 
we conceive of where potential future attacks will emerge?
There are obvious needs to reconceptualize security in the cyber era. 
The network that links our lives, states, and businesses touches every 
aspect of life as we know it both directly and indirectly. Reliance on 
networked communications is increasing over time, as are the vulner-
abilities that result. The case studies below provide examples of the 
multiple layers of threat and opportunity that exist in the cyber era. 
Some conclusions regarding the need to rework our security frame-
works in light of these cases are offered at the close of this chapter.
Figure 2.1 provides a graphic organizer of the complex angles of 
players and interests that illustrate why there is so much potential for 
contention in all of the above points.
There are potential links and disconnects between these players. 
The technology at the foundation of the equation is constantly chang-
ing. Change is in part fed by research and development (R&D) in 
the private sector. Individuals also create new techniques and tools 
that animate our digital futures. Standing by, looking to shape the 
process so as to regulate and secure cyberspace, especially when overt 
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breeches or challenges emerge, is the local and global government/
policy sector. The private sector has a stake and interest in regulation 
and security, too. Cybersecurity is thus a moving target, a live organ-
ism not a static environment. Perpetual motion makes cybersecurity 
more complex than the sum of its parts.
Two Cases of Threats to Cybersecurity
The following case studies illustrate the changing nature of the secu-
rity environment in the cyber era. Stuxnet shows how malicious code 
can be used to deal serious setbacks to a country’s nuclear infrastruc-
ture. Speculation is that this act of cyber sabotage was wielded by a 
state or a partnership of states, given the complexity and costliness 
of the project. WikiLeaks illustrates what can happen when an indi-
vidual whistle-blower within an organization decides to share propri-
etary information with the world. The WikiLeaks website encourages 
transparency and gives individuals a relatively safe and secure online 
environment within which to pursue processes of cyber-espionage. 
Together these cases reveal that cybersecurity can pose state against 
state, individual against state or states, and states against individuals. 
Sorting through these complex relationships is the goal of the sec-
tion that follows. The lessons learned apply to individuals and com-
plex organizations worldwide. Anyone or anything with a life on the 
screen can gain insights into the strategic challenges of cybersecurity 
from these cases.
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In 2005, a skeptical security researcher, Myriam Dunn, observed 
that the link between national security and cyber vulnerabilities was 
sometimes difficult to substantiate because of threats to critical infra-
structure, “the menacing scenarios of major disruptive occurrences in 
the cyber-domain triggered by malicious actors have remained just 
that—scenarios” (p. 10). Stuxnet changed that. For the first time in 
history, we have overt proof that cyber attack can be used to take criti-
cal infrastructure not only offline, but as well, to physically destroy 
systems (in this case nuclear centrifuges). According to one article in 
The New York Times, Stuxnet, as such, is “the most sophisticated cyber 
weapon ever deployed” (Broad et al., 2011, p. 1).
Stuxnet illustrates that, according to an article in the Wall Street 
Journal, “malicious software attacks…represent a growing corporate 
espionage and national security threat” (Fuhrmans, 2010, p. B3). 
Liam O. Murchu a cybersecurity researcher with Symantec, was 
quoted by Business Week as saying Stuxnet “shows what can happen 
when bad guys gain control of industrial systems” (Hesseldahl, 2010). 
In Computerworld, an industry publication, Joseph Weiss, partner at 
Applied Control Solutions, a consultancy, point out that “Stuxnet 
drives home the need for more federal oversight of cybersecurity in the 
utilities sector.” In his words, “hacking a control system does not take 
rocket science, protecting one does.” Advantage awarded to the hack-
ers. Jon Miller, director of Accuvant Labs explains in SC Magazine, 
an industry publication, that “The people writing malicious code only 
have to write one good piece of malware. The people fighting against 
the malware have to protect against a multitude of different types of 
malware. So even if the numbers of defenders and protectors were 
equal, the defenders would be at a disadvantage” (Masters, 2010, p. 31).
Given the self-propagating nature of Stuxnet, control over the 
virus’ spread was relinquished. As a result, Stuxnet was traced to mul-
tiple global intrusions, even though Iranian nuclear centrifuges bore 
the brunt of the attacks and are believed to be the intended target. 
In fact, 60% of all systems infected by Stuxnet were located in Iran, 
according to SC Magazine. Figure 2.2 shows which countries were 
most affected by Stuxnet.
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According to a 2010 article in The New York Times (Broad, p. 1), 
Tom Parker, an IT security specialist from Securion LLC, noted that 
because Stuxnet had spread widely across countries it could be seen 
as a failed operation. In fact, more than 40% of the computers hit by 
the virus were not the intended target. 45,000 industrial control sys-
tems, systems that are responsible for a nation’s critical infrastructure 
like “electric power grids oil and gas pipelines, dams, or communica-
tion networks” were infected with the virus worldwide, according to 
SC Magazine. The structure of the virus, however, “was not designed 
to do damage wherever it landed,” according to a Newsweek article 
(Dickey et al., 2010). Instead, the same piece noted that “it is struc-
tured to target a specific set of devices manufactured only in Finland 
and Iran that are used to determine the speed at which the centrifuges 
rotate.” Further, Stuxnet “was designed to do nothing to computers 
that didn’t connect with the control mechanisms it targeted.” Thus, 
although the virus was detected on computers throughout the world, 
it seems to have only had a damaging impact on Iran’s nuclear centri-
fuges. In this sense it was a smart weapon.
The difficulty in determining exactly where Stuxnet originated 
means that cyber threats like this one are hard to deter. What we do 
know is that Stuxnet was unlikely to have been the work of a single 
hacker, or even a team of hackers. The nature of the worm indicates 
that it is the work of a state or coalition of states. Analysts maintain 
Countries Hit by Stuxnet Virus: According to







Figure 2.2  Countries affected by Stuxnet. (From Microsoft Malware Protection Center Threat 
Research and Response Blog http://blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2010/07/16/the-stuxnet-
sting.aspx.)
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this interpretation of the virus’ origins for a number of reasons. 
First, according to an article in The New York Times, “the malicious 
code…would have required an organization with substantial financial 
resources to develop, test and then release such a program” (Markoff, 
2010, p. 5). More specifically, the virus uses four zero day security vul-
nerabilities to attack the targeted systems,* and purchasing each one 
of these vulnerabilities from the hacker underground, according to 
Red Herring (2010), “adds up to a decent fortune, placing the virus out 
of the budgets of most private hacking teams.” Second, according to 
an article on BusinessWeek.com (Hesseldahl, 2010), Liam O. Murchu 
of cybersecurity firm Symantec, “estimates that Stuxnet was written 
by a team of a dozen programmers working for at least six months, 
at a cost of more than USD$3 million.” Microsoft, meanwhile, esti-
mates that “building the [Stuxnet] virus likely took 10,000 man-days 
of labor by top-rank software engineers,” according to a 2010 article 
in The New York Times (Hesseldahl, 2010). In January 2011, The New 
York Times (Dickey et al., 2010) published another article in which 
it argued, based upon intelligence sources, that the Dimona nuclear 
power plant in southern Israel served “as a critical testing ground in a 
joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make 
a bomb of its own.” While Israel and the United States are not openly 
taking responsibility for the cyber war against Iran’s nuclear program, 
evidence increasingly points in that direction.
For security reasons, industrial control systems are often run on 
computers not connected to the Internet. In this instance, too, the 
Stuxnet worm was unusual because it attacked control systems that 
were not hooked to the Internet. The Stuxnet virus bypassed this 
security arrangement by (1) being uploaded by a universal serial bus 
(USB), either intentionally or unknowingly; (2) telling the host com-
puter to dial the Internet, thus establishing a connection between the 
host computer and the supposedly offline computer programs running 
the industrial control system; (3) after establishing Internet access, the 
virus provided details of the system to a server reportedly in Denmark 
or Malaysia; (4) that server responded with instructions to change part 
of the software in the control computer, which in Iran’s case meant 
* Zero days are “holes in a computer program’s security that were unknown to the 
developer” and have yet to be detected (Sugrue, 2010, p. 7).
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to reset the centrifuges to maximum speed; (5) as Norman Friedman 
(2010, p. 88), a security analyst, has noted (2010), “each of the thou-
sands of centrifuges at Natanz has a software-driven controller. Each 
controller presumably runs the same software, and many if not all are 
linked so that software revised for one computer can be spread to the 
rest”; and, as a result, (6) thousands of Iranian centrifuges, the devices 
that spin at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium, were destroyed. The 
virus was designed to alter the electric frequencies that control the 
spin rate of the centrifuges, sending them wildly out of their normal 
pattern, until they crack or cannot spin properly any more. A second 
part of the virus covered the change in the frequency converter drives 
by sending “normal readings to cover its tracks,” according to an arti-
cle in The Economist (2010, p. 8713).
A 2011 New York Times article estimated that Iran lost one-fifth 
of its nuclear centrifuges through this attack. Greg Thielmann and 
Peter Crail, writing for the Christian Science Monitor, note that this 
attack was helped along by the inherently buggy, reversed engineered 
Iranian nuclear program, based on the Pakistani model, stolen from 
the Dutch in the 1970s. Thielmann and Crail (2010) say Iran’s 
nuclear program is at best thus, “temperamental and fault-prone.” 
According to the same source, “reverse engineering faulty, smug-
gled equipment, as Iran has tried to do, only makes this challenge 
worse.” Nuclear enrichment via centrifuge technology “requires 
constructing complex machinery at precise specifications to allow 
the cylindrical devices to spin at supersonic speeds, day in and day 
out.” Given the design weaknesses of the Iranian nuclear program, 
the system was more vulnerable to attack than say a nuclear power 
plant in the United States or Europe.
The Stuxnet attack was accompanied by targeted assassinations 
of Iran’s top nuclear scientists. One of the hits was against Majid 
Shahriari, who was “killed in Tehran on November 29th by a bomb 
stuck to his car by assassins on motorbikes,” according to The Economist 
(2010), which also noted that Mr. Shahriari was at the time of his 
murder in charge of eradicating Stuxnet from the Iranian nuclear 
program, according to Debka, an Israeli website that specializes in 
security news. The Newsweek article estimated that the Stuxnet cyber 
attack, along with targeted assassinations of Iran’s top nuclear scien-
tists, set the Iranian nuclear program back several years and decreased 
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the likelihood of a more traditional military attack (e.g., cruise mis-
siles, aerial bombardment), giving diplomacy a chance and saving 
innocent lives.
Lessons learned:
 1. Do not allow the use of USB drives.
 2. Do not have Windows systems set to automatically boot when 
a USB drive is inserted.
 3. Frequently replace hardware and software to “raise the bar for 
any enemy attacking,” as Norman Friedman (2010, p. 89) put 
it in his article.
 4. Just because critical information infrastructures are not linked to 
the Internet does not mean that they are invulnerable to cyber 
attack.
 5. Cyber attacks can come from any direction (east or west, 
states or individuals, friends or foes) and are harder to antici-
pate, predict, or deter than they are to implement—advantage 
to the bad guys/aggressor; disadvantage to the defender.
 6. Stuxnet makes it difficult to determine who the bad guys 
and the good guys are, both because of the anonymity of 
the attack’s origin, as well as due to various value judgments 
regarding the attack’s goals (some might think it is a good 
thing to delay Iran’s nuclear program; others might defend 
the country’s right to develop technology as it sees fit, and see 
the attack as an act of war/illegal sabotage).
 7. Stuxnet is just the beginning, but it provides a wake-up 
call, an early warning system, so to speak, for any organiza-
tion dependent on cyber networks to function. Large sums 
of money need to be dedicated to beefing up cybersecurity 
defenses including early detection and tracking of intrusions 
or abnormalities. Frequently changing and upgrading sys-
tems, both hardware and software, will make us safer in the 
short run.
 8. The advent of cyber warfare means another realm of potential 
vulnerability, and opportunity is added to the security cal-
culus of any state or business. Security in the 21st century 
just got infinitely more complex, for all the reasons examined 
in this chapter. As noted in the November/December 2010 
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issue of Process Engineering, Stuxnet is “ just the latest inci-
dent showing a marked growth in computer hacking, Internet 
fraud, data loss, and malicious software in the industrial and 
utilities sectors.”
 9. Process Engineering (Nov/Dec 2010), also noted that Stuxnet 
reveals how simple and destructive it is for an employee or an 
outside contractor to introduce malware into a cyber infra-
structure, with grave implications for the systems that run on 
such infrastructures.
 10. Newsweek called Stuxnet “the paradigm of covert cyberweap-
ons to come” and “the first time we’ve actually seen a weapon 
created by a state (or states) to achieve a goal that you would 
otherwise have used multiple cruise missiles to achieve” 
Dickey et al., 2010).
 11. The fact that the Stuxnet code is widely available now means 
reverse engineering and copycat crimes might make its cre-
ators and the rest of the world increasingly vulnerable to per-
nicious cyber attack. In other words, the “worm could turn,” 
as Newsweek noted.
 12. Newsweek also noted that Stuxnet shows how covert cyber 
actions can buy time and “gives diplomacy a chance.”
 13. According to the US Federal News Service (2010), Stuxnet 
indicates an escalation in cyber warfare because it repre-
sents the advent of “countries launching attacks against other 
nations.”
 14. Also according to the US Federal News Service (2010), Stuxnet 
suggests the need to expand or revise the Geneva Conventions, 
the rules that govern warfare, to take account of cyber war-
fare, where the target may be physical or may be instead “soft 
or cyber damage—like the corruption of data or services.”
WikiLeaks, Freedom of Information, Espionage, and 
the Future of Diplomacy in the Cyber Era
WikiLeaks is a nongovernmental organization established in 2006 in 
order to increase government transparency, encourage the emergence 
of better journalism, more enlightened foreign policy, and more effec-
tive governance in the global community. As noted by, among others, 
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the Christian Science Monitor, Australian-born Julian Assange is the 
editor and figurehead of WikiLeaks, which is currently best known 
for a series of classified document leaks, the sum total of which are 
said to have had a detrimental effect on U.S. foreign policy and foreign 
relations. Hillary Clinton, for example, said in an article in the Sydney 
Morning Herald that “it will take years to undo the damage caused 
by WikiLeaks revelations” (Warrick, 2011, p. A11). Human Events 
called WikiLeaks a “security tsunami,” the largest public breech of 
classified documents in history and a wake-up call to any organi-
zation trying to secure proprietary information in the Internet age. 
WikiLeaks brought into the public domain, more than half a million 
classified government documents, many of which cast an embarrass-
ing light on certain dark sides of U.S. foreign policy, the war efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S. global diplomacy assessments.
The leaks resulted in top U.S. officials losing their jobs, including 
P.J. Crawley, State Department Spokesman, for his comment about 
the “stupidity” of private Bradley Manning’s (the alleged leaker) treat-
ment in prison; U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Heather Hodges, for her 
WikiLeaked comment regarding corruption in the Ecuadorian police 
force; and U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz for his leaked com-
ments about Gadhafi’s “voluptuous nurse.” The release also put at risk 
relationships between the United States and key allies by calling into 
question the American ability to keep privileged information private. 
Leaked information regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is said 
to have potentially put U.S. service member’s lives at risk. Some of the 
leaked documents embarrassed allies, especially heads of state in sev-
eral Middle Eastern countries. For example, during a December 2010 
trip I took to the United Arab Emirates as a member of a U.S. Naval 
Academy delegation, U.S. Embassy staff and Emirati foreign policy 
officials discussed the WikiLeaks debacle and agreed that Emirati 
leaders would be less frank in future dealings with the U.S. govern-
ment, given the ways in which the leaks embarrassed the Emir by 
publicizing the head of state’s frank assessment of the Iranian threat.
WikiLeaks, in the debate between the state’s right to privacy in 
world affairs and the public’s right to know, sides with the public. On 
the organization’s website (a mirror site, because the organization has 
been cyber-ousted from the public domain by its host), WikiLeaks is 
said to operate based upon the following principles:
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Publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a bet-
ter society for all people. Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and 
stronger democracies in all society’s institutions, including government, 
corporations and other organizations. A healthy, vibrant and inquisitive 
journalistic media plays a vital role in achieving these goals. We are part 
of that media. (http://www.wikileaks.ch/About.html)
WikiLeaks is a product of new information environments enabled 
by the Internet and the increased flow of information supported by the 
technologies globally. WikiLeaks believes, as Justice Black ruled in a 
1971 Supreme Court case involving freedom of the press, stimulated by 
the Pentagon Papers leak, that “only a free and unrestrained press can 
effectively expose deception in government.” As Hillary Clinton noted 
in her 2010 speech at the Newseum, in the aftermath of the China-
Google scandal, “information networks are helping people discover 
new facts and making government more accountable” (Black, 1971). 
Similarly, President Barack Obama noted, during a 2009 visit to China, 
that “the more freely information flows, the stronger societies become” 
because “access to information allows citizens to hold their own govern-
ments accountable.”
So if wider more transparent information flows make society 
better off and more democratic, according to Clinton, President 
Obama, and WikiLeaks, why is the United States launching a cam-
paign to censor the site and to charge Assange with espionage? The 
answer, of course, has to do with the fact that WikiLeaks is leaking 
classified, protected state secrets. And the whistle-blowers who aid 
WikiLeaks in its effort to expose deception in government are going 
beyond their right to free speech, breeching the limits of freedom 
of information, and potentially, according to the Christian Science 
Monitor, violating the 1917 Espionage act for “damaging US secu-
rity by publishing the documents” (Grier, 2010, p. 1). In another 
article from the same source, when Bradly Manning, a 23-year-old 
Army private working in the intelligence field, allegedly copied and 
delivered to WikiLeaks nearly one million classified documents, 
he violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice by “communicat-
ing, transmitting and delivering national defense information to an 
unauthorized source” Grier, 2010, p. 1). The documents he allegedly 
leaked include
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 1. Secret archive footage of an Apache helicopter attack on 
civilians and journalists in Iraq that occurred in a suburb of 
Baghdad in July 2007 (leaked April 2010)
 2. Afghan War Diary archive of 92,000 “field situation reports” 
from soldiers on the ground fighting in Afghanistan, giving 
their assessment of the war effort (leaked July 2010)
 3. Iraq War log, including nearly 392,000 reports that collec-
tively mapped every death and casualty in the Iraq war (leaked 
October 2010)
 4. State Department Diplomatic Cables, about 250,000 pieces of 
frank assessment of U.S. friends and foes worldwide (leaked 
November 2010)
Learning from WikiLeaks So how does a data breech of this mag-
nitude happen and what lessons can we learn from it about how to 
defend our cyber borders and infrastructures? According to Forbes 
magazine, WikiLeaks, if nothing else, “should serve as a reminder 
for the information security community” that “a single whistleblower 
with a conscience can turn your entire organization inside out.” The 
Christian Science Monitor (Grier, 2010, p. 1) meanwhile reports that 
according to Manning, he “had unprecedented access to classified 
networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months.” He “would 
come in with music on a CD-RW…erase the music…while exfiltrat-
ing possibly the largest data spillage in American history.” So what 
weaknesses allowed Manning to create this “data tsunami?” Manning 
explains in an article in the Christian Science Monitor, “Weak servers, 
weak logging, weak physical security, weak counterintelligence, and 
inattentive signal analysis.”
WikiLeaks played a role, too. As the organization explains on 
its website,
As a result of technical advances particularly the internet and cryptog-
raphy—the risks of conveying important information can be lowered. 
We believe that it is not only the people of one country that keep their 
own government honest, but also the people of other countries who 
are watching that government through the media. In the years leading 
up to the founding of WikiLeaks, we observed the world’s publish-
ing media becoming less independent and far less willing to ask the 
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hard questions of government, corporations and other institutions. 
We believed this needed to change. (Current WikiLeaks mirror site: 
http://213.251.145.96/About.html) 
Some argue that WikiLeaks reveals that less information should 
be classified. In the words of Christopher Graham, UK Information 
Commissioner, as quoted in The Guardian (Borger and Leigh, 2010), 
“If all of us just accept that this is the people’s information and 99.9% 
should be out there in all its tedium, you wouldn’t have WikiLeaks.” 
Plainly stated, according to the same source, “the best form of defense 
is transparency.” WikiLeaks focuses a bright, clarifying light on 
weaknesses in the globe’s information assuredness. This is because, in 
our present system, a 23-year-old Army private can download hun-
dreds of thousands of sensitive documents while pretending to listen 
to a Lady Gaga CD. As CNN’s Wolf Blitzer (2010) asks, “Is our 
security system that lax?”
The more important question is, if it was that lax, has the United 
States and other complex organizations like states and multinational 
corporations around the globe done anything to make it less so? 
According to The Guardian (Borger and Leigh, 2010), some three mil-
lion U.S. public servants have access to classified information. Is this 
needed? Is there a way to limit, within the system, the documents to 
which analysts lower in the food chain have access? Wouldn’t it make 
sense to limit the kinds of recordable devices that can be hooked up 
to a classified information network?
In general, the WikiLeaks case study yields six main lessons:
 1. Keep in mind that cyber threats can be both external (com-
mon conception) and internal (whistle-blowers, disgruntled 
employees, former employees with an ax to grind, or crimi-
nals who operate behind the cover of loyal employee/good 
citizen).
 2. Do not allow external storage devices to be hooked to com-
puters linked with classified servers.
 3. Monitor networks for unusual flows of bits and bytes.
 4. Only give employees enough access to classified data as 
needed to do their job. Compartmentalize the rest to prevent 
sweeping breaches like WikiLeaks.
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 5. Remember, in the information age, privacy and censorship 
are an increasingly scarce resource even for authoritarian 
states. According to Admiral Blair, former Director of U.S. 
National Intelligence, the 21st century will be remembered as 
the time of mutually assured humiliation (Blair, 2011).
 6. Just because information is made classified does not mean 
that bad policies can be hidden behind a veil of secrecy forever 
and always. If people in positions of power knew the whole 
World Wide Web was watching their behavior, would that 
behavior change to conform to public scrutiny? If so, then 
perhaps decisions are tainted, if they need to be kept secret 
in order not to create diplomatic upsets, public outcries, and 
regional unrest. As Graham, UK Information Commissioner 
observed in The Guardian, government and corporate trans-
parency is the best defense against future WikiLeaks damage.
It is to the latter issue of IT-inspired regional unrest that we now 
turn. Both Stuxnet and WikiLeaks have clear links with the Middle 
East, but neither case study focuses upon a process that originated 
in the region at the grass roots. During the writing of this chapter, 
information technology has enabled everyday citizens in the Middle 
East to create processes of significant political change through a series 
of revolutionary events, as examined below.
Conclusion: Lessons for Global, Regional, and 
State Security in the Cyber Age
Is there a link between Stuxnet, WikiLeaks, and regional unrest that 
is sweeping the Middle East, including thus far, a regime collapse 
in Tunisia and Egypt, continuing unrest, as of 2011, and signs of 
civil war in Libya and Yemen, a new more repressive police state in 
Bahrain, continued unrest and governmental uncertainty in Oman, 
Jordan, and Syria, riots and demonstrations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, and Algeria? What role has enhanced information technol-
ogy diffusion and use played in such regional unrest? Is it correct to 
call these “Twitter and Facebook revolutions?” What do the changes 
sweeping the Middle East teach us about cybersecurity? These ques-
tions form the foundation for this conclusion.
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In states where there is a critical mass of people with IT skills and 
access, matched with robust indicators of social failure, cyber threats 
from these areas will be more likely. As illustrated by social media-
enabled regime change in Tunisia in January 2011, and Egypt in 
February 2011, unemployment, large pockets of poverty, inequitable 
access to education, demographic factors such as the youth bulge, a 
lack of meaningful pathways to political participation, patterns of 
state repression, human rights violations, and corruption all combined 
with IT capabilities among the public to create threats to national, 
regional, and international security. When citizens throughout the 
Middle East read WikiLeaked documents about their government’s 
corruption, it added one more log to the fire of their desire for good 
governance and regime change. In addition, groups working for 
regime change in Egypt, for example, “the April 6 youth movement” 
which has 70,000 followers on Facebook, “uses social networking 
sites to orchestrate protests and report on their activities,” thus reveal-
ing the link between IT access, activism, and unrest in the Middle 
East, according to The Telegraph online.
As General Petraeus’s (2010) report on the CENTCOM AOR 
illustrates, U.S. national security strategy considers regional stabil-
ity in the Middle East and North Africa as crucial to global security 
interests, especially as the region contains vast energy resources and 
has been a venue for attacks on western interests in the past. Global 
cybersecurity strategy needs to be sensitive to what author Jeffrey 
Carr (2010) calls “latent tensions” in the world. Developing criteria 
for “latent tension” and identifying regions, countries, and movements 
that may now or in the future contribute to regional and global insta-
bility is an important element in mapping potential hot spots for cyber 
insecurity.
When and How Did the Middle East Become so Tech Savvy?
From June to July 2009, I spent a month in Kuwait researching 
emerging Internet cultures and attitudes. My research, especially a 
survey of more than 300 Internet users conducted by my students at 
American University of Kuwait, illustrated that in “far-away places,” 
in countries relatively “underdeveloped” politically, vibrant, socially 
networked, and politically active Internet communities continue to 
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spread at phenomenal speeds. The majority, more than 80% of those 
interviewed for this project, stated that Internet use was having a sig-
nificant impact on politics. Most of those interviewed had a Facebook 
page, with large, extended friend networks. Text messaging, blogging, 
and using new media technologies to experiment with new freedoms 
of expression and organization continue to grow. What these findings 
indicate is that cyberspace is globally shared, locally constructed in 
the imaginations of digital citizens around the world. We should not 
assume that the network of networks has boundaries but rather is a 
globally vibrant and spreading imagined community.
The Internet continues to spread more rapidly in the Middle East 
than on any other place on the planet. The U.S. government has made 
getting free and open access to new media technologies to citizens 
of the Middle East, especially those living in hostile, authoritarian 
regimes like Iran, a matter of U.S. National Security Strategy. While 
this is an interesting “non-Military” strategy designed to enable domes-
tic pressures for regime change, with each new member of the global 
Internet user community added, the potential for cyber-vulnerabilities 
and attack grows. The study of Kuwaiti Internet cultures reveals that 
even in conservative Islamic societies, Internet use, for more than 20 
hours a week, is becoming a regular feature of everyday life. While not 
every user added to the network is a threat we should be aware of, the 
rapid increase of Internet use in the Middle East, a current theater of 
Department of Defense (DoD) operation, and a location from which 
hostile uses of the Internet to coordinate and implement acts that chal-
lenge U.S. security interests, have originated in the past. From the 
coordination of terrorist attacks, to recruitment, to computer network 
breeches, to jihadi website proliferation, and ideological warfare—of all 
these hostile acts take place because of the rapid growth and increasing 
dependence of the region on computer networks and communication. 
Unfortunately, it is not only democrats who are empowered by the net-
works, but hackers, jihadis, and thieves as well.
The increasingly bold forms of new media enabled public opposi-
tion to regimes in the region, from Shia opposition to Suni rule in 
Bahrain, to Internet-enabled opposition to state brutality and unac-
countability in Egypt, to more subtle forms of push for democracy 
in Kuwait and not so subtle socially networked forms of opposition 
to Ahmadinejad’s Iran. Each of these processes, while small steps 
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forward for democracy in the region, also eat away at stability and 
security in a region vital to U.S. security interests. We should be 
aware of the potential unintended consequences of using the Internet 
to support processes of social and political reengineering in a region 
hostile to colonialism, even in electronic form. Due to the possibilities 
for “clashes” of civilizations, so overtly pronounced in the tragic 9/11 
attacks, in which the Internet was the handmaiden to the organizers, 
we should not underestimate the creativity, tech-savvy, and dedicated 
mindset of our potential enemies, as well as the potentially destabiliz-
ing effects of Internet use on regimes with which the United States 
is allied. Both friends and enemies are enabled by the spread of new 
computer and media technologies. As we have seen in the past, even 
if dictators pull the plug on the Internet, when it gets used to chal-
lenge governmental authority, this is not an effective act for stopping 
revolution. This is because the public has other ways of communicat-
ing its opposition, and as well, the offline impacts of online behaviors 
have deep and lasting impacts on society that cannot be erased by a 
temporary kill switch.
The Clinton-led State Department has openly declared the Internet 
as a tool for regime change and has stated its desire to get safe Internet 
access in the hands of all global citizens. Although it may be clearly in 
U.S. interests for such tools to destabilize regimes in Iran and China, 
just like Stuxnet hitting targets outside of Iran, Internet access once 
diffused to the far reaches of the globe can be used to destabilize the 
regimes of our friends, raising oil prices, creating security challenges 
throughout the region.
Our stereotypes of Arab and Muslim cultures of being relatively 
backwards, both in social ideals and technological prowess, may leave 
us vulnerable as we try to map and to predict future cyber attacks 
from unexpected locations. We need to peer beyond the veil and 
think outside of the box of our cultural blinders. What happens if 
Iran or someone else reengineers the Stuxnet virus to attack U.S. 
critical infrastructures? Where will the WikiLeaks debacle end? 
What other diplomatic crises will result, and how will U.S. foreign 
policy makers and diplomats alter opinions and policies to restore the 
U.S.’s image and influence in the global community? How can the 
United States promote good governance and increased human secu-
rity in the region without fostering short-term chaos and increased 
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economic hardship for the region’s poor and disenfranchised youth? 
Cybersecurity opportunities and strategies have a role to play in mak-
ing the Middle East and the world a more stable and equitable place 
for all. At the same time, increased cyber threats if not anticipated 
and prevented through proactive and effective security strategies have 
the potential to change the world as we know it. Stuxnet, WikiLeaks, 
and Information Technology for regime change as explored in this 
chapter all provide important lessons about what is at stake in the 
cyber era as well as best practices for making the future more secure 
and safe than in the past.
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(DDoS) attack targeted South Korean Internet services in addition 
to those in the United States. The identity of the attackers remains 
unconfirmed, but the incident made the region’s governments realize 
the importance of defending their countries from cyber threats.
The more our social system becomes dependent on computers, the 
more vulnerable our society becomes to attack by cyber terrorists. 
The problem is that computers and networks remain “black boxes” to 
many of us in that we do not fully understand them. It is also becom-
ing increasingly difficult to understand the threat. We may not even 
know when an attack is taking place. Attacks such as the demolition 
of a dam via remote control over a network are obvious, but if a com-
puter database is covertly accessed with the objective of modifying its 
records, it is quite likely that the time and perpetrator of the attack 
may go unknown. This is the reason that cyber terrorism has become 
a difficult concept that evokes unease.
Because targets cannot always recognize an attack the involve-
ment of law enforcement agencies may not be enough and intelli-
gence agencies must therefore be involved in the defense against cyber 
attacks, especially regarding serious attacks concerning national secu-
rity. This chapter analyzes public documents and draws on personal 
interviews with relevant organizations to shed light on the current 
organizational arrangements for cybersecurity in Japan. It begins with 
an overview of various forms of cyber threats and attacks before ana-
lyzing how Japanese government agencies responded to the July 2009 
attacks against the United States and South Korea, in particular the 
cooperation and competition between intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the current 
situation in East Asia.
Cyber Threats
The world is increasingly dependent on information and communica-
tion networks, and likely to become ever more reliant on cyberspace as 
the information society emerges. Cybersecurity is also a global prob-
lem, and as more countries move to the information society stage, 
the challenges will increase. Unless we cut computer and network 
cables, there will be new types of threats and we need security to 
protect against them. There are various kinds of criminal activities in 
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cyberspace, and perpetrators vary, too. One way to view the concept 
of cyber terrorism is to break it down into multiple categories based 
on the subject being a group or an individual, and the objective being 
mental or physical.
Imagine a two-dimensional plane separated into four quadrants by 
two axes, one vertical and one horizontal (Figure 3.1). The horizon-
tal axis signifies the intent of the user, ranging from “malicious” to 
“good.” The vertical axis signifies the number of users in question, 
which ranges from “group” to “individual.” The four categories created 
in this way show four different categories.
People in the first category are “hackers,” individual users who 
possess good intentions. The term “hacker” originally meant an indi-
vidual with considerable computer knowledge and did not signify 
malicious intent. In modern language, they may also be called “geeks” 
(Katz 2000). A geek is defined as “a peculiar or otherwise odd per-
son, especially one who is perceived to be overly intellectual.” Net 
culture, which is developed by geeks, is quite different from govern-
ment culture. One of the leaders in the Internet community, Dave 
Clark of MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) in the United 
States, once said, “We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe 
in rough consensus and running code.”* Rough consensus means that 
they keep on discussing issues until almost all of the members agree, 
even if it takes several years. But nobody has a veto. And running 
codes imply that they try to be as practical as possible. They don’t 
* Clark didn’t intend to advocate anarchism. But his words spread in cyberspace and 
were widely share among hackers without a context of his speech. Interview with 




















Figure 3.1  Concepts around cybersecurity.
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accept abstract idealism and unworkable codes. It might be difficult 
for government agencies to work with geeks. These geeks, however, 
are increasingly controlling our social systems.
The second category is groups with good intentions. They are 
known as netizens, which is a combination of the words “net” and 
“citizen,” or alternatively as “smart mobs,” a term used by Howard 
Rheingold (2000), an American cultural writer (2002). These users 
utilize technology and knowledge shared over a network to achieve 
group objectives.
The problem consists of users with malicious intent. Groups that 
possess malicious objectives can be dubbed “cyber warriors.” They 
may be sponsored by governments or nongovernment entities. Either 
way, they are users who abuse network technology in order to achieve 
organizational goals.
Last, there are individual users with malicious intentions. As 
pointed out by Steven Levy (1984), an American journalist and 
author, these users were once known as “crackers” rather than “hack-
ers.” However, users who conduct destructive activities with politi-
cal motivations rather than mere personal enjoyment can be labeled 
“cyber terrorists.” It should be assumed that, in general usage, the 
term “cyber terrorist” includes “cyber warriors” as well.
Activities conducted by users with malicious intent can further 
be divided into two categories depending on their specific objec-
tives. Researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt at the RAND 
Corporation, headquartered in Santa Monica, California, differ-
entiate between the terms “netwar” and “cyber war” (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 1993). Netwars consist of societal-level ideational con-
flicts and take place between both countries and societies. Their aim 
is to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population “knows” 
by targeting the public or elite opinion, or both. Simply stated, the 
objective of netwar is to mess with people’s heads.
In contrast, cyber war is the conduct of military operations accord-
ing to information-related principles. Warfare is moving from physical 
territories to networks. For example, it is now common that command 
controls of military forces are dependent on information and com-
munication networks, and a modern digitalized military force cannot 
fight without them.
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In order to clarify the difference of meanings between netwar and 
cyber war, the former could be termed “head war,” because netwar is 
the act of trying to modify or change something in your head, while 
the latter could be called “body war,” as an objective of cyber war is 
physical damage.
Cyber Attacks
The scope of cyber attacks and cyber crimes is increasingly wide and 
spread from individual to international (White House, 2003, 2008, 
2009). Broadly speaking, there are four main types of cyber attacks: 
(1) physical damage, such as demolition of a dam or clash of airplanes; 
(2) financial damage, such as unauthorized access to bank account or 
illegal stock exchange; (3) psychological damage, such as web falsi-
fication or service disruption; and (4) virtual damage, which are not 
recognized by victims, such as a covert operation.
As an illustration of trends, Figure  3.2 shows the increase of 
reported unauthorized access in Japan. As the National Police 
Agency collected information in a proactive manner in 2001, this 
number is unusually high. For example, private sector companies 
are otherwise often hesitant to share such information with the 
public in order to avoid a bad reputation. The trend is stable after 
2001 but has turned sharply upward since 2005. Figure 3.3 shows 
the number of reported web falsification. It rose sharply in the 
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Figure  3.2  Reported unauthorized access. (From National Police Agency. http://www.kantel.
go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/dai7/siryou2.pdf.)
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Internationally, examples of large-scale cyber attacks are Estonia 
in 2007 and Lithuania and Georgia, both in 2008. Many important 
websites in the three countries were shut down as a result of attacks 
from Russia, though it does not necessarily mean that the Russian 
government was involved. Richard Clarke, the former U.S. presiden-
tial adviser, provides an example with physical repercussions in his 
latest book (Clarke and Knake, 2010). Allegedly, Israel disabled the 
Syrian air defense network in 2007 as the Syrian army could not find 
any Israeli jet fighters in its radar systems.
In a modern espionage mystery, in 2008, two Canadian research-
ers, Ronald Deibert of University of Toronto and Rafal Rohozinski of 
SecDev Group, a consultancy, found strange transmissions of Internet 
Protocol (IP) packets on the Internet (Information Warfare Monitor, 
2009). Because it was unclear who was operating the network they 
eventually came to term it “GhostNet.” A typical virus creates infec-
tion and duplicates itself, but the malware they found did not do so. 
Instead, GhostNet secretly entered target computers and was remotely 
controlled to send files to somewhere without the owner’s knowledge. 
The two researchers analyzed the traffic of the malware and found 
that 1,295 computers in 103 countries were infected with 30% of 
the infections being high-value targets belonging to governments, 
financial corporations, human rights groups, and others. Traffic pat-
terns implied that GhostNet was used to send information to China; 
however, further research and analysis could not be done legally as 


























Figure 3.3  Number of web falsification (first quarter of 2008 to fourth quarter of 2009). (From 
JPCERT/CC. http://www.kantel.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/dai7/siryou2.pdf.)
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of legal jurisdiction. As such, Deibert and Rohozinski had to give up 
their research. Instead, they wrote a report about the issues and made 
it public online in March 2009. Their warnings were widely echoed 
in cyberspace.
It is easy to say that cybersecurity is important, but it is hard to pin-
point its real importance. But in 2009, a massive scale of attacks broke 
out on the east and west sides of the Pacific Ocean, an event that came 
to illustrate clear and present danger to the region’s governments.
The Cyber Attacks against South Korea and the United States in July 2009
In July 2009, right after the U.S. Independence Day holiday, someone 
started distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against more than 
20 governmental and commercial Internet sites in the United States, 
including the White House, Department of State, Department of 
Justice, Department of Defense, and commercial enterprises such as 
Yahoo! and amazon.com (Nakashima et al., 2009; Sudworth, 2009; 
and Goodin, 2009).
Similarly, important South Korean websites, such as Ministry of 
Defense, National Congress, National Intelligence Service (NIS), 
and those in the financial services sector were also attacked, begin-
ning on July 7 and lasting two days. Major attacks occurred in a wave 
fashion at 18:00 on July 7, at 18:00 on July 8, and at night on July 9 
(KST: GMT+9). The attacker(s) propagated malware through online 
storage sites and embedded the predefined targets and schedules 
in the malware (Cho, 2010). According to a report in Korea Times 
(Han, 2009), in an emergency measure to recover disabled online net-
works, the Korean Communications Commission (KCC) ordered the 
nation’s Internet operators KT (Korea Telecom), SK Broadband, and 
LG Dacom to deny Internet access to nearly 30,000 virus-infected 
computers until their operating systems were cleaned (Author’s inter-
view at KCC on January 28, 2011). According to the Korean Internet 
and Security Agency (KISA), many of the hard drives in certain 
PCs that were hijacked and remotely controlled, “Zombies,” were 
destroyed after the attacks (Author’s interview at KISA on January 
27, 2011). All kinds of document files and programs were erased 
while the attacking source files were overwritten or encrypted. In 
addition, fixed disk MBR (Memory Buffer Register) was overwritten 
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with specific meaningless values. All Internet browsing histories in 
the Zombie PCs were also removed in order to make it impossible to 
identify the original source of the malware (Claburn, 2009).
“This is an attack against our country’s system and an act or provo-
cation to our national security,” said the Chief of the Korean Prime 
Minister’s Office in a task force meeting. KCC officials kept working 
four nights without sleep to stop the attacks and fix problems. Later 
analysis indicated that the attacks against South Korea came from the 
same program as those used against the United States.
At first, Korean National Intelligence Service told some mem-
bers of the National Congress about the possibility of North Korean 
involvement. But no clear evidence was presented, although the South 
Korean government also received information saying that the North 
Korean government had issued an order to develop computer pro-
grams to crack South Korean communications systems. Two weeks 
later, the government saw signs of simulation tests targeting KISA 
and a university in Pusan. All these pieces of information lead to con-
tinued suspicions about North Korean involvement.
After the attacks against the two countries, the South Korean gov-
ernment sent an inquiry to the Japanese government regarding eight 
computer servers in Japan. These servers appeared to be used as step-
ping stones for the attacks, according to my personal interview with 
the National Police Agency (2010). A stepping-stone is a way of hid-
ing the real attacker. The eight servers were owned by the private sec-
tor and their owners had no idea that they were used in the attacks. 
Three of the eight had a fixed IP address, which allowed them to be 
identified, and specific stepping stone programs were found on them. 
The other five were used by commercial Internet service providers, 
and dynamic IP addresses were allocated to them. It is against secrecy 
of communications to identify them, and the five are still unknown.
The programs, which were found in the three servers, were the 
same, and a code to direct targets was found. Only the targets listed 
were attacked. But the program could not be fully revealed, and it was 
not possible to locate the route of which the servers had been infected. 
As such, no information revealing the real attacker or where he or she 
was located was available, and any North Korean involvement could 
not be proved.
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But the fact that the United States, a Japanese ally, and South 
Korea, its neighbor, were simultaneously attacked concerned Japanese 
leaders. The second part of this chapter will detail how they responded 
to this event, focusing on the National Police Agency, the Ministry 
of Defense, and the National Information Security Center (NISC), 
starting with an organizational overview.
Organization of Japan’s Intelligence Activities
Today’s Japanese intelligence community, even though it was not 
clearly defined by law, includes National Police Agency, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Public Security Intelligence Agency, and 
Ministry of Defense. But the scale and scope of intelligence activi-
ties in Japan used to be smaller and narrower (Fukuda, 2010; Hori, 
1996; Kitaoka, 2009; Kotani, 2004; Omori, 2005; Sugita, 1987; 
and Tsukamoto, 1988). During the Cold War most of intelligence 
came from the United States under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. 
Japan did not have IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) capabilities and 
had limited HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and SIGINT (Signal 
Intelligence) capabilities. However, these situations started chang-
ing in the post–Cold War era. The emergence and development of 
cybersecurity and the rise of cyber threats was also a reason to push 
for intelligence reforms. Cybersecurity is not necessarily an issue to 
be dealt with by an intelligence agency, but as cyber attacks become 
larger in scale and affect national security, they also become more 
serious and it is necessary to involve intelligence agencies to prevent 
attacks (Nye, 2010; Saka, 2004; and Tsuchiya, 2007).
Growing concerns regarding cybersecurity, especially in light of 
the 2009 attacks, have added a new dimension to Japan’s intelligence 
activities. Although the revival of intelligence agencies such as the 
Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) after the Japanese defeat 
in World War II was relatively quick, the National Police Agency has 
been more powerful both in intelligence and law enforcement activi-
ties than any other security-related agency. That is, there has been 
no clear wall between law enforcement and intelligence activities in 
terms of organizational functions. However, new cyber threats are 
forcing changes to the system because they are too complicated and 
elusive to respond to under the existing organization.
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The National Information Security Center (NISC), established in 
2005, is a key player in this new environment (Yamada et al., 2010). 
It is an agency under the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister. It 
used to focus on technical measures for cybersecurity, but after the 
July 2009 attacks it quickly acquired national security perspectives. If 
NISC were to be a cross point of intelligence and law enforcement, 
this cooperation system between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies could be a first step to reorganize the Japanese intelligence 
system to prepare for future cyber and other types of threats.
The first government agency to respond to cyber threats is the 
police. If a cyber attack can be categorized as a crime, a police agency 
will attempt to catch and prosecute a perpetrator. However, if the 
attack goes beyond a simple crime and is perceived as a national secu-
rity threat, a military force (Self Defense Force in the Japanese case) 
will respond. For example, falsification of websites is just a crime, 
but physical attacks on critical infrastructure, such as power grids 
or national transportation systems are different. Similarly, the third 
corresponding agency is intelligence. It tries to forecast and prevent 
attacks beforehand, primarily against targets such as nuclear facilities, 
transportation systems, or financial systems. In order to prevent those 
attacks, intelligence activities such as wiretapping are needed.
In the case of Japan, these three types of government agencies and 
organizations are overlapping and cannot be separated in a rigorous 
manner. For example, the Security Bureau of the National Police 
Agency is a powerful intelligence section inside a law enforcement 
agency. The Intelligence Headquarter of the Ministry of Defense is 
also an intelligence section for signal intelligence (SIGINT). The top 
director position of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) 
has been always occupied by officers from the National Police Agency, 
and the position of deputy directors has always been occupied by 
officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among many related 
agencies, the National Information Security Center (NISC) is play-
ing a central role in these situational changes. The central problem, 
however, is how these overlapping Japanese government agencies 
responded to the large-scale cyber attacks in July 2009, the scale of 
which had impressed Japanese government leaders.
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The Japanese Government Response to the 2009 Attacks
National Police Agency
The attacks in July 2009 heightened tensions in the National Police 
Agency. Attacks to the neighboring country made the Japanese 
government recognize cyber attacks as real and direct threats. The 
agency started making plans to prepare for future attacks, and the 
July 2009 attacks became a good example to which to refer. On 
March 19, 2010, the government set up a new structure to deal with 
cyber issues (Figure 3.4). Under this structure cyber attack is rec-
ognized as a crisis similar to natural disasters, such as earthquake 
or eruption. Thus, when an attack breaks out, crisis management 
mechanisms will start working.
In addition, the National Police Agency has a fixed 24-hour 
monitoring system of Internet traffic in 150 locations around Japan 
as well as contacts with 600 private sector critical infrastructure 
operators, which will report suspicious activity to the agency. The 
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Figure 3.4  Crisis management structure for cybersecurity. (From a document obtained during 
author’s interview on July 2, 2010 at National Police Agency.)
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These kinds of structural changes were lead by Hirofumi Hirano, 
then Chief Cabinet Secretary. After looking at the July 2009 attacks, 
Hirano asked his staff what would happen if Japan were attacked in 
this manner, and ordered them to prepare for future attacks. Although 
there had been discussions to prepare for cyber attacks since spring of 
2008, serious preparations started right after his direction.
The National Police Agency has not officially evaluated the July 
2009 attacks. Officers in charge felt that the attacks were more of a 
demonstration than an attempt at inflicting any harm. But the event 
seemed to last too long to simply be a demonstration, and because 
DDoS attacks shut down websites rather than take any data from 
servers, it is difficult to know the real intention of the attacker.
Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense of Japan thought that the impact of the 
July 2009 attacks on them were minimal because their systems, 
including the Self Defense Force (SDF), were independent from 
the Internet, according to my personal interview with them (2010). 
In fact, until the release of “Information Security Strategy for 
Protecting the Nation” in May 2010, the Ministry was thinking 
of cybersecurity as a computer system level challenge. Now, how-
ever, the Ministry started thinking that it should be considered as a 
national security issue.
Unlike the United States, which deploys troops in several places 
overseas, the main goal of Japan’s Ministry of Defense is to protect 
its command and control systems inside Japanese territories, as SDF 
is not expected to deploy overseas due to constitutional limits. The 
Ministry is preparing enough to threats from outside Japan, but there 
is still a problem of internal threats as William J. Lynn, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense in the United States, wrote in his 2010 article 
in Foreign Affairs. Although users of the systems are strictly limited, 
devices such as USB memory sticks are easy to use and very difficult 
to stop from being used for malicious activity. Confidential informa-
tion can be carried out through such devices and virus or malware can 
be brought into systems (Lynn, 2010).
Unlike the National Police Agency, the Ministry has no moni-
toring system and can only detect attacks against itself and cannot 
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therefore grasp the whole picture of attacks against the Japanese gov-
ernment. It needs to get information through the NISC. In case of 
emergency, the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Defense 
are mandated to cooperate to respond to the situation (Figure 3.5). In 
order to make it happen, the Ministry temporarily sends seven self-
defense officials to NISC to work with them.
The Ministry also does not analyze attacks by itself. Cyber Clean 
Center (CCC) which is jointly operated by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry will do such analysis. For the Defense Ministry, it does 
not matter much who is attacking. In terms of defense, the SDF must 
protect the nation from any enemies but identifying or catching them 
is out of scope for them.
The Ministry is interested in USCYBERCOM, the U.S. 
Department of Defense agency responsible for cybersecurity, which 
the Obama Administration set up in 2009. According to Japan’s 
Defense and its Budget (2010), a Japanese Ministry of Defense publi-
cation, it is possible that it will set up a similar organization in 2011 
under the SDF, tentatively entitled the “cyber space defense unit.”
National Information Security Center (NISC)
In February 2000, the Information Security Section was created under 
the Cabinet Office; it became the National Information Security 
IT Strategy Headquarter
(Lead by Prime Minister)
Information Security Policy Council






Figure 3.5  Organization for national information security in Japan. (From Cabinet Office)
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Center (NISC) in April 2005. The following month, the National 
Information Security Policy Council (ISPC) was established, and 
NISC serves as a secretariat bureau of ISPC. NISC is mandated to 
coordinate public–private information (or cyber) security policies. 
ISPC released its “First National Strategy on Information Security: 
Toward the Creation of a Trustworthy Society” on February 2, 2006, 
covering fiscal years 2006 through 2008. The “Second National 
Strategy on Information Security: Aiming for Strong ‘Individual’ and 
‘Society’ in IT Age” was released on February 3, 2009, covering fiscal 
years 2009 through 2011.
However, after the Second National Strategy, in July 2009, the 
massive scale of cyber attacks against the United States and South 
Korea broke out. In August 2009 the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), which had been in a ruling position for a long time, lost the 
national election, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came 
into a coalition government. This was a historic regime change and it 
affected the ISPC and the NISC in that previous LDP policies were 
being revised, starting with the release of “the Information Security 
Strategy to Protect the Nation” on May 11, 2010. This strategy covers 
FY 2010 to 2013 including the Second National Strategy and man-
dated that an annual plan to be created. The cyber attacks against the 
United States and South Korea played a critical role in the revision 
of Japanese cybersecurity measures, as the first page of the Strategy 
stated:
After the Second National Strategy on Information Security was 
resolved, a large-scale cyber attack took place in the United States and 
South Korea in July 2009. Also, numerous incidents of large-scale pri-
vate information leaks occurred one after another.
The large-scale cyber attack in the United States and South Korea 
particularly alerted Japan—where many aspects of economic activi-
ties and social life are increasingly dependent upon Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT)—to the fact that a threat to infor-
mation security could be a threat to national security and require effec-
tive crisis management.
The basic principle of the Strategy has three points: (1) strengthen-
ing of policies and upgrading of countermeasures, (2) establishment of 
information security policy that can be adjusted in new or changing 
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environments, and (3) transformation from reactive information secu-
rity measures to proactive ones. It is not fair to say that cyber attacks 
were neglected or considered less serious in the First National Strategy 
and the Second National Strategy; however, it is noteworthy that 
cyber attack concerns hitched to the fore in the May 2010 Strategy.
About a month after the release of the Strategy, Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama resigned and Naoto Kan, new leader of DPJ, suc-
ceeded the administration. Under the new cabinet, the National 
Information Security Policy Council’s meeting was held on July 22, 
2010, and it authorized its annual plan called “Information Security 
2010.” The first item in it is “upgrading counter measures for large-
scale cyber attack situations,” and 19 policy items were listed in the 
plan.
Concluding the Japanese Response
The response to the July 2009 attacks differed among the three 
main Japanese government entities, the National Police Agency, the 
Ministry of Defense, and the National Information Security Center 
(NISC). But while the response varied, the outcome remained the 
same: along with government leaders, they all realized the impor-
tance of developing new strategies to meet the rising cyber threat.
As an example of this, Japan, for the first time, joined the “Cyber 
Storm” exercise in September 2010. Organized for the third time by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, it is the world’s larg-
est simulation in the area and involves cooperation between the gov-
ernment and the private sector. In this effort, Japan was, represented 
by NISC, National Police Agency, Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, and the nonprofit JPCERT/CC (Japan Computer 
Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center), an independent 
organization dealing with computer security incidents. According to 
an article in Asahi Shinbun, more than 3,000 people in 13 countries 
participated in the simulation overall (Toh, 2010).
Recent East Asia Developments
East Asia is a region that continues to be a hotspot for cyber activities, 
including cyber attacks. The numbers of Internet users are growing 
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rapidly in this part of the world mainly due to China, which, along with 
South Korea greatly influence regional developments. Due to historical 
disputes, Japan is sometimes a target of cyber attacks from China and 
South Korea, though this is not the sole reason of course. To provide a 
broad picture of cybersecurity in East Asia, this chapter concludes with 
a brief overview of the recent situation in these two countries.
China
Chinese presence in cyberspace is becoming greater and greater. The 
world’s Internet population is estimated at around two billion and 
China constitutes about one-fourth of that, despite the fact that the 
Chinese penetration ratio is still low. If it reaches the same ratio as 
developed countries, its presence will be overwhelming.
China is notorious for attacking other countries online. In 2007, 
The Times, a British paper, reported that China is trying to achieve 
“electronic dominance” over each of its global rivals by 2050, particu-
larly the United States, Britain, Russia, and South Korea (Reid, 2010). 
According to the same article, Chinese cyber terrorists were suspected 
of penetrating hundreds of U.S. State Department computers all over 
the world and also disrupting the U.S. Naval War College’s network. 
Overall, the article noted that the Pentagon had logged more than 
79,000 attempted intrusions in 2005. Further, according to MSNBC 
(2009), an American news channel, China’s elite hacker community 
may have ties to the government, though there is little hard evidence 
per se (Baldor, 2009).
In January 2010, Google, the Internet search engine giant, began 
a dispute with China over censorship it claimed it could not follow 
but that was mandated by the government. Google also claimed 
their systems, in particular the free e-mail service Gmail, were 
being attacked by China. With the support of the U.S. govern-
ment, Google tried to change the Chinese government’s policy in 
vain and instead withdrew from the market. In the end, Google 
received a service license to reroute their search engine to its Hong 
Kong site.
These kinds of news regarding China are flooding media coverage 
yet the government is denying claims that the Chinese Communist 
Party or its People’s Liberation Army is involved in any cyber attacks. 
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Instead, it says, China is being continuously attacked by foreign pow-
ers. Norton Online Living Report 2009 reported that 53% of Chinese 
Internet users say they had experienced cyber intrusion into their 
computers, the highest among surveyed countries (Symantec, 2009).
It is quite strange that there are a lot of cyber crimes and attacks in 
China because the government is maintaining strong control over the 
Internet. Both Internet connection service providers and content ser-
vice providers must be registered and providers watch their customers 
in detail. Even when a Chinese citizen uses an Internet café, he or she 
must register an ID. The government is also regulating international 
traffic because all of international gateways are under control of the 
government. If the government is really serious, it can stop “illegal” 
or suspicious traffic. This point makes people outside China believe in 
the government’s involvement in cyber attacks against foreign coun-
tries, though there is still no hard evidence of this. According to a 
2009 report in The Wall Street Journal (Gorman, 2009), a spokesman 
for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Wang Baodong, said that 
the Chinese government “resolutely oppose[s] any crime, including 
hacking, that destroys the Internet or computer network” and has 
laws barring the practice.
South Korea
South Korea experienced a serious economic downturn in the Asian 
economic/financial crisis in 1998, something that would come to 
determine its future as a digital nation. In order to recover, President 
Kim Tae-jung proposed “Cyber Korea 21” in 1999 and introduced 
ambitious technologies and policies to make the country adapt to the 
new political and economic modes of the digital age. Key technologi-
cal developments stemming from the initiative include semiconductor 
chips, ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) for Internet 
broadband access, and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) for 
mobile phones. Samsung and other South Korean digital vendors 
went global, leaving their Japanese competitors stuck to their domes-
tic market.
There are many reasons why South Korea advanced in broadband 
adoption specifically. One of them is that it is costly to lay broadband 
access technologies in vast areas, but the population in South Korea is 
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concentrated in cities. More than one-fifth of the total population is 
living in Seoul and most of them are living in apartment complexes. 
There was also a culture of people competing to gain faster speeds in 
order to get jobs, educate their children, buy cheap goods online, play 
games, among other things.
The success in broadband penetration made South Korea proud of 
its new cyber culture and today it is an important part of life. However, 
at the same time, new cyber threats emerged, in particular ID theft. 
A big boom of the online economy in South Korea was made possible 
by its resident registration number, which is assigned to every citizen 
in South Korea in order to burn out North Korean agents hidden 
in South Korean society. All Internet service sites requested users to 
register their own numbers. The number system also helped service 
providers to understand customers better; however, theft of ID num-
bers became a serious social problem. Financial fraud, impersonation, 
privacy invasion, and other crimes and attacks were seen. In addition, 
computer viruses and spam mails were getting worse. For example, 
according to The New York Times, South Korea’s former President Roh 
Moo-hyun’s ID number was used to gain access to 416 sites requiring 
personal identification, including 280 pornographic sites. According 
to Hotwired Japan, an online publication, 4,552 fraud cases were 
reported in the first half year of 2004 alone, the consequence of which 
saw the government introducing an improved online system to fix the 
problem in 2006 (Tsuchiya, 2004).
In 2008 President Lee Myung-bak reorganized the Ministry 
of Information and Communication, and its functions were trans-
ferred to Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS), 
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (MKE). And Korea Communications Commission (KCC) 
is regulating the industry now. However, national security perspective 
of cybersecurity is administrated by the National Intelligence Service 
(NIS). Under NIS, National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) is 
the core of policy making. Outside the government, KISC (Korea 
Internet Safety Commission) is a CSIRT (Computer Security 
Incident Response Team) and KISA (Korean Internet and Security 
Agency) is playing a role to bridge between the government and the 
private sector.
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Because their neighbor, North Korea, is a potential threat, it was 
easy to expect that they might start a cyber attack. But the severity of 
the July 2009 attacks was a big shock to South Korea and damaged 
the country’s pride. One Korean journalist wrote, “South Korea was 
proud to be an Internet advanced nation and its economy is supported 
by exports of IT-related technologies. The biggest loss in this attack 
was that its image was hurt” (Cho, 2009).
We still do not know who attacked South Korea, but its govern-
ment is now more aware of the importance of defending its cyber 
domain. For example, in February 2010, the South Korean govern-
ment proposed to set up an organization for international cyberse-
curity under the United Nations and to locate it in Seoul. It was not 
agreed, but the government understands well why it must protect its 
cyber infrastructures.
Conclusion
In order to respond to changing situations in East Asia, widening 
scope of intelligence activities is an important policy agenda in Japan. 
Rising possibilities of cyber attacks in recent years added a new role to 
intelligence agencies. Perhaps because of good intelligence, there has 
been no successful large-scale cyber attack against Japan.
Either way, the attacks in July 2009 built a momentum to improve 
Japanese cybersecurity measures. The change of administrations 
is an important factor, but it is also noteworthy that the Second 
Information Security Basic Plan was overwritten while it was still 
active after the attacks.
NISC is not within the Japanese intelligence community, but it must 
help the community and political leaders to find better approaches. 
Its role is critical in cybersecurity preparedness. We need to define 
NISC’s role more clearly in national security environments.
Widening the scope of intelligence in society might raise anxieties 
over privacy and other basic human rights. For example, we might 
need executive power to wiretap communications to prevent cyber 
terrorism, which Japanese law does not allow (but wiretapping for law 
enforcement purposes is allowed). ISPC and NISC are publishing 
a series of strategies, but we need concrete policy measures to ful-
fill them. Among other things, the Prime Minister and his cabinet’s 
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political will are needed to move forward ISPC, NISC, and other 
related agencies and private sectors toward better preparation to pro-
tect the nation.
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Introduction
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) transform 
modern lifestyles through global real-time access to an almost unlim-
ited amount of information. At the same time, these innovative tools 
also create opportunities for exploitation and abuse.
Cyber threats have become one of the biggest global issues of our 
time. The proliferation of constant connections creates a global net-
work of open conduits. While these bring untold benefits in terms of 
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access to information, they also lead to an alarming rise in the number 
and scale of cyber threats, cyber criminals, and cyber terrorists. For 
example, according to the International Multistakeholder Partnership 
Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT), more than 12 million ICT sys-
tems worldwide are affected at any given time by malware.
Cybersecurity is one of the most critical concerns of the informa-
tion age. It forms the cornerstone of a connected world. It is a global 
issue that demands a truly global approach. Because of light-speed 
communications and ubiquitous networks, cyber criminals and cyber 
terrorists do not need to be anywhere near the scene of the crime. 
International cooperation and response is the only answer. And there 
is little time to waste.
The power of the virtual world increases every day. By the time you 
have read this chapter, that power will have grown even further. A 
young student in a developing country will have accessed the library 
of a prestigious university in the West; a senior citizen who has never 
traveled abroad will have virtually visited a nation on the other side of 
the world; a small-business owner will have attended an international 
conference without leaving her office. With each of these achieve-
ments, the virtual world brings about another real-world victory for 
education, dialogue, and better understanding between peoples.
Unfortunately, there is nothing virtual about the hazards that 
accompany modern communications technologies. The Internet may 
open our minds to new possibilities, but it also exposes us to the pit-
falls and dangers of cyber threats.
Like many of the challenges facing our planet today, these dan-
gers know no borders. Just as viruses and bacteria can spread from 
region to region, computer viruses spread from computer to computer, 
regardless of physical location.
The United Nations, through the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), its specialized agency for information and communi-
cation technologies, has a vital responsibility to ensure the safety of 
all those who venture online, especially as online services become an 
integral part of peoples’ lives. Technology is improving direct and 
democratic access to health, financial and telecommunications ser-
vices, among many others. None of us would stand idly by during 
attacks or theft at the hospital or bank or phone company; we must 
provide the same security to the increasing number of people who 
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work with these institutions online. Leaders strive to ensure the safety 
of their citizens on their countries’ highways and roads; the attention 
to safety on the information superhighway, where people young and 
old travel for hours each day, should be no different.
The ITU has dealt with security issues since its inception in 1865: 
from the invention of the telegraph, through the era of radio and tele-
vision to the deployment of satellite and Internet-based technologies. 
The goal remains to forge partnerships and support projects whose 
goal is to create a safe and secure environment. Access to communica-
tions is useless if peace and safety cannot be guaranteed.
ITU recognizes that information and technology security are criti-
cal priorities for the international community. Cyber threats are global; 
therefore, the solutions must be global, too. It is vital that all countries 
arrive at a common understanding regarding cybersecurity, namely 
providing protection against unauthorized access, manipulation, and 
destruction of critical resources. However, any successful global strat-
egy must first start by identifying existing national and regional initia-
tives already in place in order to find common ground that will increase 
the likelihood that an international strategy can effectively engage all 
the relevant players and establish clear priorities for action.
The need for a global framework to secure cyberspace is also being 
fueled by the growing realization that ICTs play a decisive role in the 
development process. More than five billion people will be connected 
in cyberspace by 2015. It is both desirable and necessary to provide 
them with a safe and secure cyber environment conducive to bringing 
about economic growth.
Given the global nature of the cyber threat, this is not a problem 
any one nation can solve alone. A global framework is needed, giving 
us international principles to match hackers’ international range, and 
allowing rapid coordination between countries at the regional and 
global levels. In order to accomplish this goal, the ITU created The 
Global Cybersecurity Agenda, the elements of which will be outlined 
in this chapter.
Cyberspace—No Longer Just a Virtual World
The Internet has become an integral part of modern societies, pro-
pelling the end user to the forefront of communication. All sorts of 
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information and opinion are available in various languages on almost 
any topic.
The difficulty with the ever-growing multitude of resources is effec-
tively sorting through the vast amount of information available on the 
Internet. How much of that information is factual, or even genuine? 
The real concern is not just with the dissemination of inaccurate or 
misleading information, but above all with malicious content. Fraud, 
theft, and forgery exist online just as they do offline. If users are to 
benefit from the full advantages of the Internet, then confidence in its 
infrastructure is of utmost importance.
Cyber threats such as malicious software (malware) are becom-
ing extremely sophisticated. This is especially true with the increased 
presence of organized criminal groups online. The Internet has ceased 
to be the domain of the technically competent. User-friendly software 
and interfaces have enabled all types of users, including children and 
novices, to interact online. Consequently, cyberspace contains a gold 
mine of valuable information and potential victims. The complicated 
infrastructure of the Internet also makes it difficult to track down 
criminals.
But criminals are not the only threat on the Internet. The vul-
nerabilities of ICTs also extend to cyber warfare, espionage, and 
terrorism, all of which can pose serious threats to critical informa-
tion infrastructure.
Even though national measures are being taken, cyber threats 
remain an international problem. Loopholes in legal frameworks are 
being exploited by perpetrators, and harmonization between existing 
laws is far from satisfactory. For example, different laws regarding spam 
or phishing, or even those related to the identity of online users, allow 
cyber criminals to originate criminal acts from localities where they 
cannot be detected or prosecuted. Coupled with the absence of inter-
national organizational structures and national level outfits that can 
coordinate internationally (such as computer incident response teams, 
CIRTs), there is a genuine problem in responding to cyber threats.
This is without considering the constant evolution and sophisti-
cation of such threats as well as the vulnerabilities in software, and 
more recently hardware, applications. With the phenomenal growth 
in mobile ICTs and new trends such as cloud computing and virtu-
alization, it is increasingly likely that cyber threats will spread to new 
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levels. For example, in 2007, the ITU noted that the rise of spam had 
become a broader cybersecurity threat, acting as a platform for other 
scams such as phishing and hacking.
A Unique Global Forum, a Unique History
In 2000, global leaders gathered at the United Nations in New York and 
pledged themselves and their countries to achieving eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), ranging from halving extreme poverty 
to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary 
education, all by the target date of 2015. The MDG goals have gal-
vanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poor-
est. For example, Millennium Development Goal number 8 calls for a 
global partnership that challenges world leaders to cooperate with the 
private sector to make available the benefits of information and com-
munications technology to those with the least access to them.
Given the interdependencies that are created by ICTs, a commit-
ment by all UN member states is needed to ensure that MDG Goal 
8 is achieved and that the Global Cybersecurity Agenda is adopted as 
an appropriate framework for cooperation. The development potential 
of eHealth, eEducation, eCommerce, and eGovernment programs 
and services will only be successful if the ICT infrastructures that 
they rely upon for delivery are secure.
Founded on the principle of international cooperation between 
governments and the private sector, the ITU represents the unique 
global forum for action to promote cybersecurity and to tackle cyber-
crime. In order to ensure that the benefits of the information society 
are extended to all of the world’s citizens, ITU was asked to organize, 
on behalf of the United Nations, a two-part World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005). It 
was during the WSIS process that leaders and governments entrusted 
the ITU to take the lead in coordinating international efforts in the 
field of cybersecurity.
From broadband Internet to the latest-generation wireless technolo-
gies, from aeronautical and maritime navigation to radio astronomy and 
satellite-based meteorology, from convergence in fixed-mobile phone, 
Internet access, data, voice, and TV broadcasting to next-generation 
networks, ITU is committed to connecting the world.
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However, building confidence in a global communication system 
that has been built by multistakeholder input will require a global 
multistakeholder solution.
Toward the Global Cybersecurity Agenda
The objective is clear: we need to ensure a global information society 
in which trust and security in the use of ICTs is the norm for the ben-
efit of mankind. For this reason, on May 17, 2007, the ITU Secretary 
General launched the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) to pro-
vide a framework within which an international response to the grow-
ing challenges to cybersecurity can be coordinated and addressed. The 
GCA is an international cooperation framework and strives to engage 
all stakeholders, including governments, the private sector, civil soci-
ety, and international organizations, in a concerted effort to build 
confidence and security in the information society. The GCA is built 
upon five pillars with seven strategic goals.
The five pillars are
 1. Legal measures
 2. Technical and procedural measures
 3. Organizational structures
 4. Capacity building
 5. International cooperation
The legal, technical, and procedural measures and the organiza-
tional structures need to be undertaken at the national and regional 
levels but also harmonized at the international level as follows:
• National laws need to be put in place where they do not yet 
exist, and existing laws as well as regional and international 
agreements need to be based upon a shared understanding of 
what constitutes cybercrimes and cyber attacks, and how to 
confront them.
• Technical solutions need to be identified and developed, 
taking into account the principles of globally accepted stan-
dards, aimed at providing hardware and software security 
baselines that can be adopted by vendors, manufacturers, 
and end users.
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• Appropriate organizational structures, such as coordina-
tion and response centers with national responsibility (e.g., 
Computer Incident Response Teams), need to be established 
in order to promptly respond to cyber attacks and coordinate 
with their counterparts at the international level.
The last two pillars cross-cut all areas and aim at elaborating strate-
gies to ensure that the required capacity is available to allow IT secu-
rity professionals to properly react in case of cyber attacks as well as to 
build relations and partnerships at the international level.
In order to carry out this work, ITU is collaborating with both UN 
member states and private sector partners to identify current chal-
lenges, consider existing and emerging threats, and propose global 
strategies to meet the following seven strategic goals:
 1. Elaboration of strategies for the development of a model 
cybercrime legislation that is globally applicable and interop-
erable with existing national and regional legislative measures
 2. Elaboration of global strategies for the creation of appropriate 
national and regional organizational structures and policies 
on cybercrime
 3. Development of a strategy for the establishment of globally 
accepted minimum security criteria and accreditation schemes 
for hardware and software applications and systems
 4. Development of strategies for the creation of a global 
framework for watch, warning, and incident response to 
ensure cross-border coordination between new and existing 
initiatives
 5. Development of global strategies for the creation and endorse-
ment of a generic and universal digital identity system and the 
necessary organizational structures to ensure the recognition 
of digital credentials across geographical boundaries
 6. Development of a global strategy to facilitate human and 
institutional capacity building to enhance knowledge and 
know-how across sectors
 7. Proposals on a framework for a global multistakeholder strat-
egy for international cooperation, dialogue, and coordination 
in all the above-mentioned areas
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In order to achieve these seven goals, the GCA has been structured 
in pillars to facilitate implementation and ensure an integrated and 
harmonized approach.
The Pillars of the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA)
This section provides details on the pillars composing the GCA and 
the work currently undertaken by ITU in coordination and collabora-
tion with its partners.
Legal Measures
Cyber criminals are an ever-present menace on the Internet while 
organized crime is on the rise. This is due to the fact that loopholes in 
national and regional legislation remain, making it difficult to effec-
tively track them down. The main problem is the lack of international 
harmonization regarding cybercrime legislation. Investigation and 
prosecution are difficult if the categorization of crimes differs from 
country to country. The Internet is an international communication 
tool, and consequently, any solution to secure it must be sought at the 
global level.
Cybercrime Legislation Resources The ITU assists member states in 
understanding the legal aspects of cybersecurity in order to move toward 
harmonizing legal frameworks. Through these cybercrime legislation 
resources, ITU addresses the first of the seven strategic goals of the 
GCA, which calls for the elaboration of strategies for the development 
of cybercrime legislation that is globally applicable and interoperable 
with existing national and regional legislative measures. This activity 
also addresses the ITU approach for organizing national cybersecurity 
efforts, highlighting that establishing the appropriate legal infrastruc-
tures is an integral component of a national cybersecurity strategy.
The adoption by all countries of appropriate legislation against the 
misuse of ICTs for criminal or other purposes, including activities 
intended to affect the integrity of national critical information infra-
structures, is central to achieving global cybersecurity. Because threats 
can originate anywhere around the globe, the challenges are inher-
ently international in scope and require international cooperation, 
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investigative assistance, and common substantive and procedural 
provisions. Thus, it is important that countries harmonize their legal 
frameworks to combat cybercrime and facilitate international coop-
eration. The ITU (2009) cybercrime legislation resources currently 
consist of “Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing 
Countries,” a publication, and the “ITU (2010) Toolkit for Cybercrime 
Legislation,” described below.
“Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries” This publi-
cation aims to help developing countries better understand the national 
and international implications of growing cyber threats; assess the 
requirements of existing national, regional, and international instru-
ments; and assist countries in establishing a sound legal foundation.
The guide also provides a broad selection of resources for a more 
in-depth study of the different topics, such as an overview of the phe-
nomena of cybercrime, which includes descriptions of how crimes 
are committed and explanations of the most widespread cybercrime 
offenses such as hacking, identity theft, and denial-of-service attacks. 
It also covers the challenges as they relate to the investigation and 
prosecution of cybercrime and a summary of activities undertaken by 
international and regional organizations in the fight against cyber-
crime. It concludes with an analysis of different legal approaches 
with regard to substantive criminal law, procedural law, international 
cooperation, and the responsibility of Internet Service Providers, pro-
viding examples of international approaches as well as good-practice 
examples from national solutions.
“Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation” (2010) The toolkit aims to provide 
countries with sample legislative language and reference material 
that can assist in the establishment of harmonized cybercrime laws 
and procedural rules. Developed by a multidisciplinary international 
group of experts, the toolkit is a practical instrument that countries 
can use for the elaboration of a cybersecurity legal framework and 
related laws.
The sample language provided in the toolkit, while not intended 
as a model law, was developed after a comprehensive analysis of the 
most relevant regional and international legal frameworks currently 
in place. The toolkit language is consistent with these laws and is 
86 marCo oBIso and Gary foWlIe
intended to serve as a guide for countries desiring to develop, draft, 
or modify their own cybercrime laws. The toolkit intends to advance 
the global harmonization of cybercrime laws by serving as a central 
resource to help legislators, attorneys, government officials, policy 
experts, and industry representatives around the globe move their 
countries toward a consistent legal framework that protects against 
the misuse of ICTs.
Technical and Procedural Measures
ICTs are a vital tool in information societies. However, they continue 
to be exploited by malevolent users, and this phenomenon is becoming 
intrinsically linked to organized crime on the Internet. Vulnerabilities 
in software applications are purposely sought out in order to create 
malware that enable unauthorized access and modification, thus com-
promising integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of ICT networks 
and systems. With the increasing sophistication of malware, these 
threats cannot be overestimated as they could have dire consequences 
if critical information infrastructures are affected.
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Standardization Work ITU’s 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) brings together the private sector and 
governments to work and promote the harmonization of security policy 
and standards on an international scale, which are essential in ensuring 
cybersecurity.
Not only will harmonization of standards increase the level of 
security, it will also reduce the costs of building secure systems.
There are now literally hundreds of ITU standards (ITU-T 
Recommendations) on security, or which have cybersecurity implica-
tions. In particular,
• The X.500 series of Recommendations on directory ser-
vices and authentication, including the well-known 
Recommendation ITU-T X.509. X.509 is a cornerstone for 
designing applications related to public key infrastructure 
(PKI) and is widely used in a wide range of applications 
from securing the connection between a browser and a 
server on the web to providing digital signatures that enable 
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e-commerce transactions to be conducted with the same 
confidence as in a traditional system. Without wide accep-
tance of the standard, the rise of e-business would have 
been impossible.
• The X.800 series on Security Architecture includes 
Recommendation ITU-T X.805, which gives telecom net-
work operators and enterprises the ability to provide an end-
to-end architecture description from a security perspective. 
Key players from telecom network operators, manufactur-
ers, and governments have defined the specifications that 
will alter the way that companies look at their networks. The 
Recommendation will allow operators to pinpoint all vulner-
able points in a network and mitigate them.
• The Recommendation ITU-T X.1205 “Overview of 
Cybersecurity” provides a definition of cybersecurity and tax-
onomy of security threats. It discusses the nature of the cyber-
security environment and risks, possible network protection 
strategies, secure communications techniques, and network 
survivability (even under attack).
Ongoing ITU work on security includes architecture and frame-
works; cybersecurity; vulnerabilities, threats, and risk management; 
incident handling and traceback; countering spam; telebiometrics; 
information security management; identity management; security for 
next-generation networks (NGN), IPTV, home networks, ubiquitous 
sensor networks, mobiles; and secure application services. ITU Study 
Groups are also starting to look at security concerns in emerging areas 
such as smart grids and cloud computing.
One particularly urgent area of work is in combating identity 
theft, which was identified in an ITU survey as the biggest fear pre-
venting users from placing more trust in online networks. In 2009, 
a first set of ITU-T Recommendations dealing with identity man-
agement was approved for application in NGN, for globalization of 
existing solutions, and ensuring interoperability, and for user control 
of digital identity.
Study Group 17 is the lead study group on telecommunications 
security and identity management at the ITU. It is responsible for 
studies related to security, including cybersecurity, countering spam 
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by technical means, and identity management and handles secu-
rity guidance and the coordination of security-related work across 
all ITU-T study groups. Study Group 17 updates the manual on 
“Security in Telecommunications and Information Technology” and 
also electronically publishes a Security Compendium on its website 
containing a catalogue of approved ITU-T Recommendations related 
to security and presenting an extract of security definitions from 
ITU-T and other sources.
In addition, ITU-T’s Cybersecurity Information Exchange 
(CYBEX) initiative will be importing more than 20 best-of-breed 
standards for platforms developed over the past several years by gov-
ernment agencies and industry to enhance cybersecurity. These plat-
forms capture and exchange information about the security “state” 
of systems and devices, about vulnerabilities, about incidents such 
as cyber attacks, and related knowledge “heuristics.” The CYBEX 
approach pursued pulls these platforms together in a coherent way to 
provide for (1) “locking down” online systems to minimize vulnera-
bilities, (2) capturing incident information for analysis when network 
harmful incidents occur, and (3) facilitating evidence for enforcement 
action if necessary.
As a starting point of CYBEX, Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 
provides an overview of the landscape of current and forthcom-
ing Recommendations on “Cybersecurity information exchange 
techniques.” First, practical means for such cybersecurity informa-
tion exchange techniques are specified in Recommendation ITU-T 
X.1520 “Common vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE),” which pro-
vides a structured means to exchange information security vulnera-
bilities and exposures that aim to provide common names for publicly 
known problems in the commercial or open source software used in 
communications networks, end-user devices, or any of the other types 
of ICT capable of running software. In that regard, X.1520 allows 
vulnerability databases and other capabilities to be linked together, 
and to facilitate the comparison of security tools and services.
Recommendation ITU-T X.1521 “Common vulnerability scor-
ing system (CVSS)” provides an open framework for communicating 
the characteristics and impacts of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) vulnerabilities in the same context and allows the 
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users of this Recommendation to speak from a common language of 
scoring ICT vulnerabilities.
Recommendation X.1209 “Capabilities and their context scenar-
ios for cybersecurity information sharing and exchange” describes 
the foundational scenarios at a high level and identifies the support-
ing capabilities for cybersecurity information sharing and exchange. 
These provided capabilities are important for supporting interoper-
ability between applications for the sharing and exchange of cyberse-
curity information.
The CYBEX activities are surrounded by Recommendation ITU-T 
X.1206 that yields “A vendor-neutral framework for automatic notifi-
cation of security related information and dissemination of updates,” 
and by Recommendation ITU-T X.1207 that captures best practices 
and “Guidelines for telecommunication service providers for address-
ing the risk of spyware and potentially unwanted software.”
For CYBEX, ITU worked closely with the Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST)—a global organization for 
coordination and cooperation among Computer Emergency Response 
Teams. Collaboration between other standards bodies and other tech-
nical bodies is an essential characteristic of ITU’s work.
ICT Security Standards Roadmap Promoting Collaboration between 
International Standards Bodies The ICT Security Standards Roadmap 
promotes the development of security standards by highlighting 
existing standards, current work, and future standards among key 
standards development organizations. The Roadmap was launched by 
ITU Study Group 17 and is a joint effort with the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) and the Network and 
Information Security Steering Group (NISSG). The Roadmap 
describes the different standards organizations, their structures, 
and the work they are undertaking in security standards, includ-
ing International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International 
Standards Organization (ISO), International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), International Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
Oasis Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) (OASIS), Alliance 
for Telecommunication Industry Solutions (ATIS), European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 3rd Generation Partership Project 
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(3GPP), and 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2). The 
publication provides a database summarizing approved standards and 
gives an overview of standards under development by ITU and ISO/
IEC. It also includes future areas of work in security standards where 
gaps have been identified or proposals made for new standards work 
as well as a repository of security-related best practices contributed by 
members and stakeholders.
ITU Radiocommunications Radio spectrum global frequency manage-
ment is increasingly important for building confidence and security 
and creating an enabling environment in the use of ICTs. Wireless 
applications, such as 3G, are becoming an integral part of daily life, 
and the global use and management of frequencies require a high level 
of international cooperation.
ITU’s Radiocommunication Sector’s (ITU-R) mission is to 
ensure rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use of the radio-
frequency spectrum by all radiocommunication services, including 
those using satellite orbits, and to carry out studies and adopt rec-
ommendations on radiocommunication matters. It plays a pivotal 
role in facilitating complex intergovernmental negotiations needed 
to develop legally binding agreements between sovereign states in an 
increasingly “unwired” world.
International radiocommunication provisions are embodied in 
the ITU Radio Regulations (treaty status, which means they are 
binding once agreed to) that incorporate the decisions of the World 
Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs) and in world and regional 
plans adopted for different space and terrestrial services. ITU Radio 
Regulations agreements apply to frequencies ranging from 9 kHz to 
400 GHz and include information on how radio frequency is shared 
around the globe.
ITU-R specializes in developing radio standards, including spec-
trum identification and harmonization applicable to national, regional, 
and international broadband network infrastructure including the 
capacity to countries and their citizens for new ICT-based services 
through satellite systems. ITU-R ensures interference-free operations 
of radiocommunication systems and facilitates any new developments 
and the continuation of satellite services in a safe way.
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Safeguarding quality of service against degradation or denial of 
service is vital for the secure functioning of networks in data trans-
mission and service provision, and many of the Radiocommunication 
Sector’s (ITU-R) latest Recommendations on generic requirements 
and the protection of radiocommunications against interference are 
relevant for security.
ITU’s work in radiocommunication standardization continues, 
matching the constant evolution in modern telecommunication net-
works. For example, ITU established clear security principles for 
IMT-2000 (3G) networks (Recommendation ITU-R M.1078 and 
Recommendations M.1223, M.1457, M.1645 are also relevant) and 
also recommended that the security provided by mobile broadband 
IMT-2000 (3G) networks should be comparable to contemporary 
fixed networks.
International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) 
Global Response Center The Global Response Center (GRC), part 
of the ITU’s collaboration with the International Multilateral 
Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT), plays a pivotal 
role in realizing the GCA objective of putting technical measures 
in place to combat new and evolving cyber threats. The two high-
lights of the GRC are NEWS (Network Early Warning System) and 
ESCAPE (Electronically Secure Collaboration Application Platform 
for Experts).
The GRC is designed to be the foremost cyber threat resource cen-
ter in the world. Working with leading partners, including academia 
and governments, the center will provide the global community with 
NEWS, a real-time aggregated early warning system. It will help 
countries identify cyber threats early on and provide guidance on 
what measures to take to mitigate them, including implementation of 
watch, warning, and incident response capabilities, establishment of 
computer incident response teams, and distribution of alerts, techni-
cal assistance, and security-related training.
The GRC will also provide ITU member states with access to spe-
cialized tools and systems, including the recently developed ESCAPE 
platform. ESCAPE is an electronic tool that enables cyber experts 
across different countries to pool resources and collaborate with each 
other remotely, yet within a secure and trusted environment. Access 
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to ESCAPE is given to representatives selected by the member states, 
as well as to experts designated by ITU IMPACT partners. By pool-
ing resources and expertise from many different countries on short 
notice, ESCAPE will enable individual nations and the global com-
munity to respond immediately to cyber threats, especially during 
crisis situations.
As of 2011, some 136 countries have joined ITU IMPACT, and 
access to the GRC is being given, including the necessary capacity 
building.
Organizational Structures
Watch and warning systems and incident response are essential when 
it comes to responding to cyber attacks, as is the free flow of infor-
mation, collaboration, and cooperation within and between national 
organizational structures.
Collaboration at all levels of government and with the private sec-
tor, academia, and regional and international organizations is nec-
essary to raise awareness of potential attacks and take steps toward 
remediation. Effective incident management also requires consider-
ation of funding, human resources, training, technological capability, 
government and private sector relationships, and legal requirements. 
Efforts are being made to bring together organizational structures 
at the national and regional levels in order to facilitate communica-
tion, information exchange, and the recognition of digital credentials 
across different jurisdictions.
However, more needs to be done at the global level, and interna-
tional cooperation between these different structures is indispensable.
In this regard, ITU is working with member states to identify the 
specific cybersecurity needs that they have and, based on this work, 
with the relevant national, regional, and international organizations 
to implement these activities.
Yet, there is still a low level of computer emergency preparedness 
within many countries, particularly developing countries. But the 
launch of an attack from networks of the less-prepared nations can 
affect global ICT networks because of a high level of interconnectiv-
ity. As such, several ITU initiatives are recommending that mem-
ber states establish national cybersecurity response centers, such as 
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computer incident response teams (CIRTs). For example, Resolution 
58 of the World Telecommunication Standards Assembly in 2008 
and Resolution 69 of the World Telecommunication Development 
Conference in 2009 emphasize that well-functioning CIRTs in devel-
oping countries will improve the level of readiness in responding to 
cyber attacks and contribute to achieving security in national ICT 
infrastructures, as well as achieve better coordination at the regional 
and international levels. In addition, they resolve to support the cre-
ation of CIRTs by identifying best practices to establish CIRTs, assess 
where they are needed, and support their implementation.
IMPACT Security Assurance Division In partnership with leading 
ICT experts, IMPACT aggregates and develops global best prac-
tice guidelines, creating an international benchmark that is espe-
cially relevant for governments. This division conducts, upon request, 
independent ICT security audits on government agencies or critical 
infrastructure companies, thereby ensuring that these organizations 
subscribe to the highest security standards.
The IMPACT Security Assurance Division functions as an inde-
pendent, internationally recognized, voluntary certification body 
for cybersecurity.
Capacity Building
Capacity building is essential in order to develop a sustainable and 
proactive culture of cybersecurity. One of the key challenges of cyber-
security is effectively educating the end user. This is a matter that 
concerns all stakeholders from governments and industry to education 
both at school and at home.
Given the essential role that ICTs play in providing services in sec-
tors as varied as health, education, finance, and commerce, awareness 
of the opportunities offered by a secure cyber environment and of the 
threats inherent to cyberspace are vital. Programs aimed at creating a 
level playing field in raising basic awareness and building capacity at 
all levels are important, and these also need to be undertaken within 
the international arena.
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A National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide The ITU has established a 
practical guide to assist member states wishing to design their national 
approach to cybersecurity and critical information infrastructure pro-
tection (CIIP).
Cybersecurity and CIIP are the shared responsibilities of government, 
business, other organizations, and individual users who develop, own, 
provide, manage, service, and use information systems and networks 
(“participants”). Managing inherent security risks requires the active 
cooperation of all participants, addressing the security concerns relevant 
to their roles. The collective goal is to prevent, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from any incidents rapidly, while minimizing damage.
In any interconnected system, roles and responsibilities often over-
lap. Only when all participants share a common understanding of the 
security objectives, how to achieve them, and of their individual roles 
in the effort, can this collective goal of a safe and secure communica-
tions be achieved.
Governments are in a position to lead national efforts to enhance 
cybersecurity and improve CIIP. Many countries have already imple-
mented national governmental efforts to protect critical (informa-
tion) infrastructure. A common vision with well-delineated roles and 
responsibilities is essential in order to create a strategy for managing 
risks inherent in ICT use.
Once a nation has gained valuable domestic experience of address-
ing cybersecurity and CIIP issues, it can make more valuable contri-
butions to global cooperative security efforts.
In this regard, the ITU National Cybersecurity Guide aims to 
assist ITU member states in developing their national strategy by 
examining their existing capacities for addressing challenges to 
cybersecurity and CIIP, identifying their requirements and outlining 
a national response plan. It is directed at leaders in the policy and 
management levels of government, providing them with guidance 
on how to assess their existing national policies, procedures, norms, 
institutions, and relationships in light of national needs to enhance 
cybersecurity and address critical information infrastructure protec-
tion. It also guides them on how to develop cybersecurity strategies 
after matching ends (objectives), means (resources and capabilities), 
and ways (how to use the means to achieve the ends), in line with the 
overall objectives and goals of the GCA.
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ITU, through its Telecommunication Development Sector, pro-
vides member states with the assistance needed to undertake these 
efforts, as well as providing support for countries that are in the process 
of developing and reassessing their national cybersecurity strategies.
A Botnet Mitigation Toolkit ITU is working with experts on develop-
ing a practical Botnet Mitigation Toolkit to assist developing coun-
tries in particular to deal with the growing problem of botnets.
A botnet is a collection of software agents, or robots, that run 
autonomously and automatically. The term is most commonly associ-
ated with malicious software, but it can also refer to a network of com-
puters using distributed computing software. While botnets are often 
named after their malicious software name, there are typically mul-
tiple botnets in operation using the same malicious software families.
The Botnet Mitigation Toolkit is a multistakeholder, multipronged 
approach to track botnets and mitigate their impact, with a particular 
emphasis on the problems specific to emerging Internet economies. It 
will provide information and guidelines to member states on how to 
protect against and deal with botnets, and will also advise states on 
how to cooperate with local and regional stakeholders, including busi-
ness and private industry, law enforcement agencies, Internet service 
providers (ISPs), and civil society organizations.
International Cooperation
Even though the Internet and ICTs have enabled unparalleled inter-
connection, they also limit the ability of countries to close their bor-
ders to incoming cyber threats and contain those coming from within. 
Attempts to solve these challenges at national or regional levels are 
important, but they can be undermined.
Cybersecurity is as global and far-reaching as the Internet. Therefore, 
solutions need to be harmonized across borders. International coopera-
tion is necessary, not only at the government level, but also with indus-
try, nongovernmental, and international organizations. For this reason, 
the GCA seeks to harness the power of multistakeholder collaboration 
in order to arrive at global strategies to enhance cybersecurity.
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International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) 
The International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats 
(IMPACT) is an international public–private initiative dedicated to 
enhancing the global community’s capacity to prevent, defend, and 
respond to cyber threats. In May 2008, the ITU was invited to become 
a member of the IMPACT Advisory Board. In November 2008, 
IMPACT’s headquarters in Cyberjaya, Malaysia, formally became the 
GCA’s operational, physical, and state-of-the-art home.
IMPACT Center for Policy and International Cooperation Under the lead-
ership of the ITU, and together with UN agency partners, Interpol, 
Council of Europe, and Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), among others, the Center for Policy 
and International Cooperation contributes to the formulation of new 
policies and the harmonization of national laws around a variety of 
issues relating to cyber threats, including cybercrimes.
The Center for Policy and International Cooperation also provides 
advisory services to interested member states on policy and regulatory 
matters for cybersecurity. With the support of the ITU, the center 
fosters international cooperation through specific programs such as 
coordinated cyber-drill exercises between countries.
IMPACT Training and Skills Development Center In collaboration with 
leading ICT companies and institutions, IMPACT conducts high-
level briefings for the benefit of representatives of ITU member states. 
Many of IMPACT’s key partners have made available their respective 
chief technical officers, chief research officers, and other experts in a 
unique high-level IMPACT program to keep governments abreast of 
present and future cyber threats.
The ITU contributes its experience to the center in capacity-building 
and developing frameworks for policy response to this program. Such 
high-level, cross-industry briefings give countries invaluable exposure 
and private sector insight about the latest trends, potential threats, and 
emerging technologies.
IMPACT Research Division The focus of the Research Division is to 
direct academic attention, including from universities and research 
institutes, to areas of concern that may not currently be adequately 
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addressed. This includes research into new areas as well as specialized 
niche areas, including research into vulnerabilities of nonmainstream 
systems, such as the legacy Supervisory Control and Data Aquisition 
(SCADA) systems still used by some countries.
With a small user base, niche technologies may not be commer-
cially viable for industry-oriented solutions, making governments or 
organizations using such technologies vulnerable to threats.
IMPACT is committed to making facilities available and encour-
aging joint research efforts to address specific areas of concern. In 
collaboration with the ITU, IMPACT is making its research network 
available for the benefit of the global community. Besides the aca-
demic network, IMPACT global headquarters provides ITU member 
states with access to specialized ICT laboratories, specialized equip-
ment, resource center, and other facilities.
A Cybersecurity Gateway The Cybersecurity Gateway is an informa-
tion resource on national, regional, and international cybersecurity-
related initiatives worldwide.
In today’s interconnected world, threats can originate anywhere, 
and thus our collective cybersecurity depends on the security practices 
of every connected country, entity, business, and citizen. Through the 
Cybersecurity Gateway, ITU aims to enable information access, dis-
semination, and online collaboration among stakeholders working in 
cybersecurity- and cybercrime-related areas. It serves as a platform to 
make stakeholders more aware of the various actors and groups work-
ing on the different areas of cybersecurity at the national, regional, 
and international levels.
The ITU invites all interested parties to explore the vast resources 
and links available through the Cybersecurity Gateway (http://www.
itu.int/cybersecurity) and join in partnership with the ITU and others 
to build confidence and security in the use of ICTs.
Child Online Protection Under the GCA umbrella, the ITU launched 
the Child Online Protection (COP) as an international collaborative 
network for action to promote the online protection of children and 
young people by providing guidance on safe online behavior in con-
junction with other UN agencies and partners. The key objectives of 
the initiative are to
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• Identify key risks and vulnerabilities to children and young 
people in cyberspace.
• Create awareness of risks and issues through multiple channels.
• Develop practical tools to help governments, organizations, 
and educators minimize risk.
• Share knowledge and experience while facilitating interna-
tional strategic partnerships to define and implement con-
crete initiatives.
The COP initiative draws together an effective package of policies 
and practices, education and training, infrastructure and technology, 
and awareness and communication. It operates on a multistakeholder 
basis with the belief that every organization—whether online or 
mobile, educator or legislator, technical expert or industry body—has 
something to contribute.
Cybersecurity—The United Nations Acting as One The ITU, as requested 
by the international community through the UN World Summit on 
the Information Society, has taken as a core principle of its man-
date the need to build confidence and security in the use of ICTs. 
Information and communication technology may have changed since 
the advent of the telegraph, but the mission of ITU to “Connect the 
World” in a safe and secure manner has not.
ICTs have become an essential part of human development, 145 
years after the ITU was established to deal with the challenges and 
opportunities of what was the very beginning of the information age. 
Today, management and provision of water supplies and power net-
works depend upon ICT networks. Food distribution chains, trans-
portation. and navigation systems are built around them. Industrial 
processes and supply chains operate because of them while they help 
education, healthcare, government, and emergency services become 
more efficient.
The essence of the challenge of cybersecurity is that the global 
ICT networks that have grown around these vital aspects of our daily 
lives were never designed to be especially secure. The cyber environ-
ment of today is significantly different from that which existed when 
the ITU first became a specialized agency of the United Nations 60 
years ago. It is an environment that challenges many of our traditional 
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approaches to security and requires unique solutions. However, one 
thing is certain, cybersecurity is a global issue that can only be solved 
with global solutions.
As the leading UN agency for ICTs, the ITU plays a pivotal role 
in facilitating this global cooperation, and together with govern-
ments, the private sector, civil society, and international organiza-
tions, can expedite the process of achieving global cybersecurity, 
through
• Facilitating the harmonization of legal frameworks at 
national, regional, and international levels
• Providing a platform to discuss and agree on the technical 
measures to be implemented to mitigate the risks posed by 
misuse of ICTs
• Helping member states in establishing those organizational 
structures needed to responding proactively to cyberthreats, 
triggering coordination and cooperation with all stakeholders 
at national and international levels
• Promoting the importance of building capacity and inter-
national cooperation as key elements for countries to fol-
low-up in order to obtain the necessary expertise to start 
elaborating and implementing national strategies as well 
as establishing mechanisms of cooperation at regional and 
international levels
In May 2011, the first step in this direction was taken as the ITU 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime signed a memo-
randum of understanding (MoU) to collaborate globally in assisting 
Member States to mitigate the risks posed by cybercrime with the 
objective of ensuring secure use of ICTs. It is the first time that two 
organizations within the UN system have formally agreed to cooper-
ate at the global level in regards to cybersecurity.
The MoU enables the two bodies to work together on technical 
assistance to be provided to Member States on cybercrime and cyber-
security, making available the necessary expertise and resources to 
facilitate the establishment of legal measures and legislative frame-
works at a national level, within the principle of international coop-
eration, and to the benefit of all countries in the world.
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Establishing global cybersecurity may be a complex, multifaceted, 
and challenging task, but if we act as one, the benefits gained from 
our information society may provide humanity with the best chance it 
has ever had for sustainable peace, security, and development.
Acronyms
ATIS: Automatic Terminal Information Service
CIRT: Computer incident response team
CIIP: Critical information infrastructure protection
COP: Child Online Protection
CYBEX: Cybersecurity Information Exchange
DDoS: Distributed denial of service
ENISA: European Network and Information Agency
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute
GCA: Global Cybersecurity Agenda 
ICTs: Information and communication technologies
IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
IMPACT: International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber 
Threats
IMT-2000: International Mobile Telecommunications–2000
IP: Internet Protocol
ISO: International Organization for Standards
ITU: International Telecommunication Union
NGN: Next-generation network
NISSG: Network and Information Security Steering Group
OAIS: Open Archival Information System
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PKI: Public key infrastructure
QoS: Quality of service
UN: United Nations
WSIS: World Summit on the Information Society
WTSA: World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly
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International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) Resolutions, Decisions, Programs, 
and Recommendations on Cybersecurity
Resolution 71 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Antalya, 2006)
This Resolution outlines the Strategic Plan for the Union 
for 2008–2011, including its mission and nature, stra-
tegic orientations and goals and detailed objectives for 
the Sectors. Under Goal 4, ITU should specifically 
engage in “developing tools, based on contributions 
from the membership, to promote end-user confidence, 
and to safeguard the efficiency, security, integrity and 
interoperability of networks,” with information and 
communication network efficiency and security defined 
as including, inter alia, spam, cybercrime, viruses, 
worms, and denial-of-service attacks. Under Objective 
3, ITU’s General Secretariat has been tasked to facilitate 
the internal coordination of activities among the three 
Sectors where work programs are overlapping or are 
related, so as to assist the membership in ensuring that it 
benefits from the full complement of expertise available 
within the Union.
Resolution 130 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Revised, Guadalajara, 2010)
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and 
security in the use of information and communication 
technologies”
Resolution 174 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Guadalajara, 2010)
“ITU’s role with regard to international public policy issues 
relating to the risk of illicit use of information and com-
munication technologies”
Resolution 181 the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Guadalajara, 2010)
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“Definitions and terminology relating to building confidence 
and security in the use of information and communication 
technologies”
Resolution 45 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (Revised, Hyderabad, 2010)
“Mechanisms for enhancing cooperation on Cybersecurity 
including countering and combating spam”
Resolution 69 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (Revised, Hyderabad, 2010)
“Creation of national computer incident response teams, 
particularly for developing countries, and cooperation 
between them”
Doha Action Plan Programme 2 of the ITU World 
Telecommunication Development Conference (Hydarabad, 
2010)
“Cybersecurity, ICT applications and IP-based network-
related issues”
Resolution 2 of the ITU World Telecommunication Development 
Conference (Revised, Hydarabad, 2010)
Annex 2 of Resolution 2—Question 22/1 “Securing informa-
tion and communication networks: best practices for develop-
ing a culture of cybersecurity”
Resolution 50 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Standardization Assembly (Johannesburg, 2008)
“Cybersecurity”
Resolution 52 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Standardization Assembly (Johannesburg, 2008)
“Countering and combating spam”
Resolution 58 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Standardization Assembly (Johannesburg, 2008)
“Encourage the creation of national Computer Incident 
Response Teams, particularly for developing countries”
ITU-T E.408
“Telecommunication networks security requirements”
ITU-T E.409
“Incident organization and security incident handling: 
Guidelines for telecommunication organizations”
ITU-T H.235.x Series Recommendations
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H.323 security: Framework for security in H series (H.323 





“Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks (global stan-
dard on identity management)”
ITU-T X.800 Series Recommendations
Global standards on key security aspects including authen-
tication, access control, nonrepudiation, confidentiality, 
integrity, audits, and security architecture for systems pro-
viding end-to-end communications
ITU-T X.805
“Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end 
communications”
ITU-T X.811
“Information technology—Open Systems Interconnection—
Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication 
framework”
ITU-T X.812
“Information technology—Open Systems Interconnection—
Security frameworks for open systems: Access control 
framework”
ITU-T X.1031
“Security architecture aspects of end users and networks in 
telecommunications”
ITU-T X.1034
“Framework for extensible authentication protocol (EAP)-
based authentication and key management”
ITU-T X.1035
“Password-authenticated key exchange (PAK) protocol”
ITU-T X.1036
“Framework for creation, storage, distribution and enforce-
ment of policies for network security”
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ITU-T X.1051
“Information technology—Security techniques—Information 
security management guidelines for telecommunications 
organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002”
ITU-T X.1055
“Risk management and risk profile guidelines for telecom-
munications organizations”
ITU-T X.1056
“Security incident management guidelines for telecommuni-
cations organizations”
ITU-T X.1081
“The telebiometric multimodal model—A framework 
for the specification of security and safety aspects of 
telebiometrics”
ITU-T X.1082





“Telebiometrics system mechanism—Part 1: General biomet-
ric authentication protocol and system model profiles for 
telecommunications systems”
ITU-T X.1086
“Telebiometric protection procedure—Part 1: A guideline to 
technical and managerial countermeasures for biometric 
data security”
ITU-T X.1088
“Telebiometrics digital key framework (TDK)—A frame-
work for biometric digital key generation and protection”
ITU-T X.1089
“Telebiometrics authentication infrastructure (TAI) ”
ITU-T X.1111
“Framework for security technologies for home network”
ITU-T X.1112
“Device certificate profile for the home network”
ITU-T X.1113
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“Guideline on user authentication mechanism for home net-
work services”
ITU-T X.1114
“Authorization framework for home network”
ITU-T X.1121
“Framework of security technologies for mobile end-to-end 
data communications”
ITU-T X.1122
“Guideline for implementing secure mobile systems based on 
PKI”
ITU-T X.1123
“Differentiated security service for secure mobile end-to-end 
data communication”
ITU-T X.1124
“Authentication architecture for mobile end-to-end data 
communication”
ITU-T X.1125
“Correlative Reacting System in mobile data communication”
ITU-T X.1141
“Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)”
ITU-T X.1142
“Web services security—eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML 2.0)”
ITU-T X.1143
“Security architecture for message security in mobile web 
services”
ITU-T X.1151
“Guideline on secure password-based authentication protocol 
with key exchange”
ITU-T X.1152
“Secure end-to-end data communication techniques using 
trusted third party services”
ITU-T X.1161
“Framework for secure peer-to-peer communications”
ITU-T X.1162
“Security architecture and operations for peer-to-peer 
network”
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ITU-T X.1171
“Threats and requirements for protection of personally iden-
tifiable information in applications using tag-based 
identification”
ITU-T X.1191





“A vendor-neutral framework for automatic notification of 
security related information and dissemination of updates”
ITU-T X.1207
“Guidelines for telecommunication service providers for 
addressing the risk of spyware and potentially unwanted 
software”
ITU-T X.1231
“Technical strategies for countering spam”
ITU-T X.1240
“Technologies involved in countering email spam”
ITU-T X.1241
“Technical framework for countering email spam”
ITU-T X.1242
“Short message service (SMS) spam filtering system based on 
user-specified rules”
ITU-T X.1244
ITU-T “Overall aspects of countering spam in IP-based mul-
timedia applications”
ITU-T X.1303
“Common alerting protocol (CAP 1.1)”
ITU-T X.1500 
“Cybersecurity information exchange techniques”
ITU-T X.1520
“Common vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE)”
ITU-T X.1521
“Common vulnerability scoring sytem (CV1S)”
Resolution 45 of the ITU World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (Doha, 2006)
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“Mechanisms for enhancing cooperation on cybersecurity, 
including combating spam”
Recommendation ITU-R M.1078
“Security principles for IMT-2000”
Recommendation ITU-R M.1223
“Evaluation of security mechanisms for IMT-2000”
Recommendation ITU-R M.1457
“Security mechanisms incorporated in IMT-2000”
Recommendation ITU-R M.1645
“Framework and overall objectives of the future development 
of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000”
Recommendation ITU-R S.1250
“Network management architecture for digital satellite sys-
tems forming part of SDH transport networks in the fixed 
satellite service”
Recommendation ITU-R S.1711
“Performance enhancements of transmission control protocol 
over satellite networks”
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The Tyranny of Geography
E L A I N E  C .  K A M A RC K
Introduction
It is not uncommon to begin a paper on the role of the government by 
imagining how surprised Presidents George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson would be at the concerns of the day. But for cybersecurity 
one only has to go back to the first Clinton Administration to real-
ize that it is a unique problem unlike anything government has ever 
faced. A search of major newspapers on LexisNexis, an information 
provider, finds one article that mentions cybersecurity prior to 1996, 
and that is a story of how credit card companies tried to go online 
and suffered near instantaneous security breaches. Part of the problem 
stems from the speed with which the Internet moved from a tool used 
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by a handful of researchers to trade information into something that 
is at the center of everything that modern people do. When I went 
to serve in the Clinton Administration in 1993, there was no World 
Wide Web. The Internet became available in the White House in 
1996, but by the time I left government in 1997 I had never browsed 
the web. Today, hardly a day passes without me using it.
Because the Internet began benignly and grew rapidly, the govern-
ment has played catch up and seems destined to continue to do so for 
quite some time. The American governmental father of cybersecurity, 
Richard A. Clarke, has a clear message in his best-selling book on the 
topic: America invented the Internet; it is the most wired country in 
the world, and hence, it is the most vulnerable—in spite of its sophis-
tication. Clarke’s insight has a historical distinctiveness that should 
not be overlooked. Technological advantages in warfare have always 
been associated with greater security for those who possessed them. 
But in the case of the Internet, technological advantage has simul-
taneously created vulnerability. In a brief amount of time the entire 
communications infrastructure of the nation has changed in ways that 
have made us more vulnerable to attack in spite of our economic and 
military advantages. Responding to these new threats poses policy 
challenges that are new to modern government.
But beyond being simply new, another reason that cybersecurity 
puts the government in uncharted territory has to do with geogra-
phy, or in this instance, the absence thereof. From inception, gov-
ernment has relied on geography. Kings ruled kingdoms—areas of 
land with borders—sometimes imprecise, often disputed—but always 
defining the geography within which the state could act. In modern 
government geography exercises a tyranny over organization. The tyr-
anny of geography defines the distinction between domestic and for-
eign, between nation and state, between state and town. Geography 
defines jurisdiction, “the power or right to exercise authority” per the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary. In modern government jurisdiction is 
implicit in everything from war between nation states to controver-
sies between national and local authorities, as exemplified by tensions 
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local police 
departments in the United States.
Cyberspace, however, transcends geography and herein lays the 
fundamental governmental problem. No one can put yellow police 
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tape around the cybercrime scene, and no one can define the battle-
field. The absence of geography makes the traditional governmental 
tasks of protection and retribution especially difficult. It is also unclear 
who is in charge of protecting cyberspace. In the United States, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) created the first Cyber Command in 
2010 while the FBI has traditionally taken jurisdiction in crimes that 
cross state lines as nearly all cybercrimes do. But when a cybercrime or 
cyber attack occurs, we have trouble finding out where the criminals 
are. We have established protocols, arrangements with other countries 
that allow us to extradite murderers, child molesters, and all sorts of 
other undesirables so that they can be brought to justice. But often we 
have no idea or cannot be sure where the cyber criminal is. If another 
country attacks us we know where the missiles come from and we can 
decide how to retaliate. But it is very difficult to know where hack-
ers are. Sometimes we can pinpoint the country in which they sit 
but cannot determine whether the attack is an intentional attack by a 
government or an attack by a group of criminals who happen to be in 
a given country at a given time and who perhaps have also attacked 
sites in that same country.
This is why cybersecurity is a challenge unlike anything govern-
ments have encountered before. When we are able to establish juris-
diction, we are able to establish rules, laws, and accountability for 
adherence to the law—the three bedrock principles of modern demo-
cratic governance. In the absence of jurisdiction everyone is account-
able and therefore no one is accountable. Other problems emerge from 
this underlying challenge to cybersecurity policy. Using the U.S. fed-
eral government as a primary example but also showing that these 
issues are common challenges to other information age countries as 
well, this chapter highlights diffusion of responsibility between gov-
ernment organizations and discusses three areas of complexity that 
flow from it: civil liberty and privacy issues, the challenge of public–
private partnerships, and the people problem.
The Rise of Electronic Government
The Internet was created by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), an American government entity tasked with 
developing innovative technology for the military, and evolved from 
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there to a system used by the entire world. But less well known is that 
demand for computing was not only created by the United States but 
also by large, domestic, data-driven agencies like the Social Security 
Administration. Testimony to this fact was that when the year turned 
from 1999 to 2000, the infamous “Y2K” problem that was supposed 
to wreak havoc with computers around the world turned out to be 
largely an American problem, not a global one. The reason was that 
the U.S. government had practically single-handedly created the 
information age, and it alone, therefore, was the owner of “legacy” 
systems that were vulnerable to the Y2K problem.
By the time President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore came to 
office in 1993 the information age was already transforming the pri-
vate sector. Gore, whose landmark legislation brought the Internet 
out of DARPA and into global use, was given the task of “reinvent-
ing government.” To do so, he was determined to use new informa-
tion technologies to bring to the public sector the same large-scale 
productivity breakthroughs that had occurred in the private sector; 
hence, the term electronic government, or simply e-government, 
was born.
With lightning speed the Internet became critical to operations 
within government and to communications between citizens and gov-
ernment. As Gore led the Clinton Administration’s efforts to put the 
government online, it became evident that the Internet could promise 
huge savings to government and improved convenience to citizens. 
Initially most government agencies put information and forms online. 
But by the end of the Clinton/Gore Administration people wanted 
more than information—they wanted to be able to conduct transac-
tions as well. For most of the world’s information age economies, the 
movement from “information” to “transactions” on the Internet was 
swift. As long as a country had a large number of citizens online and 
had a banked economy (i.e., not a cash economy), the move from office 
transactions to Internet transactions was relatively easy. New private 
sector entrants such as Ezgov.com and established corporations such 
as Microsoft and IBM also discovered a large new market opportu-
nity in helping governments move from paper to web.
Research from the Pew Internet and American Life Project, which 
has been polling Americans about their use of the Internet since 2001, 
illustrates the increased use of e-government. Its 2010 poll found that
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[M]any more Americans are now completing simple transactions with 
government than was the case in 2001. At that time, just 2% of online 
government users had paid a government fine online—now, 15% of all 
Internet users have done so. Similarly, 4% of online government users 
had applied for a recreational license online in 2001, a figure that has 
now grown to 11% of all Internet users. Renewing driver’s licenses and 
auto registrations has also become much more common—from 12% of 
online government users in 2001 to one-third of all Internet users today.
The most common form of online government transaction has become 
tax filing, which has been growing steadily over the course of the past 
decade. In 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported that 99 
million people used e-file in the United States, thus keeping up with a 
trend of steadily increasing use of the Internet for purposes of paying tax. 
In Sweden, about half the population declares their taxes online.
While America might have led the way, e-government is a global 
trend fueled by two powerful factors—public demand and cost. By 
2007 the percentage of people who had used the Internet in their 
transactions with public authorities averaged 32% for citizens in the 
OECD countries. As younger tech-savvy citizens got to the age where 
they had to file tax returns and register motor vehicles they expected 
to be able to do this online, because they were doing most of their 
other transactions online—from buying clothes to meeting members 
of the opposite sex. On the government side of the equation, public 
sector leaders discovered that online transactions were much cheaper 
than offline transactions. Ezgov.com, an online solutions provider, 
estimated that postal or telephone transactions cost from 5 to 10 times 
more than an online transaction and that face-to-face transactions 
cost from 50 to 100 times more.
But as the rate of online transactions has grown so has the risk. It is 
one thing to hack into someone’s Amazon.com account; quite another 
to hack into their tax or health records. And so, as e-government has 
expanded to keep pace with private sector dependence on the Internet 
so have the vulnerabilities of average citizens to cybercrime and 
the need for modern governments to provide some sort of coherent 
defense for its citizens. But in order to achieve good cybersecurity, 
the public sector must tackle several problems, all stemming from the 
tyranny of geography.
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Problem #1: Diffusion of Responsibility 
between Government Organizations
The first recorded instance of computer espionage took place in 1986 
and illustrated the problem with jurisdictional thinking when it comes 
to cybersecurity. The story is told in a 1989 book by Clifford Stoll 
called, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer 
Espionage. The author, a graduate student managing computers at the 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories, is asked to resolve a $0.75 
discrepancy in the lab’s accounting system. As he tries to untangle 
this fairly minor issue, he discovers that someone is systematically 
hacking into or attempting to hack into U.S. military sites. As the 
saga unfolds and Stoll attempts to alert the authorities he is handed 
from one part of the government to another. The FBI initially cannot 
be interested in the problem because the amount of money involved 
is too small. The national security agencies are intrigued but do not 
know quite what to do. As Stoll is handed off from one federal agency 
to another, he encounters various parts of the government’s national 
security apparatus—a culture shock for a self-described countercul-
tural type. The story finally ends with the FBI coming back into the 
picture to arrest the hackers in Germany, an early illustration also of 
the fact that this is a global issue.
In the intervening years the governmental response to cyber 
threats has changed from the lackadaisical and somewhat quizzical 
attitude encountered by Stoll to one of intense interest, not to men-
tion intense funding. But the cacophony of governmental entities in 
the game persists because in cyberspace the government is playing 
both offense and defense.
In the United States, the offense is and has been handled, not 
surprisingly, by the DoD and the National Security Agency (NSA), 
both of which have been involved in this area for a long time. For 
example, according to Clarke’s new book, Cyber War: The Next Threat 
to National Security and What to Do about It, the first class of officers 
trained in cyber war graduated from the National Defense University 
in 1995. In 1996, cryptome.org, a military news website, reported 
that the Pentagon published a report of the Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Information Warfare Defense, which was one of the 
earliest to identify the possibilities and vulnerabilities of the United 
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States to information warfare. Also in 1996, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) was already dealing with the cyber world through its 
advanced technology panel. But within the U.S. federal government 
no agency has been as preeminent as the NSA, which, as the nation’s 
premier organization for electronic spying, has had the technological 
and legal authority to explore infiltration of the Internet for intel-
ligence purposes. Its long involvement and significant expertise has 
given it enormous capacity which is why General Keith Alexander 
assumed a dual position as Director of NSA and Commander of the 
U.S. Cyber Command, formed in 2010. The other reason that NSA is 
the preeminent government player in this area has to do with money. 
Although the portion of the cyber budget at DoD is difficult to deter-
mine because so much of it is for “black” or cybersecurity activities 
that are highly classified, most sources put it at somewhere around 
$2.3 billion—a number that dwarfs spending on the nonmilitary side 
of the budget.
The defensive side of cybersecurity has been located in the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ever since it was created 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a result of combining 22 existing 
agencies into one. The perception that the defensive, or domestic, 
side of the government’s cybersecurity operation was weak has been 
reinforced by an overall impression that DHS was weak. In its early 
years, DHS was known in government as a dumping ground for 
mediocre civil servants. On the political side, DHS was known as the 
place where the Bush Administration placed people it owed political 
favors without regard to their preparation for the job. Colonel Robert 
Stephen, who was brought into the White House to work for then 
homeland security advisor Tom Ridge (whom he followed to DHS 
when the new department was created), recalls the early days of DHS: 
“The NSA was off doing its own thing, DoD was doing its own thing. 
Their two ships never crossed paths. There was a lot of contention 
between FBI and DHS over this…. We brokered a truce in the 2004 
time frame [because] everyone was setting up their own cyberspace. 
DHS was the newer and weaker kid on the block” (Interview with 
Author, 2010).
The status of DHS in this area began to change in 2007 as a result 
of presidential attention. Again, according to Stephen (2010):
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To be honest… none of it mattered until 2007 (late spring or early sum-
mer) when the Office of the Director of National Intelligence requested 
briefing time with President Bush and rolled in with a very scary cyber 
briefing. Bush got very interested in this after that and did a quick study. 
Within a few months after that at a briefing with the National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee—Bush came in for 45 min-
utes and talked in depth about the cyber problem and pinged 30 CEOs 
in the room. …When the President gets involved… first lots of money 
appears. …From that moment on it became an interagency frenzy.
By 2008, President Bush’s attention to cybersecurity was being felt 
throughout the government. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS, 
made it one of his top priorities for 2008, admitting to reporters in 
a USA Today article that “It’s the one area in which I feel we’ve been 
behind where I would like to be” (Wolf, 2008, p. 6A). Bush’s bud-
get proposed a 10% increase in cybersecurity funding. The increased 
attention coincided with an increase in reported security breaches to 
DHS and reports that Estonia’s largest bank had been shut down for 
3 weeks in 2007, a victim of cyber attacks.
President Obama came into office promising that he would put 
cybersecurity on center stage. One of the first things he did was to 
task Melissa Hathaway of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive 60-day review to assess U.S. 
cybersecurity. The plan, formally known as the “Cyberspace Policy 
Review,” was released on May 29, 2009. The very first recommen-
dation was to appoint an official responsible for coordinating the 
nation’s cybersecurity policies and to create an National Security 
Council (NSC) directorate devoted to the interagency coordination 
of those issues. On January 6, 2010, the White House announced 
that Georgia Tech professor Howard Schmidt, a former Microsoft 
official with decades of experience in the field, would assume the role 
of cyber czar. His tenure has illustrated the divisions within govern-
ment, reflected in the difficulties DHS has had in recruiting and 
retaining leadership and in the ongoing disputes within the govern-
ment between the domestic and national security sides. For instance, 
Seymour Hersh, a veteran journalist, reported in a 2010 article in The 
New Yorker that the Director of the National Cybersecurity Center 
Rod Beckstrom had resigned, stating that DHS’s cybersecurity efforts 
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are “controlled” by the National Security Agency. Beckstrom is not 
the first DHS official to resign in frustration and thereby prompt 
attempts at solving the underlying problem of who’s in charge of 
what. In 2005, Amit Yoran, the very first director of cybersecurity, 
left amidst speculation that he was frustrated at the lack of impor-
tance put on cybersecurity at the DHS. Michael Chertoff, the then 
Secretary of DHS, responded that summer by announcing the cre-
ation of the position of Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and 
Telecommunications. After Beckstrom’s departure the Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates and the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
Janet Napolitano signed a Memorandum of Agreement, published 
in October 2010, that would place DoD analysts at the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) 
and would place DHS personnel at NSA. This was widely praised as 
an important step in recognizing the difficulties inherent in trying 
to separate cybersecurity issues by organization. Nonetheless, some 
believe that this will not be enough and that the only solution will 
be to place cybersecurity in its own separate organization. A 2010 
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
a Washington think-tank that conducted President Obama’s 60-day 
review of cybersecurity policy, stated: “Although the administration 
created a cybersecurity coordinator and a new office, we still believe 
that the nation will ultimately need something like the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative to lead and coordinate federal policy for 
what has become a central element of national security and economic 
life” (p. 6).
For the time being, however, the U.S. federal government seems 
to have opted for a decentralized approach to cybersecurity where 
the DoD controls offense and defends the dot-mil domain space and 
where DHS is responsible for the dot-gov domain space and attempts 
to coordinate security with the private sector. In practice this means 
leaving large portions of cyberspace to their own devices when it 
comes to security. This is similar to the current European approach 
where there is a strict division of labor between the civil and mili-
tary approaches to cybersecurity, again leaving large parts outside of 
government domain. Specifically, European Union (EU) policy is 
developed only in regard to civilian defense of cyberspace, and the 
organization’s member states are responsible for military operations. 
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Coordination of Western military response at the international level, 
another topic of diffusion of responsibilities, is primarily addressed 
through NATO’s Cooperate Cyber Defense, located in Tallinn, 
Estonia, which was created in response to the 2007 cyber attacks on 
that country.
Those who feel that the current level of government involvement is 
not sufficient face major obstacles in attempting greater coordination 
and centralization—concerns about privacy and civil rights, difficul-
ties in getting cooperation from the private sector and the problem of 
attracting talented information technology (IT) personnel to govern-
ment service.
Civil Liberty and Privacy Issues
Civil liberty and privacy issues have been at the center of the govern-
ment’s attempts at cybersecurity since the very beginning and compli-
cate efforts to achieve greater cooperation and centralization. In the 
United States, the involvement of NSA continues to rouse suspicions 
among privacy advocates. NSA is tasked with electronic spying on a 
global level but is prohibited from spying on U.S. citizens. In a world 
where jurisdiction could be defined by geography this was not a prob-
lem—in today’s world it is. This dilemma came up early in the his-
tory of U.S. government involvement in cybersecurity. In the Carter 
Administration, the Department of Commerce was made responsible 
for the protection of unclassified computer information. But a 1984 
executive order by President Reagan shifted responsibility for com-
puter security to the DoD and the NSA. The outcry from the private 
sector, civil libertarians, and privacy advocates was swift. They did not 
want domestic computer systems coming under the Defense estab-
lishment. As a consequence, in 1987 Congress passed the Computer 
Security Act, which placed responsibility for the federal government’s 
computer security in the hands of the National Institute of Standards 
(NIST) at the Department of Commerce while giving the DoD and 
NSA authority over classified computers.
By the mid 1990s, as security issues moved from securing the fed-
eral government’s computers to securing a network that was dominat-
ing all aspects of society, the preferred position of those concerned 
with privacy was to advocate a “hands-off” policy. Government 
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intervention, it was argued, would only ruin the Internet which was 
a truly self-regulating system. This laissez-faire attitude toward the 
Internet was so widely accepted that when Ira Magaziner, author of 
the ill-fated Clinton health care plan, was given a second govern-
mental assignment—running a panel to look at governance of the 
Internet—he concluded that government should refrain from regulat-
ing the Internet. The irony was duly noted. The same person who had 
sought to get the government into the business of health care took a 
big step away from that position when confronted with the Internet.
Unfortunately, terrorism, like cyber terrorism, defies the jurisdic-
tional lines upon on which modern government was formed where 
spying on fellow Americans was under the jurisdiction of the FBI and 
the court system; the national security agencies were supposed to stay 
away from Americans and from the homeland. None of this mapped 
very well to the terrorist and the electronic worlds, both of which arrived 
in the United States at about the same time. Thus, in response to the 
events of 9/11, President Bush created the Patriot Act that authorized 
NSA surveillance of American telephone and Internet communica-
tions without prior Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
approval. As the involvement of the big telecommunications compa-
nies in this arena came to light, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
and the American Civil Liberties Union took the big companies to 
court. The cases were eventually dismissed in part because FISA was 
revised to make it somewhat easier to conduct electronic surveillance 
while building in safeguards for American citizens. Spying on fellow 
Americans now involves a complex set of legal procedures and a heavy 
dose of probable cause that a crime was in the works.
Although the anger and court cases over electronic surveillance are 
no longer front-page news, they left a powerful legacy of concern over 
privacy, most of which has its origin in the heavy involvement of NSA 
in cyberspace. The problem is tricky because while NSA has perhaps 
the best technical ability in the government, it is primarily a spy agency. 
And so in 2009, Amit Yoran, the first director of the National Cyber 
Security Division during the Bush Administration, testified before 
Congress as follows: “In news reports and discussions among privacy 
and civil liberties groups the role of the NSA in monitoring or defend-
ing domestic private networks is debated. Should such intelligence 
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programs exist, DHS should be very careful to distance itself from par-
ticipation, support or engagement in these activities.”
By the time the Obama Administration issued its 60-day review in 
early 2010, privacy issues were not much closer to being resolved than 
they had been nearly 30 years before in the Reagan Administration. 
Out of the 10 near-term action items proposed in the review, two 
dealt specifically with privacy. The first advocated that a privacy and 
civil liberties official be assigned to the NSC cybersecurity director-
ate. The second called for building a program that addressed privacy, 
civil liberties, and privacy-enhancing technologies.
In contrast to the hands-off approach of the United States, the 
European Union takes an active role in regulating data protection 
with most policies in this area concerning privacy as in the protection 
of personal data. With a community of 600 million people across 27 
member states, a number of initiatives cover data protection and pri-
vacy, including, perhaps most notably, the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC, which offers strong protection of individual data. A formal 
review to update privacy legislation was started in 2009 in an effort to 
maintain protection while improving data-sharing. Like its American 
counterparts, European telecommunications companies have found 
themselves in the middle of the issue as they would need to breach 
personal data to properly address risk.
The fact of the matter is that this issue has no easy answers. To fur-
ther complicate matters, in addition to the public at large and policy 
makers, privacy issues are also important to the private sector, which 
is often at the center of the debate.
The Public–Private Conundrum
Among the primary obstacles to cybersecurity has been and remains 
the fact that the bulk of IT systems vulnerable to attack are in the 
private sector. It was clear from the beginning that security enhance-
ments to private systems would be expensive, cut into the bottom 
line, and compromise effectiveness. And no one was quite sure that 
this was even necessary. Typical of a debate that has not really been 
solved was a headline from Kiplinger Business Forecasts, on January 
15, 2002, that read, “Keeping Systems Safe From Cyber Bugs Can 
Cut Productivity.” When U.S. Republican Senator Robert Bennett 
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of Utah proposed that the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
adopt rules requiring public companies to disclose their readiness to 
meet cyber threats, the business community mobilized to argue that 
cybersecurity should be treated as a risk factor where appropriate but 
that it should not be an entirely new disclosure category, an argument 
that won out.
President Obama’s 60-day review admitted that “the private sector 
often seeks a business case to justify the resource expenditures needed 
for integrating information and communications system security into 
corporate risk management and for engaging partnerships to mitigate 
collective risk.” The report also acknowledges private sector concerns 
beyond the bottom line. In addition to being reluctant to make major 
investments in cybersecurity, businesses are cautious about sharing 
information about security breaches with the government for fears 
that such information can be subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act, lead to public disclosure, and ruin trust in a company or reveal 
trade secrets to its rivals. Further, businesses loathe disclosure of 
proprietary information and too much interaction with the govern-
ment can lead to unanticipated regulatory actions. In other words, 
there are few incentives for the private sector to engage in the sorts 
of partnerships that are put forward as a solution to these problems. 
In spite of legislation such as the Trade Secrets Act and the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act, both designed to deal with the prob-
lems posed by the Freedom of Information Act disclosures, private 
sector skepticism remains. All too often businesses prefer to defend 
themselves without the government.
Even in the case of large infrastructure companies, who are most 
vulnerable to attacks, the government has to tread lightly. In the 
United States, for instance, NSA is developing a program called 
“Perfect Citizen,” a digital surveillance program to detect cyber 
attacks on private companies such as the electricity grid, dams, and 
nuclear power plants. But as the following quote from the Wall Street 
Journal (Gorman, 2010) indicates, the program is not mandatory: 
“While the government can’t force companies to work with it, it can 
provide incentives to urge them to cooperate, particularly if the gov-
ernment already buys services from that company, officials said” (p. 3).
The tentativeness with which government is moving into the 
area of critical infrastructure is not limited to the United States. In 
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Great Britain, the Government Communications Headquarters, 
the UK’s version of NSA, is seeking to broaden its mandate to 
watch for signs of attack on private systems. According to the 
Computer Business Review, an industry publication, the Prime 
Minister met with heads of major companies to discuss the plan 
but the government was careful to deny that the plan has any pri-
vacy implications.
Official pronouncements about the importance of public–private 
partnerships in the area of cybersecurity are ubiquitous. But the prob-
lem remains. As long as the private sector feels it can defend itself 
against attack or that it can quickly recover, the risks of greater gov-
ernment involvement will seem high. Government has been loathe to 
mandate security improvements that might be deemed too expensive, 
and it has been reluctant to force its involvement on private sector 
entities such as utilities and power plants where the consequences of 
cyber attacks can be catastrophic.
People Issues
It is generally difficult for the public sector to attract and keep talent 
in the area of cybersecurity because top IT professionals are always in 
demand by the private sector, whether the economy is good or bad. 
To deal with the issue in the United States, DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano recently received exemptions from civil service hiring and 
wage scales in order to hire 1,000 cybersecurity experts. But in spite 
of the exemptions and in spite of studies by respected institutions such 
as the National Academy of Public Administration urging new com-
pensation structures for IT professionals, the government has trou-
ble filling these IT posts. “We’re all fighting for the same resources. 
We don’t have thousands of unemployed security professionals,” said 
Patricia Titus, chief information security officer (CISO) for informa-
tion technology firm Unisys and former CISO at the Transportation 
Security Administration in a 2010 article in SFGate.com (Cabrera, 
2010, p. 2). “Good IT professionals are still employed and trying to 
entice them from private sector into the government is going to be 
difficult.”
The people problem was front and center in President Obama’s 
60-day review, which argued for new policies to attract cybersecurity 
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expertise and improve retention. For example, while the review noted 
a small measure of improvement in recruitment, it acknowledged the 
time needed for security clearances remains inadequate. To deal with 
retention, the review promoted the idea that employees should be able 
to build their professional portfolios beyond a single agency, suggest-
ing “Shared training and rotational assignments across agencies and 
potentially with the private sector would not only be efficient, but 
would promote beneficial cross-fertilization and the building of pro-
fessional networks” (Cyberspace Policy Review, p. 15).
The people problem in the federal government exists at both the 
civil service and political levels. At the civil service level it is a subset 
from the bigger problem that the federal government suffers from an 
antiquated personnel system that is bad at attracting and retaining 
highly skilled workers. At the political level talented IT leaders have 
so many more lucrative opportunities outside of government that there 
is little incentive for them to stay on and fight the bureaucratic battles. 
The leadership problem is directly connected to the problems outlined 
above; the lack of clarity about the government’s role in cyberspace 
means that, as we’ve seen, talented leaders in this field can easily feel 
that they are spinning their wheels and that they could make more of 
a contribution outside the government.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that public sector organizations throughout the 
modern world are more aware and more capable of dealing with 
threats to cyber infrastructure today than ever before. More money 
is being spent and more vulnerabilities are being identified. But 
in the nearly three decades since the U.S. federal government has 
been concerned with protecting first its own computers and then 
the Internet, the challenges of dealing with cybersecurity have not 
changed much.
At the heart of the cybersecurity policy challenge is the traditional 
government geographical division into foreign and domestic issues, 
which is now obsolete. A cyber attack can be both and the organiza-
tions needed to defend cyber infrastructure will probably involve both 
as well. Cybersecurity is one of the biggest challenges governments 
have ever faced—in part because there’s never been a challenge like it. 
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Government has been organized around physical geography for cen-
turies but the cyber threat is borderless and challenges the domestic 
and the national security sides of the government to achieve a seam-
less architecture of cooperation. Up until now both the public and pri-
vate sectors have simply dealt with challenges as they have come up. 
While some of them have been embarrassing, they have been fixed, 
usually in an acceptable amount of time. In other words, so far the 
system of cybersecurity has largely been able to cope with the threat.
But that is because so far the threat has not been “existential”—
to borrow a phrase from national security policy. There is still debate 
about the potential impact of cyber attacks on physical security but 
until it is settled we will continue to live with a somewhat cautious gov-
ernment involvement that is influenced by the original culture of the 
Internet—“open, untrammeled, … the Wild West…a self-organizing 
community led by private action where governments should play only 
a limited role,” as described by the CSIS report. Until the assumptions 
inherent in the original culture of cyberspace prove to be obsolete, we 
will be left with a cybersecurity architecture that is suboptimal.
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Introduction
On December 22, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced 
that Howard Schmidt would become the first-ever White House 
Cybersecurity Coordinator. The appointment of Schmidt to this posi-
tion represents the culmination of decades of work by information 
security professionals, researchers, and government officials who have 
argued that protecting American computer systems is of such impor-
tance that it should be addressed at the highest levels of government. 
The selection of Schmidt, an individual with experience from both 
the public and private sectors, as the first “cyber czar” reflects the 
multifaceted nature of the federal government’s role in cybersecurity, 
a part that has been changing and evolving for decades.
Federal efforts to address cybersecurity are a study in contradictions. 
Policy makers demand secure systems that are able to withstand assault 
by well-funded foreign adversaries and are impenetrable to attack, 
while at the same time insisting on digital tools capable of penetrat-
ing enemy networks and allowing the United States to engage in cyber 
warfare. For years Congress has recognized the importance of informa-
tion technology to the economy while acknowledging the severe impact 
that a failure of these systems could have on America. Yet, many fear 
that without a strong catalyst, such as a “digital 9/11” with visible con-
sequences, policy makers will continue to delay substantive reform. 
Efforts to improve cybersecurity have stretched on for decades across 
multiple presidential administrations even though many of the basic 
challenges have remained the same.
It is likely that many of these contradictions will remain unresolved 
in the years ahead. Yet policy makers continue to make progress, 
albeit slowly, and learn from the past. The focus of this chapter is 
to provide an overview of current cybersecurity efforts at the federal 
level including major threats facing federal agencies, the evolution of 
the current policy framework, and an understanding of how cyberse-
curity resources, both human and financial, get deployed across the 
federal government’s civil agencies. It will also discuss the different 
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approaches between the United States and Europe and highlight 
emerging policy challenges facing the federal government.
Federal Cybersecurity Threats
The U.S. government has had an interest in maintaining security for 
information systems and telecommunication networks dating back as 
far as the use of radiotelegraphs in the early 20th century, and the 
modern era of cybersecurity emerged out of the network and com-
puter revolution in the 1970s. This era witnessed the introduction of 
networking innovations, like the Internet Protocol (IP) and the wide-
spread use of ARPANET, which eventually grew into the Internet. 
Convergence between telephony networks and the Internet, along 
with an increasingly greater role for information technology in daily 
life, mean that cybersecurity is more important than ever.
Computers in the United States are regular targets for malicious 
activity and government systems are no exception. According to a 2009 
survey by CDW, a consultancy, of federal information technology (IT) 
professionals, over half of all federal agencies experience a cybersecurity 
incident each week. The type and source of threats faced by the fed-
eral government vary as it must defend itself against many of the same 
threats faced by the private sector: malware, spam, identity theft, denial 
of service attacks, botnets, packet sniffing, system scans and probes, and 
unauthorized intruders. Federal employees are also subject to the same 
threats at home as business users including viruses, worms, spyware, 
and phishing. Federal workers using web-based tools, including social 
networking applications like Facebook and Twitter, or using Internet 
applications, like instant messaging clients or peer-to-peer file sharing, 
expose agencies to new risks and present new challenges. In addition, 
the increasing number of federal workers who take advantage of options 
to work remotely from potentially insecure home computers and public 
hotspots mean that the security of federal data and information systems 
must be balanced against other government initiatives such as work-
force flexibility and productivity. This challenge will only increase as 
the government catches up to corporate America in this area: accord-
ing to a 2010 (Telework, 2010) survey by FedScoop, an online media 
company, currently less than a quarter of federal government employees 
regularly telework compared to over 60% in the private sector.
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The federal government faces many unique threats as well. Although 
cyberspace is a relatively new frontier for espionage and war, many coun-
tries are preparing to engage in this domain. Well-funded adversaries 
who wish to penetrate U.S. government networks and access or disrupt 
critical information systems pose a serious threat to both virtual and 
physical attacks. The national security of the United States depends on 
the nation remaining secure from cyber threats and information warfare.
Actors
Federal computer systems and networks are targeted by a variety of 
state and nonstate actors including foreign nations, terrorists, criminals, 
and other malicious actors. Foreign governments are developing the IT 
skills necessary to carry out espionage, gain an economic advantage, and 
fight wars online. Terrorist groups can use IT to launch attacks against 
critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid and the air traffic con-
trol system, or launch cyber attacks that destabilize financial systems, 
including banks and the stock market. Similarly, criminals increasingly 
use IT to coordinate, commit, and cover-up crimes including fraud, 
money laundering, and identity theft. Criminals, including malicious 
insiders such as disgruntled employees, may also use cyber attacks for 
revenge or retribution. Insiders use their knowledge of systems and net-
works to launch attacks that an outsider might not be able to perform. 
Insiders work from within an organization to commit cyber crime, such 
as stealing data or committing fraud. Finally, hackers present a threat 
to federal cybersecurity. Hackers range in skill from elite programmers 
who discover new software vulnerabilities to “script kiddies” who sim-
ply download prewritten hacking tools from the Internet. Hackers are 
often motivated to break into systems for the challenge or thrill rather 
than any particular monetary reward. Others in the hacking commu-
nity work to advance a specific ideology. The term “hacktivist” is used 
to describe politically motivated individuals who use hacking tools to 
attack systems for the purpose of sending a political message.
Domains
Federal cybersecurity efforts encompass multiple related domains 
including military, intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement, 
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and commerce. Each of these efforts has been created primar-
ily to respond to the different sources of threats described above. 
However, over time it has become clear that while the motivations 
of different threat actors may not be the same, the means that they 
use to accomplish a cyber attack are often identical. Because the 
tools, techniques, and technologies to address threats are often the 
same it makes sense to have a more coordinated federal response to 
improve cybersecurity.
Military
A key purpose of the federal government is to protect the home-
land and its citizens from foreign threats. While previously limited 
to invasion or violence, the role of government has expanded in the 
21st century to meet the new digital challenges that affect American 
freedom and prosperity, including potential attacks on IT systems. 
The threat of cyber attack does not generally generate the same level 
of concern among policy makers as nuclear, biological, or chemical 
attacks. But the consequences of a well-designed cyber attack could 
have a profound impact on vital national interests, especially as the 
separation between virtual and physical is increasingly blurred and no 
international standards exist for what constitutes aggression online. 
Attacks on U.S. systems and networks, such as the power grid or 
transportation networks, can have life-and-death consequences in the 
real world, and countries that conduct cyber warfare operations can 
trigger physical retaliation and engagements. Moreover, identifying 
the source of a cyber attack is critical for deterrence, yet remains a 
significant challenge because the source of digital attacks can often 
be masked.
The importance of cybersecurity was highlighted in 1997 during 
“Eligible Receiver,” the first cyber warfare exercise in the United 
States. By simulating an attack by a rogue state, military and civil-
ian leaders demonstrated that critical infrastructures in the United 
States, such as the electricity grid and transportation networks, were 
vulnerable to a cyber attack. The Pentagon’s Joint Task Force on 
Computer Network Defense also found that the United States was 
unprepared to respond to a coordinated attack on critical infrastruc-
ture, according to a report from the Congressional Research Service 
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(Hildreth, 2001). Since then, the military has admitted that hackers 
have broken into and stolen data from classified information systems. 
In a high-profile example, it was revealed in 2009 that data on the 
Defense Department’s $300 billion Joint Strike Fighter project had 
been stolen by online hackers who appeared to have originated in 
China. But not all attacks happen over networks. As retold (Lynn, 
2010) in a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, in 2008, a foreign intel-
ligence agency managed to infect classified and unclassified military 
networks after a flash drive infected with malware was inserted into 
a government laptop in the Middle East.
The U.S. military is developing offensive and defensive cyber warfare 
competencies. These capabilities are designed to resist cyber attacks, 
provide cyber attack capabilities, and serve as a deterrent to attacks by 
other countries. On May 21, 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
launched the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a central-
ized command for ensuring the security of military information sys-
tems. USCYBERCOM’s responsibilities include operating, securing, 
and defending DoD networks, supporting military operations, and 
conducting military cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM is a 
subordinate of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), one 
of 10 unified commands under the DoD with members from all four 
military services. As with traditional power, cyber warfare capabilities 
are only one component of a broad arsenal of economic, diplomatic, 
and political tools available to the federal government to combat 
threats to national security.
Intelligence
The U.S. intelligence community is developing its capacity for cyber 
espionage. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) is 
responsible for foreign signals intelligence. Through these activi-
ties, the agency develops its capabilities to intercept and analyze 
electronic communication. The NSA has expertise in cryptography 
including both methods for employing strong encryption and per-
forming cryptanalysis. There are 17 different agencies and organiza-
tions in the U.S. intelligence community responsible for gathering 
information, according to Intelligence.gov. They include Air Force 
Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast 
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Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of 
Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, 
Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, 
National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence, and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.
Homeland Security
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is tasked with 
protecting the United States from domestic emergencies, such as 
acts of terrorism and natural disasters. In recent years, its mission 
has expanded to include protecting the nation’s critical infrastruc-
ture from cyber attacks to ensure continuity of services essential to 
the government and economy. Critical infrastructure includes tele-
communications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water 
supply systems, and emergency services supplied both by the private 
and the public sectors. This mission is carried out by the National 
Cybersecurity Division (NCSD), a division within DHS. NCSD 
sponsors various programs to carry out its mission including the 
National Cyberspace Response System to respond to cyber incidents; 
the Federal Network Security branch, which focuses on developing 
and improving solutions that solve common enterprise-wide techno-
logical needs in federal agencies; and the Cyber-Risk Management 
program, which seeks to help agencies better assess and reduce risk 
in their infrastructure. As part of the Cyber-Risk Management pro-
grams, DHS conducts the biennial Cyber-Storm exercises to test 
emergency response capabilities for cyber incidents, promotes a soft-
ware assurance program to minimize software vulnerabilities, and 
holds events in conjunction with the annual National Cybersecurity 
Awareness month.
The National Cyberspace Response System includes a number of 
important programs to help coordinate responses to cyber incidents. 
For example, DHS operates the Cyber Cop Portal to facilitate infor-
mation sharing for investigators anywhere in the world working on 
cybercrime cases. The largest of these projects is the U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the principal organization 
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responsible for defending the nonmilitary federal systems from cyber 
attacks. US-CERT also has primary responsibility for fostering col-
laboration and information sharing between the federal government, 
state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and 
other countries. US-CERT monitors and maintains a database of 
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities and makes this data available 
in a variety of formats for both technical and nontechnical users, such 
as average consumers. US-CERT also publishes a variety of docu-
ments to educate consumers on good information security practices to 
protect their personal information and stay safe online.
Law Enforcement
Cybercrime is on the rise. Cybercrimes include hacking, fraud, extor-
tion, corporate theft, identity theft, money laundering, trafficking 
in illegal goods, harassment, and violation of intellectual property 
rights. Although security awareness training can help protect individ-
uals from cybercrimes, it is not failsafe, and even educated consumers 
can become victims of cybercrime. Multiple federal organizations, in 
addition to state and local authorities, have law enforcement author-
ity for cybercrime; however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are the principal agen-
cies responsible for investigating and prosecuting cybercrime. Other 
organizations, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF) and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), are responsible for certain crimes that use the Internet as a 
platform, such as illegal online sales of firearms and drugs.
Because the Internet has no borders, a particular problem with 
cybercrime is the difficulty of establishing jurisdiction for law 
enforcement. To make it easier for victims of cybercrimes to get 
help, the FBI, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National 
White Collar Crime Center partnered to create the Internet Crime 
Complaint Center (IC3). The IC3 provides a single destination for 
collecting data on Internet-related crimes and referring them to the 
proper authority. The 2009 Internet crime report found that IC3 
received over 330,000 complaints, an increase of more than 20% 
over the previous year. The total reported dollar loss in 2009 was 
$559 million.
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Commerce
The information economy is a principal driver of economic activity in 
the United States and internationally. According to analysis by the 
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a technology 
think tank, the Internet contributes approximately $1.5 trillion to the 
global economy annually. Businesses rely on the free flow of informa-
tion for commerce. They need to communicate securely over reliable 
networks and store information securely on computers. Consumers 
meanwhile must have confidence that the Internet is secure to engage 
in online commerce.
Various agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities with impli-
cations for the national economy. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) both operate important information systems that are 
vital to the health of our nation’s financial network. However, the 
Department of Commerce is the chief federal entity responsible for 
advancing commercial interests in the United States and for ensuring 
that cybersecurity spurs, rather than hinders, economic growth. The 
two principal organizations responsible for cybersecurity work at the 
Department of Commerce are the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST).
NTIA is leading government efforts to review and implement new 
networking technology, such as IPv6 and DNSSEC, intended to cre-
ate a more secure Internet infrastructure. NIST is the primary federal 
agency responsible for developing information security standards and 
best practices for nonnational security systems and providing agen-
cies with general technical assistance to improve their security poli-
cies and practices. These include the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) publications that define mandatory implementa-
tions of security technologies such as digital signatures and encryp-
tion standards and the Special Publication (800 Series) that include 
recommended guidelines for agencies to use for both specific tech-
nologies (e.g., Bluetooth security), specific procedures (e.g., assessing 
security controls), and specific policies (e.g., contingency planning). 
NIST manages and operates a number of federal cybersecurity 
resources including the National Software Reference Library that 
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maintains forensic digital signatures of software and the National 
Vulnerability Database, a repository of vulnerability data used for 
automated vulnerability management.
Organizational and Policy Issues
The federal government must develop robust cybersecurity policies 
that protect national and economic security, and balance these needs 
against issues such as personal privacy and civil liberties. Over the 
past few decades, the federal government’s response has evolved as 
conditions have changed, and these issues are still debated today.
A Policy History of Cybersecurity
Various laws and regulations govern federal activities in cyberspace. 
In addition, the federal government has produced various high-
level policy documents and presidential directives intended to guide 
national cybersecurity efforts. Many information and communica-
tion policies, such as accessibility or privacy, do not necessarily relate 
directly to cybersecurity; however, they may affect the availability and 
use of these systems. Understanding cybersecurity depends on under-
standing the history that has brought us to where we are today. What 
follows is a discussion of major policy initiatives that have influenced 
cybersecurity since the early 1980s, when the modern computing and 
Internet era began.
Military and Intelligence
As with much of IT, cybersecurity initially grew out of military and 
intelligence efforts. The Department of Defense and the Central 
Intelligence Agency have long held an interest in protecting com-
munication from interception or manipulation and information sys-
tems from unauthorized access. Even though activities to advance 
cybersecurity have increased in recent years, the broad goals of 
federal efforts in this area have remained the same for decades. 
In 1984, President Reagan issued National Security Decision 
Directive Number 145 (NSDD-145) declaring that a “compre-
hensive and coordinated approach must be taken to protect the 
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government’s telecommunications and automated information sys-
tems against current and projected threats.” The Directive outlined 
four objectives for improving cybersecurity: (1) developing a capa-
bility to assess threats and vulnerabilities and implement effective 
countermeasures; (2) developing a technical knowledge base both 
within government and the private sector; (3) applying government 
resources more effectively and encouraging private sector efforts; 
and (4) supporting other policy objectives to enhance cybersecurity.
The Directive gave oversight for implementing these objectives to 
a steering committee composed of senior-level government members, 
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget, and the Director of Central Intelligence. 
Notably NSDD-145 established the Secretary of Defense generally, 
and the Director of the National Security Agency specifically, as the 
principal agents responsible for developing and implementing the 
necessary security programs, research, and standards for improv-
ing cybersecurity not just for the Department of Defense, but for 
the entire federal government. NSDD-145 also specified additional 
responsibilities for the Department of Commerce, which was directed 
to issue Federal Information Processing Standards for the security of 
information systems.
Cybersecurity may have its roots in the Department of Defense, 
but just as the Internet has evolved from a defense network into a 
commercial network, so too has cybersecurity changed to the point 
that it is no longer dominated by the military.
Cybercrime
Much of the initial federal cybersecurity policy outside of the military 
focused on cybercrime and law enforcement issues. The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), for example, created crim-
inal penalties for unauthorized access to information systems. 
Unauthorized access is defined to mean not only access to a computer 
without authorization but also access to information on a computer 
that exceeds authorized access (e.g., an FBI agent using his or her cre-
dentials to obtain information from a computer system that the agent 
is not entitled to use). Specifically CFAA criminalized the following:
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• Unauthorized access to a computer system containing 
restricted government information with the intent to harm 
the United States or to benefit a foreign nation
• Unauthorized access to a computer system to obtain finan-
cial records
• Unauthorized access to a computer system exclusively used by 
the government or disruption of government use of a com-
puter system that is not exclusively used by the government
• Use of a government computer system to commit fraud
• Unauthorized use of a government computer that results in 
alterations, damages, or destruction of the system or prevents 
authorized use of the system
• Buying or selling passwords or related information to enable 
unauthorized access to a computer system affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce or used by the government
CFAA also granted the U.S. Secret Service the nonexclusive 
authority to investigate offenses committed under the Act. Two 
years later, Robert Morris, a Cornell student, unleashed the Morris 
worm, one of the first major self-propagating viruses. The Morris 
worm spread rapidly across ARPANET, the Internet’s predecessor, 
infecting approximately 10% of the connected systems and causing 
an economic loss of millions of dollars, according to an article on the 
“Security of the Internet” (1997) in The Froehlich/Kent Encyclopedia 
of Telecommunications. According to the same source, the severity 
and impact of the worm prompted the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency to fund the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) Coordination Center to track and respond to these types of 
incidents. Morris was eventually charged and convicted of violating 
the CFAA.
Electronic Surveillance
The proliferation of IT introduced the need for new government regu-
lations protecting privacy in electronic communications. The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was created in response 
to concerns that the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans were 
at risk from domestic surveillance operations and that the federal 
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government’s authority to use electronic surveillance to combat ter-
rorism was at risk. The purpose of FISA was to provide government 
oversight of domestic surveillance of foreign individuals in the United 
States while still protecting national security. Under FISA, the fed-
eral government could authorize electronic surveillance without a 
court order for up to 1 year as long as the U.S. Attorney General could 
certify that U.S. citizens would not likely be subjected to surveillance. 
FISA also outlines procedures for obtaining authority to use pen reg-
isters and trap-and-trace devices to monitor incoming and outgoing 
communications in foreign intelligence investigations. These devices 
allow investigators to collect address information for electronic com-
munication, such as the source and destination of communications, 
but not the message itself. For example, a pen register records the 
numbers dialed on a particular telephone while a trap-and-trace 
device records what numbers called a particular telephone.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 
created new legal protections for the privacy of electronic data com-
munications by creating civil and criminal penalties for unauthor-
ized interception of electronic communications. ECPA also defined 
requirements for government access to electronic communication, both 
in transit and in storage, for law enforcement purposes and foreign 
counterintelligence investigations. The law outlines specific condi-
tions necessary for a government investigator to gain access to elec-
tronic communications, such as a warrant or court order, and defines 
recordkeeping requirements for service providers, such as maintaining 
backups of subpoenaed data. One notable problem with ECPA is that 
electronic data in storage, specifically data stored for over 180 days, 
is treated differently than data in transit. Investigators must satisfy 
stricter requirements to gain access to electronic communications in 
transit, such as providing probable cause to obtain a search warrant. 
The bar is lower for data in storage and investigators can more readily 
gain access using a subpoena. ECPA also created a provision govern-
ing the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices (the “Pen/Trap 
statute”). ECPA’s requirements did not substantially alter the existing 
electronic surveillance permissions created by FISA.
A further expansion of electronic surveillance occurred in 1994 
when President Clinton signed into law the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) that mandated that 
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telecommunications providers, including wireless carriers, com-
ply with government requests for electronic surveillance, including 
site location data for cell phones. Importantly, CALEA specifically 
excluded the Internet from its requirements. In addition, CALEA 
does not require the service provider to be able to decrypt the com-
munications, or enable the government to decrypt the communica-
tions, if it does not possess the key. CALEA was created in response 
to technical and administrative challenges law enforcement faced in 
acquiring wiretaps in a timely manner. CALEA has provided the 
legal framework for modern surveillance systems such as the FBI’s 
Digital Collection System Network (DCSNet) that allows agents to 
easily intercept voice and text communication over traditional tele-
phony networks.
Information Technology (IT) Management and Risk Management
In the 1990s, government recognized the need to modernize IT 
practices and adapt to the growing threat of having insecure com-
puter systems. The Clinger-Cohen Act (originally more aptly named 
the “Information Technology Management Reform Act”), passed 
in 1996, was created to reform the way the federal government 
designed, acquired, used, operated, and managed IT resources. Most 
notably the Clinger-Cohen Act assigned the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) responsibility for improving 
the acquisition, use, and disposal of information technology by, for 
example, establishing best practices for IT acquisition, overseeing the 
development of standards in cooperation with NIST, and monitor-
ing and reviewing the budget of IT projects. The Act also directs all 
federal agencies to take certain steps to modernize their IT process by 
designating a chief information officer (CIO) responsible for IT acqui-
sition and management. Following the passage of the Clinger-Cohen 
Act, agency heads formed a Federal CIOs Council to develop best 
practices and standards across agencies. Initially an informal group, 
Congress later established the council as an organization within the 
executive branch, consisting of CIOs and deputy CIOs across many 
federal government executive agencies.
One of the most important moves to improve cybersecurity across 
the entire federal government was the passage of the E-Government 
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Act of 2002. The Act established a broad framework intended to pro-
mote the development and use of e-government services and processes 
to make the federal government more efficient and to increase oppor-
tunities for citizens to engage with the government. The Act directed 
all federal government agencies to develop performance metrics to 
demonstrate progress toward implementing e-government solutions. 
One of the most substantive changes brought about by the Act was 
the creation of the Office of Electronic Government in the OMB 
whose department head would be the de facto CIO of the federal gov-
ernment responsible for managing technology investments, improv-
ing information security, ensuring privacy, and developing enterprise 
architecture across the federal government.
A key part of the E-Government Act is Title III, also known as 
the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). The 
purpose of FISMA is to define a comprehensive framework for 
information security controls at federal agencies including effec-
tive management and governance, the development of information 
security standards and best practices, and proper oversight. FISMA 
is technology neutral and does not include prescriptive requirements 
for specific technologies, but instead leaves the selection of IT solu-
tions to individual agencies. FISMA tasks the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), with cooperation from the 
defense and intelligence communities, to be responsible for develop-
ing the security standards implemented at civil agencies. In addition, 
policy makers recognized the value of market-driven technologies; 
FISMA encourages the use of commercially developed information 
security solutions.
The precursor to FISMA was the Computer Security Act of 1987. 
The purpose of the Act was to establish minimum standards for fed-
eral computer systems. Specifically the Act assigned the National 
Bureau of Standards (now NIST) the responsibility for developing, 
in cooperation with the NSA, the technical, management, physical, 
and administrative standards and guidelines needed to assure cost-
effective security and privacy for federal information systems. The 
Computer Security Act also required agencies to establish security 
plans for all federal computer systems containing sensitive informa-
tion and mandated security training for all users of federal IT systems.
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Homeland Security
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed 
the USA PATRIOT Act that modified aspects of ECPA, FISA, 
and CFAA. Although the focus of the law was not on cybersecu-
rity, it contained many amendments to strengthen federal cyberse-
curity efforts to improve national security and facilitate federal law 
enforcement activities. The most important of the amendments were 
contained in Title 2 of the Act, which modified and expanded the 
government authority to conduct electronic surveillance. For example, 
the PATRIOT Act expanded the ability of law enforcement to use 
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices to monitor Internet commu-
nications. The Act also increased the amount of information that a law 
enforcement agent could compel a service provider to disclose about 
their customers to include information such as network IP addresses 
and billing information. In addition, the Act granted service provid-
ers the ability to voluntarily disclose private communications if they 
believe it is an emergency situation that could result in physical harm 
to others.
Civil liberties groups have argued that the PATRIOT Act gives 
the federal government too much power in the name of national secu-
rity at the expense of individual rights and personal privacy. Section 
217 of the PATRIOT Act is one such example. This section includes a 
provision that allows law enforcement officials to intercept electronic 
communication from a “computer trespasser” if they receive authori-
zation from the owner or operator of the computer system in question. 
The purpose of the provision is to provide private sector computer 
system owners and operators the ability to call on law enforcement to 
help monitor and respond to cyber attacks, especially those on critical 
infrastructure. However, this provision illustrates the difficult nature 
of balancing law enforcement with individual rights: under this law, 
government has the authority to monitor private communications of 
individuals on a computer system without any judicial approval and 
potentially without any judicial oversight. Although the purpose is 
to monitor trespassers, or those engaged in unauthorized activity, 
the term is defined loosely and could be used to broadly monitor the 
online activities of individuals.
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Other important sections in the Act include strengthening crimi-
nal laws against terrorism, which contains a provision about deterring 
and preventing cyber terrorism and developing enhanced cybersecu-
rity forensic capabilities. The Act also calls for the Secret Service to 
create a national network of task forces to prevent, detect, and inves-
tigate electronic crimes, including potential attacks against critical 
infrastructure and financial systems. Even though the PATRIOT 
Act expanded government authority to pursue cyber criminals 
threatening national security, some feel it did it at the expense of 
civil liberties.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) implemented wide-
spread organizational changes throughout the federal govern-
ment, most notably creating the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) as a new cabinet-level department. The HSA created within 
DHS a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection responsible for, among other things, developing a com-
prehensive plan to secure critical infrastructure and related systems. 
Many functions and centers relating to cybersecurity previously run 
out of other departments were transferred to DHS including the 
Federal Computer Incident Response Center at the General Services 
Administration and the National Infrastructure Protection Center at 
the FBI. The Secretary of DHS was made responsible for develop-
ing a national plan for securing critical infrastructure, developing and 
coordinating emergency response for attacks on critical information 
systems, working with both the public and private sectors to provide 
warnings on information security risks, and performing and funding 
cybersecurity-related research and development.
Federal Resources and Leadership
Although legislation has shaped much of the cybersecurity agenda 
over the past few years, federal efforts have not been driven entirely by 
Congress. Even though the position of White House Cybersecurity 
Coordinator is new and—for the first time—a senior-level official in 
the White House is officially responsible for advising the president on 
cybersecurity issues, many past policies governing information secu-
rity were also set by the highest levels of the executive branch.
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In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 
63 (PDD-63) setting a national goal of securing America from 
attacks against its critical infrastructure within 5 years. As noted in 
the directive, “any interruptions or manipulations of these critical 
functions must be brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically iso-
lated and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States.” 
The directive called for forming public–private partnerships to help 
reduce vulnerabilities and designated sector-specific lead agencies 
to be the primary liaison to work with the private sector on secur-
ing critical infrastructure. To support the private sector in improving 
cybersecurity, the federal government pledged to assist with periodic 
risk assessments of critical infrastructure, help identify best practices, 
and develop better ways to respond to computer crime.
PDD-63 also required the government to conduct an assess-
ment of critical infrastructure, in particular the federal government’s 
assets, and to prepare a plan on how to protect the United States from 
cyber attacks. In response to this requirement, President Clinton’s 
White House released the “National Plan for Information Systems 
Protection” in 2000. The Plan was the first step in the United States 
toward a comprehensive review of cybersecurity issues and chal-
lenges facing the federal government and made clear the necessity of 
improving cybersecurity to protect the nation’s economic and national 
security in the information age.
The George W. Bush Administration continued to develop a 
comprehensive plan for cybersecurity. In 2003, DHS released the 
“National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” as part of the “National 
Strategy for Homeland Security.” The document combined both 
high-level thinking about improving cybersecurity for the nation 
and specific recommendations the government could take to reduce 
security risks. The strategy defined three strategic objectives: prevent 
cyber attacks against critical infrastructure; reduce vulnerability to 
cyber attacks; and minimize damage and recovery time from cyber 
attacks that do occur. To achieve this, the strategy outlined broad 
national priorities that focus on improving information collection, 
analysis and sharing, reducing threats and vulnerabilities, improving 
security awareness and training, securing government information 
systems, and developing a system of international cooperation for 
cybersecurity.
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After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. govern-
ment began to embrace a more methodological approach to national 
security by creating a structured framework by which to identify, cat-
alogue, and respond to threats to the homeland. An example of this 
is Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), issued in 
December 2003, in which DHS instructed all federal departments and 
agencies to identify, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure from 
terrorist attack. For each sector, such as energy or agriculture, DHS 
has directed that a lead agency continue to assume primary responsi-
bility for coordinating critical infrastructure protection between the 
public and private sectors. These lead agencies must develop sector-
specific risk management plans using the risk management frame-
work defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, a policy 
framework created by DHS.
HSPD-7 applied this rigorous approach to cybersecurity, a key 
component of critical infrastructure in virtually every sector. The 
Department of Commerce, for example, was ordered to coordinate 
the security of IT products and services necessary to meet homeland 
security requirements with the private sector, the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy was directed to coordinate interagency 
research and development for critical infrastructure, and the Office of 
Management and Budget was instructed to implement government-
wide standards for information security at federal agencies.
DHS continues to implement various programs to improve federal 
network security, although some efforts have not been made public. In 
January 2008, DHS issued HSPD-23, a classified directive that came 
out of a presidential request for an interagency review of cybersecurity 
threats to the United States and how best to defend against them. 
HSPD-23 established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative (CNCI) with the goals of reducing vulnerabilities, protecting 
federal resources, and better anticipating threats. CNCI has created 
multiple interagency working groups including the National Cyber 
Study Group to coordinate CNCI’s activities, the Communications 
Security and Cyber Policy Coordinating Committee, tasked with 
implementing recommendations and presenting findings to the White 
House, and the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force, responsible for 
monitoring federal projects and coordinating between the intelligence 
and nonintelligence communities.
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Although many details of CNCI are classified, the Obama 
Administration has released information about 12 initiatives. They 
include coordinating cybersecurity research and development across 
the government, connecting agencies to increase government-wide 
situational awareness, increasing the security of classified networks, 
expanding cybersecurity education through training and personnel 
development, and better securing the global supply chain for IT. One 
important strategic effort has been the Trusted Internet Connections 
(TIC) initiative outlined in OMB Memorandum M-08-05 in 
November 2007 and which continues as part of the CNCI. The goal 
of the initiative is to reduce the total number of external network con-
nections in the federal government by consolidating them into a cen-
tralized solution by using preapproved network services.
This will allow DHS to better implement cross-agency network 
security monitoring. For example, by identifying, cataloging, and 
consolidating the number of Internet access points, DHS can more 
reliably implement solutions to analyze network traffic for the mali-
cious or potentially malicious activity on federal networks. DHS has 
implemented some of this through its EINSTEIN network intrusion 
detection systems. EINSTEIN 1 provided basic network monitoring 
and could detect anomalies on the network. EINSTEIN 2 provided 
significantly enhanced capabilities as it can automatically analyze net-
work packets for specific signatures of malicious content and report 
threats to US-CERT in real time. The next generation of this technol-
ogy, EINSTEIN 3, which DHS began pilot testing in 2010, will pro-
vide more advanced real-time packet inspection and identification. It 
will also be capable of detecting and responding to attacks, such as by 
automatically generating threat signatures. These types of systems are 
useful for responding to “zero day” exploits that attack vulnerabilities 
previously unknown to users. EINSTEIN 3 will also be designed to 
support enhanced information sharing between DHS, civilian agen-
cies, and the intelligence community while still maintaining appro-
priate safeguards to protect the privacy of communications.
In late 2010, the Obama Administration directed a 60-day compre-
hensive review to reassess U.S. policies and practices for cybersecurity. 
The resulting Cyberspace Policy Review, guided heavily by recom-
mendations from the nonprofit Center for Strategic and International 
Studies’ (CSIS) report to the president, recognized previous efforts but 
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called for renewed federal leadership and accountability for improv-
ing cybersecurity. The Cyberspace Policy Review called for a national 
awareness campaign to educate Americans about the importance of 
action, increased efforts to partner with stakeholders abroad and in 
the private sector, better information to guide cybersecurity planning 
and response, and better defined performance metrics for improving 
the security of critical infrastructure. Most notably, it advocated for 
stronger senior-level leadership and authority on these issues from the 
White House. The proposal also included more forward-looking pro-
posals such as appointing a privacy and civil liberties official to the 
National Security Council’s cybersecurity directorate, building iden-
tity management solutions, and focusing research and development 
efforts on “game-changing” technologies that can greatly improve 
overall security. The Obama Administration announced that efforts 
begun under the CNCI will be continued under its updated national 
cybersecurity strategy.
Private Sector Coordination
The private sector has an important role to play in supporting fed-
eral cybersecurity efforts. From power to transportation to informa-
tion and communications technology, national security depends on 
many services provided by the private sector. In fact, according to the 
Government Accountability Office, approximately 85% of critical infra-
structure is owned and operated by private organizations. Although 
the federal government is not directly responsible for securing this 
infrastructure, it does have oversight, for example, by setting security 
standards or audit requirements, for these sectors. But this oversight 
must be managed carefully as the federal government is not neces-
sarily best placed to evaluate the risks of systems beyond its purview. 
To ensure the security of critical infrastructure, the federal govern-
ment must partner and work with the private sector. For example, the 
National Security Agency is developing the classified “Perfect Citizen” 
project that would involve deploying sensors to monitor private sector 
networks of critical infrastructure to detect anomalous activity.
A key challenge the government faces with the private sector is 
how to enable effective information sharing. Companies may be 
reluctant to share data about attacks because of how that may impact 
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their business or they may lack an incentive to share information in 
a timely manner. Conversely, government agencies may not be able 
or willing to quickly share intelligence with the right people at the 
right time. To address these issues, the government has formed the 
Government Coordinating Councils (GCC), an interagency gov-
ernment counterpart with representatives from the federal, state, 
and local levels, to partner with the Sector Coordinating Councils 
(SCC), a self-governed group of industry representatives. In addi-
tion, the private sector collaborates through various Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). ISACs exist for many sec-
tors including communication, electric, financial services, and sur-
face transportation. ISACs help protect critical infrastructure by 
sharing threat data across sectors and providing the federal gov-
ernment with intelligence on known threats, vulnerabilities, and 
incidents. Each sector can create its own rules to facilitate data shar-
ing, such as keeping information classified or making the threat 
information anonymous. Despite these improvements, information 
sharing remains a challenge because the private sector hesitates 
to disclose proprietary information that gives them a competitive 
advantage. Likewise, the public sector cannot always share infor-
mation in a timely manner because of restrictions that prevent the 
government from giving individualized treatment to companies or 
sharing information that is either classified or has not gone through 
a strict review process. As a result, according to the Government 
Accountability Office, policy makers must find additional areas for 
reform to create the necessary conditions for successful information-
sharing arrangements.
Federal Cybersecurity Agenda: Emerging Policy Issues
The federal government will likely take on an even greater role in 
managing cybersecurity issues in the years ahead. First, it will con-
tinue to expand its role as coordinator of national cybersecurity: devel-
oping information security standards and best practices, facilitating 
information sharing and pursuing cybersecurity-related research 
and development. Second, as the federal government increasingly 
adopts and funds e-government solutions, for everything from elec-
tronic health care records to intelligent transportation systems to 
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a nationwide public safety network, it will become more actively 
involved in building, operating, certifying, and maintaining infor-
mation systems critical to our national economy and security. For 
example, the 2009 Stimulus Act included over $25 billion for health 
information technology, including a nationwide network of elec-
tronic health records and health information exchanges. The National 
Coordinator for Health IT at the Department of Health and Human 
Services is now responsible for setting the security requirements for 
health information systems that it will certify. Similarly, the federal 
government allocated approximately $3.4 billion in stimulus fund-
ing for the smart grid, an effort to modernize the power grid using 
two-way communication and sensors. The Department of Energy and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must assess and make 
recommendations on best practices for smart grid components such as 
smart meters to ensure the security and reliability of the electric grid. 
Total federal spending on cybersecurity will most likely rise from 
approximately $8 billion in 2010 to $10 billion in 2015, as reported by 
PC World and Information Week, two industry publications.
The issue areas discussed below are emerging as important policy 
issues for cybersecurity.
Electronic Surveillance
Most of the efforts by law enforcement to perform Internet-based sur-
veillance, such as the FBI’s Carnivore program that involved deploying 
packet-sniffing servers to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to monitor 
e-mail and other Internet-based communication, have received a pub-
lic backlash spurred on by civil liberties group. Now law enforcement 
fears that the increasing security capabilities of modern communi-
cations networks and devices will make them impenetrable to gov-
ernment surveillance. In particular, many communications providers 
are beginning to offer security architectures that utilize end-to-end 
encryption so that no third party, including the service provider, can 
intercept or decrypt private communications. This has created tension 
between service providers who seek to offer the highest level of secu-
rity possible to their customers and governments that would prefer to 
restrict the use of this technology. The conflict has been evident both 
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in restrictions placed on the use of certain technologies and on the 
ability of businesses to export certain technologies to other countries.
A high-profile example occurred in 1993 when the NSA developed 
the Clipper chip, which was a hardware-based cryptographic tool for 
telecommunications devices that implemented a key escrow system 
intended to allow law enforcement to be able to access its communica-
tions. Although the Clipper chip faced public backlash and was not 
widely adopted, the underlying issue has not receded. Debate contin-
ues as to whether and to what extent government should use tech-
nology mandates to weaken commercial security offerings in order 
to gain access to sensitive information for law enforcement or coun-
terterrorism purposes. For example, until the late 1990s the United 
States had export restrictions for cryptographic protocols, although 
many of these have now been lifted.
In 2010, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia all 
made requests that Research In Motion (RIM), the manufacturer 
of the popular Blackberry smart phones, make changes to their 
service offering so that government investigators can access the 
private communications of its customers. RIM refused to comply 
with this request, even under threat of having to cease operations in 
these countries. The Obama Administration announced its intent to 
update CALEA to require Internet-based communications provid-
ers, such as RIM, Skype, Facebook, and others, to allow law enforce-
ment to be able to comply with wiretap orders. Such a requirement, if 
implemented, would likely require substantial revisions in how some 
of these systems work as their design often precludes interception 
and decryption of transmissions by anyone, including the service 
providers.
Differences between the United States and other Countries
Differences between the U.S. approach to cybersecurity and that of 
other countries have long been apparent. For example, the Bush-era 
“National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” revealed a marked differ-
ence in the U.S. government’s perspective on cybersecurity compared 
to the one outlined in 2001 by the European Commission entitled 
“Network and Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy 
Approach.” Whereas the U.S. government stated that its principal 
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goal was to protect critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, the EC 
focused more broadly on creating a dependable computing and net-
working environment and protecting privacy. The EC proposal also 
indicated that it was worried by the fact that they were losing control of 
information security to foreign companies, many in the United States. 
For example, with regard to secure e-mail, the report complained that 
“access for European users depends on the export control policy of 
the United States.” To remedy this situation, the proposal suggested 
standardizing the security practices of organizations in the European 
Union’s member states in an effort to both act as role models for 
European businesses and to improve their market power. In addition, 
the European proposal recommended a targeted research program to 
develop strong encryption products equivalent in security to what was 
commercially available. This would have the desired effect of promot-
ing the development of security products within Europe that were not 
subject to the export restrictions of the United States.
Differences between the two regions continue with the U.S. gov-
ernment more likely to support security technologies that increase 
their ability to investigate cyber crimes and terrorism, whereas the 
European Union may tilt the scale more toward protecting the privacy 
of citizens.
Efforts to address cybersecurity at an international level often 
reveal differences between countries generally. Since 1998, for exam-
ple, Russia has called for an international arms control treaty for cyber 
warfare at the United Nations and other international forums. This 
proposal has been routinely rejected by officials in the United States, 
although their tone softened in 2010, according to a story in The Wall 
Street Journal (Gorman, 2010). Given the likelihood that cyber and 
information warfare will be a significant part of future military con-
flicts, cyber disarmament has important strategic consequences for 
many countries. It is also important in terms of defining foreign rela-
tions, as international norms have not yet been defined for what types 
of cyber activities constitute acts of aggression. Creating international 
cybersecurity peace treaties may require changes in Internet gover-
nance that promote stronger control by national governments.
Policy makers need to remember that cybersecurity is not a domes-
tic issue and the federal government must engage with partners 
abroad. The United States currently does not have a formal policy or 
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framework for working with foreign partners on cybersecurity issues. 
Most of the efforts to date have focused on collaborating on interna-
tional cybercrime and law enforcement issues.
Identification and Authentication
One important challenge that many organizations face is how to 
manage electronic identities for users, organizations, and devices. The 
government must maintain the necessary controls to properly authen-
ticate and authorize users to use federal networks and systems. DHS 
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in 
2004 that called for a common identification standard for all federal 
employees and contractors. Previously, the federal government lacked 
a government-wide standard on the requirements for identification 
used to access secure government information systems and facilities. 
HSPD-12 directed NIST to develop a robust federal standard for 
secure identification that can authenticate individuals electronically. 
In addition, the directive required all agencies to implement the stan-
dard for all federal systems and facilities.
Identity management is also important for activities such as accessing 
electronic health records, sending secure e-mail, accessing government 
services, and banking online. In June 2010 the Obama Administration 
released the “National Strategy for Trust Identities in Cyberspace” that 
provided a long-term vision to create a trusted identity system. The 
purpose of the system is to secure online transactions and better iden-
tify and authenticate online users. Although the policy statement does 
not mandate specific technology, it does highlight the need for strong, 
interoperable credentials. Currently the United States lags countries 
such as Estonia that have created a robust electronic ID system for its 
citizens to use for everything from paying taxes to voting online.
Research, Education, and Training
Many government proposals call for research and development to 
improve security technology to keep pace with new challenges that 
are constantly emerging. For example, the “National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace” (2003), calls for the national research agenda 
to be prioritized to support technology that would improve the 
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security of cyberspace across all sectors. Although much of the 
publicly funded cybersecurity research comes out of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), other organizations, such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the 
national laboratories and federally funded research and develop-
ment centers, and the various intelligence agencies fund and sponsor 
information security research. For example, the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP), with oversight for coordinating 
research and developing technology to secure critical infrastruc-
ture, has been tasked with creating short-, medium-, and long-term 
recommendations to improve cybersecurity. This includes improv-
ing the security of networking protocols on the Internet and the 
security of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems used to monitor and control industrial facilities like factories, 
power plants, and refineries.
Only recently has the value of research to cybersecurity begun 
to be appreciated by the federal government, although more work 
in this area remains. Congress passed the Cybersecurity Research 
and Development Act in 2002 to increase the amount of funding 
made available for both applied and academic research in informa-
tion security. The Act directed the National Science Foundation, in 
cooperation with other agencies such as NIST and OSTP, to fund 
research in areas such as cryptography, computer forensics, reliable 
IT infrastructure, privacy, network security architecture, vulnerabil-
ity assessments, wireless security, and emerging threats. In addition 
to providing research grants, the Act also authorized NSF funding 
to establish multidisciplinary Centers for Computer and Network 
Security Research at universities throughout the country.
The federal government has long recognized the need to hire and 
retain well-qualified information security professionals. In 2000 
Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Counter-Terrorism for President Clinton wrote in 
the National Plan for Information Systems Protection that “the most 
urgently needed, the hardest to acquire, and the sine qua non for all 
else that we will do, is a cadre of trained computer science/informa-
tion technology (IT) specialists.” In response, the government created 
a multipronged effort to train and recruit federal IT security person-
nel. These efforts included completing an occupational study for IT 
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positions in the federal government, training existing federal employ-
ees and providing continuing education, creating a security awareness 
training program for all federal employees, creating a scholarship for 
service programs to recruit undergraduate and graduate students into 
federal service, and recruiting high school students to federal employ-
ment through federal internship and summer work programs.
The Cybersecurity Research and Development Act also provided 
funding to improve the cybersecurity workforce. Faced with a limited 
supply of qualified candidates and heavy competition for recruitment 
from the private sector, workforce issues have been a challenge for the 
federal government. To increase the quality and quantity of cyber-
security professionals, the Act authorized grant funding to universi-
ties to improve their curriculum and educational opportunities in this 
area. In addition, it created a competitive grant program for students 
pursuing graduate degrees in computer or network security to train 
both future cybersecurity professionals and faculty.
Reforming Current Risk Management Practices
Critics of FISMA argue that its compliance requirements force agen-
cies into a paper-pushing exercise that yields few tangible improve-
ments in the overall cybersecurity posture of the organization. 
Agencies were previously required to submit reports quarterly. Most 
of these data submissions came as individual spreadsheets or copies of 
internal security assessment reports. The Obama administration, led 
by former federal Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra, advocated 
for security programs that continuously and automatically monitor fed-
eral systems and networks. In April 2010, the Office of Management 
and Budget released M-10-15, a memo outlining new FISMA report-
ing requirements for all federal agencies. These included requirements 
to report data feeds directly from security management tools, provide 
responses to a set of questions on the security posture of the agency, 
and respond to agency-specific follow-up interview questions. The 
new memo also requires agencies to begin reporting this new data on 
a monthly basis beginning in January 2011.
The federal CIO also created “CyberScope,” an online reporting 
tool to facilitate data collection and reporting. CyberScope allows 
any of the more than 600 different users from the federal agencies to 
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submit data on their security and privacy programs using a secure web 
interface. Part of the goal of the CyberScope initiative is to reduce the 
reporting costs for cybersecurity so more resources can be directed 
to securing systems rather than compliance. OMB estimates that 
FISMA’s certification and accreditation process costs the federal gov-
ernment $1.3 billion annually. Automation should help reduce these 
expenditures. In addition, the OMB (Streufert, 2009) is planning to 
collect data to establish better performance metrics for cybersecurity 
investments.
Another goal of collecting data electronically through CyberScope 
is to more easily facilitate automated analysis of cybersecurity risk 
assessments, as have been achieved at some model agencies such as 
the Department of State. The data collected through this program 
will eventually be fed into a federal cybersecurity dashboard that will 
provide government leaders with practical intelligence on the state 
of cybersecurity both government-wide and at individual agencies. 
The goal of these efforts to streamline data collection and create more 
automated cybersecurity analytics tools is to drastically reduce the 
timeframe to collect data, identify threats, and implement remedies.
Conclusion
Cybersecurity remains uncharted territory. While significant progress 
has been made, one of the core underlying issues is that organizations 
still cannot accurately measure risk. Without a clear measure of risk, 
appropriate mitigation strategies cannot be taken. And without an 
accurate measurement of risk, good security practices often go unre-
warded while bad security practices go unpunished. In the current 
environment, consumers are more likely to purchase a product based 
on the reputation of the vendor rather than on the level of security the 
product actually provides. Developing an improved understanding of 
risk will help put market forces to work by encouraging the private 
sector to develop better cybersecurity products and reward innovation.
In regard to cybersecurity, the federal government is clearly ahead of 
where it was a few decades ago. Today, agencies understand the impor-
tance of risk management and have dedicated significant resources to 
secure government information systems, including hiring and train-
ing information security professionals, developing security policies 
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and procedures, and providing user education. But problems with 
implementation persist at many agencies. As the federal government 
takes on more responsibility to develop strong cybersecurity practices 
internally and in the private sector, this problem may increase.
In addition, the threat landscape is changing and government must 
adopt flexible policies to address these challenges. Although the ini-
tial reaction in government is sometimes to simply prohibit disruptive 
new technologies, like mobile phones or social networking sites, that 
break existing security models, a long-term prohibition on progress is 
not possible or advisable. Instead, public sector managers should seek 
creative solutions that balance productivity and convenience with the 
appropriate level of security. Future federal cybersecurity efforts must 
address emerging threats based on the changing nature of informa-
tion technology such as the growth of cloud computing, a ubiqui-
tous mobile Internet, and the emergence of the “Internet of Things.” 
For example, what new risks will emerge once IPv6 is more widely 
deployed and every device on the planet, including weapons, has an 
IP address?
Many policy debates remain unresolved. One of the central ques-
tions is whether cybersecurity should fall principally under the domain 
of the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland 
Security. Although the military, intelligence, and homeland security 
agencies would all prefer to have greater control over cybersecurity, a 
strong case could be made for locating the majority of the cybersecu-
rity policymaking in the Department of Commerce: long-term, infor-
mation security will only improve through market-driven innovation 
that benefits government, businesses, and consumers. Cybersecurity 
is an arms race between the good guys and the bad guys; to prevail, 
the government should renew its commitment to funding cyberse-
curity research and development. Moreover, most IT products have 
the same security profile regardless of whether the user is in govern-
ment or the private sector. The same is true within government where 
the distinction and requirements between intelligence and nonintel-
ligence systems do not differ substantially.
More broadly, efforts should continue to update a coordinated stra-
tegic plan to secure cyberspace and mitigate the threats to national 
security, ensure reliable systems, foster innovation, and protect 
citizens. The United States should continue to build a coordinated 
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response to cybersecurity threats, both between the public and pri-
vate sectors and between the United States and foreign partners. 
Cybersecurity does not start or end at the border, but instead requires 
a global framework for monitoring, detecting, and responding to 
cyber incidents.
Many challenges and uncertainties remain, but one thing is clear: 
more work remains to be done.
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* Noting as an illustration of how fast things can change in this area, in the months 
since this was written, the European Commission released a new communication 
on critical information infrastructure protection—“Achievements and Next Steps: 
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Introduction
Half of all European growth in productivity is currently driven by 
information and communications technology (ICT) and this trend is 
expected to accelerate, according to the Digital Agenda, the European 
Union (EU) strategy on how to leverage technology to support eco-
nomic growth. But the Digital Agenda also identifies the unintended 
consequences of a digital economy: spam accounts for 80% to 90% 
of all e-mails in circulation globally, identity theft and online fraud 
both continue to grow, and there are increasingly complex types of 
cyberspace threats that are often motivated by financial purposes. 
According to EurActiv, an online information provider dedicated to 
EU affairs, in early 2010 the European Commission estimated that 
the costs of cybercrime for the EU are €750 billion annually, greater 
than the costs of drug trafficking and roughly equivalent to 1% of 
global gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, the Digital Agenda 
highlights the need for further EU action in regard to Internet trust 
and security, one of seven policy priority areas for the region.
Protecting cyberspace is a complex task as it bestrides multiple 
public policy domains, including criminal justice, technology, stan-
dardization, cooperation, research and development, and mar-
ket regulation. Cybersecurity also requires active participation of a 
range of stakeholders across the public and private sectors, as well as 
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individuals. But addressing the challenge of cybersecurity in the EU, 
a community of over 600 million people in 27 different countries is 
especially complicated as various organizations and institutions at the 
national and regional levels make policy efforts difficult to harmo-
nize. The main European institutions with respect to understanding 
EU policy, however, are the European Commission (EC), Council 
of Ministers (Council of the European Union), European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA), and the European Police 
Agency (Europol). The EC is represented by the European Parliament, 
which also represents the views of European citizens and holds the 
executive power (often referred to as “Guardian of the Treaties”). 
The Council of Ministers represents governments and is the main 
decision-making authority while organizations such as ENISA and 
Europol are separate agencies or institutions.
In addressing cybersecurity, European Community Communi-
cation 251 (2006) adopted what it termed a “three-pronged approach” 
that covers
• Specific measures relating to Network and Information 
Security (NIS), defined by the EC as “the ability of a network 
or an information system to resist, at a given level of confi-
dence, accidental events or malicious actions that compromise 
the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of 
stored or transmitted data and the related services offered by 
or accessible via these networks and systems”
• The regulatory framework for electronic communications
• The fight against cybercrime
European cybersecurity policy focuses on the domains of network 
and information security and cybercrime. Crucially, due to the complex 
historical, geopolitical, and institutional construct of the EU and mem-
ber states, military responses to cybersecurity are not dealt with. This is 
an area of competence that remains outside of the purview of the EU. 
Other organizations, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), have been more active in this area with the formation of the 
Co-operative Cyber-Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia and inclu-
sion of defense against cyber attack as part of NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The military aspects 
of addressing cybersecurity are seen as increasingly important with the 
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United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Sweden all 
working on doctrine for how to deploy military force in cyberspace.
This chapter will first describe relevant European organizations 
involved in cybersecurity, followed by details on various normative 
(i.e., rules that set out what ought to happen) EU laws and regula-
tions. Although EU law, action plans, initiatives, and communica-
tions account for one side of the story, it is increasingly noted that the 
key to successfully tackling cybersecurity is partnership and a strong 
implementation of initiatives. Partnership, dialogue, multilateralism, 
and multistakeholder approaches are now constant characteristics of 
EU policy in the field of cybersecurity. The weight being given to pro-
posing new laws compared to strengthening implementation is per-
haps most starkly observed in the EU’s Digital Agenda. Out of the 
100 actions proposed, only 31 are legislative (i.e., revolve around the 
drafting or modification of EU legislation).
Institutions
This section provides an overview of the main organizations with respect 
to the formulation of European cyberspace policy. The main executive 
and legislative institutions are described along with a summary of what 
was until late 2009 a unique “pillar structure” to policy areas in the EU, 
which is of significant impact with respect to cybersecurity policy.
The European Commission: “Engine-Room” of European Union Policy
Roughly analogous to a national-level civil service, the European 
Commission (EC) is an apolitical executive body responsible for much 
of the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of European 
policy. The European Commission proposes legislation that is then 
submitted to the Council of Ministers and European Parliament for 
approval. The EC is composed of a number of Directorates-General 
(DGs), the European equivalent of U.S. Secretaries, with responsibili-
ties for various policy areas, or portfolios. For purposes of this chapter, 
the main portfolios for cybersecurity are the DG Information Society 
and Media and the DG Home Affairs.
DG Information Society and Media is primarily technically ori-
entated and concerned with the use of ICTs across the public and 
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private sectors, as well as citizen usage. Its portfolio includes tele-
communications regulation, promoting the uptake of ICT in society 
for economic and social benefits and regulatory policy governing the 
ICT market. It is also responsible for a considerable applied technical 
and scientific research and development (R&D) budget. In relation 
to cybersecurity, DG Information Society and Media includes policy 
desks looking at Network and Information Security (NIS). The work 
is mainly of a technical nature, for example, investigating security 
risks inherent in specific technologies, use of risk management to pro-
mote Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), or whether the market 
for ICT security products and services is sufficiently vibrant. The DG 
is also concerned with user awareness regarding cyberspace risks and 
digital literacy education and training.
The second DG of relevance is DG Home Affairs, which with 
respect to cybersecurity has responsibility for two significant policy 
areas, namely cybercrime and critical infrastructure protection. In the 
cybercrime area, the DG monitors the implementation of rules and 
policies using criminal law to address the misuse of cyberspace. With 
regard to critical infrastructure protection the DG introduces measures 
to improve the resilience and protection of national and European criti-
cal infrastructure, including for the ICT sector. The EC continue to 
note that the consequences of damage to infrastructures across two or 
more member states provides a clear rationale for EU-level intervention.
The EC also plays an active role in international discussions, such 
as at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Council of Europe, and the United Nations. For example, 
according to Communication 181, the EU made an especially strong 
case for the availability, reliability, and security of networks and 
information at the UN-organized World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) in Tunis in 2005. This furthered the policy debate 
regarding the need to continue the fight against cybercrime and spam 
while protecting privacy and freedom of expression. The need for a 
common international understanding of NIS was also identified at 
this meeting, as was the importance of collecting and sharing security-
related information and best practices regarding countermeasures.
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The European Council of Ministers: National Governments
The second major institution of importance in European policy regard-
ing cybersecurity is the Council of the European Union, also known 
as the Council of Ministers. Every 6 months, an EU member state 
assumes the role of the presidency of the Council on a rotating basis. 
The Council is the major decision-making body of the European Union. 
It is made up of 27 ministers (one for each member state) who repre-
sent different national ministries depending on the specific policy being 
discussed (e.g., agriculture, police, criminal justice, etc.). The Council 
effectively represents the relevant department(s) in each member state 
with specific responsibility for particular issues. The member state in 
charge of the rotating presidency has a degree of latitude about which 
issues are going to be of interest, called “policy priorities.” The priorities 
are important as they inject added policy impetus to selected issues. In 
2009, for example, the Czech Presidency supported a major conference 
on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, due in no small part 
to a sustained cyber attack that Estonia suffered a year earlier.
The European Network and Information Security Agency: 
Middleware of European Cybersecurity Policy
Unlike the EC or the Council, the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) is a European Community agency of the 
EU. This means it has a greater degree of independence in its activities 
than, for example, the EC that must negotiate with member states to 
get policies implemented.
Based in Crete, Greece, ENISA is an intermediary or “policy mid-
dleware” between the EU, specifically the European Commission and 
member states, and the private sector. Effective information security, 
it was recognized, can contribute toward the smooth functioning 
of the EU’s internal market.* Hence, ENISA’s mission is to foster a 
* Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
March 10, 2004, establishing the European Network and Information Security 
Agency. A “European Community agency” is a body set up by the EU to carry out a 
specific technical, scientific, or management task within the “Community domain” 
(“first pillar”) of the EU. These agencies are not provided for in the treaties. Instead, 
each one is set up by an individual piece of legislation that specifies the task of that 
particular agency.
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culture of network and information security for the benefit of citi-
zens, consumers, and public and private sector organizations alike. 
Although its specific role is under review as of this writing in early 
2011, ENISA currently acts both as a Centre of Excellence for NIS, 
with its “customers” being the European Commission and EU mem-
ber states, and to further cooperation with the business community in 
order to help the private sector address cybersecurity.
ENISA achieves its objectives by undertaking a variety of tasks, 
mainly revolving around the provision of advice and assistance to the 
European Commission and member states on addressing security-
related issues in hardware and software; collecting and analyzing data 
on security incidents in Europe and emerging risks; promoting risk 
assessment and risk management methods; and raising awareness and 
stimulating cooperation between public and private sector actors, such 
as the development of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in this area.
ENISA is headed by an executive director and has a management 
board and a Permanent Stakeholders Group (PSG) consisting of rep-
resentatives from relevant groups such as ICT industry, user organiza-
tions, and academic experts in cyberspace. In regard to NIS, ENISA 
is currently undertaking three major areas of work:
• Supporting policy cooperation between member states in 
the European Forum for Member States (EFMS) and the 
European Public–Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R)
• Providing expertise and assistance regarding the implementa-
tion of the security measures in the revised Regulatory pack-
age for Telecommunications
• Contributing to cybersecurity preparedness exercises and 
provision of technical support for the establishment of a 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for the EU 
institutions and a European-wide network of CERTs
When an evaluation of ENISA was carried out in 2007, 
Communication 285 noted that although significant problems existed 
with the agency, there were positive aspects of its operation despite 
limited resources.
Given the expiry of ENISA’s official remit in March 2009, a regu-
lation to extend the existing legal mandate and budget of ENISA 
until 2012 was adopted by the European Council and the Parliament 
166 neIl roBInson
in September 2008, according to Regulation 1007. At that time, the 
then Commissioner for DG Information Society and Media, Mrs. 
Viviane Reding, called upon both the Council and the European 
Parliament to open an “intense debate on Europe’s approach to net-
work security and how to deal with cyber attacks” and that the future 
role of ENISA should be included in these deliberations. ENISA’s 
legal mandate is thus undergoing change and, as of early 2011, its 
tasks and objectives are likely to evolve further.
At the end of September 2010, the EC made public a proposal 
to strengthen and modernize ENISA. The EC hopes that by giving 
ENISA a broader range of tasks, the EU, member states, and the pri-
vate sector will be better supported in the development of their capa-
bilities to prevent, detect, and respond to cybersecurity challenges. In 
effect, the proposal contains two legal initiatives: a relatively uncon-
troversial recommendation to extend its current legal mandate and 
budget by a year and a half but also a new legal mandate assigning 
ENISA important new areas of responsibility, greater flexibility, 
and increased budget. This unusual approach recognizes the need 
for debate among the Council and the Parliament but risks a legal 
vacuum if the new mandate is not formally adopted before the current 
one expires in 2012.
The proposed terms mean that ENISA will become the catalyst for 
a more coordinated European fight against cybercrime by including 
representatives from the law enforcement community, judiciary, and 
European data protection and privacy commissioners. This consti-
tutes a major step forward as it brings together (at least operationally) 
the discrete and largely separate policy portfolios of DG Information 
Society and DG Home Affairs. Some characteristics of this new set 
of roles include
• Greater flexibility, adaptability, and capability to focus on 
emerging issues relating to cybersecurity
• Better alignment of the Agency to the EU regulatory process, 
providing countries and institutions with assistance and advice
• Action by the Agency in taking into account the network and 
information security aspects of the fight against cybercrime
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• Strengthened governance structure through a stronger super-
visory role of the Management Board, in which the EU 
Member States and the European Commission are represented
• Simplification of procedures to improve efficiency
• Gradual increase of the Agency’s financial and human resources
The 2010 proposal indicates that ENISA would assume a broader 
range of tasks to permit a more dynamic response to the changing 
requirements of risks in cyberspace. Such tasks include regular assess-
ments on the state of NIS in Europe and the provision of assistance to 
the EU and member states in promoting the use of risk management 
and good security practices and standards for electronic products, sys-
tems, and services.
Europol—Criminal Intelligence Regarding Cybercrime
With a remit to collect and analyze criminal activity regarding 
organized transnational crime affecting member states, the role 
of Europol, the European Policing Organization set up in 1999 in 
The Hague, cannot be ignored. In June 2010 a meeting was held at 
Europol Headquarters where it was decided to establish the European 
Union Cybercrime Task Force. This meeting was attended by rep-
resentatives from law enforcement cybercrime units from across the 
member states and also officials from Eurojust (an EU agency sup-
porting judicial cooperation across the Union) and the European 
Commission. Participants discussed operational and strategic issues 
on cybercrime investigations, prosecutions, and cross-border coop-
eration as well as information exchange, case studies, new criminal 
trends, criminal modus operandi, legal constraints, and the role of 
the private sector as well as provision of police and criminal justice 
training.
As a result of this meeting, the subsequently established 
European Cybercrime Platform includes the Internet Crime 
Reporting System (ICROS), the Analysis Work File (AWF), a 
support system for crimes related to the Internet, and an Expert 
Forum that hosts technical data and police training. The intent of 
the European Cybercrime Platform, as described by Europol’s 2010 
to 2014 Strategy, is for it to serve as a reporting point, receiving 
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national-level reports and statistics about the prevalence of cyber-
crime in each member state and aggregating them to find trends. 
Ultimately, it is hoped that the European Cybercrime Platform will 
be part of a proposed European Cybercrime Center, which was first 
described in the Conclusions of the Spanish Presidency in April 
2010. Specifically, it was proposed as part of a strategy to cope more 
effectively with crimes committed by means of electronic networks. 
An essential element of the facilitation of information in this regard 
would be undertaken by the European Cybercrime Platform, as 
described above. Longer-term actions for the Center proposed by 
the Council in April included
• Ratification by the European Union of the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Convention
• Improvement of training standards of law enforcement and 
those in the criminal justice system to better deal with cyber-
crime investigations
• Encouragement of information sharing between police 
authorities of the member states
• An assessment of the fight against cybercrime in the EU and 
member states in order to achieve a better understanding of 
trends and developments
• Adoption of a common approach in respect to international 
collaboration, for example, regarding revocation of Domain 
Name and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
• Promotion of harmonization of different contact points, such 
as those of the G8 Hi-Tech Crime community and Interpol
The Council asked the European Commission to draw up a feasi-
bility study on the possibility of the establishment of the European 
Cyber Crime Center to carry out these activities. It asked that this 
feasibility study should include arrangements for budgeting and 
whether it should be located within Europol.
In late 2010, Europol was known to be working on a first version of 
a threat assessment regarding cybercrime known as iOCTA (Internet 
facilitated organized crime threat assessment). As of early 2011, no 
further details have yet been released regarding this assessment, but 
the analytical capabilities involved are relevant in the establishment 
of any forthcoming European Cyber Crime Center. Coincidentally, 
169euroPean CyBerseCurIty PolICy
Europol was assigned the status of a full EU agency in 2010, mean-
ing it has increased powers to request the provision of criminal intel-
ligence from member states but also subject to increased budgetary 
control by the European Parliament.
The (Former) Pillars of European Policymaking and the New Structure
This section concludes by summarizing the unique pillar structure of 
the EU, which up until recently saw different sets of rules apply to 
different policies relating to cybersecurity, depending upon whether 
they were concerned with matters in the “Internal Market” or “Police 
and Criminal Justice Co-operation.”
Until the entry into force of the Treaty of the EU (TEU) and 
Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in December 2009, EU 
policy was based on a “pillar” structure, the result of the evolution of 
heavily negotiated compromises based in the origins of the European 
Project in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 
“First Pillar” (the Internal Market) provided the basis for the creation 
and imposition of common European regulations across the member 
states, to propose regulatory intervention in, for example, the areas 
of competition, private international law, and consumer rights. The 
objective of such intervention was to remove barriers to free trade 
within and between the member states. Policy in the “Second Pillar” 
included areas of EU organizational machinery and the governance 
of the institutions, such as the powers for the European Court of 
Auditors. The “Third Pillar” was an area of EU competence in which, 
formerly, power was placed in an Intergovernmental Council of the 
EU. This was because policies relating to interior affairs (such as crim-
inal justice, law enforcement, and so on) was not originally seen as an 
area of specific EU competence (i.e., that warranted direct EU inter-
vention using consistent European-wide rules) due to broad differ-
ences between legal, cultural, and social norms in the member states. 
However, this has now changed under the Treaty of the European 
Union (the Lisbon Treaty). Title V of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) that entered into force on December 
1, 2009, brings these areas back into the competence of the EU, under 
an Area for Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ):
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The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and tradi-
tions of the Member States.
In practice, this means that legislation in this area can now be adopted 
by a smaller majority (two-thirds) of the European Council and the 
European Parliament and it is no longer possible for a single country 
to block a proposal. Furthermore, in monitoring the implementation 
of EU law, the European Commission will have greater powers to 
refer cases of noncompliance of the member states to the European 
Court of Justice.
Nonetheless, in order to place the different policy initiatives in their 
appropriate context, an appreciation of the pillar structure is impor-
tant because the TFEU remains relatively recent and most policy ini-
tiatives in this area are a result of this unique arrangement.
Instruments: Normative Law and Policy
A number of European policy initiatives on cybersecurity have 
been launched over the last 10 years. They take the form of non-
binding Communications, Action Plans, and Strategies, or legisla-
tion, such as Framework Decisions, Directives, or directly binding 
Regulations. But they generally stem from a wider context of the 
formulation of strategies setting out how Europe can make the 
most of ICTs in economic and societal growth. These may be part 
of much broader plans describing strategic global-level objectives 
for Europe.
The Digital Agenda initiative, for example, aims to provide sus-
tainable economic and societal benefits from a single digital market. It 
is the first of seven “flagship initiatives” to be released, making up the 
overarching Europe 2020 strategy. Europe 2020 is about three things: 
“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.” The Digital Agenda for 
Europe is a horizontal initiative and lays out key actions in seven areas 
regarding how Europe can maximize the benefits of ICTs. These are a 
vibrant digital single market, interoperability and standards, trust and 
security, fast and ultrafast Internet access, research and innovation, 
enhancing digital literacy and skills, and finally ICT-enabled benefits 
for EU society.
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Given that lack of security and trust is seen as a major barrier to 
the widespread uptake of ICTs by European citizens, it is also an 
obstacle to growth. For example, a consumer survey conducted by the 
UK’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 2009 identified that a third of 
Internet users are not shopping online with the lack of trust being 
identified as the biggest reason. The two most relevant policy areas 
in this regard are Network and Information Security (NIS) and the 
fight against cybercrime. This section looks at the salient initiatives 
and policies in both areas.
Network and Information Security (NIS) Policy
The Network and Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy 
Approach was a response to a request from the European Council, 
in March 2001, for the development of “a comprehensive strategy 
on security of electronic networks including practical implementing 
rules.” The initiative set out seven main policy efforts and indicated 
how NIS policy initiatives relate to two other important domains: the 
existing telecommunications and data protection regulatory frame-
work and policy concerning cybercrime. The Communication pro-
posed a number of measures:
• Raise awareness through the launch of public information and 
education campaigns as well as promotion of best practices
• Strengthen Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
to establish a European Warning and Information System 
and subsequent examination of how to organize data collec-
tion, analysis, and planning of predictive responses to emerg-
ing cybersecurity threats
• Promote funding of cybersecurity research and development 
support within the EU’s official scientific research funding
• Further facilitate market-based mechanisms to support stan-
dardization and certification including the acceleration of 
work on interoperability, support for electronic signatures, 
and further development of the next generation of IP tech-
nology (IPv6)
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• Establish an inventory of legal measures regarding cybersecu-
rity taken by member states in accordance with EU law, and 
propose legislation on cybercrime
• Promote effective and interoperable security solutions in 
e-government and e-procurement activities and incorporate 
e-signatures in any future e-government activities
• Reinforce international dialogue on NIS
Strategy for a Safe and Secure Information Society 2006
In the Strategy for a Safe and Secure Information Society: Dialogue, 
Partnership and Empowerment, the European Commission presented 
its ideas for how risks to the emerging information society would be 
addressed. The strategy identified that NIS represented a complex 
policy challenge requiring cooperation and coordination between 
the public and private sectors. In addition to a widespread culture of 
security, the strategy argued that a secure information society must 
also be based on enhancing NIS. A dynamic and integrated approach 
was proposed based on dialogue, partnership, and empowerment. 
According to the strategy, this would be an open and inclusive multi-
stakeholder dialogue across the public and private sectors.
The strategy proposed to benchmark national NIS-related poli-
cies and identify best practices to improve awareness among small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and citizens. This strategy also 
urged governments, the private sector, and research and academia 
involved to participate in a structured multistakeholder debate focus-
ing on the need to strike “an appropriate societal balance between 
security and the protection of fundamental rights” (p. 8).
ENISA, meanwhile, was asked to develop a partnership with 
member states and other relevant parties and to develop an appropri-
ate data collection framework to enable the collection of useful data 
on cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities. Member states and the 
research community were also invited to join in a strategic partner-
ship together to ensure that data on the ICT security industry was 
available in addition to evolving market trends for ICT security prod-
ucts and services. ENISA was also asked to examine the feasibility of 
a European Information Sharing and Alert System to support a more 
effective response to threats to information infrastructures.
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The Commission recommended that the member states participate in 
proposed benchmarking activities; promote, in close cooperation with 
ENISA, awareness-raising campaigns on the benefits of security; lever-
age the e-government services to communicate and promote good secu-
rity practices; and stimulate the development of NIS programs as part 
of higher education curricula. The private sector was invited to, among 
other things, develop an appropriate definition of responsibilities for 
software producers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in relation to 
the provision of adequate and reliable and auditable levels of security; 
promote diversity, openness, interoperability, usability, and competi-
tion as key drivers for security; stimulate the deployment of security-
enhancing products, processes, and services to prevent and fight ID theft 
and other “privacy intrusive” attacks; disseminate good security practices 
across a range of relevant organizations (e.g., SMEs or network opera-
tors); provide training programs for security personnel; work toward 
affordable security certification schemes for products, processes, and ser-
vices that address EU-specific needs; and, involve the insurance sector 
for the development of appropriate risk management tools and methods 
to tackle ICT-related risks and foster a culture of risk management in 
organizations and businesses (in particular SMEs).
The European Council endorsed this strategy, publishing its 
Resolution on the Strategy (2007/ C68/01).
European Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection
European policy concerning Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is based 
on the 2007 European Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP). The purpose of this program, like the Stockholm Programme 
(see below) in the context of the former Third Pillar, was to set out key 
actions that Europe needed to take in respect to the protection of criti-
cal infrastructures, of which cyberspace is generally regarded as but one 
example. EPCIP focuses on motivated attacks as well as on the implica-
tions of accidents and natural disasters. The Programme has three main 
tasks: first, the creation of broad measures across all CIP areas; second, 
the protection of European critical infrastructures and reduction of 
their vulnerability; and third, the establishment of a national frame-
work to assist EU countries in the protection of their National Critical 
Infrastructures. The EPCIP program includes a number of associated 
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proposed European rules and regulations, the most important of which 
include setting up a procedure for identifying and designating European 
critical infrastructure in addition to developing a common approach to 
assessing the need to protect such infrastructure (to be implemented 
by a proposed EU Directive on identification of European critical 
infrastructures); actions to establish a Critical Infrastructure Warning 
Network (CIWN); Critical Infrastructure Protection expert groups at 
EU level and the establishment of information-sharing processes and 
identification and analysis of interdependencies.
Communication on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) 2009
March 2009 saw the publication of a Communication from the 
European Commission on Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP): COM 2009 (149). The objectives were to protect 
Europe from large-scale cyber attacks and disruptions, promote a cul-
ture of security and resilience, and tackle cyber attacks and disrup-
tions from a systematic perspective. The means outlined in the strategy 
included enhancement of the CIIP preparedness and response capa-
bility in the EU, promotion of the adoption of adequate and consistent 
levels of preventative, detection, emergency, and recovery measures in 
the member states and foster international cooperation, particularly 
on Internet stability and resilience. The proposed approach to achieve 
the objectives was fourfold: to build on national and private sector 
initiatives, engage the public and private sectors, adopt an all-hazards 
approach (including natural events and manmade accidents as well as 
cyber attack) and remain multilateral, open, and inclusive.
In addition to the threat posed by cyber attacks, this Communication 
identified the role of cyberspace in European infrastructure security 
and its associated vulnerabilities. The Communication also had a 
number of more specific objectives, namely the fostering of coopera-
tion and exchange of good policy practices between member states, 
development of a European-level public–private partnership on 
the security and resilience of Critical Information Infrastructures; 
enhancement of incident response capability across the EU; pro-
motion of national and pan-European–level exercises on simulated 
large-scale network security incidents; and finally, the reinforcement 
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of international cooperation on global issues, specifically resilience 
and stability of the Internet. The action plan that accompanied this 
Communication was thus made up of several strands: preparedness 
and prevention, detection and response, mitigation and recovery, and 
international cooperation. Finally, the Communication set out objec-
tives to establish criteria to identify European Critical Infrastructures 
in the ICT sector.
The subsequent Council Resolution on a collaborative European 
approach to Network and Information security [2009/C 321/01] formally 
adopted the approach described in the Communication on CIIP 
alongside calling for further development of ENISA into a more effi-
cient body and increasing its available resources.
European Public Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R)
As described in the Communication on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection in 2009 the European Public Private 
Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) was created following a Resolution 
from the European Council on A collaborative European approach to 
Network and Information Security. According to a nonpaper on EP3R, 
this endorsed a multistakeholder approach to cybersecurity, the main 
objectives of which are
• Provide a platform for sharing information and policy prac-
tices in order to foster a common understanding of the eco-
nomic and market dimensions of security and resilience in the 
context of CIIP as well as on the roles and responsibilities of 
public and private stakeholders
• Discuss public policy priorities, objectives, and measures with 
a view to define appropriate conditions and socioeconomic 
incentives to improve the coherence and coordination of poli-
cies for security and resilience in Europe
• Identify and promote the adoption of good baseline practices 
for security and resilience, with a view to pursue minimum 
security and resilience standards and coordinated risk assess-
ment approaches
EP3R is based on four key principles:
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• Complementarity: EP3R should build upon, complement, 
and leverage the existing national public–private initiatives 
while respecting national responsibility
• Trust: EP3R should provide the structure, processes, and 
environment for trusted collaboration, including the protec-
tion of sensitive information from disclosure
• Value: emphasis on exchanges between public and private 
sector participants and providing value for both governments 
and industry. EP3R should aim to deliver concrete results
• Openness: open to all stakeholders contributing to the secu-
rity and resilience of CIIPs, balancing the need for a high 
degree of representation with the potential for a higher num-
ber of participants to lower the level of trust
Nonetheless, private sector participants involved in this process 
identified that the necessity to establish practical and appropriate 
structures, rules, and processes for E3PR would play an important 
role in its effectiveness.
European Forum for Member States
The European Forum for Member States (EFMS) is a counterpart 
to the EP3R and was another part of the Action Plan implement-
ing the Communication on CIIP from March 2009. EFMS and the 
EP3R are meant to be complementary. The EFMS is meant to include 
representatives of national public authorities with responsibility for 
NIS and CIIP policy in their respective country. The objective and 
basic principles revolve around the sharing of information and good 
policy practices on security and resilience of Critical Information 
Infrastructures between Member States. As such, it is only open to 
official government representatives.
Revised Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications 
2009 (Framework Directive)
As a result of an Amending Act to the 2002 Directive on a Common 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications and Services, 
a new set of rules governing telecommunications were adopted in 
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late 2009. The Amending Act creates a consistent pan-European 
policy on telecommunications infrastructures, measures to pro-
hibit market dominance and discrimination and the protection of 
consumers. The Act contained a set of obligations relating to NIS 
for providers of public e-communications networks. These rules 
were contained within a new chapter on Security and Integrity of 
Networks that requires that providers take measures around three 
domains: implement measures to ensure a level of security appro-
priate to the risks, prevent and minimize the impact of security 
incidents on users and connected networks, and finally ensure the 
continuity of supply of services.
This act goes on to introduce a “breach notification” law in article 
13a. This means that providers must provide notification of informa-
tion security breaches having significant impact on operations and 
the Competent National Authority, usually the communications 
regulator in each member state, must inform other EU authori-
ties, ENISA, and the public when appropriate (e.g., if the breach 
involved customers’ personal data). Relevant national governmen-
tal agencies are now also required to submit a yearly report to the 
European Commission and ENISA. The European Commission 
also reserves the right, after having taken the advice of ENISA, to 
adopt appropriate “technical implementing measures” to harmonize 
the implementation of rules in the previous paragraphs, accord-
ing to article 13a. Article 13b lays out enhanced powers of each 
Competent Regulatory Authority to monitor and enforce imple-
mentation of these rules.
The breach notification obligation received considerable criti-
cism from the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The 
EDPS argued that restricting the obligation to providers of elec-
tronic communications services missed the point because other 
organizations, such as “providers of information society services” 
broadly defined, are more likely to put personal data of individuals 
at risk and hence breach notification. It also argued that the misuse 
of personal data would decrease by incentivizing firms rather than 
penalizing them.
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Public Consultation on Future of European Network 
and Information Security Policy, 2009
At the request of the European Council and European Parliament 
and in the context of the extension of the mandate of ENISA 
described previously, between November 2008 and January 2009 the 
European Commission organized a public consultation on the future 
of European NIS policy. This received 596 contributions ranging 
from governmental and public bodies, private citizens, industry asso-
ciations, individual companies, and academic institutions. Of the 
more significant comments by respondents to the consultation, the 
importance of a more coordinated approach was recognized, as was 
the need to undertake any policy in the context of global cooperation 
taking advantage of transnational organizations such as the OECD 
and United Nations. The responses also highlighted the importance 
of information exchange between relevant organizations in the pub-
lic and private sectors. ENISA was generally regarded as having a 
great deal of support as well as links between Computer Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) across Europe.
Chapter on Trust and Security in the Digital Agenda for Europe 2010
NIS and CIIP were identified as secondary objectives within the 
single chapter on Trust and Security in the 2010 Digital Agenda 
for Europe (COM 2010(245)). Beginning with the assumption 
that establishing trust is of utmost importance if the benefits of the 
Digital Agenda are to be fully exploited, the Chapter on Trust and 
Security went on to say that “Europeans will not embrace technol-
ogy they do not trust: the digital age is neither ‘big brother’ nor 
‘cyber wild west’” (p. 16).
The Digital Agenda proposed two key actions for the European 
Commission to undertake. The first included measures aimed at 
achieving “a reinforced and high level” of NIS, covering the mod-
ernization of ENISA, measures to enable faster reactions in the event 
of cyber attacks and establishing a CERT for EU institutions. The 
second, by 2010, was to introduce measures to combat cyber attacks 
against information systems (described below as proposals for a new 
Framework Directive on attacks against information systems) and the 
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creation of related rules on jurisdiction in cyberspace at European and 
international levels by 2013. Other actions proposed for European 
policy makers include
• Establish a European cybercrime platform, to deliver a coherent 
approach to cybercrime across the European Union by 2012.
• Examine the feasibility of the creation of a European cyber-
crime center by 2011.
• Work with global organizations in the public and private sec-
tor across the digital and physical domains to conduct inter-
nationally coordinated actions against computer-based crime 
and security attacks.
• Support EU-wide cybersecurity preparedness exercises, start-
ing in 2010.
• Explore the extension of security breach notification provi-
sions in the context of the modernization of the European 
legal framework regarding personal data protection (currently 
as described above, breach notifications only apply to provid-
ers of e-communications services rather than more broadly 
“information society service providers”).
• Disseminate guidance on how the new telecommunica-
tions regulatory framework will apply in the context of the 
European legal framework regarding privacy and personal 
data protection (as some have argued that the obligations 
imposed upon telecommunications providers in respect of 
NIS may be at odds with their obligations under European 
law regarding privacy and personal data protection).
• Support the establishment of national reporting points for 
illegal online content (hotlines) and awareness campaigns on 
online safety for children as well as foster a multistakeholder 
dialogue and self-regulation of European and global service 
providers (e.g., social networking platforms) in regard to the 
use of such services by minors.
To support the Digital Agenda, member states were asked to
• Establish a well-functioning network of CERTs at the 
national level covering all of Europe.
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• Carry out large-scale attack simulation and test mitigation 
strategies, in cooperation with the European Commission, 
starting in 2010.
• Fully implement hotlines for the reporting of offensive and 
harmful online content including the organization of aware-
ness campaigns on online safety for children, teaching pro-
grams for online safety in schools, and encouragement for 
providers of online services to implement self-regulatory mea-
sures regarding online safety for children by 2013.
• Set up or adapt national alert platforms to the European 
Cyber Crime Platform (ECCP) by 2012.
Policy Responses to Cybercrime
In 2001 the European Commission published a Communication 
on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security 
of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related 
Crime (COM 2000 (890). It followed a 1998 study presented by the 
EC at the Tampere Summit of the European Council known as the 
COMCRIME report. The 2001 Communication concluded that 
high-tech crime should be included in efforts to agree on common 
definitions and sanctions for various forms of cross-border crime. 
The 2001 Communication proposed a number of measures including 
further introduction of criminal law in the area of high-tech crime. 
The promotion of specialized computer crime police units was also 
raised, as was the support for technical training for law enforcement. 
Finally, this Communication identified the intent to establish an EU 
forum including law enforcement, service providers, telecommunica-
tions operators, data protection authorities, and other interested par-
ties. This forum would have, as its aim, the enhancement of mutual 
understanding and cooperation at EU level as well as raising aware-
ness of risks relating to online criminal activity, the identification 
of effective tools and procedures to combat computer crime and the 
encouragement of further development of early warning and crisis 
management mechanisms.
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European Council Framework Decision on Attacks 
against Information Systems, 2005
In 2005 the Framework Decision on Attacks against Information 
Systems (2005/222/JHA) was published. Broadly, this document 
sought to approximate, into European law, the Council of Europe 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime No. 185 (see below). The stated 
objective of this Framework Decision was to improve cooperation 
between judicial and other competent authorities via the approxima-
tion of rules relating to criminal law across the member states in the 
area of attacks against information systems. This was deemed to be 
the most effective response to address the threat of attacks against 
information and computer systems.
The Framework Decision was intended to build upon the work per-
formed by other international organizations, such as the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. Definitions between these two 
are synchronized to a great extent. Three central criminal offenses 
are elaborated in the Framework Decision: illegal access to infor-
mation systems (article 2), illegal system interference (article 3), and 
illegal data interference (article 4). Member states were required to 
make provision for such offenses to be punished. The criminal act 
was defined as having to be intentional. Punishment was required for 
instigating, aiding, abetting, and attempting to commit any of the 
offenses listed. Member states were required to transpose the deci-
sion within a period of 2 years. In 2008 a report on the implementa-
tion of 2005/222/JHA was released by the European Commission. It 
concluded that a “relatively satisfying degree of implementation” had 
been achieved despite the fact that transposition of the Framework 
Decision was still not complete. The European Commission invited 
those seven member states that, at the time, had not yet commu-
nicated their transposition (brought into applicable national law the 
Framework Decision) to resolve the issue.* Every member state was 
asked to review their legislation to better suppress attacks against 
information systems, and the Commission also indicated that given 
the evolution of cybercrime it was considering new measures as well as 
* Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain did not respond to the request for information, 
and the answers from Ireland, Greece, and the United Kingdom were deemed as not 
possible to allow a review of their level of implementation.
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promoting the use of the Council of Europe and Group of 8 Nations 
(G8) network of contact points to rapidly react to threats involving 
advanced technology.
Communication from the Commission: Toward a General 
Policy on the Fight against Cybercrime, 2007
The EU’s current general policy governing cybercrime is described in 
a Communication from the Commission released in 2007. This initia-
tive aimed to achieve a number of objectives relating to establishing 
policies and harmonizing member state approaches to cybercrime. 
The policy advocated for the
• Establishment of national cooperation between police and law 
enforcement authorities regarding cybercrime, starting with 
the establishment of a high-level expert meeting in 2007 and 
the possibility of a central EU-level cybercrime point of contact
• Increasing financial support for initiatives aimed at improv-
ing training for police and law enforcement regarding dealing 
with cybercrime cases
• Assistance to public authorities in setting up more effective 
measures and the allocation of sufficient resources
• Supporting research in this field
• Creation of a conference bringing together law enforcement 
and the private sector to promote closer cooperation
• Launching public–private sector actions to raise awareness of 
costs and dangers posed by cybercrime
• Further promoting international cooperation
• Taking action to encourage the ratification of the Council 
of Europe’s Budapest Convention 185 on Cybercrime by the 
Member States
• Taking action in conjunction with the member states to pre-
vent and fight coordinated and large-scale attacks against 
national information infrastructures
This communication also noted that measures were needed to 
address traditional forms of crime facilitated by electronic networks. 
As a result, it proposed an examination of relevant legislation with 
a view to the drafting of specific legislation against identity theft, 
183euroPean CyBerseCurIty PolICy
improvement of techniques used to fight fraud and illegal trade on 
the Internet, and further support for specific sectoral measures such 
as fighting fraud of noncash means of payment. Other objectives 
were proposed in respect of illegal content including incitement to 
terrorism or online pedophilia. Member states were encouraged to 
devote more resources to disrupting these activities, conclude agree-
ments between them, and improve dialogue regarding procedures to 
ensure the swift removal of such content once it was reported. The 
Communication also noted the Commission intended to assess prog-
ress on the implementation of these actions and report in due course 
to the Council and Parliament.
The Stockholm Programme and Associated Commission 
Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme
The 2009 Stockholm Programme, adopted by the European Council 
on December 10 to 11, 2009, promotes policies to ensure network and 
information security and faster EU reactions in the event of cyber 
attacks. It called for both a modernized ENISA and a Directive 
on attacks against information systems (see above). The European 
Commission Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme 
was adopted in mid-2010. The Stockholm Programme and its associ-
ated Action Plan represent the next multiannual strategic work pro-
gram to deliver “an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” across 
the EU. It is hoped that it will build upon polices established in the 
predecessor Tampere (2000 to 2005) and Hague (2005 to 2010) 
Programmes. These initiatives reflect a renewed focus upon the citi-
zen and aims to set out how security policies may be designed to bet-
ter take account of fundamental rights. The Stockholm Programme 
contains a number of actions in respect to cybersecurity, mostly 
revolving around legal instruments regarding cybercrime and critical 
infrastructure protection.
Proposal for a Directive on Attacks against Information Systems, 
Repealing Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, 2010
At the end of September 2010 the European Commission released its 
proposal for a Framework Directive on Attacks against Information 
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Systems, specifically dedicated to addressing the threat from bot-
nets. This would amend the 2005 Framework Decision on Attacks 
against Information Systems. New legislation is needed, accord-
ing to the European Commission, because of the rising number of 
attacks against information systems across Europe, and the previously 
unknown large-scale and dangerous nature of these attacks that have 
affected the information systems of banks, the public sector, and even 
the military such as with the cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia, 
and the recent retaliation against Paypal, MasterCard, and Visa in 
the context of the WikiLeaks case. The 2008 Implementation Report 
on the 2005 Framework Decision underlined the emergence of such 
threats because botnets remained outside the direct focus of the origi-
nal legislation. A new Directive would also be able to take advan-
tage of the opportunity presented by the entry into force of the TEU 
and TFEU in 2009 to establish new legislation within the AFSJ, as 
described earlier. The Proposed Directive will thus retain the current 
provisions of the 2005 Framework Decision but now include penal-
ization of tools, such as malicious software or unrightfully obtained 
computer passwords, to commit the previously criminalized offenses. 
It also introduces criteria regarding aggravating circumstances under 
which the minimum penalty of imprisonment is extended. The pro-
posed new Directive would introduce illegal interception of infor-
mation systems as a criminal offense, bringing European law into 
alignment with the Budapest Convention, and improve criminal jus-
tice and police cooperation across Europe by strengthening the net-
work of 24/7 contact points by setting a time criteria for responding to 
urgent requests. Member states will be required to collect basic statis-
tical data on cybercrimes and the proposed Directive also raises maxi-
mum terms of imprisonment of at least 2 years for various offenses, 
raising the level of criminal penalties of offenses committed under 
aggravating circumstances to a maximum term of at least 5 years.
Examples of Member State Initiatives
Although there is a noted plethora of rules, regulations, and initiatives 
at the European level, much of the success or failure of these policies 
of course rests with member states and industry, who are responsible 
to a greater or lesser degree for the successful implementation of these 
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different initiatives. In addition, member states must deal with mili-
tary responses to cybersecurity as this remains substantially outside of 
the purview of the EU and is more a matter of NATO membership. 
Although distinguishing the difference between cybercrime, cyber 
terrorism, and cyber war is difficult, much of what is discussed above 
generally relates to the nonmilitary responses to risks in cyberspace.
The difficulty of implementation of these laws and regulations 
described above is not necessarily restricted to cybersecurity policies, 
however. How to improve the implementation of European law is a 
constant perennial concern of policy makers in Brussels regardless of 
the policy domain. Notwithstanding this, there are a number of ways 
that the extensive policies and laws can be implemented by member 
states. This may vary from direct transposition of EU legislation, to 
member states following guidance and best practice agreed and dis-
cussed at the EU level. At its most basic level (and again depending 
upon the specific legislative form), member states must implement or 
transpose European legislation into their own national law. Depending 
on the type of European instrument this may be done with varying 
degrees of consistency to the original text. For example, a Regulation is 
directly binding upon member states, whereas a Framework Directive 
can be transposed with varying degrees of latitude. Law must be imple-
mented usually within a certain time frame. In addition, the European 
institutions have the opportunity, where they consider that legislation 
is a blunt instrument, to support or facilitate other “softer” measures 
such as the provision of guidance or the sharing of best practice, aimed 
at improving policy responses to certain issues without necessarily get-
ting out the rule book. Some of the most common ways to achieve this 
are by the participation of member state national representatives (e.g., 
from law enforcement or cabinet-level national security communities) 
in working groups or forums hosted by the European Commission. In 
this aspect, the Commission plays the role as facilitator or enabler of 
a platform for the improvement of the implementation of EU policy.
The remainder of this section illustrates how three EU member 
states approached these issues in regard to cybersecurity. In 2009 the 
United Kingdom published its National Cyber-Security Strategy that 
is due to be updated at the end of 2011. In early 2011 France and the 
Netherlands followed suit with the release of their respective cyber-
security strategies. The publication of these national strategies was 
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welcomed by ENISA that had previously articulated the need for a 
holistic approach to addressing cybersecurity through the sharing 
of information, implementation of good practices and national exer-
cises, as well as the establishment of national CERTs and improve-
ment of cooperation between national CERTs across Europe to 
combat national, pan-European, or even global incidents and threats. 
Speaking at the first Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
International Conference in Madrid in February 2010, ENISA’s 
Executive Director, Dr. Udo Helmbrecht, stressed the importance of 
holistic national strategies that should also form an integral part of an 
overall EU cybersecurity strategy.
In France, ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes 
d’Information) was established in July 2009 as an agency charged 
with addressing the challenges faced by cybersecurity. The formation 
of this agency grew out of the French White Paper on Defence and 
National Security, published in 2008, which identified cyber attacks 
as one of the main threats to the national territory. The prevention 
and reaction to cyber attacks were also identified as major priorities 
in the organization of national security. The agency is attached to 
the Secretary General for National Defence and replaces the Central 
Directorate for Information System Security (DCSSI) and is also 
assigned a wider mission than its predecessor.
The missions of ANSSI are to
• Establish detection and early warning mechanisms for cyber 
attacks via a stronger operational center, working on a round-
the-clock basis and having operational monitoring function 
for sensitive government networks. The center should also be 
able to implement appropriate defense mechanisms.
• Reduce vulnerabilities by the establishment of criteria for trusted 
products and services across the public and private sector.
• Provide advice and intellectual support to government enti-
ties and operators of critical infrastructure.
• Administer and manage awareness raising and communica-
tion schemes aimed at companies and the wider public to 
keep them informed about information security threats and 
related means of protection.
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The United Kingdom has a wealth of agencies and organiza-
tions involved in its policy approach to cybersecurity. In mid 2009, 
the Office of Cyber Security (OCS) was revealed, as was the Cyber 
Security Operations Centre (CSOC) based at the electronic intel-
ligence agency GCHQ. These were described in the “Cyber Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom safety, security and resilience in cyber 
space.” Subsequent to the change of administration in May 2010, the 
OCS was renamed the Office of Cyber Security and Information 
Assurance (OCSIA), perhaps reflecting a merged mandate to address 
policy aspects of information assurance, formerly within the remit 
of the UK Cabinet Office and Central Sponsor for Information 
Assurance (CSIA). OCSIA and CSOC are charged with tak-
ing forward the National Cyber Security strategy and its associated 
implementation program. The Cyber Security Strategy outlined that 
in order to address the complex challenges of cybersecurity, a com-
prehensive approach across government, all organizations and public 
and international partners must play a role. The strategy is based on 
a three-pronged approach of reducing risk, exploiting opportunities, 
and improving knowledge, capabilities, and decision making to sup-
port securing the UK’s advantage in cyberspace:
• Reducing risk by
• Reducing the threat of cyber operations by reducing an 
adversary’s motivation and capability
• Reducing the vulnerability of UK interests to cyber operations
• Reducing the impact of cyber operations on UK interests
• Exploiting opportunities and knowledge by
• Gathering intelligence on threat actors
• Promoting support for UK policies
• Intervening against adversaries
• Improving knowledge and awareness by
• Developing doctrine and policy
• Developing governance and decision making
• Enhancing technical and human capabilities
The OCSIA is the main policy lead for cybersecurity in the United 
Kingdom and sits within the Cabinet Office. As well as working along-
side government departments, such as the Home Office, Ministry 
of Defence, GCHQ , Communications Electronic Security Group 
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(CESG), Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure 
(CPNI), and department of Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS), it 
supports the Security Minister and helps determine priorities for action 
in relation to securing cyberspace. OCSIA provides strategic direction 
and coordinates government action relating to cybersecurity across the 
United Kingdom. This cross-government program is composed of the 
following elements:
• Safe, secure, and resilient systems
• Policy, doctrine, legal, and regulatory issues
• Awareness and culture change
• Skills and education
• Technical capabilities and research and development
• Exploitation
• International engagement
• Governance, roles, and responsibilities
The other main organization of note in the United Kingdom is 
the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI). 
CPNI is responsible for the provision of integrated protective secu-
rity advice to reduce the vulnerability of the Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI) in both the public and private sectors. As such, 
CPNI has to use “softer” regulatory means to encourage private sector 
owner-operators of Critical Infrastructure to take their security seri-
ously. Its mandate covers physical, personnel, and electronic security. 
CPNI is an interdepartmental organization and uses resources from 
industry, academia, and other government departments and agen-
cies, chiefly the intelligence community, Ministry of Defence, Home 
Office, and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency.
There are a number of other relevant agencies and government 
departments worthy of mention, however, including the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) that deals with computer crime, 
identity theft and investigation, and intelligence gathering on cyber-
crime and the Communications and Electronics Security Group 
(CESG) which, as the “National technical authority for Information 
Assurance” provides advice on accreditation of products and services 
and, via its CLAS Checkmark Scheme, the standard-based frame-
work for cybersecurity consultants.
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By contrast, in the Netherlands, the responsibility for cybersecurity 
rests across both the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MinEZ), which 
has the job of policy coordination for the use of ICT and is the national 
point of contact for IT security in general. The Ministry of Interior 
and Kingdom Relations (MinBZK) is responsible for the security of 
governmental IT systems and services and also leads efforts to protect 
the Critical National Infrastructure of the Netherlands.
The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) “Success through 
cooperation” was released in 2011 and sets out a number of actions 
lines and priority activities identified by the Dutch Cabinet. As well 
as laying out that the Netherlands should adopt an integral approach 
across the public and private sectors, the strategy also required that 
an adequate and topical threat and risk analysis would be conducted. 
Furthermore, the strategy outlined that the resilience of Dutch ICT 
networks would need to be reinforced as well as improvements to 
the response capacity to deflect ICT disruptions and cyber attacks. 
Investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes would be intensified. 
Finally, the Netherlands indicated that it would stimulate research 
and education into cybersecurity.
The National Infrastructure against Cyber Crime (NICC) was 
set up modeled on the forerunner to the UK’s CPNI, the National 
Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC). NICC has 
as its objectives the bringing together of the public and private sector 
to exchange information, best practices, and experience in fighting 
cybercrime. Its focus on cybercrime is thus distinct from CNI (see 
below). NICC has established information exchange points that receive 
reports from national intelligence or CERTs (Computer Emergency 
Response Teams). Plans are underway to establish NICC as a per-
manent organizational unit within the Dutch Government. NICC 
is very much based on cooperation models with different sectors and 
the integration of existing initiatives. NICC’s activities include acting 
as a central contact point; undertaking duties of a reporting point; 
watching cybersecurity trends; performing monitoring and detection 
activities; distributing information and undertaking education, warn-
ing, development, and knowledge-sharing activities; and finally, sur-
veillance and prevention and termination of cybercrime risks.
NAVI (the National Advisory Centre on Critical Infrastructure) 
acts to connect government and business to support the protection of 
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the critical physical and digital infrastructure. It issues guidance to 
those involved in the critical infrastructure requesting advice about 
protection against malicious disruption.
In many of these approaches, the importance of international coop-
eration (at the European or global level) is identified and work-streams 
or specific initiatives developed along these lines. For example, via the 
representation on the permanent stakeholders group of ENISA and 
by participation in the pan-European exercises, national governments 
interact with European policy initiatives. Furthermore, bilateral dis-
cussions often take place between countries with shared or similar 
approaches (e.g., between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands).
Despite this, the multitude of different entities responsible for 
European “cybersecurity” policy with their wide range of institutional 
history, focus, and mandate, not to mention the complexity of the 
different types of instrument (each with different impacts) create a 
complex environment for member states to understand and in some 
cases can lead to the fragmentation of links, with some of the less 
mature countries being unable to understand the bigger picture of 
who is responsible for what at the European level.
Conclusions
European cybersecurity policy is a maze of communications, conclu-
sions, directives, and regulations. This chapter has provided an over-
view of relevant EU policy instruments and their substantive content 
as they relate to the protection of cyberspace.
However, what remains to be seen is the extent to which these 
normative laws will be effectively implemented: a key concern with 
any EU-level policy-making effort is that while laws and initiatives 
and programs may be prepared by the different EU institutions 
described above, it is at the member state level where the effect is felt 
in addressing these complex risks, ultimately helping to exploit the 
economic and social benefits of cyberspace.
Aside from this, the complexity of how Europe addresses these 
issues is further increased by the different institutional approaches of 
the organizations involved in public policy in this area, as described 
above. Experts, academics, and researchers generally agree that suc-
cessfully addressing risks posed in cyberspace requires a concerted 
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effort between the private sector, business, governments, and the gen-
eral public. Individuals as private citizens need to keep home comput-
ers patched and up to date, as do businesses. Industry, as a provider 
of security products and services, must also work to make these more 
secure by reducing bugs and software flaws that can be exploited. 
Finally, governments have a job to support awareness campaigns, 
provide advice and guidance, intervene as a last resort where there 
has been “market failure” to properly address these issues and where 
cybersecurity takes on the character of a national-level threat, insti-
gate appropriate measures to reduce the threat.
Although it is fair to say that things do move slowly in European policy 
making, the last 4 years have seen more activity in specific areas relating 
to cybersecurity. This includes a more sophisticated appreciation at the 
European policy level of the importance of nonregulatory measures to 
help the private sector improve levels of security (e.g., by the provision of 
nonbinding guidance and sharing of best practice) and in specific areas 
(e.g., exercises and trusted information sharing). However, the different 
character of each of the policy entities involved in cybersecurity (rang-
ing from the technology market orientated DG Information Society, to 
the legally DG Home Affairs and agencies like Europol and ENISA) 
serves to complicate matters further and render this policy landscape 
somewhat opaque. It should therefore be hoped that the formation of 
common platforms such as the EU Cybercrime Platform helps to bring 
a degree of outward-facing coherence to these efforts.
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a local cyberSecuriTy 
approach
The Case of Catalonia
I G N AC IO  A L A M I L L O  D O M I N G O  A N D 
AG U S T Í  C E R R I L L O -I-M A R T Í N E Z
Introduction
The global character of cybersecurity requires coordination and coop-
eration at different territorial levels in the implementation of poli-
cies. Although cybersecurity generally transcends state borders, local 
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governments can also make relevant contributions to promote policies 
that contribute to achieving overall objectives. Because of their prox-
imity to people, for example, local governments can develop tools that 
respond to local needs in a more effective way than national, regional, 
or global solutions.*
Establishment of local policy can also be a tool for tackling a variety of 
related issues to the development of the information society and the use 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as con-
sumer protection, the fight against crime, public health, and education.
The use of local policy is especially noticeable in decentralized 
states, which by their nature must adopt a different organizational 
solution to cybersecurity. Taking the Spanish region of Catalonia as 
an example, this chapter shows how such development can be tailored 
to effectively apply, supplement, and reinforce national (Spanish), 
regional (European Union, EU), and international (International 
Telecommunications Union, ITU) policies.
The chapter is divided into three parts. It begins with an assess-
ment of relevant global, regional, and national cybersecurity policies, 
followed by an analysis of how the local Catalan plan supplements 
them. The chapter concludes by providing ideas about the role that 
subnational security policies can have within a global framework.
Global, Regional, and National Policies Relevant to Catalonia
The information society has become a global platform for the free 
circulation of information, ideas, and knowledge. But according to 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United 
Nations (UN) World Summits on the Information Society (2003–
2005), the information society also faces challenges, such as cyber-
security, a notion reflected again in the ITU/UN World Information 
Society 2007 Report: Beyond WSIS.
This section provides an overview of the global, regional, and national 
policies relevant to the development of a local cybersecurity policy for 
Catalonia, in particular the cooperation with other territorial entities.
* Throughout this chapter, and consistent with the volume, local governments will 
be referred to as subnational entities that have significant levels of autonomy like 
Autonomous Communities in Spain, regions in Italy, or Länder in Germany.
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Global Cybersecurity Policy at the World 
Summit on the Information Society
The Declaration of Principles of the World Summit on the Information 
Society of Geneva, of May 12, 2004, reaffirmed the desire to build 
a people-centered, inclusive, and development-oriented information 
society where everyone can create, access, utilize, and share informa-
tion and knowledge premised on the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
For example, section 19 of the Declaration of the Principles of the 
World Summit on the Information Society declared confidence and 
security in the use of ICTs as a key principle of an inclusive infor-
mation society. Specifically, section B.5 of the Declaration indicates 
the need to strengthen the trust framework, including information 
security and network security, authentication, privacy, and consumer 
protection, as a prerequisite for the development of the information 
society and for building confidence among users of ICTs, promoting, 
according to section 35, “a global culture of cybersecurity needs.”
Sections 36 and 37 of the Declaration also indicated that support 
is needed for actions directed to “prevent the potential use of ICTs 
for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining 
international stability and security, and may adversely affect the integ-
rity of the infrastructure within States, to the detriment of their secu-
rity,” with a strong focus on criminal and terrorist purposes, and spam.
Section 59 deals with cybercrime, which notes that “All actors in 
the information society should take appropriate actions and preven-
tive measures, as determined by law, against abusive uses of ICTs, 
such as illegal and other acts motivated by racism, racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia, and related intolerance, hatred, violence, all forms 
of child abuse, including pedophilia and child pornography, and traf-
ficking in, and exploitation of, human beings.”
Further, the Tunis Commitment of June 28, 2006, underlines the 
importance of the security, continuity, and stability of the Internet, 
and the need to protect Internet and other ICT networks against 
threats and in their vulnerabilities. The Tunis Commitment also iden-
tifies Internet security and protection as one of the elements that must 
form part of public policies of the governance of the Internet.
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From the agenda of the Geneva Declaration and its subsequent 
follow-up in the Tunis Commitment comes the detailed activity of 
the International Telecommunications Union in matters of cyberse-
curity with the following principal objectives, as quoted from line C.5 
of the Action Plan:
 1. Promote cooperation among the governments at the United 
Nations and with all stakeholders at other appropriate work-
ing groups to enhance user confidence, build trust, and pro-
tect both data and network integrity; consider existing and 
potential threats to ICTs; and address other information 
security and network security issues.
 2. Governments, in cooperation with the private sector, should 
prevent, detect, and respond to cybercrime and misuse of 
ICTs by developing guidelines that take into account ongoing 
efforts in these areas; considering legislation that allows for 
effective investigation and prosecution of misuse; promoting 
effective mutual assistance efforts; strengthening institutional 
support at the international level for preventing, detecting, 
and recovering from such incidents; and encouraging educa-
tion and raising awareness.
 3. Governments, and other stakeholders, should actively pro-
mote user education and awareness about online privacy and 
the means of protecting privacy.
 4. Take appropriate action on spam at national and international 
levels.
 5. Encourage the domestic assessment of national law with 
a view to overcoming any obstacles to the effective use of 
electronic documents and transactions including electronic 
means of authentication.
 6. Further strengthen the trust and security framework with 
complementary and mutually reinforcing initiatives in the 
fields of security in the use of ICTs, with initiatives or guide-
lines with respect to rights to privacy, data, and consumer 
protection.
 7. Share good practices in the field of information security 
and network security and encourage their use by all parties 
concerned.
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 8. Invite interested countries to set up focal points for real-time 
incident handling and response, and develop a cooperative 
network between these focal points for sharing information 
and technologies on incident response.
 9. Encourage further development of secure and reliable appli-
cations to facilitate online transactions.
 10. Encourage interested countries to contribute actively to the 
ongoing UN activities to build confidence and security in the 
use of ICTs.
The objectives set at the international level are broad but form the 
basis for country activities in accordance with the regional context (in 
our case, the European Union), both of which will have to be taken 
into account when defining national and local cybersecurity policies. 
In addition, as noted, the achievement of objectives in this area is 
based on the adoption of instruments for cooperation between all 
actors to ensure coordination among them. This is particularly impor-
tant for decentralized states where central and local governments will 
work according to the distribution of powers among them as we will 
see later in the case of Spain.
Regional Cybersecurity Policy in the European Union
The European Union covers cybersecurity through a variety of initia-
tives, including these three:
• Specific security measures for networks and information 
systems, including the creation of the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) created by 
Regulation (EC) No. 460/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of March 10, 2004, and the establish-
ment of the Network and Information Security Steering 
Group (NISSG).
• Through regulations governing electronic communications 
and, specifically, the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of July 12, 2002, concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector.
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• Fight against cybercrime, including the regulation of member 
states’ laws on child pornography offenses, substantive crimi-
nal law in the field of high-tech crime, and the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to pretrial orders associ-
ated with cybercrime investigations involving more than one 
member state.
The European Union has also established specific actions that, in 
a supplementary way, deal with the problem of ICT security through 
research and development programs, the “Safer Internet” program, 
and involvement in international forums that tackle these questions, 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Council of Europe, and the United Nations.
The Communication from the Commission “The role of e-Govern-
ment for Europe’s future,” COM (2003) 567 of September 29, 2003, 
recognized that it is only possible to offer public services within an 
environment in which there is confidence, an environment that must 
always guarantee secure interaction for companies and for the general 
public and interoperability.
In more general terms, the Communication from the Commission 
“Challenges for the European Information Society beyond 2005,” 
COM (2004) 757 of November 19, 2004, identifies the need to 
establish policies relating to the use of information and commu-
nications technology to cover gaps in the public services, includ-
ing identity management issues; the insufficient degree of security 
and dependability of the networks; and the difficulty of being able 
to send signed electronically documents in the context of telemat-
ics procedures, especially in relation to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).
In “i2010. A European information society for growth and employ-
ment,” COM (2005) 229 of June 1, 2005, a strategic framework, 
called i2010, was proposed to promote an open and competitive digi-
tal economy and backing information and communication technology 
as a stimulus to inclusion and quality of life.
One of the pillars on which this strategic framework is based is 
the construction of a Single European Information Space that is spe-
cifically developed in the Communication from the Commission “A 
strategy for a Secure Information Society—Dialogue, partnership 
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and empowerment,” COM (2006) 251 of May 31, 2006, and in the 
strategic framework of i2010.
This Communication recognizes that security is a challenge to 
everyone, including the public authorities, which must deal with the 
security of their systems, not only to protect information in the public 
sector but also to give an example of good practices to others.
In this context, the Commission invited the member states to take, 
among others, the following actions: promoting awareness campaigns 
on the virtues, benefits, and advantages associated with the adoption 
of effective technology, practices, and behavior in relation with secu-
rity; promoting the deployment of e-government services designed 
to communicate and encourage good security practices, which could 
later be extended to other sectors; and fighting identity theft and other 
attacks against privacy.
Later, in the same context, there is the Communication from the 
Commission “On Fighting span, spyware and malicious software,” 
COM (2006) 688 of November 15, 2006, which identifies lines of 
action to combat these threats to security. Notably, member states 
and competent authorities are called upon to lay down clear lines of 
responsibility for national agencies involved in fighting spam, and 
ensure effective coordination between competent authorities.
The European Union also has tackled the question of protecting crit-
ical information infrastructures in, for example, the Communication 
by the Commission “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight 
against terrorism,” COM (2004) 702 of October 20, 2004, the 
Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, COM (2005) 576 of November 17, 2005, and the Council 
Directive 2008/114/EC of December 8, 2008 on the identification 
and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assess-
ment of the need to improve their protection.
Through some of these various instruments and related efforts, the 
European Union has materialized some of the objectives established 
at the international level. They are implemented through organiza-
tions at the regional level but also by the European Union member 
states. However, the European Union has not provided direct inter-
vention of local governments in these policies, leaving this decision 
in the hands of each member state. Nonetheless, local governments 
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should take into account all these principles and policies when they 
develop their own cybersecurity policies.
National Cybersecurity Policy in Spain
In Spain, there are various cybersecurity policies, primarily Plan 
Avanza and Plan Avanza 2. The Plan Avanza, led by the Ministry of 
Industry, Tourism and Trade, through the State Telecommunications 
and the Information Society Secretariat, is one of the more important 
instruments in relation to the Spanish strategy for information secu-
rity and was in effect between 2006 and 2010.
The Plan Avanza was structured in four large areas of action, one of 
which is called “New Digital Context” and, in reference to the line of 
security and confidence (“e-Confidence”), had the following objectives:
• To increase the degree of awareness, training, and sensitiza-
tion of the public, companies, and Public Administrations in 
matters of information and communication technology secu-
rity. In this way, it seeks to reduce the number of companies 
with over 10 workers with access to the Internet which have 
security problems, placing this at 10% by 2010, and increasing 
the number of individuals who take specific security precau-
tions; specifically, in 2010, 60% of private individuals should 
have installed antivirus software.
• To stimulate the use of digital identity, considering that by 
2010, 100% of the general public with identification cards 
will have a single, effective, and practical identifier that can 
be used intensively in all ambits.
• To stimulate the incorporation of security into organizations 
as a critical factor to increase their competitiveness, develop-
ing the necessary security infrastructures and promoting the 
adoption of better practices, especially the information secu-
rity certificate. By 2010, 95% of companies with more than 10 
workers will have applied security precautions.
• To develop an effective infrastructure for the execution of the 
national policy on information security, coordinating the var-
ious agents and actions, carrying out continuous monitoring 
of the state of information security, and coordinating interna-
tional representation in matters of ICT security.
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The measures envisaged in the Plan Avanza to achieve these objec-
tives included circulation, communication, and dissemination of aware-
ness campaigns; development of a network of security centers and the 
creation of a computer security incidents response team (CSIRT); pro-
motion of innovation of security technology; stimulus to the installation 
of digital identity and electronic signature; promotion of certificates of 
security, products, services, and processes; extension of the better prac-
tices associated with security and self-regulation; and actions for infor-
mation security and confidence, including the creation of an Information 
Security Committee, with the participation of Ministries and the Public 
Administrations competent in matters of information security, as well 
as the private sector, carrying out tasks of coordination among the vari-
ous agents, promoting mechanisms of national and international coop-
eration, creating discussion areas, and disseminating and understanding 
better practices in matters of information security; and developing met-
rics and methodologies for the evaluation of e-Confidence indicators, 
making studies on advances in matters of the use of security technology 
by the various segments of users (the public, companies, homes, etc.).
When the OECD analyzed Plan Avanza it found that the plan 
played an important role in contributing to positive results toward 
progress in advancing the country’s information society, improving 
security, and protecting consumers’ rights. OECD also observed that 
stakeholders are increasingly active, and more and more regional and 
local governments are seeking support from the Plan.
For its part, the Plan Avanza 2, covering 2011 through 2015, con-
tinues developing the line of e-Confidence. It focuses on achieving 
several objectives that will contribute to overcoming the challenges 
related to spreading trustworthy ICT among citizens and enter-
prises, strengthening the protection of privacy in the network and 
for children, continuing the fight against online fraud, and helping 
in the protection of logical infrastructures, especially through the 
Communication Technology Institute (INTECO).
Spanish Cybersecurity Organization
In addition to Plan Avanza 2, the Spanish government created several 
bodies that will be in charge of it (INTECO; Red.es; Cryptology 
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National Center—Computer Security Indicent Response Team 
(CCN-CERT) and tackle various cybersecurity aspects.
RedIRIS, is a public entity attached to the Ministry of Industry, 
Tourism and Trade. It performs the following principal functions:
• Stimulating the development of information security through 
the execution of programs defined in the Plan Avanza for 
convergence with Europe and between the autonomous 
communities
• Analyzing the information society through the 
Telecommunications and Information Society Observatory
• Offering specific advice and support to the General State 
Administration
• Managing the registry of “.es” domain names
In matters relating to security in technology and the information 
society, it was considered necessary to define a strategic plan and model 
for the introduction of a National Security Centre, which includes 
starting up a Security Demonstrator Centre for SMEs with the pur-
pose of making tests and comparisons of the various types of security 
products, serving as a platform of tests and support to other centers 
such as the Incident Response Centre of the Information Technology 
and Security Observatory, strengthening the use of information secu-
rity technology among Spanish SMEs and stimulating international 
visibility of Spanish technology in information security.
Also, it was considered necessary to carry out research into Internet 
users for the purpose of preparing a study on user perception and 
confidence in the network. The idea is to stimulate knowledge and 
follow-up of the principal indicators and public policies related with 
information security and confidence, to generate a database for pur-
poses of the analysis and evaluation of security and confidence on a 
time perspective, and finally to prepare and present reports on mat-
ters of security, which would form support for the Administration in 
making decisions in matters of security.
Also, Red.es manages RedIRIS and participates in INTECO. 
RedIRIS is the national Research and Development network that 
provides security services to the scientific community, including 
the following:
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• The RedIRIS (IRIS-CERT) security service, for the pur-
pose of detecting problems affecting network security in the 
RedIRIS centers, and actions coordinated with these centers 
in solving the problems. It also has a preventive task, warn-
ing of potential problems in time, offering advice to the cen-
ters, organizing activities in accordance with them, and other 
supplementary services
• Public Key Infrastructure services (PKI) for the RedIRIS 
community, including secure server certificates and grid net-
work certificates
• Access control and authorization services, through the fed-
erated authentication sofware (PAPI) software
The Communication Technology Institute (INTECO), promoted 
by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, and with participa-
tion by Red.es, is a platform for the development of the Knowledge 
Society through projects in the field of innovation and technology, 
including initiatives in technological security, accessibility, and inclu-
sion in the digital society, and communication solutions for individu-
als and companies.
The activity of INTECO in relation to information security 
includes the following projects:
• Response Centre for Incidents in Information Technology for 
SMEs, for the main purpose of achieving a solid development 
of the Spanish business fabric by providing SMEs with reac-
tive, preventive, and training services in matters of security
• Rapid Antivirus Alert Centre, with the main purpose of stim-
ulating awareness in matters of security, offering alerts, infor-
mation, free protection tools, and daily security reports on the 
latest malicious codes appearing in the Network since 2001
• Information Centre for Dissemination of the Security 
Culture, with the main purpose of
• Starting up and operating a portal for the dissemination 
of information in matters of information security
• Preparing contents and practical guides in matters of 
information security, in collaboration with relevant agents 
in this field
204 alamIllo domInGo and CerrIllo-I-martÍneZ
• Information Security Observatory, with the main purpose 
of analyzing, describing, advising, and disseminating the 
security culture and confidence in the information society, 
through the generation of specialized knowledge in the sub-
ject, and the preparation of recommendations and proposals 
that allow the definition of valid trends for the taking of deci-
sions in the field of security.
• The Observatory must be a point of reference for the analy-
sis and follow-up of confidence in the information society in 
Spain, preparing, collecting, summarizing, and systemizing 
indicators.
• Also it will generate and disseminate specialized knowledge 
in at least the following key areas of information security: 
Security of electronic signature and digital identity; measures 
of protection against information security risks; digital rights 
management technologies (DRMs); and other available secu-
rity technology and tools.
The Secretary of State director of the National Intelligence Centre, 
as director of the National Cryptographic Centre (CCN), is the 
authority responsible for coordinating the actions of the different 
bodies of the Administration that use coding methods or procedures, 
in order to guarantee the security of information technology in this 
ambit, advising on the coordinated acquisition of cryptographic mate-
rial and training the specialist administrative personnel in this field.
The director of the CCN is the authority for certification of informa-
tion technology security (http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es) and the authority 
on cryptographic certification (http://www.ccn.cni.es). Also, he is in 
charge of overseeing compliance with the regulation relating to the 
protection of classified information, in the aspects of information and 
telecommunications systems, in accordance with article 4.e) and f) of 
the Act 11/2002, of 6 May.
The National Cryptographic Centre is attached to the National 
Intelligence Centre, sharing means, procedures, regulations, and 
resources with it. Within its field of action, the National Cryptographic 
Centre carries out the following functions:
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• Preparing and disseminating standards, instructions, 
guides, and recommendations to guarantee the security of 
the Administration’s information technology systems and 
communications. Actions arising from the development of 
this function will be proportional to the risks affecting the 
information processed, stored, or transmitted by the sys-
tems (http://www.ccn.cni.es)
• Training the specialist personnel of the Administration in the 
field of security in information and communications technol-
ogy systems
• Constituting the certification institution of the national 
scheme of evaluation and certification of information tech-
nology security, of application to the products and systems in 
its field (http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es)
• Evaluating and accrediting the capacity of the coding prod-
ucts and information technology systems, which include 
the means to code, process, store, or transmit information 
securely
• Coordinating the promotion, development, obtaining of, 
acquisition, and putting into exploitation and use of security 
technology for the systems mentioned above
• Overseeing compliance with the regulations relating to the 
protection of classified information in its ambit of competence 
(e.g., NATO security information)
• Establishing the necessary relations and signing the relevant 
agreements with similar organizations in other States, for the 
development of the functions mentioned
Within the activities of the CCN, there is CCN-CERT, the 
Spanish Computer Emergency Response Team, the main purpose of 
which is to improve the levels of security in information systems in 
the public authorities of the Spanish State.
The purpose of CCN-CERT is to be the center of alert and response 
to security incidents, assisting the public authorities to respond more 
rapidly and efficiently to security threats that affect their information 
systems, through two broad lines of action:
• The provision of information services, such as alerts regarding 
new threats
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• The undertaking of tasks of research, training, and dissemi-
nation of information security
The National Security Scheme, regulated by Law 11/2007, of 
June 22, of electronic access for the general public to the public 
services, addressed to public authorities, was approved by Royal 
Decree 3/2010, of January 8. The aim of the National Security 
Scheme is to create the conditions necessary to inspire confidence in 
the use of electronic means, by implementing measures that guar-
antee the safety of systems, data, communications, and electronic 
services, thereby allowing citizens and Public Administrations to 
exercise their rights and comply with their obligations through 
these methods.
It was prepared in collaboration with all the Public Administrations 
to which it applies, getting a favorable report from the Permanent 
Commission of the Higher Council of Electronic Government, the 
Public Administration Sector Conference, and the National Local 
Authorities Commission, and being submitted to the preliminary 
report of the Spanish Data Protection Agency. The National Security 
Scheme is the main participative process in Spain, and it explicitly 
considers the feedback of the regions and local authorities.
The Spanish government has driven different public policies and 
implements several mechanisms to improve the development of infor-
mation societies in Spain that have a great impact on cybersecurity. 
In this process, the Spanish government has taken into account 
local government, but greater participation and coordination will be 
needed, especially moving forward as more local entities deploy elec-
tronic procedures.
The Catalan Plan for Cybersecurity
Spain is organized in territorially autonomous communities that have 
legislative and executive powers conferred by the Spanish Constitution 
and the Statute of Autonomy.
There are currently 17 regions in Spain, one of which is Catalonia, 
home to about 7.5 million people constituting 16% of the Spanish pop-
ulation. The Generalitat of Catalonia is the institution created in 1977 
in which the self-government of Catalonia is politically organized. 
207a loCal CyBerseCurIty aPProaCH
The Statute of Autonomy passed in 2006 gives the Generalitat of 
Catalonia the powers that enable it to carry out self-government.
Powers of the Generalitat of Catalonia in the Field of Information Security
In 2004, the Catalan government (Generalitat of Catalonia) estab-
lished a new security policy that aims to protect the information sys-
tems used by the government and its departments and the bodies that 
depend on them.
It is organized by the Telecommunications and Information 
Technology Centre and supplemented by the Information Security 
Office, a unit attached to the area of quality, security, and relations 
with suppliers, which is in charge of watching over the establishment 
of regulations and standards of security, making a preventive analysis 
of security problems, intervening in support of corporate systems, and 
responding, in general, to any need of security put to it.
The main policy is supplemented by initiatives addressed both 
to corporate protection and to the overall security of specific sec-
tors, such as Order SLT/465/2008, of October 27, which regulates 
the Information Security Program of the Ministry of Health, which 
has an undoubted impact on the health sector. Another example are 
the technological initiatives being led by the general management 
of the regional police force—the Mossos d’Esquadra—in relation 
to the fight against all forms of electronic crime, through a specifi-
cally specialized unit addressed to improving the capacity of detec-
tion and response to crime with a technological base. Finally, there 
is the important task undertaken, in matters of information security, 
by the Catalan Certification Agency, a body attached to the Catalan 
Open Administration Consortium, and the Catalan Data Protection 
Agency, in the ambits of digital identity and personal data protection, 
aspects that are intimately related to security.
Because of the various policies and actions in matters of the fight 
against electronic crime described above, there is a strong need to 
establish and lead a public action of a global nature in Catalonia, with 
the collaboration of all the authorities and the private sector, to coor-
dinate and stimulate all the actions directed to combating the prob-
lems mentioned above and to be a reference in Spain.
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However, Catalonia had suffered a significant time-lag in rela-
tion to the public performance in Spain and even compared to other 
regions, which resulted in the loss of competitiveness and restraining 
investment in the ICT market. Although some policies and actions 
have been adopted, ICT security levels were not optimal in Catalonia. 
In fact, the situation could only be considered successfully treated in a 
few cases, especially in large public or private organizations, while vul-
nerabilities remained for most citizens, small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), as well as in Public Administrations with fewer resources.
Accordingly, the Catalan government decided to act decisively 
and urgently to establish a long-lasting political action program to 
correct this situation, setting a 4-year plan (2009 to 2013), which is 
currently ongoing.
The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia is its basic institutional 
regulations. It defines the rights and obligations of the citizens of 
Catalonia, the political institutions of the Catalan nationality, their 
competences and relations with the Spanish State, and the financing 
of the Government of Catalonia. This law was approved in referendum 
by the citizens on June 18, 2006, and substitutes the Statute of Sau that 
dated from 1979. Among other competences, the Statute of Autonomy 
of Catalonia provides the foundation of the powers of the Generalitat 
of Catalonia in matters of security in the information society:
• Guarantees the protection of individuals and families, par-
ticularly children and youth (Article 40 EAC).
• Obligates public authorities to “ensure the dignity, safety, 
and full protection of all individuals, especially those who are 
most vulnerable” (Article 42.3 EAC).
• Guarantees the protection of health, safety, and defense of the 
rights and legitimate interests of consumers and users (Article 
49.1 EA).
• Grants exclusive powers of the Generalitat of Catalonia in 
matters of consumer affairs, indicating the aspects of con-
sumer training and education, which are particularly impor-
tant in security of ICT (Article 123 EA).
• Grants executive powers on the administrative regulation of 
electronic commerce (Article 112.1.a EAC).
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• Obligates public authorities to act positively in relation to 
ICT by providing that “public authorities shall facilitate 
knowledge of the information society and shall encourage 
equal access to communication and to information technolo-
gies in all areas of life, including the workplace; they shall 
encourage that these technologies are at the service of people 
and do not negatively affect their rights, and shall guarantee 
the provision of services by means of the above-mentioned 
technologies, in accordance with the principles of universal-
ity, continuity and modernization” (Article 53 EAC).
• Grants executive power over electronic communications. This 
power includes in any case promotion of the existence of a 
minimum set of universally accessible services and inspection 
of the shared telecommunications infrastructures and exercise 
of the corresponding power to sanction. Security of electronic 
communications networks must be protected, as these net-
works are the main factor allowing the existence and continu-
ity of the information society (Article 140.7 EAC).
Introducing the Catalan Information Security Centre (CESICAT)
The Catalan plan for ICT security was approved by the Catalan gov-
ernment on March 17, 2009, and aims to guarantee a secure informa-
tion society in Catalonia for everyone. The Catalan cybersecurity plan 
is structured around four principal objectives. In order to achieve them 
and to enhance ICT security in Catalonia, the Telecommunications 
and Information Society Secretariat (TISS) of the Government 
of Catalonia created the Catalan Information Security Centre 
(CESICAT). It is in charge of establishing and monitoring programs 
under the strategic direction of the Catalan General Directorate of 
the Information Society, with direct participation of the private sec-
tor and civil society. Specifically, CESICAT will implement public 
policies in ICT security and create a regional business network of 
support, applications, and services of ICT security, which can become 
a national and international industrial reference.
CESICAT is incorporated to support and assist the Government of 
the Generalitat of Catalonia in reaching the objectives of the regional 
Plan for IT Security in Catalonia.
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Its legal structure is a foundation of the public sector of the 
Generalitat of Catalonia, with the participation of both public sec-
tor agencies and private sector companies. The main reasons for 
believing that the objectives of general interest pursued are best 
achieved establishing a foundation instead of other forms of public 
or private are
 1. To incorporate many kinds of public and private bodies, with-
out the problems of granting shares in the capital
 2. The most appropriate formula for nonprofit initiatives, and 
not wanting to compete in the market
 3. Easier access to grants, and has excellent tax benefits in con-
nection with the public company
 4. Strengthens the role of neutral operator, coordinator, and col-
laborator with the private sector
 5. Evolution of founding a center of excellence in management 
and research
CESICAT manages a program of 16 political action lines over sev-
eral years (initially from 2009 up to 2013), funded initially from the 
Catalan Government public budget, but with a financing model that 
covers the main universal services but that also guarantees its conti-
nuity through the provision of some commercial services. CESICAT 
is highly specialized and small, with about 30 people on staff and a 
budget of approximately one million euros per year. When responding 
to cyber incidents, CESICAT uses its own personnel and the regional 
police, as well as external support from selected contractors.
CESICAT is organized as follows:
 1. General management
This unit is in charge of governance and administration. It is 
also accountable for the implementation of the regional 
plan and publishes the following publications:
 − The CESICAT annual report
 − Reports on the state of  ICT.cat (a plan to improve com-
petitiveness of ITC companies in Catalonia) security 
in Catalonia, oriented to provide feedback both to the 
Catalan government and CESICAT
 2. ICT security incident prevention and response unit
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This unit is in charge of the following services, in support of 
the indicated actions:
 − Prevention and training in ICT security service that 
includes the following actions: dissemination of 
notices and alerts in ICT security, as a form of pre-
vention; security awareness programs; ICT security 
guides; program for the management of lists of secure 
configuration of ICT systems; information security 
courses (Catalan public employees’ school, universi-
ties, others); practical workshops on tools, methodolo-
gies, and others and service of alerts and warnings on 
ICT security and vulnerabilities
 − Vulnerabilities and ICT security incidents response 
service against service denials, malware, unauthorized 
access, incorrect use of systems, or combinations of the 
following: remote assistance (containment, solution, and 
recovery); local assistance (forensic analysis, contain-
ment, solution, and recovery); coordination with third 
parties; analysis of incidents (in laboratory); and knowl-
edge base of vulnerabilities and response strategies
 3. ICT security professional services unit
This unit is in charge of the following services, in support of 
the indicated actions:
 − Preventive analysis in ICT security service in relation with 
surface, penetration, infrastructure, and best practices
 − ICT security consultancy service. In particular, risk anal-
ysis, security management programs, and support for the 
acquisition and management of security infrastructure
 − Specialized legal advice in ICT security service like 
legal aspects of security programs: labor, criminal, 
administrative, and treatment of electronic evidence 
(legal aspects of forensic computer systems); legal 
guidelines and recommendations; and finally, proto-
cols of collaboration with police and bodies respon-
sible for national security and critical infrastructures
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CESICAT and the Catalan Cybersecurity Objectives
Establishment of the Catalan Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) Security Strategy The first objective was the development 
of a local information security strategy that supplements national, 
regional, and global policies. In order to meet this goal, Catalonia 
developed specific research tools and increased public awareness of 
threats and vulnerabilities through a multidisciplinary approach with 
multiple participants on one hand, and a high-level governance struc-
ture on the other.
A public model of security in the information society is defined for 
Catalonia, to address in a holistic manner the challenges posed at all 
times, operating in contact with all those involved and having a real 
capacity of response to the problems that may arise, with an infor-
mation security center as the articulating unit of the regional ICT 
security plan, making a continuous analysis of risk and overseeing the 
integrity and continuity of the networks and systems.
But a top-down approach is insufficient. Because government can-
not handle the cybersecurity challenge alone, there is a need to involve 
the private sector and civil society. This can be achieved in a variety 
of ways, such as the creation of public–private partnerships, devel-
opment of best practices, and information sharing and participation 
in shared organizations. CESICAT, for example, is a shared orga-
nization with participation from both Catalan governmental bodies 
and private companies. Further, a government program that aims to 
improve the computer service offering in Catalonia, TIC.cat, con-
tains a subprogram specifically to promote dialogue with companies 
that offer security products and services. This effort will align their 
efforts with those of the government and help the companies be more 
competitive.
This system leverages existing initiatives and programs, such as 
the Catalan Public Key Infrastructure system, under the respon-
sibility of the Catalan Certification Agency, and the action of 
supervisory bodies, including trade, consumption, children and 
young people, and the police. Collaboration between CESICAT 
and other public initiatives related to information security is pri-
marily through the Telecommunications and Secretariat of the 
Generalitat de Catalonia. For example, there have been joint 
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actions between CESICAT and the Catalan Consumer Agency 
and police in regard to the removal of illegal content affecting the 
safety of consumers.
CESICAT actions related to objective 1 are as follows:
1. Establishment of a Catalan model of information society secu-
rity; who’s who in information security in Catalonia; dialogue 
with all the sectors affected and with the bodies involved in 
each of the sectors, including the Catalan Administrations, 
the Chambers of Commerce, and companies, through the 
TIC.CAT plan.
2. Creation and operation of a security incident response team 
(CSIRT) for Catalonia, addressed to public administrations, 
universities, companies, and individuals, which will also act 
as a catalyst for the ICT security community. This team pro-
vides reactive services to security incidents, proactive services 
such as improving awareness, and security quality manage-
ment services.
3. Continuous analysis of risks that may have an impact on the 
development of the information society in Catalonia.
4. Provision of managed security services for specific entities 
and groups, principally the Catalan public sector and SMEs. 
(Such services include an intrusion detection and prevention 
service [IDPS], security information and event management 
[SIEM], and vulnerabilities management service [VMS].)
  Finally, support and promotion for the protection and 
assurance of the .CAT domain name system and the basic 
Internet services used by the general public (e-mail, web, 
ftp, others) when the electronic communication suppliers 
operate in Catalonia.
Support for the Protection of Critical ICT Infrastructures The second 
objective aims to protect the elements that form Catalan critical ICT 
infrastructures, such as computer, energy, water, transportation, 
financial, telecommunications, and health systems.
The consequences of a cyber attack on critical infrastructures vary. 
Even though it may not result in any direct victims per se, it could 
mean the loss of vital infrastructure services with severe consequences. 
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For example, the loss of telephone service relied upon by the emer-
gency services or leakages of toxic chemicals.
A cyber attack can also cause failures in public services, such as the 
case of an attack on the public communication services, which sup-
port vital services such as e-Health. Some cases to be dealt with are 
the ICT services of the Government of Catalonia and the Catalan 
local authorities, the emergency service, and civil protection networks 
(the single number 112 contacts the Catalan Police, Citizen Advice 
Agencies, the fire brigade, rural agents, etc.), and the private services 
that support them.
Although each government department must perform an assess-
ment of their infrastructure to determine what should be classified as 
critical infrastructure, CESICAT will be able to act as a unit of cyber-
security for all departments, due to the presence of the Catalan police 
in the CESICAT constituency. The Spanish critical infrastructure 
protection draft legislation establishes the legal competence referred 
to the protection of the critical infrastructure upon the Spanish police, 
but also upon the regional police. This possibility opens an opportu-
nity to regions to cover the full spectrum of cybersecurity issues.
CESICAT actions related to objective 2 are as follows:
In collaboration with the Catalan police, competent in matters 
of public security and the protection of critical infrastructures, 
and in the ambit of the competences of the Government in 
ICT, CESICAT is starting the following actions:
First, establishment and follow-up of a protection plan 
for critical government ICT infrastructures, includ-
ing electronic communications by the authorities, data 
processing centers, and coordination with Catalan and 
Spanish agencies, in particular the Catalan Emergencies 
Centre (CECAT) and the Spanish National Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Centre
Second, public–private collaboration in relation to critical 
nongovernmental ICT infrastructures located in Catalan 
territory, with a catalogue of interdependencies and 
mutual protection measures
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Promotion of a Catalan ICT Business Network The third objective is the 
creation of an ICT security business network in Catalonia to supple-
ment the public policies introduced before and stimulate the develop-
ment of the ICT sector in the security industrial sector, as introduced 
in this section.
A study on the ICT market in Catalonia, carried out in 2008 
by the Information Society Observatory Foundation of Catalonia 
(FOBSIC), found that there was an insufficient number of compa-
nies offering support to Catalan SMEs and citizens, and there was an 
excessive concentration of the service offered in the Barcelona area, 
which implied an important lack of support in the rest of Catalonia. 
Thus, it recommended the stimulation of SMEs in the ICT sector 
through different actions, including
• Promoting technology and quality certificates for companies 
in the sector
• Communicating the benefits of certificates, regulations of 
mandatory compliance in contracting with the administra-
tion, and support for training programs
• Creating certification of methodologies and processes in the 
supply of services
The creation of a network of SMEs promotes ICT security services 
and protection against cyber incidents. It encourages the development 
of an ICT security community with special attention to training and 
certification of professionals, companies, products, and software, 
including open security software, as well as innovation and research.
The SME network generates ICT business for the region and 
essentially can serve as a near-shore security expert community for 
Catalonia. As such, it was located in a technology park in the city of 
Reus.
CESICAT actions related to the third objective are as follows:
Promotion of a Catalan business fabric with solid ICT security, 
as a tool of industrial policy for the sector, especially addressed 
to the SMEs, micro-SMEs, and self-employed professionals 
acting in the Catalan ICT market
216 alamIllo domInGo and CerrIllo-I-martÍneZ
First, creation of a national network of SMEs specialized in 
ICT security, which supply services of immediate response, 
coordinated and supported, even financially, by CESICAT
Second, promotion of a software community on ICT security 
products, based principally on free software under the con-
trol of a community of developers, directed by CESICAT, 
including risk analysis products, security evaluation and 
follow-up products, coding products, products for paren-
tal control over contents, antivirus, antispam, antimalware 
products, and so forth
Third, promotion of the evaluation and certification, by accred-
ited bodies, of secure software development processes, 
including, for example, secure web coding (OWASP) or 
secure software coding
Fourth, promotion of the certification of security processes, 
by accredited bodies, and especially, of the ISO 27000 
security process standards family
Fifth, promotion of training and certification of profession-
als in ICT security and related disciplines, including 
security processes based in ISO 27000; security man-
agement based, for example, in Certified Information 
Security Manager (CISM); technical security based in, 
for example, Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP); business continuity based in 
Business Continuity Professional Certification (BCP); 
good ICT government based in Certified in the 
Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT), or ICT audit, 
based in Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) 
or Control Objectives for IT (COBIT)
Sixth, promotion of the certification of product security based 
in ISO 15408 Common Criteria, focusing on selection 
and evaluation of security profiles for the security evalua-
tion of products acquired by the public sector; production 
of security profiles, with special attention given to prod-
ucts acquired by the Government of Catalonia and the 
local authorities
Seventh, promotion of research and innovation in ICT secu-
rity, including the creation of a chair in ICT security in 
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a Catalan University or specialized research center, and 
fostering joint publications between the university, com-
panies, and CESICAT
Increasing Confidence and Protection of the General Public The fourth 
objective seeks to improve the confidence and protection of the gen-
eral public in their use of information technology with special atten-
tion given to vulnerable groups, such as children, through awareness 
and support programs.
Examples of the current activities “A Internet posa-hi seny!” an 
awareness program targeting youngsters that is conducted through 
Facebook and features two imaginary roles, Cesc and Cati Cesicat.
This awareness program is based in a Facebook profile, available 
at http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/profile.php?id= 100000 
831630615, which is used by Cati Cesicat to give security advice 
using the social network.
Another interesting awareness action is based on an online gaming 
space (http://www.cesicat.cat/cesicat2010), where there are several 
games designed to teach youngsters to protect themselves.
There is also coordination with relevant agencies in the fight against 
all forms of computer crime. Some experiences include investigating 
voice Internet protocol (IP) fraud against small municipalities, in a 
coordinated action with the Catalan police.
CESICAT actions related to the fourth objective are as follows:
First, education in security and confidence, especially addressed 
to vulnerable groups, such as children, and the elderly, but also 
targeting consumers generally. Presence of the principal public 
and private portals addressed to the Catalan public, and other 
tools under the Web 2.0 philosophy (e.g., Facebook); publica-
tion of guidelines, recommendations, teaching materials; and 
specific actions, such as awareness campaigns. Concretely, 
CESICAT has already published several guidelines addressed 
to public administrations, companies, and citizens, which 
may be downloaded from the CESICAT webpage, and which 
are distributed in print at conferences and events organized by 
the CESICAT regularly directed to different groups.
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  Also, CESICAT created specific Facebook and Twitter 
accounts to establish additional relationship models with 
their communities of interest.
Second, promotion of essential security instruments among the 
general public, including fostering the use of electronic certifi-
cates; vigilance and monitoring tools installed in the computers 
of the general public, with their consent, for proactive detection 
of threats; or backup copy tools, coding, and others. Mainly 
open software tools, CESICAT is currently distributing tools 
such as Truecrypt, an open-source disk encryption software, or 
Ovaldi, an open-source local vulnerability assessment scanner.
Conclusions
From a global point of view, the World Summit on the Information 
Society stated trust and security of ICT as key principles of an inclu-
sive information society. These general principles have subsequently 
been defined in several assignments developed by the ITU in the 
area of cybersecurity by promoting cooperation among states and 
other actors, prevention and response to cybercrime, education, or by 
strengthening trust and safety.
The European Union has also advanced in this area through spe-
cific measures for networks and information systems, regulations on 
electronic communications, and the fight against cybercrime. It has 
also insisted that security is a challenge for everyone. Beyond the 
actions specifically developed by the European Union, it has invited 
state members to actively take different actions in this area.
At the national level, the Spanish government has adopted several 
instruments for defining national policy on security technology in 
order to increase the degree of awareness, training, and sensitization; 
to stimulate the use of digital identity; to stimulate the incorporation of 
security into organizations; and to develop an effective infrastructure 
for the implementation of the national policy of information security. 
The Spanish government has created different agencies to implement 
several policies adopted in this field (Red.es, INTECO, CHN).
Finally, we focused our attention on local cybersecurity policy as 
established by the Government of Catalonia on March 17, 2009. 
The Generalitat of Catalonia implements its policy through a public 
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foundation. This option allows a transversal approach to cybersecu-
rity through the participation of different bodies of the Generalitat 
of Catalonia, which represent different areas affected, such as tele-
communications, police, universities, enterprises, and e-government. 
From this perspective, it achieves greater proximity between the 
cybersecurity policy and the different actors involved and affected.
Finally, the plurality of actors and policies on cybersecurity that 
we analyzed prove the need to use mechanisms to promote coordina-
tion between the different territorial levels and the various political 
actors that define and implement them. Coordination is necessary 
to ensure consistency in the development of cybersecurity policies. 
In this regard, we must remember that the European Commission 
Communication “On fighting spam, spyware and malicious soft-
ware,” COM (2006) 688 final, calls on Member States and compe-
tent authorities to lay down clear lines of Responsibility for national 
agencies involved in fighting spam, and Ensure effective coordination 
between competent authorities.” Also, in Spain, the Avanza Plan has 
paid attention to the need to coordinate the various actors and actions.
For example, CESICAT currently has partnerships with various 
actors involved in cybersecurity. In Spain, CESICAT collaborates 
with the CCN-CERT, and INTECO entities at the state level are 
responsible for the security policies of the information presented ear-
lier. At the international level, CESICAT has been integrated into 
the network of CSIRTs of Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams (FIRST), and is part of the antiphishing working group.
Coordination and collaboration are especially necessary when pub-
lic authorities want to influence global public goods such as network 
security in the 21st century, in a context where prevention and time-
to-incident are absolutely essential.
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Introduction
E-government, social media, and Web 2.0/Gov 2.0 (and as impor-
tant, whatever comes after Gov 2.0) are here to stay, and public sector 
agencies at all levels need to figure out how best to deal with it, not 
to fight it.
Although this paper specifically focuses on cybersecurity policy 
related to social media and Gov 2.0 adoption at the local level, it is 
worth recounting this passage from the Federal CIO Council on the 
risks associated with social media (italics added):
The decision to embrace social media technology is a risk-based deci-
sion, not a technology-based decision. It must be made based on a strong 
business case, supported at the appropriate level for each department or 
agency, considering its mission space, threats, technical capabilities, and 
potential benefits. The goal of the IT organization should not be to say “No” 
Malware Filtering at the Network Perimeter 234
Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Prevention Systems 234
Data Loss Prevention 235
Moderating Content 235
URL Shortening Preview Tools 235
Browser with Restricted Privileges 235
Web Reputation Services 235
Policy Development around Social Media 236
Internal Considerations 236
External Considerations 237
Microstudy—A Snapshot of Local Gov 2.0 in Southern 
California 239
General—Information Technology/E-Government Planning 
and Policy 241








to social media websites and block them completely, but to say “Yes, follow-
ing security guidance,” with effective and appropriate information assurance 
security and privacy controls. The decision to authorize access to social 
media websites is a business decision, and comes from a risk manage-
ment process made by the management team with inputs from all play-
ers…. The use of social media and the inherent cybersecurity concerns 
form a complex topic that introduces additional vulnerabilities, targeted 
by an advanced threat, requiring updated sets of controls. (p. 6)
We focus in this chapter on cybersecurity policy issues related spe-
cifically to efforts by governments and public agencies at the local 
level to become more transparent through the use of Web 2.0 tools 
(Gov 2.0) and implementation of open data/open government initia-
tives. As such, we assume that virtually all agencies are already imple-
menting some baseline level of network security, data loss prevention, 
antivirus, intrusion detection, and so forth, and do not go into any 
detail on those aspects of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity and Gov 2.0
The integration of the digital world into the daily lives of citizens 
has increased user demand for government transparency, information 
access/availability, and outlets for citizen feedback. President Barack 
Obama made open government and government transparency a cor-
nerstone of the new administration, issuing a seminal Open Data 
Directive as one of his first official memoranda in January 2009. 
Governments at all levels have followed suit, slowly at first, but in the 
second half of 2010 and through 2011 the pace has picked up rapidly. 
This digital movement—popularly termed “Government 2.0” or sim-
ply “Gov 2.0”—was described in 2010 by Mark Drapeau of O’Reilly 
Radar, an online news and information site focusing on emerging 
technologies, as
[A]bout changing the status quo of government in various ways [includ-
ing] but [...] not necessarily limited to: innovation by government, 
transparency of its processes, collaboration among its members, and 
participation of citizens. In total, these would constitute a huge trans-
formation of government, at any level.
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However, as more government entities attempt to meet this grow-
ing expectation for government transformation, they must tackle key 
policy issues, especially regarding the security of publicly available 
online data and information, and increasingly open communications 
by public officials and employees to and with members of the public. 
At the highest level, in his early open government directives, President 
Obama specifically called for agencies to stop using the general threat 
of security and privacy as a reason to do nothing as this only would 
stifle innovation.
One of the key business and policy questions facing public offi-
cials considering how best to implement social media is the proper 
balance between risk management and open government. There is a 
natural tension between the hallmarks of open government—open 
data, open access, transparency, and accountability—and the sensi-
tivities of security.
E-Government Services, Open Data Initiatives, 
and the Social Media Fueled “Gov 2.0”
At the U.S. federal and state government levels, agency chief infor-
mation officers constantly rate cybersecurity as one of their top con-
cerns. Yet they are also under increasing pressure from all fronts to 
implement more and better e-government services, develop usable 
open data resources, and generally support more transparent deci-
sion making and communications including implementing vibrant 
social media initiatives. The pressure is even greater at the local 
level, where citizens interact daily with a variety of public agencies. 
In Southern California, this can include multiple municipal govern-
ments and their specific departments charged with key public ser-
vices, public utilities including water and energy, often overlapping 
public transit agencies, local and regional planning agencies and 
organizations, community redevelopment agencies, air quality dis-
tricts and other environmental agencies, public school and commu-
nity college districts, and countless others. Communications, service 
delivery, and information technology personnel as well as elected 
officials struggle daily with balancing the desire, and sometimes the 
mandate, to provide ever more access to public data and informa-
tion, and facilitating real dialogue with citizens and constituents, 
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and the very real threats to privacy and security issues. The rise of 
Gov 2.0 has raised the stakes on both sides of that balance.
Cybersecurity Risks Related to Gov 2.0
As the editor in the introduction to this book notes, cybersecurity can 
be defined broadly as the vulnerability of computer systems, includ-
ing Internet websites, against unauthorized access or attack, or the 
policy measures taken to protect them. The cybersecurity risks in Gov 
2.0 also cannot be focalized into one type of concern or category. 
Gov 2.0/Web 2.0 is inclusive of a number of factors including human 
actions, concerns related to infrastructure, social expectation, and 
even crosses over to multiple platforms and interfaces.
Human Error and Carelessness
Especially with social media, the most real security threat may be 
the inadvertent disclosure of potentially compromising information 
or data by careless government employees. Much of the allure of 
social media is its ability to “connect” large numbers of individu-
als in real time. Real time presents great opportunities for Gov 2.0 
including the ability to inform constituents of details as events are 
occurring and to have open channels that can immediately connect 
government to what constituents are experiencing. However, real-
time response can also result in less time and focus spent on ensur-
ing correct responses and increases the potential that government 
employees might provide information that has not yet been vetted, 
may be privy to security concerns, or may even be expressed in a 
manner that is not appropriate.
Physical Network Access
The incredible growth of social networking and social media sites, 
services, and applications—thousands and growing exponentially 
each day—provides numerous new potential entry points for com-
puter networks. This is one of the most basic, and obvious, threats and 
should not be overlooked.
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Malicious Data/Information Mining
Virtually all cell phones made after 2005 in the United States are 
required by law to include GPS (Global Positioning System) tech-
nology. The law, commonly known as E911 (Enhanced 911), was 
mandated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as a 
means of ensuring that users who dialed 911 in emergencies could be 
located within 100 meters of their actual location.
From this legislation and technological implementation, most lead-
ing smart phones have the ability to procure geotags that provide lati-
tude and longitude coordinates of the phone and, subsequently, where 
the phone user is located. The popular social media sites Twitter and 
Facebook have measures in place to avoid the publishing of geotags 
by unwitting users, and most smart phones include the ability to turn 
these settings off. Social media sites specifically focused on photo 
sharing—such as Flickr and Picasa—do an even better job, by offer-
ing geotagging options but not automatically enabling them.
However, one of the major combined benefits of mobile technolo-
gies and social media is the sharing of geo-location information. This 
is often discussed primarily as an online privacy issue, but in the con-
text of local government agencies it can present a very real cybersecu-
rity issue—location of key public assets such as power plants and other 
important infrastructure, public transit and transportation data, the 
comings and goings of key public officials, access patterns around key 
public facilities, and so forth. This can become a potential problem 
both in the public context—for example, public agency communica-
tions personnel providing photos of events, groundbreakings, and so 
forth. It can also pose a problem as social media is used more and 
more for enterprise collaboration or distributed communications and 
fieldwork. Some new public e-government services are actually built 
around this. Services such as See-Click-Fix, for example, encourage 
“active citizenship” by offering a variety of platforms for citizens to 
report their uses/concerns including mobile device options and photo 
uploads. The military has taken up the effort as young soldiers espe-
cially are starting to use social media to communicate with friends 
and family, the Army website notes that “Geotagging is the process 
of adding geographical identification to photographs, video, websites 
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and SMS messages. It is the equivalent of adding a 10-digit grid co-
ordinate to everything you post on the Internet.”
Social Engineering
A large area of cybersecurity vulnerability revolves around what is 
known as “social engineering.” At its most basic, social engineering 
as a cybersecurity concept involves exploiting the human element 
of trust that is at the very core of social networking. This is espe-
cially troublesome for public agencies as ever higher profile govern-
ment actors—elected officials, city managers, board and commission 
members, general managers, communications and public information 
officers, and so forth—utilize social media to communicate and share 
information with the public directly, often in real time.
Trend Analysis of Social Media “Conversations”
A booming industry has arisen around social media “listening.” For 
private sector marketing, branding, and public relations, the goal is 
to collectively assess what consumers are saying or sharing about a 
product, an event, a specific company, and so forth. By staying abreast 
of these “trending” conversations, companies can attempt to actively 
guide and shape them—by fueling positive trends and attempting 
to dampen negative trends. This is still much more art than science, 
but the rise of data mining and business intelligence tools that enable 
users to relate discrete pieces of data and information to each other for 
predictive analysis has created powerful opportunities for malicious 
users. These tools can be used, for example, for what are commonly 
known as “spear phishing” attacks, or to piece together broad knowl-
edge bases about public facilities and infrastructure, internal opera-
tions, plans and strategies, and so forth.
Phishing and Spear Phishing
Phishing scams have become a growing scourge across the Internet: 
who has not seen that now ubiquitous e-mail inquiry or solicitation 
attempting to get you to click on an apparently legitimate site link to 
check an account (often bank or other financial accounts), a special 
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offer, or some similar scheme in order to steal usable information 
such as credit card numbers. Although many of these phishing scams 
border on the ridiculous and are readily recognizable by even most 
digital neophytes, many have become increasingly sophisticated and 
look remarkably similar to the actual accounts and sites that they are 
masking. With the rise of social media an even more nefarious scam 
dubbed “spear phishing” has emerged and escalated rapidly. Spear 
phishing is an attack targeting a specific user or group of users, and 
attempts to deceive the user into performing an action, such as open-
ing a document or clicking a link, launches an attack. Spear phishers 
rely on knowing some specific information about their target, such as 
an event, interest, travel plans, address, current issue, and so forth, 
and have found social media sites and conversations a treasure trove 
for finding these critical pieces of information. The popular use of 
URL shorteners in the social media world has added to the effective-
ness of spear phishing as users cannot easily recognize a modified 
URL of a branded website.
Application Security/Attacks
Web applications have posed serious security vulnerabilities for pub-
lic agencies for some time, especially with the rise of e-government 
services over the past five to ten years. In the Gov 2.0 context, two 
new trends have added to these security concerns: mobile applications 
and the rise of open application development contests or challenges 
by government agencies. Although there are current and emerg-
ing security standards in place for application development such as 
the Open Web Applications Security Project (OWASP) guidelines, 
tracking and enforcing these in the dynamic Gov 2.0 world is becom-
ing increasingly difficult.
Mobile Government Applications
Predictions by virtually every reasonable technology source note that 
mobile connections to the Internet—smart phones, pads/tablets—
will outstrip computer-based connections by around 2013. Symantec, 
a security company, and others in the industry report that as mobile 
phones become “smarter” and add new features, applications, data 
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access, and connectivity, they open up entirely new avenues for cyber 
criminals. The development of mobile applications—stand-alone 
applications generally available for download from online applica-
tion “stores” and mobile web applications generally available to any/
all mobile users—is one of the richest areas of application develop-
ment. The opportunities for mobile e-government services and mobile 
web applications are virtually endless. So, too, is the variability in the 
quality of mobile application development. In the commercial space, 
leading app stores, such as iTunes for iPhone-specific applications and 
the App Market for Android-based applications, screen applications 
for functionality, but, according to Wired, an industry magazine, do 
not generally assess security vulnerabilities or malware. More flexible 
mobile web applications that do not have to be distributed by the vari-
ous app stores and are therefore potentially more widely accessible are 
prone to the same vulnerabilities as web-based e-government appli-
cations and services but include a layer of complexity because of the 
multitude of mobile handsets and operating systems in the market. 
Monitoring and management of this development is often beyond the 
expertise or capacity of local government IT personnel.
Open Applications Development Contests/Challenges
Vivek Kundra, the current Federal Chief Information Officer, 
launched in 2008 an “Apps for Democracy” contest while he was 
still the Chief Technology Officer for the District of Columbia. The 
simple idea was to open key government datasets and tools to the 
public, and allow companies and individuals to develop their own 
e-government applications for use by the government. New York City 
followed suit with its “NYC BigApps” contest, which is now in its 
own 2.0 version, and numerous other public sector agencies have fol-
lowed suit since. In Southern California, the City of Anaheim com-
pleted its first “The Great Anaheim Apps Challenge,” and the Los 
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) 
announced in early 2011 its own “Metro Developers Challenge” 
focusing on transportation-related web and mobile applications using 
Metro datasets. Although a number of these contests, such as the 
one offered by Metro, indicate in their rules and guidelines that apps 
must be free of malware, this request is generally buried, reducing 
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the potential prominence of this concern and not providing details 
on how apps can or will be screened for malware. Admittedly, the 
more that rules and structure infiltrate these Gov 2.0 crowdsourc-
ing initiatives, the more likely they will be perceived to be not really 
open, but some very basic cybersecurity frameworks could go far in 
avoiding potentially major problems down the line. The potential for 
malware especially to be built or introduced into such “open” appli-
cations is a distinct vulnerability, especially if the contests and the 
resultant applications see greater usage by members of the public and 
the agencies.
Social Media Tools
According to a study by the Human Capital Institute and Saba, two 
human resources consultancies, 66% of all government agencies in the 
United States currently use some form of social networking. At the 
local level, a small but fast growing 31% of counties and municipali-
ties utilize social media for external processes and as a more efficient 
means of engaging stakeholders, especially for feedback.
Symantec, a global leader in security, makes the case in its annual 
security threat report that the increasing adoption of social media by 
government agencies increases the risk of cyber attack. They especially 
point out the use of shortened URLs—an efficiency measure whereby 
lengthy URLs are shortened especially for microblogging such as 
Twitter—as being dangerous because they mask the true links behind 
them. The firm was sounding the alarm particularly for national-level 
governments and global corporations, and termed the rise of these 
highly targeted and sophisticated attacks cyber warfare: “Stuxnet and 
Hydraq, two of the most visible cyber-events of 2010, represented true 
incidents of cyber warfare and have fundamentally changed the threat 
landscape,” said Stephen Trilling, senior vice president of Symantec 
Security Technology and Response (Stuxnet was a notable attack on 
nuclear facilities programs; Hydraq was used in an attack on Google.) 
However, the alarm should be no less loud for the local level.
In a recent study conducted over 4 months by the Georgia Tech 
Information Security Center (2011), an average of 130 instances of 
malware were found every day simply by search ing for content on 
popular, “trending” topics via Twitter, Google, Yahoo!, and Bing. 
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The principal investigator noted that “While the issue of malware on 
social network ing sites and popular search engines is quiet, it is con-
sistent and happens around the clock, all day every day” (p. 7).
External Communications
One of the main drivers for government adoption of social media is 
its ease of use as an external communication tool. Facebook, Twitter, 
and blogging platforms can provide online identities that can be easily 
communicated and “liked” or “followed” by a potentially large num-
ber of constituents. In turn, constituents through the same channels 
can provide responses resulting in a potentially effective two-way 
channel. But social media as an external communication tool can be 
problematic due to issues that might arise from the real-time nature 
of the content, the brevity emphasized in communication, and the 
public/private division and conflicts that may be difficult to discern 
when employees and officials are using these tools.
For example, according to Social Media Today, an online social media 
news site, the Red Cross had an incident where an employee acciden-
tally tweeted a personal tweet in their official account. They were able 
to rectify the situation with humor and turn the potentially embar-
rassing situation into a public positive, but such an example shows 
how easy it is that communication mistakes can happen and lines can 
be crossed when using open communication tools meant for public 
consumption. This is particularly true when government officials or 
public officers may have even official Facebook or Twitter accounts 
readily available, causing them to make known public views in real 
time that have not been thoroughly considered or worded. Senator 
Claire McCaskill (D-Mo) had such an incident when she attempted 
to express her view on the health care debate via Twitter after a long 
night at the office, resulting in poor word choice to appropriately 
express her viewpoint, according to an article in the Huffington Post.
Internal Collaboration
Social media also opens the doors for internal collaboration oppor-
tunities via blogs, wikis, and mash-up interfaces that include social 
media networks. Used effectively, social media can provide valuable 
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productivity and efficiency tools for employees, often at a very low 
cost. However, without proper guidelines, monitoring and train-
ing these technologies can provide openings for inadvertent security 
breaches by employees, or worse yet, malicious security breaches.
Initial Defenses: Baseline Technological Controls
In addition to the most critical line of defense which is the human 
aspect, there are a growing number of accepted technology tools 
and approaches that if implemented in a strategic and methodi-
cal manner can provide a comprehensive safety net of sorts. The 
following is a sample list that has been adapted from N.Y. State 
Cybersecurity Guidelines for Social Media, the Federal CIO coun-
cil, and others.
Universal Resource Locator (URL) and Internet Protocol (IP) Filtering
This is a fairly basic technology that blocks certain websites, parts of 
websites, or IP addresses identified by users or administrators. This 
can help protect users who may be redirected to a known malicious 
site. In addition, for some social networking sites, using URL filters 
to block the login pages for all but those employees with a business 
need, allows for access to public information while preventing access 
to applications and messaging tools that may bypass a State entity’s 
security controls.
Malware Filtering at the Network Perimeter
This technology inspects traffic before it gets into an entity’s network 
to ensure that it does not contain malware and blocks any malware 
that it finds. This can be implemented as part of a comprehensive 
screening, intrusion detection, and usage policy framework.
Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Prevention Systems
This technology provides near real-time monitoring and analysis of 
network activity for potential attacks in progress.
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Data Loss Prevention
This technology is designed to detect and prevent the unauthor-
ized use and transmission of confidential information. It should 
be used at both the desktop and the web gateway to monitor for 
and block outbound confidential data. With the rise of mobile data 
usage, this technology needs to keep pace with all data traffic in 
the network.
Moderating Content
When hosting a State-entity social media site, establish a process that 
would allow the host to moderate (i.e., preview, accept, reject) content 
submitted to the site prior to its being posted (i.e., made visible to visi-
tors). This helps the host block content containing malicious links or 
inappropriate content.
URL Shortening Preview Tools
These tools display the actual URL destination masked by short-
ened URLs from services such as Google, TinyURL, and Bit.ly. The 
preview allows users to make informed decisions about links before 
clicking. Additionally, customized, branded short URLs can be cre-
ated to increase legitimacy of content and connect the URL to the 
source sharing information.
Browser with Restricted Privileges
If available, this feature ensures that the browser and its add‐ons run 
with a minimal set of permissions preventing the installation of mali-
cious code.
Web Reputation Services
These services test websites for spam, spyware, scams, and so forth, and 
use those tests to give safety ratings to help users avoid visiting unsafe 
sites. For this technology to be most effective, it should be delivered 
with end-user training on how to interpret and use the ratings.
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Policy Development around Social Media
Given the many potential cybersecurity issues indicated thus far, one 
of the ways in which government can begin to tackle these issues is to 
develop policy surrounding social media. Social media policy has to 
consider a number of factors:
• What social networks should be participating in
• What technologies may be required to participate fully in 
these social networks
• What standard user guides should be followed by staff (and 
who on staff should be given access)
• What plans are in place if an issue arises whether it is the 
dissemination of misinformation, the unauthorized use of 
an account, or one that may derive itself from the technolo-
gies utilized
• What visual and textual branding must be included to ensure 
constituents formally recognize such social networks as offi-
cial channels of information
Perhaps most apparent in the list above, and especially in discuss-
ing specifically the development of policy, is that the human element 
must be emphasized.
Internal Considerations
With more and more social technologies becoming available, govern-
ment agencies must decide how to use their resources in this regard 
and how to communicate with their specific audiences. A number of 
these implementations may be free or low cost, but there are monetary 
and time investments made to create and maintain online identities 
and information channels. Multiple investments increase the atten-
tion required to oversee various channels. It is worth understanding 
what will likely engage the target audiences and if there is adequate 
staff to maintain such channels appropriately.
Given the human resources and technologies required to be active par-
ticipants in social media—to not only disseminate information in a timely 
matter but to also engage with users interacting with social tools—a part of 
policy should include how to determine which staff should be responsible 
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for such engagement and the structure required to send out information 
on channels. For example, in situations that require real-time responses, 
who makes the call to provide this information to social channels and 
how should this information be worded or available? Having such policy 
and structures in place reduces the likelihood of miscommunication.
Additionally, social technologies can now include third-party 
software that enables access to these networks via desktop applica-
tions and mobile devices. This software may also be free or low cost, 
increasing productivity in these channels, but with additional tech-
nologies comes an increase in possible security concerns with products 
and more means of creating mistakes – especially if these tools enable 
users to add on multiple accounts that may mix up personal and pro-
fessional participation.
Ultimately, a number of issues can be avoided or reduced if pub-
lic sector employees are adequately trained and educated in how 
they should be engaging with constituents through these channels. 
Users of technology are often the weakest link in the chain as indi-
vidual actions may be managed but never fully controlled. Human 
error and carelessness must be an anticipated factor when consider-
ing implementation of any technology. Some might argue that this 
is not acceptable, but mistakes can occur and will likely happen. In a 
survey with more than 100 technology, media, and telecommunica-
tions companies conducted by Deloitte, a consulting firm, in 2008, 
“human error” was indicated as a top factor in security threats and 
ran a gamut of issues with human error being cited by 75% of the 
participants, according to an article in CIO.com, an online magazine. 
By training and educating employees, some potential dangers can be 
mitigated. Additionally, by developing policy that includes making 
training materials available and mandatory for staff engaging with 
social media, government agencies and their staff will also increase 
awareness and understanding of their goals with social media and 
pro’s and con’s with integrating the experience into their organization.
External Considerations
Social media sites are targeted by cyber criminals because they offer 
an effective means of propagating malicious code to a wide, unsus-
pecting audience. According to a report from Websense Security 
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Labs, a leading web security provider, sites that allow user‐generated 
content are among the most active distributors of malicious content, 
such as worms that can shut down networks, or spyware and key-
stroke loggers that can compromise data. Many postings to blogs, 
chat rooms, and message boards are spam or contain malicious links. 
Because many links on social media sites are in the form of shortened 
or condensed URLs (e.g., TinyURL, Bit.ly), a user is unable to deter-
mine where these links lead, making it easy for criminals to direct an 
unsuspecting user to malicious sites. The false sense of a trusted com-
munity when visiting social media sites increases the likelihood that 
a user may fall victim to this type of threat. If an employee is using 
State resources when this occurs (e.g., a work PC), these resources 
have an increased risk of becoming infected.
Rise of new positions, such as the Chief Digital Information Officer 
(NYC), or Director of Digital Communications (Metrolink, OCTA) 
brands web technology and digital solutions as a primary concern 
with a distinguishable future ahead. By officiating people to oversee 
policy and implementation of web solutions, it also provides a distinct 
and public understanding that standards and structure are required in 
this area and decisions must be made to proceed responsibly.
Adopted, published policies and guidelines are also a signal to citi-
zens, evoking the foundational nature of Gov 2.0 as being a movement 
to an open, transparent, and “secure” arena. Citizens in a Web 2.0 
world expect the integration of such technologies into their interactions 
with government entities, but there are still underlying concerns of pri-
vacy and public information sharing. Providing guidelines and policies 
can mitigate such concerns and open up for discussion additional needs 
and expectations of the citizens as development progresses in this area.
Similar to user guidelines for staff, public input should also have its 
own guidelines to ensure that users understand where their informa-
tion is going, what is expected of their content, and in what ways their 
content can be removed, shown, or edited. Guidelines for public input 
help to shape expectations, facilitate dialogue, and reduce potential 
issues that may arise from content removal by directly citing guide-
lines that the user is adhering to with his or her participation. Policy 
should also be provided for how information is recorded for public 
record. This is especially important if there is already existing public 
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policy related to the public record that must now accommodate for 
new technology and communication channels.
Microstudy—A Snapshot of Local Gov 2.0 in Southern California
This discussion is of particular importance at the local level where 
users are more likely to engage with, have a direct connection with, 
or be impacted by government information and transparency. The 
“mega-region” of Southern California is an ideal place to explore this 
emerging need in local government policy, as it is an expansive region 
including a rich variety of municipalities, large and small, and gov-
ernment agencies that have daily effects in citizens’ lives from policy 
and utility perspectives.
This is supported by a brief survey conducted by the authors related to 
local-level government within the Southern California “mega-region.” 
The microstudy explores the following questions within this area:
• Is Gov 2.0 formal policy currently available?
• Are there action plans that may create formal policy regard-
ing Gov 2.0?
• What are the primary concerns of local-level municipality 
and government agencies about Gov 2.0?
• Are municipalities and agencies engaging in discussion or 
idea-sharing regarding Gov 2.0 implementation?
• Does social media adoption or mobile implementation impact 
this discussion?
For the purposes of this microstudy, “formal policy” is defined broadly 
and should encompass any type of organization-recognized plan or 
course of action that impacts the organization’s procedures.
This survey was structured to generate a snapshot of policy develop-
ment about Gov 2.0 implementation as well as gauge the level of imple-
mentation that is occurring in the sample area of Southern California. 
A key hypothesis to this survey is that matters of open government 
and concerns/actions of establishing related policy already existed. The 
survey was initiated over an approximate 4-month period beginning 
November 18, 2010, and for the purposes of this chapter, assesses the 
responses of six local agencies representing a diverse cross section of 
agency types, sizes, and geographic coverage in Southern California.
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Participants were first recruited from a sample of convenience, 
primarily client association with Civic Resource Group (CRG), the 
e-government/Gov 2.0 consulting and development firm of which the 
authors are associated. The primary requirements for survey participa-
tion were as follows:
• The participant is affiliated with a public agency or municipal-
ity that is within the “mega region” of Southern California.
• The participant is employed in the position of having knowl-
edge related to his or her agency or municipality’s web tech-
nology implementation and needs, including knowledge of 
the agency or municipality’s policy.
Those contacted were asked to become survey participants or forward 
the information to the appropriate potential participant within their 
own agency/municipality. Contacts were also asked to forward this sur-
vey to other related agencies and municipalities that fit the requirements.
For the targeted microstudy, the authors reached out to 10 initial 
contacts seeking participation in this survey. Of these 10, six partici-
pants responded to the survey in a timely fashion. The six respondents 
had the following:
• Three mid-sized cities with populations ranging from 60,000 to 
100,000, each located in a different Southern California county
• An independent agency of a large Southern California county 
serving a population of about 10 million
• A small municipal water agency serving a population of less 
than 50,000
• A large regional planning organization covering multiple 
jurisdictions with about 19 million residents
A survey was developed by CRG and was finalized with 19 questions 
related to the following:
• General demographic information.
• General—Information technology/e-government planning 
and policy.




As Gov 2.0 is a relatively new term, a baseline definition was pro-
vided at the start of the survey:
Gov 2.0 is the incorporation of Web 2.0 technologies in the government 
sector; this can encompass anything from social media integration to 
data sharing/transparency to online citizen collaboration. This may also 
be known as Open Government.
An e-mail with a link to a survey was sent out to a list of pos-
sible participants by the authors. E-mails were tailored to the specific 
people contacted. Participants were also asked to forward the survey 
link to other related contacts. Prior to filling out the survey, the par-
ticipants were informed that all questions were optional and that the 
results of the survey would maintain confidential, as no individual or 
organization would be named in the results.
General—Information Technology/E-Government Planning and Policy
Participants were provided a list of information technology needs 
and asked to check up to five in terms of importance to their organi-
zation. Although there was no one need selected by all participants, 
two needs were selected by a majority (4 out of 6) of the partici-
pants: “automating internal operations/businesses processes” and 
“providing online services.” Figure 9.1 shows all selected responses.
Participants were also asked to rank the importance of specified 
training categories for IT/E-Government Training Needs. They were 
also able to indicate and rank a category that was not prespecified. 
Similar to the ranking of IT Needs, no one category was ranked the 
most important across all respondents (see Figure 9.2). Two partici-
pants provided additional training categories under “Other”—one 
related to technical training as it related to e-government technolo-
gies, and the other related to training in the use of social media.
Of the respondents, five out of six had existing strategic plans for 
IT/E-Government in one form or another.
Gov 2.0/Open Government
Participants were asked the priority of Gov 2.0 to their organization, 
revealing mixed responses of two “High Priority,” two “Medium 
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Priority,” and two “Low Priority” (see Figure 9.3). Only one out of 
the six participants, however, had made decisions or developed policy 
specifically related to Gov 2.0 (Figure 9.4) including one that noted 
his of her organization will be updating social media guidelines in 
2011. One of the five respondents who indicated that he or she had no 
official policy, however, did elaborate that despite no formal policy the 
technologies of Gov 2.0 were still heavily used. Half of the respon-
dents indicated that the subject of Gov 2.0 policy was something they 
had discussed with other government agencies.
Social Media
Five survey participants were also users of some type of social media. 




Automating internal operations/business processes 66
Providing online services 66
Providing citizens/residents with online participation and input 
tools
50
Providing more/better information online 50
Upgrading key internal systems (e.g., financial management, 
human relations)
50
Implementing line of business systems/applications for key 
services and departments (e.g., Parks and Rec, Public Works, 
Utilities)
33
Cloud computing for routine operations (e.g., e-mail) 16
Disaster recovery 16
Homeland security—information sharing, emergency 
communications, community alerts/information dissemination, 
collaboration, and so forth
16
Information security (cybersecurity) 16
Technology-/e-government-related training 16
Figure 9.1  Importance of technology needs.
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were also able to specify other social media types, and two participants 
chose to add in a blog that was not included in the initial options.
Participants who responded to affirmatively to using social 
media were also asked their primary reasons for using social media 
(Figure 9.6). In addition to the options provided in the survey, they were 
able to indicate other reasons. Two participants provided additional 
reasons related to Public Participation/Two-Way Communication 
Channel with the Community.
Despite the use of social media by a majority of the participants, 
only one participant had an established policy for social media use 
either as a separate item or as part of a larger policy. Two indicated in 
corresponding notes, however, that such a policy was being consid-
ered or may be implemented in the near future.
Mobile Development
Almost all participants (five out of six) have considered or are con-


























1 1 2 1
Basic information 
security awareness 
training for all staff
1 1 2
Other 1 1
Figure 9.2  Importance of training categories (1 = most important; 5 = least important).
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Blogs Flickr
Figure 9.5  Social media use by participants.
245seCurInG GoVernment transParenCy
were asked to indicate possible reasons for their mobile development. 
Responses can be seen in Figure 9.7.
Summary Findings
The results of this survey, particularly with its small sample of par-
ticipants, do not provide a comprehensive review of the Gov 2.0 pol-
icy discussion in the mega-region of Southern California, but they 
do offer a snapshot of what is occurring in the region at the local 
level. The responses no doubt provide much insight into the questions 
related to Gov 2.0 that local government practitioners are facing in 
PRIMARY REASONS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA USE COUNT
PERCENT 
(%)
Popularity of social media tools 4 80
Public expectation of social media access 4 80
Ability to share information easily 3 60
Real-time benefits 3 60
Usefulness of social media as a tool 2 40
Outreach for public participation (two-way 
communication channel)
2 40
Figure 9.6  Reasons for social media use by participants who use social media.
PRIMARY REASONS FOR MOBILE DEVELOPMENT COUNT PERCENT 
(%)
Access to mobile tools/applications streamlines 
communication needs
4 80
Increased use/access of smart phones among citizens 4 80
Expected demand of mobile technology 3 60
Mobile mapping technology is beneficial to the purposes 
of the organization
2 40
Mobile technology provides additional functionality not 
afforded through other communication options
1 20
Figure 9.7  Reasons for social media use by participants.
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the region, particularly if the participants can each be seen as separate 
case studies as opposed to a representative sample.
The question of “Is Gov 2.0 formal policy currently available?” was 
only confirmed by one survey taker with the other participants lean-
ing more toward working on action plans to create such policy. The 
existence of formal policy in at least one organization, the medium-to-
high priority of Gov 2.0 among the participants, and the discussion of 
action plans to develop policy support the hypothesis that matters of 
open government and concerns/actions of establishing related policy 
currently exist.
The participants had mixed responses to the question of “Are 
municipalities and agencies engaging in discussion or idea-sharing 
regarding Gov 2.0 implementation?” Although this small sample size 
does not relay in any way how much discussion is occurring about Gov 
2.0, it does reflect that at least some discussion is occurring.
No participant answered the question directly related to primary 
Gov 2.0 concerns of local-level municipality and government agen-
cies, but some concerns in this area may be discernable from responses 
in the use of social media and support/plans for mobile development 
which are ripe areas for Gov 2.0 participation. All participants con-
firmed support or plans for mobile development, and five out of six 
respondents were participants of social media. Participants high-
lighted communication opportunities, public demand/expectation, 
and citizen use/access as key reasons for their participation in social 
media and support of mobile development.
Perhaps one of the most crucial pieces of information that supports 
the importance of Gov 2.0 policy discussion is the estimated popula-
tions of the constituents provided by the survey respondents. There 
were six participants in this survey, but the smallest population/user 
base estimate provided was around 20,000 and the highest around 19 
million. Thus, the discussion of Gov 2.0 policy is an important one to 
begin to understand. The policies set forth by these municipalities and 
agencies, particularly in light of their public-oriented reasons for Gov 
2.0 participation and development, can and will impact millions of 
people. From a policy and security perspective, this is even more cru-
cial considering that almost all survey participants already had social 
media participation, and none were able to definitely say at the time 
that they had developed policy for its use.
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Case Studies
As reflected in the microstudy, development and adoption of formal 
social media, or Gov 2.0 policies is still low at the local level. It is 
a relatively new area, and governments are struggling to understand 
how to best and responsibly manage implementation of Web 2.0 tools 
for public sector use. Policies can take two general paths—specific 
policies/guidelines dealing with security issues, or acceptable use 
policies and guidelines, or the combination of the two. The following 
case studies show the implementation of the policy at work.
THE CITY OF LONG BEACH—
SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES
In late 2010, the City of Long Beach, a port city of nearly 
500,000 located on the coast just south of Los Angeles, devel-
oped and published a set of Social Media Guidelines. The City 
claimed at the time that this was among the first, if not the 
first, document of its kind to be created and published by a 
municipal government agency. Although this claim has not 
been verified, the lack of readily findable social media or Gov 
2.0 guidelines or policy-related documents appear to give sup-
port to that claim.
The following are some key excerpts from the City of Long 
Beach Social Media Guidelines. The first is descriptive text that 
clearly reflects how the City perceives social media tools, the 
City’s use of such tools, and how an employee should understand 
his or her role when conducting City business within these autho-
rized channels:
 Social media tools are designed to be circulated to a wide 
audience, many times beyond the initial intended audi-
ence. The line between private and public activity has 
been blurred by these tools and great care should be 
taken in crafting and sending messages, blog posts or 
tweets. Any content that you post represents you and the 
City of Long Beach to the outside world as much as a 
press release or the City’s website does.
Guideline number 4 of the City of Long Beach Social Media 
Guidelines reflects specifically on ensuring that confidential and 
proprietary information remain undisclosed, clearly introducing 
how social channels blur boundaries:
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 Protecting confidential and proprietary information: 
Social computing blurs many of the traditional boundar-
ies between internal and external communications. Be 
thoughtful about what you publish. You must make sure 
you do not disclose or use City confidential or propri-
etary information.
Guideline number 7 of the City of Long Beach Social Media 
Guidelines discusses specifically copyright and intellectual prop-
erty laws that can be easily infringed upon or violated through 
online media and specifically addresses that content needs to be 
generated by staff:
Do not infringe copyrights or violate intellectual property 
laws. Do not post pictures, videos or other content directly onto 
City sites that was not taken or created by city employees.
ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY (OCTA)—FORMAL DIGITAL 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENT
The authors were specifically commissioned as web development 
and communications consultants to develop the formal digital 
communication policy for the Orange County Transportation 
Authority (OCTA). What initially began as the development of 
basic guidelines and how-to’s on social media for employees devel-
oped into a larger “E-Communications Policy and Guidelines” 
project.
The E-Communications Policy was directly tied to OCTA’s 
Digital Communications Strategic Action Plan including 
the application of the Action Plan’s four “pillars” of digital 
communications:
• Web Communications (OCTA’s corporate site, public 
site, and other affiliated project/program websites)
• External e-mail communications
• Mobile communications (OCTA mobile sites, applica-
tions, etc.)
• Social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other 
current and future social media tools and networks)
By creating social media as its own “pillar” of information, 
OCTA’s Digital Communications Strategic Action Plan provides 
social media with not only its own focused place in their digital 
strategy, but also provides it with the same prominence of more 
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established “pillars” of the traditional web. The addition of mobile 
communications in this structure shows OCTA’s broad under-
standing and commitment to responsibly implementing current 
and future technologies. In fact, the E-Communications Policy 
and Guidelines Summary specifically states:
 The Orange County Transportation Authority (“OCTA”) 
recognizes the importance and public expectation of 
government transparency and open communications. 
OCTA’s ability to effectively use all forms of electronic 
communications (“e-communications”)—e-mail, web, 
mobile and social media among others—will be critical 
for the Authority to successfully communicate informa-
tion to and connect with the general public.
The E-Communications Policy, however, is moreover focused 
on mitigating risks and guiding operational needs: “OCTA 
also understands that the implementation of e-communications 
comes with certain risks. This document provides a summary of 
OCTA’s efforts to reduce such risks while also providing the nec-
essary guidelines and policies that will assist in clear and concise 
e-communications.”
It also clearly defines specific entities within OCTA that 
this policy will most likely be effecting in terms of operational 
needs and strategic value from e-communications technologies, 
services, and business processes. These entities included Public 
Outreach and Media Relations, Marketing, Customer Relations 
and Services, and Project/Program Specific Initiatives.
The creation of an E-Communications Policy also enabled 
OCTA to make a strategic and internal decision by naming 
the OCTA External Affairs Division and E-Communications 
Steering Committee as the specific internal division and com-
mittee that would be overseeing e-communications strategy and 
policy. In doing so, OCTA provides a functional starting point 
for a formalized process in which policy in this area must be 
discussed, vetted, and adopted, creating the formalized ground-
work for adopting future technologies.
The following is a summary of points that OCTA’s 
E-Communication Policy provides:
• Creating and using a channel given an “official” 
designation
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• Guidelines for users and related policy (e.g., OCTA 
Code of Conduct Policy and OCTA User Guidelines for 
E-Communications) that they must follow
• Security compliance with OCTA’s Internet Acceptable 




There are also associated policies that provide direction for
• Public comments, such as
• Procedures for approving public comments
• Guidelines for removing any comments
• Guidelines for moderating content
• Recognized/approved channels including usage stan-
dards and requirements
Conclusion
Cybersecurity threats are on the rise, and all predictions point to their 
increasing frequency and levels of sophistication. In the public sector, 
these risks threaten the take-up of social media and Gov 2.0 by gov-
ernments and agencies seeking to become more open and transparent. 
This is especially true at the local level, where local governments and 
agencies have an even greater pressure on them to engage their con-
stituents directly, and to be as open as possible.
The basic conclusion to be drawn is that governments at all levels, 
and especially local governments, must continue to adopt, and in fact 
develop new, Gov 2.0 technologies and strategies in order to remain 
trusted providers of public services and information. However, gov-
ernments must do so in a careful, strategic manner, with the policies, 
guidelines, technological tools, and training in place to defend against 
cybersecurity threats.
Part of this careful and strategic approach involves making clear 
business decisions about the value of specific Gov 2.0/social media 
tools and initiatives. By assessing the potential risks of specific initia-
tives or long-term strategies, proper planning and resources can be 
allocated to implement and manage them. Figure 9.8 provides a high-
level framework for this kind of assessment.
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While signing up for a social media account and providing users 
with information (or asking for their feedback) may appear straight-
forward and easy, the decision for a government agency to participate 
in Web 2.0 technology and trends bring up a number of risks and 
issues, as illustrated by Figure 9.8.
• High risks: Ultimately, the actions of people are the greatest 
risk that Gov 2.0 participation must bear.
• Public Participation must be met with policies that ensure 
that the agencies articulate clearly responsibilities, disclaim-
ers, and policies that enable them to monitor/remove content.
• External Collaboration requires safe measures to ensure 
that public contributions adequately match the needs 
and desires of the agencies/organizations. The policies 
provided in Public Participation must apply here as well, 
and how participants are providing information must be 
assessed and analyzed for all possible security risks prior 
to implementation.
• Staff Participation must be met with policies as well—staff 












Figure 9.8  Potential risk assessment in Gov 2.0 participation.
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public via social channels. Information should be clearly 
marked for disclosure on public networks and language 
must be included to provide context such as identifying 
the source of the information, the intended or appropriate 
use of the information, and so on.
• Real-Time Information is both good and bad. Being able to 
provide people with up-to-date information is important, 
but at the same time, this information needs to be moni-
tored and updated regularly. The risk of this type of on-
the-go information being available increases when taking 
into account that other people will likely share official 
information in “real time” as well.
• Low Risks: Gov 2.0 technologies and strategies with lower 
risks are often those that have increased controls before they 
are open to the public:
• Brand Identity: From logos to naming conventions, the 
brand identity of the organization must extend through 
Web 2.0 channels before it is implemented.
• Additional Outreach Channels: There are numerous tools in 
the social web and Gov 2.0 must make conscious decisions 
about what tools to use. Despite the zero to low cost of 
signing up for accounts, these channels require staff and 
staff time, and there is a risk in choosing to participate in 
channels that will not be beneficial to the organization.
• Internal Collaboration: Gov 2.0 opens many doors for internal col-
laboration and communication, but this, too, has potential risks 
including the difficulties that may arise in attempting to manage 
many internal channels, and the misuse or abuse by employees.
As with any new technologies, business models, and services, govern-
ments tend to lag well behind the private sector in their adoption. This 
has also been the case with social media and Web 2.0. Governments 
are poised, however, to accelerate their implementation of these tech-
nologies and strategies, and in fact shape them into an emerging plat-
form—Gov 2.0—developed specifically around the needs of the public 
sector. Local governments and agencies can be the leaders in this devel-
opment, and in so doing become more open, transparent, and account-
able. Cybersecurity threats new and old will always face the users 
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and advancers of new technologies. Fear of these threats should not 
stifle innovation but rather stimulate the kind of sound preparations, 
responses, and new technologies to protect the public good.
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Cyber, in certain circles one does not even need to append “secu-
rity” to the term, is a topic of burgeoning interest for several reasons. 
First, ubiquitous and mobile computing coupled with the movement 
toward digital formats and the low cost of reproduction has resulted 
in government fear for loss of information control. This is a problem 
both in regard to personally identifiable information (PII) of pub-
lic sector employees and those served by them as well as confiden-
tiality of records not meant for public consumption, exemplified by 
the intelligence reports posted by WikiLeaks. Second, information 
technology (IT) has changed the way government works and has 
become a massive component of public sector budgets. According to 
the Federal IT Dashboard, the federal government spent $81.9 bil-
lion on IT in fiscal year 2010. Third, securing information systems is 
costly. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
the Department of Homeland Security holds a 2011 budget of more 
than $350 million for its cybersecurity directorate while the National 
Security Agency spends upwards of $1 billion on securing the systems 
of the Department of Defense (DoD) alone, according to the 2011 
budget request and reports in Information Week (Hoover, 2010), an 
industry publication. As funding increases, the cybersecurity agenda 
in Washington will continue to rise in political importance.
But despite all this spending, government computer systems 
remain vulnerable. For example, three-quarters (75%) of 217 senior-
level IT executives at U.S. federal organizations said they experienced 
one or more data breach incidents in the prior year, according to a 
2009 survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute, a consultancy. How 
to respond to such cyber incidents, whether major data breaches or 
potentially crippling attacks launched against pieces of critical infra-
structure, such as the power grid or telecommunications system, is 
a major challenge. The global digital interconnection and reliance 
on networked computers will lead to unanticipated externalities, 
prompting serious thought about the current state of cyber incident 
response for government organizations. Two major events in 2010 
illustrate this new security era. First, to the dismay of officials around 
the world, WikiLeaks, an online nonprofit organization, demon-
strated the potential unintended consequences of massive digital 
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information compromise by posting thousands of U.S. government 
reporting cables and raw intelligence reports on the Internet for any-
one to view. Second, the reported execution of Stuxnet, a malicious 
computer worm targeting an Iranian uranium enrichment facility at 
Natanz, exemplified that it is possible to accomplish physical damage 
using the Internet.
In order to help public sector managers gain a better operational 
understanding of their cyber environment, the first part of this chap-
ter provides an overview of the civilian U.S. federal government cyber 
incident response challenges and reviews relevant policies, including 
requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) and guidance from the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and other civilian agencies. The second 
part discusses the issue of a national cyber incident response policy, 
with emphasis on the draft National Cyber Incident Response Plan 
(NCIRP) and the issues present in mounting an effective response 
to the sorts of events within the domain of possibility, both known 
and unknown.
The Cyber Incident Conundrum
A cyber attack will generally render three possible results: (1) a denial 
of availability to information, (2) a compromise of confidentiality of 
information, or (3) a subversion of the integrity of information. Denial 
of availability may be undertaken to protest a particular policy or gov-
ernment service. Thieves may profit from confidential information. 
Altering government documents may sow confusion or obstruct law-
ful activity. Typically, we would see these as criminal acts. And there 
is general agreement that cybercrime is a growing problem. However, 
differentiating between criminal acts, mere electronic hooliganism, or 
serious threats to national security is not always apparent as a cyber 
attack is detected or unfolds.
In coping with cybersecurity, public sector managers must connect 
government policy with the technical vocabulary of computing and 
information security. In any real-world incident scenario, the primary 
issue for the information manager is simply to make the unauthorized 
activity stop. This necessitates asking what policy has been enacted 
to aid systems managers in achieving this. Mitigation is at the heart 
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of any incident response and has been incorporated into the policy 
directives adopted by the U.S. government in the last decade, but less 
is known of the response process.
Responding to cyber incidents is a dynamic activity as they vary 
tremendously in impact and scope. For example, some incidents can 
be seen immediately, such as when systems are knocked offline, but for 
others this may not be the case, as breaches can continue for periods 
of great length without discovery. For the IT manager, whether a sys-
tems administrator, division head, or chief information officer (CIO), 
the issue of how to respond should cover a number of questions:
• Is the incident ongoing or has activity ceased?
• Have the culpable parties and technologies been located?
• Should notice of the incident, as currently understood, be 
passed to higher authority?
• Should vendors of affected technologies or those providing 
other services be contacted?
• Is it necessary to report the incident to law enforcement?
• Does the incident indicate a wider pattern of activity?
Although this list of considerations is by no means exhaustive, it 
represents the sort of thinking embodied in the organizational triage 
that is and will continue to be required in responding to incidents 
in which digital resources are compromised. Mitigation of incidents 
increasingly involves elements beyond technology. This provides an 
important insight for incident response: prevention is often painfully 
simple in hindsight. For example, according to the 2010 Data Breach 
Investigations Report from Verizon, an American telecommunica-
tions firm, 85% of confirmed data breaches were not deemed highly 
difficult and 96% of them could have been avoided through simple or 
intermediate controls.
Civilian Response Policies
Early manifestation of government’s desire to secure digital 
resources can be traced to research by organizations such as SRI 
International and MITRE by Bell and LaPadula (1973) on behalf 
of the Department of Defense on computer security, which eventu-
ally grew into policy through publication of the Trusted Computer 
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Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), which dates to 1983. These 
works largely focused on how to protect information resources 
through system design. This remains a point of emphasis for com-
puter security, as policy guidance still largely covers prevention of 
incidents rather than a response to them.
At a time when former generals and top-level government officials, 
such as William Lynn (2010), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
warn of potentially massive disruptions to critical infrastructures, 
such as power and water provision, the U.S. government appears 
woefully behind in securing its own computer systems as well as 
those it depends upon, which are held by other public and private 
stakeholders. But arguments that federal systems are either hope-
lessly vulnerable or amply protected are both flawed. With a mid-
dle ground somewhere between those poles as our starting point, 
reevaluating strategy of response to improve incident management is 
required. This is largely because existing policy has not been linked 
to any improvement in either vulnerability mitigation or enhanced 
incident response capabilities. The information security strategy 
for the classified systems of the military and intelligence services 
will largely take place out of public view and is not considered in 
the purview of this chapter. Thus, high-level policy consideration is 
largely directed at the Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA) of 2002 that dictates security policy for unclassified 
information systems.
The Policy Umbrella: The Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA)
In 2002, FISMA instituted government-wide directions for federal 
agencies to secure their information systems. It mandated that agen-
cies would send reports to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) and then receive feedback regarding performance. The pro-
cess, grossly simplified, involves (1) creating an inventory of sys-
tems, (2) categorizing information on the systems and determining 
its importance, (3) conducting risk assessment, (4) creating a security 
plan, (5) certifying and accrediting systems, and (6) engaging in con-
tinuous monitoring of systems. With FISMA, OMB, in theory, could 
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deny an agency funding if it failed to take adequate measures to secure 
its computer systems.
But FISMA did not solve the government’s information security 
problems. To an outside observer, such as security specialist Wm. 
Arthur Conklin (2008), it seems that much or even most federal 
activity on the security of information systems emphasizes prepared-
ness and an understanding of systems operations rather than proper 
incident response. FISMA put the task of implementing the law’s 
provisions upon the agencies themselves, with OMB standing as a 
reviewer of reporting. A recurring question of those responsible for 
information systems security in government agencies was what bear-
ing the paperwork process of FISMA, primarily the ongoing need to 
certify and accredit systems as secure, had on the actual information 
security posture of those systems.
To a computer engineer or systems administrator focusing on the 
security of systems, the idea that an annual review or multiyear certi-
fication would say much of anything about systems security is incom-
prehensible as threats continuously evolve. A properly certified system 
may become vulnerable at any time. Accreditation does not provide 
a guarantee of trouble-free operation but rather offers a basic level of 
certainty that the system is operating in a manner that security prac-
titioners would find acceptable.
Despite this, federal agencies’ systems security offices and the 
firms they contract to produce the reporting to comply with the law 
expend considerable effort in filling out certification and accredita-
tion (C&A) reporting templates as a part of the FISMA process. 
In 2010, there has been increased push back on how to meet the 
FISMA mandate. In May, NASA’s deputy CIO for IT security, Jerry 
Davis, argued in an agency-wide memorandum that the fiscal year 
2010 FISMA instructions from OMB were, “clear regarding a shift 
away from cumbersome and expensive C&A paperwork processes, 
in favor of a value-driven, risk-based approach to systems security” 
(p. 1). What is unclear, however, is exactly how such an approach 
to cybersecurity would be undertaken. There may be a consensus 
that the certification and accreditation machine that FISMA has 
become is undesirable or even perhaps counterproductive, but the 
alternatives are unknown.
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Managing Incidents: Guidance from Government
Moving beneath the umbrella that FISMA represents, the U.S. gov-
ernment has also produced significant guidance on how to prepare for 
information security incidents. The National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce 
is tasked with translating the vision encapsulated within FISMA 
into binding standards called the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) and recommendations (Special Publications). In 
a role defined by the OMB’s Circular A-130, NIST standards and 
guidance produced by its Computer Security Division are applied to 
all federal information systems transmitting unclassified information 
(see Table 10.1). There are currently 14 NIST FIPS, largely providing 
guidance regarding cryptography. Much longer is the list of Special 
Publications, more than 120 including appendices and revisions.
FIPS requirements are mandatory, whereas the Special Publications 
are more granular guidelines providing practical “how-to” advice on 
computer security. A handful of the NIST guidance publications 
cover remedies regarding malware or forensics, but only one, Special 
Publication 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, 
tackles the issue of how an agency should respond to a major computer 
Table 10.1  Assignment of Information Security Responsibilities under Circular A-130
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY
Department of Commerce Develop and issue standards guidance
Provide computer security awareness
Offer security planning guidance
Coordinate agency incident response
Evaluate new information technologies
Department of Defense Provide technical advice and assistance
Evaluate vulnerabilities and emerging technologies
Department of Justice Provide guidance on legal remedies
Coordinate with law enforcement on incidents
Pursue legal action in the wake of security incidents
General Services Administration Provide guidance on security in information technology (IT) 
acquisition
Facilitate contracting for security products
Provide security services to federal agencies
Office of Personnel Management Update and maintain training for awareness and practice
Source:  U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-130.
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security event. What SP 800-61 covers in detail are the general forms 
of incident that take place: (1) denial of service, (2) malicious code, (3) 
unauthorized access, (4) inappropriate usage, and (5) multiple com-
ponents, acknowledging that lines between incident forms may be 
blurred. These distinctions, while still largely valid, must evolve with 
the increased sophistication of attacks that target specific resources 
or actors by multiple mechanisms. SP 800-61 also offers a four-step 
cycle for incident response: (1) preparation; (2) detection and analy-
sis; (3) containment, eradication, and recovery; and (4) postincident 
activity. These steps provide the structure for the current civilian U.S. 
federal government workflow of incident response as discussed below.
Step 1: Preparation
The first step involves the drafting of policy and identifying resources 
for incident response. Preparation typically means maintaining sys-
tems with no vulnerabilities, or at least as few as possible. In regard 
to response after a threat has exploited a vulnerability to produce 
an incident, this is the component of guidance that suggests the 
formation of an incident or emergency response team. Also involved 
in this component are mechanisms to escalate response to an inci-
dent as necessary. Everything that might be needed to overcome an 
incident, from human capital to replacement hardware, is covered 
by this phase of incident response. The emphasis in preparation is 
in building the foundation for a rapidly scalable activity involving 
staff who may not hold intimate knowledge of affected systems. 
Technical documentation of network information, data formats, 
system policies, and expected operational baselines are vital in inci-
dent response.
Step 2: Detection and Analysis
Analyzing systems operations to detect incidents emphasizes the 
capacity to identify departure from the norm in system function. This 
can be fairly simple to detect, as in the case of a denial of service attack 
in which many users as well as the system manager(s) observe dys-
function, or quite hard, as when an authorized user spirits away data 
or a camouflaged Trojan awaits instructions to perform its function. 
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Baselines for system function are pivotal in detection. Rules should 
be established for system function, and when those rules are violated, 
alarms should sound. As such, this component of incident response 
has been a heavily technical effort. Networks are guarded by intru-
sion detection systems, hosted by antivirus software, and so on. The 
problem is that new incidents are occurring rapidly and the code base 
on which organizational information systems function needs to con-
stantly evolve.
Step 3: Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
The third step encompasses the often ugly business of repairing dam-
aged systems and returning them to trouble-free operation. It is both 
a science and an art. Evidence is typically collected and determining 
the source of the attack is desirous but not always possible. There can 
be conflicting needs in closing the door on a vulnerability. Improving 
the chances of successful prosecution may necessitate collection of 
additional evidence; however, system operators and other stakehold-
ers may want only for the vulnerability to be mitigated and a return 
to normal operation.
Step 4: Postincident Activity
Finally, in the postincident phase, emphasis is placed on learning les-
sons of what occurred and incorporating those into future IT man-
agement decisions. This may include determining the costs incurred 
and assessing the level of harm to the organization and its systems. 
Of course, some incidents are easier to put a price tag on than others. 
An hour of downtime on a revenue-generating website has a different 
cost than the leak of sensitive or classified reports. This variation goes 
largely unconsidered in NIST guidance today.
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
Also mentioned in SP 800-61 is the role of the U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), a group within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). US-CERT is a coordi-
nating body for cybersecurity incident response and awareness for the 
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U.S. federal government. It publishes known vulnerabilities and is 
designated to aid agencies in their response to security incidents; how-
ever, its products appear somewhat comparable to other vulnerability 
reporting from industry, and it is unclear to what degree US-CERT 
renders assistance beyond the boundaries of DHS. Reporting of 
activity from US-CERT is thin. The December 2010 activity report 
is typical of US-CERT’s public communications. It documents soft-
ware security vulnerabilities and widely known e-mail phishing scams 
but provides no hint of what major response activities it might have 
engaged in during the period in which WikiLeaks and Stuxnet were 
front-page news.
But rendering assistance in major incidents is what US-CERT is 
supposed to do. According to federal law, when a computer security 
incident is discovered by a federal civilian agency, commonly referred 
to as a dot-gov entity in federal IT circles, it must be reported to 
US-CERT. This fulfills a FISMA (2011) requirement for federal 
agencies on “notifying and consulting with the Federal information 
security incident center,” in the event of a security incident, and stands 
as the point of exchange when an incident migrates from an agency 
issue to an item to be addressed by an interagency process. This is 
where federal guidance becomes more complicated, as is evinced 
within national-level plans to cope with major cyber incidents.
Constructing National Policy for Cyber Incident Response
The development of national cyber incident response policy occurring 
in the civilian agencies of the federal government is largely handled by 
DHS. In December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7 (2011) tasked the department with responsibilities to “maintain 
an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyber-
space.” DHS responded with the publication of its December 2004 
National Response Plan (NRP), which superseded response planning 
prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
during the Clinton Administration. The 2004 NRP (Bush, 2004) 
included a component addressing response to a major cyber attack, 
the Cyber Incident Annex. In 2008, the NRP was superseded by the 
newly enacted National Response Framework; however, as of early 
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2011 a successor document to the Cyber Incident Annex has yet to 
be released.
The 2004 Cyber Incident Annex is a highly compact piece of policy 
guidance for the federal government. It catalogues the agencies to 
be involved in cyber incident response, identifies policy authorities, 
and provides a concept of operations for government regarding a non-
military cyber incident. As unclassified, public guidance for the com-
munity of responders to a cyber incident, it provides only the barest 
of instructions regarding which offices in government to contact and 
when to do so in case of an emergency. Two issues raised in the 2004 
Annex remain problematic. First is the limited size of pooled expertise 
on cyber incident response and the capacity for responders to meet a 
crisis. The second has to do with coordination with the private sector. 
As the Annex’s authors (Bush, 2004, p. CYB-5) opined, “Cyberspace 
is largely owned and operated by the private sector; therefore, the 
authority of the Federal Government to exert control over activities in 
cyberspace is limited.” In the Obama Administration’s revisiting of a 
response plan, these items remain the two most complicated.
Currently Planned Efforts
As of early 2011, the Obama Administration’s National Cyber 
Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) remains a draft. The plan repre-
sents an attempt to build upon the White House’s 2009 Cyberspace 
Policy Review, spearheaded by Melissa Hathaway, which recom-
mended preparation of a “cybersecurity incident response plan.” Part 
of a near-term action plan, the NCIRP was prepared by the DHS to 
serve as a more concrete set of guidance for the United States to work 
from in the event of a major cyber incident affecting the information 
systems of the government. NCIRP differentiates between various 
levels of risk and response with a set of shelves, the National Cyber 
Risk Alert Levels (NCRAL) (Table 10.2).
Designed to steer resources and activate communications channels 
in response to a major cyber event, NCIRP is linked to the updated 
iteration of the NRP, now dubbed the National Response Framework 
(NRF) (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Overseen by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the NRF is a self-
described guide to an all-hazard response by the nation and provides 
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guidance on how the different layers of government, from federal to 
local, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the pri-
vate sector should respond to disaster events.
Largely predicated to serve as the blueprint for an enormous cyber 
event that has yet to take place, the self-declared purpose of NCIRP is 
to provide a comprehensive “strategic framework for operational roles, 
responsibilities, and actions to prepare for, respond to, and begin to 
coordinate recovery from a cyber incident” (p. 1). NCIRP is important 
as it is a national plan, not merely one to cover the agencies of the U.S. 
federal government. Specifically, NCIRP’s framework covers all levels 
of government, from international to local, as well as purveyors and 
users of IT in the private sector. The document covers four compo-
nents: (1) a national concept of operations, (2) the organization of the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, (3) 
Table 10.2  National Cyber Risk Alert Levels
LEVEL LABEL DESCRIPTION OF RISK LEVEL OF RESPONSE
1 Severe Highly disruptive levels of 
consequences are 
occurring or imminent
Response functions are overwhelmed, and 
top-level national executive authorities 
and engagements are essential; exercise 
of mutual aid agreements and federal/
nonfederal assistance is essential
2 Substantial Observed or imminent 
degradation of critical 
functions with a 
moderate to significant 
level of consequences, 
possibly coupled with 
indicators of higher 
levels of consequences 
impending
Surged posture becomes indefinitely 
necessary, rather than only temporarily; 
the Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary is engaged, and appropriate 
designation of authorities and activation 
of federal capabilities such as the Cyber 
Unified Coordination Group (UCG) take 
place; other similar nonfederal incident 
response mechanisms are engaged
3 Elevated Early indications of, or 
the potential for but no 
indicators of, moderate 
to severe levels of 
consequences
Upward shift in precautionary measures 
occurs; responding entities are capable 
of managing incidents/events within the 
parameters of normal, or slightly 
enhanced, operational posture
4 Guarded Baseline of risk 
acceptance
Baseline operations, regular information 
sharing, exercise of processes and 
procedures, reporting and mitigation 
strategy continue without undue 
disruption or resource allocation
Source:  National Cyber Incident Response Plan, Interim Version (NCIRP), Department of Homeland 
Security, September 2010, p. 3.
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an outline of the incident response cycle, and (4) the roles and respon-
sibilities that cut across federal agencies and other stakeholders in the 
national cybersecurity enterprise. Each component will be reviewed 
in turn.
Concept of Operations
According to NCIRP (2010), successful response to a cyber incident 
depends on effective communication and “requires close coordina-
tion across traditional boundaries and requires the development of a 
robust common operational picture as a foundational element” (p. 3). 
There is a concern for incident response in regard to communication 
of information from classified resources inside government and pro-
prietary information held by industry. What the NCIRP will depend 
upon is a capacity for centralized coordination and decentralized 
execution. Through its National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC), DHS will serve as a hub for response 
but will need to marshal resources from the Executive Office of the 
President; Departments of Defense, Justice and State; other Sector 
Specific Agencies (i.e., Department of Energy for electricity issues); 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector; and 
NGOs. In practice this likely means that personnel (analysts, engi-
neers, forensics experts, and others) will be seconded to the NCCIC 
to cope with a crisis. There may, however, be an issue with such a 
strategy if many of the stakeholders are also responding to the same 
crisis.
With the number of participants large in an NCIRP response, the 
federal government is placed in a position where it should accept that 
there will be an enormous capacity for leadership discretion in the 
improvisation of those charged with managing it. Further, accord-
ing to NCIRP, “The authorities and capabilities of each entity often 
must change in size, scope and complexity as situations evolve.” In the 
concept of operations, DHS is identified in two capacities, as a sup-
ported organization, a role in which it would serve as the lead civilian 
agency for incident response, and as a supporting organization. In 
regard to the latter, in a major incident response, lead agency author-
ity may shift to the DoD, but until then, DHS’s coordinating bodies 
would hold the role of shaping incident response. Finally, NCIRP 
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acknowledges that, “As incidents become more complex, incorporat-
ing cyber and physical effects, more agencies and organizations may 
need to become involved” (p. 10).
The Response Center
At the heart of any cyber incident response is the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. Designed to 
tackle both day-to-day activities as well as manage more significant 
incident responses, the NCCIC will be the nerve center of civilian 
response to major cybersecurity incidents. An amalgamation of the 
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), National 
Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), and the 
National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC), the NCCIC also includes 
input from DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis office and, “private sector 
partners,” according to a 2009 press release from DHS. Ostensibly 
what this input adds up to is large quantities of information regard-
ing security incidents and potential options for response. In mandate, 
NCCIC is to produce guidance for consumers across government and 
provide information publicly to those concerned with cyber incident 
response. This translates to the provision of guidance on security 
vulnerabilities similar to that provided by industry players such as 
Symantec and McAfee.
Among the issues of concern for the NCCIC is the capacity to 
scale up to meet the demand of coordinating the diverse set of actors 
involved in incident response. Just as the Pentagon grappled with all 
manner of interservice communications and organizational issues as it 
pushed the military toward a concept of “jointness” in its operations, so 
too will there be a need to cover these problems among the set of stake-
holders, both public and private, that will be charged with responding 
to a major cyber event. What DHS will need to consider is how it will 
create a shared information picture with the command centers of other 
organizations. For instance, how can the NCCIC develop the capacity 
to see the situation in network operations centers such as Verizon’s in 
Virginia or AT&T’s in New Jersey when such  a need arises? Codifying 
such relationships will not be easy, but will be necessary so that bonds 
of trust between U.S. government officials and professionals in the 
telecom sector will exist when something goes wrong.
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The Response Cycle
One item given great consideration in the period between pub-
lication of the 2004 Cyber Incident Annex and the drafting of 
NCIRP is demarcating the phases of incident response. In NCIRP, 
the response cycle is broken down into five phases: (1) prevent and 
protect (i.e., ordinary day-to-day monitoring and operations), (2) 
detect, (3) analyze, (4) respond, and (5) resolve. The first two com-
ponents of the cycle will fall upon the distributed constellation of 
system owners who may call upon the NCCIC for assistance, but 
it is the analysis and response portions that will need the greatest 
degree of attention from DHS and other government stakeholders 
as the United States moves forward in developing its civilian cyber-
security operations.
In the analysis phase, responders are to identify the incident in 
its National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) system, which is 
employed to assess the impact of any cyber incident (see Table 10.2). 
Guidance on responses to be undertaken in responding to and resolv-
ing the incident would be based on this four-tiered system. Although 
the NCCIC will be able to call upon many sources of data regard-
ing threats and vulnerabilities, it would be useful for it to develop 
strong capabilities in locating expertise and technical talent that can 
reinforce government efforts in determining the nature of cyber inci-
dents and understanding their impact. Only by having preexisting 
relationships with the builders of hardware and software, as well as 
those experienced in mitigating vulnerability with respect to systems 
of high importance will the analysis portion of the NCIRP’s response 
cycle have the opportunity to meet problems with any chance of suc-
cess. In the analytical phase, the DHS will need brainpower on tap, 
and lots of it.
Once the analytical work begins leading to hypotheses regard-
ing remedies, the other great challenge of cyber incident response, 
mentioned in the 2004 Cyber Incident Annex, emerges, the 
organization, management, and coordination of surge capacity to 
mount the response. There is language regarding what parts of an 
incident action plan to employ in NCIRP, but the extent of reach 




Finally, NCIRP (2010, p. 27) specifies some universal roles and respon-
sibilities regarding preparedness, incident response, and recovery. “All 
organizations are responsible…for preparedness activities,” accord-
ing to NCRIP, including engagement with NCCIC, maintenance 
of response plans, development of incident assignments, preposition-
ing of resources, training of incident responders, conduct of response 
exercises, and institution of evaluation mechanisms. Mandating such 
activity is an issue not yet decided by the U.S. Congress.
Ways Forward
Crises are crises because they are largely unexpected or do not con-
form to advanced planning. As a society, we are increasingly cog-
nizant of problems produced by data breaches and the increasingly 
realized potential of attacks launched against real pieces of infrastruc-
ture controlled by computers. Cyber warfare, which to most seemed 
like science fiction not long ago, now appears real. Reports of the 
Stuxnet worm’s impact on uranium enrichment activities by Iran and 
the releases of sensitive information by WikiLeaks are indicators that 
cyber incident response policy is needed.
A key challenge in the analytical phase, however, is sharing infor-
mation, both within government and beyond. Pooling together 
resources to mount an effective response to a national-level incident 
will most likely involve questioning assumptions on how government 
and industry work together. For instance, most of the DHS incident 
responders hold U.S. government security clearances but few in the 
private sector do. In fact, many of those charged with running and 
securing the networks of the largest U.S. corporations may not even 
be residents of the United States.
Furthermore, the universal roles and responsibilities speci-
fied in NCIRP speak for a common situational awareness across 
government and the private sector, but it is unclear this can be 
mandated. While debate in Congress has often degenerated to dis-
agreement regarding an Internet “kill switch,” we are left to won-
der how the country will marshal its resources, from the analytical 
talent found in universities, government labs, and industry to the 
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legions of systems engineers that will be needed to clean up the 
mess that may be a major cyber incident. We have no concept of 
what civil defense, indeed civil security, means in cyberspace. This 
must change, and soon.
Then there is the fissure between civil security and military action. 
The Department of Defense, which has indicated tremendous interest 
in the topic of cybersecurity and cyber warfare, has yet to release an 
unclassified doctrine of either offensive or defensive cyber operations. 
But the United States needs a strong cyber warfare doctrine, accord-
ing to a former NSA director as reported in Defense Systems (Jackson, 
2010), an industry publication, which would be incredibly useful as it 
usually sets clear rules of conduct and behavior in an organizational 
setting. Well-crafted, cogent, and adaptive doctrine may allow those 
on the receiving end of cyber attacks to have a clear idea of who and 
where to call when a particular piece of evidence is found or type of 
attack is underway.
But there is the lingering question of when to call in the Pentagon. 
It will certainly hold significant resources for incident response, but 
we need to determine the point at which we want the U.S. Cyber 
Command to collaborate actively with the private sector, such as major 
Wall Street banks like Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, or the Bank 
of America. Even though it would be useful to improve information 
sharing on an ongoing basis regarding incident response between the 
private and public sectors, this blurs the civil-military lines that will 
likely prompt strong reactions from corporate and national security 
lawyers alike, but is necessary nonetheless.
Collaboration on information security matters between govern-
ment, industry, and academia largely currently rests with work-
ing groups constituted under the auspices of the Departments of 
Homeland Security and Defense, as well as the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology. These working groups, while helpful in 
developing relationships and providing venues for discussion are only 
a piece of the puzzle of developing the capacity to build government/
nongovernment response communities. A better answer may be to 
constitute regional cybersecurity information clearinghouses in which 
government is an active participant and does not hold participants 
at arm’s length with onerous national security information control 
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regimes. The idea is to have practitioners together to share ideas and 
expertise both physically and virtually in advance of a major event.
Developing the planning for and actually responding to the cyber 
incidents that grow in number and impact with each passing month 
will be the best path to being more effective responders. It is incum-
bent upon those charged with responding to these incidents to take 
good notes and share them widely.
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Introduction
Organizations around the world are increasingly using information 
technology (IT) and the Internet to offer better service to their con-
stituents. IT is now considered a critical asset, and most organiza-
tions have implemented some form of security protection in response 
to cyber threats. In order to manage this risk properly, particular 
attention is paid to information security (IS) management, such as 
raising the awareness of employees, improving the skills of IT staff, 
introducing Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs), or 
applying security equipment, such as firewalls, intrusion-detection 
systems (IDSs), or intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) to ensure net-
work security. All these preventive measures increase the informa-
tion security budget; however, the real question is whether money is 
being spent on the necessary preventive measures and equipment, and 
whether they are really effective in protecting organizations’ IT assets.
In fact, a lot of security threats are hidden in an organization due to 
user errors, the ineffectiveness of IS systems, or unknown external mali-
cious acts. In order to lower these risks, many organizations have intro-
duced ISMS based on the ISO/IEC 27001 standard, established in 2005 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). This standard pro-
vides specifications for bringing information security under management 
control and allows organizations to implement security control measures 
according to the standard’s defined security policy and operational pro-
cedures, which can then be audited and certified accordingly.
In many cases, organizations would assume that they are able 
to identify and solve information security problems by introduc-
ing ISMS. But ISMS has two major problems. First, only security 
issues within its scope are audited, which means that auditors simply 
examine whether a policy is implemented or not; however, security 
issues outside of the scope are not considered. Second, ISMS results 
provided by auditors only provide nonconformances, not quantifi-
able data. Management maestro Peter Drucker once said that “what 
cannot be measured cannot be managed.” If an organization wants 
to take risk control measures to reduce information security risk, it 
has to properly quantify information security risk and minimize the 
preventable risk, and the cost of loss. This is why the ISO is currently 
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developing ISO 27004, Metrics and Measurement of Information 
Security Management, as announced on December 7, 2009.
To improve the problems of ISMS, the Institute for Information 
Industry (III), a nongovernmental organization that supports the 
development and applications of the information industry as well 
as the information society in Taiwan, set up the Information and 
Communication Security Technology Service Center (ICST), a task-
force. The mission for ICST is to assist Research, Development, and 
Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of Executive Yuan (the Taiwanese 
Cabinet), to provide an early security warning in advance, and to 
recover systems after the forensic and other technical services. In this 
chapter, ICST introduces the Cybersecurity Health Check (CHC) 
framework to measure the performance of an organization’s informa-
tion security protection with a set of quantifiable metrics.
Because of the current lack of systematic measurement of IS per-
formance, CHC builds on two business strategies: the theoretical per-
spectives of Strategy Map and Balanced Scorecard (BSC). This helps 
to improve security through internal and external protective mecha-
nisms and on-site measurement. The CHC framework can assist 
organizations to identify their potential security threats and adopt 
needed protection solutions in advance. This will allow organizations 
to strengthen their security levels and lower the cost of loss.
Theoretical Basis of Cybersecurity Health Check (CHC)
The CHC framework measures the performance of an organiza-
tion’s information security protection with a set of quantifiable met-
rics. These metrics are created based on the management theories of 
Strategy Map and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as follows.
Strategy Map
Strategy Map is a strategic planning tool proposed by Professors Robert 
S. Kaplan and David P. Norton (1996, 2006) of Harvard University in 
1990. It includes two components: “Strategy” and “Map.” Strategy is 
the action plan for specific objectives, and Map is the graphical repre-
sentation of the strategy. That is, “Strategy Map” can be described as 
“an action plan road map to achieve a specific value proposition.” On 
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the other hand, Strategy Map should clearly explain the causal and 
logical relationship of various strategies.
When applied to information security, the concept of Strategy 
Map is to emphasize the integrated resources of IS management and 
protection deployment. We assume the strategic goal of cybersecurity 
is to “find potential ISMS problems” and “lower cybersecurity risks” 
in an organization. In order to achieve this strategic goal, we have to 
find the road map and causal relationship of management and tech-
nology first, and then produce the Strategy Map of cybersecurity, as 
shown in Figure 11.1.
According to the casual relationship and theory of Strategy Map 
in Figure 11.1, four perspectives are used to reduce the risk of infor-
mation security incidents, each of which will be discussed in turn: 
Security Awareness and Training, ISMS Establishment, Defense-in-
Depth Implementation, and Protection Requisitions.
Security Awareness and Training/Education People are the most critical 
factor in cybersecurity protection, but also the weakest link in the sys-
tem. If an organization wants to achieve the strategic goal of reducing 
security risks, it should provide IT users with training. In doing so, 
end-users will recognize the importance of security protection to their 
jobs and be willing to follow the policies and regulations accordingly. 
Strategy Goals: Find Potential ISMS
Problems and Lower Cybersecurity Risks
Strategy1: Enforce IS Protection
























Strategy2: Build Sound IS Management
Figure 11.1  Cybersecurity Strategy Map.
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Another critical factor is whether staff members responsible for cyber-
security within the organization have enough awareness and technical 
competency to protect the organization from external attacks. If the 
IT staff members do not have the fundamental knowledge or exper-
tise, the organization could be paralyzed when encountering security 
threats and make the situation worse. Last, the delegation and sup-
port of top management is also a key factor in determining the success 
of an action plan. After completing the fundamental training of its 
personnel, an organization can enact an information security policy 
and management system to ensure the safety of its information equip-
ment and data.
Information Security Management System (ISMS) Establish ment 
Considering resource limitations, an organization may base its IS man-
agement policies and procedures on ISMS to protect its IT assets. When 
developing ISMS, an organization has to make sure that the policy and 
control measures are implemented. If there are no security policies, 
employees have nothing to follow. If the organization has established 
security policies but does not implement them correctly and effec-
tively, then ISMS will become a mere formality. It is recommended 
that the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, and Act) model proposed by W. 
Edwards Deming could be used to examine effectiveness of ISMS at an 
organization.
Defense-in-Depth Implementation Once ISMS is in place, the deploy-
ment of protection equipment is needed to meet the organization’s 
requirement in IS management criteria and control measures. The 
organization should focus on risk assessment. In addition, it should 
also keep track of the implementation of the equipment to prevent 
against internal or external information threats.
Protection Requisitions After tackling the above three perspectives, 
it does not mean an organization can just sit back and relax due to 
the rapid development of security attacks. In addition to well-known 
security issues, organizations should actively guard against unknown 
threats through security drills, incident reporting and response 
mechanisms, and so on. Organizations should continue to monitor 
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all ISMS measures and maintain solutions for the latest information 
security information, and take necessary preventive measures.
Balanced Scorecard (BSC)
Balanced scorecard (BSC) is a business strategic management tool, 
also developed by Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2006). The concept of 
BSC focuses on finding the balance between the short-term and long-
term goals, financial and nonfinancial measurements, lagging and 
leading indicators, as well as internal and external performances.
BSC can be regarded as a quantifiable indicator for organizations 
to review their performance on various fronts. Traditionally, a BSC 
system reviews the performance from four perspectives: financial, 
customer, internal, and learning and growth. Managers can deter-
mine different perspectives and performance measurement metrics 
based on different targets and strategies and match them with orga-
nizational strategy and vision to help each department to reach their 
objectives. BSC enables an organization to achieve its goal or mission 
by aligning action and vision; therefore, it can also be regarded as a 
performance measurement system that describes, communicates, and 
executes strategies.
BSC is also used to convert organizational vision and strategy into 
objectives and measurements. It is intended not only to develop mea-
sureable items, but to achieve the goals of management and execution 
in a “balanced” way. Therefore, this study designed a cybersecurity 
BSC (as shown in Figure 11.2) by referencing the IS protection expe-
rience. It tried to identify the vulnerabilities that exist between the 
ISMS strategy and IS protective operations by the indicators from 
different IS perspectives. It also tried to identify the performance 
from the key performance indicators (KPIs) and driving factors.
Definitions of Items
CHC often uses perspectives, critical activities, KPIs, and driving 
factors to describe the whole framework and also uses them to deduce 
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Perspectives: Perspectives refers to the different dimensions of IS 
protection in organizations. Once the performance differences 
in various perspectives are too large, it means the organization 
is in the situation of uneven distribution of security resources. 
At this time, the organization needs to review the allocation 
of security resources in order to avoid too much emphasis on 
one perspective and cause security problems in another.
In CHC, there are four perspectives: protection requisitions, 
defense-in-depth implementation, ISMS establishment, 
and security awareness and education/training.
Critical Activities: Critical activities are possible causes of perspec-
tives and are the important factors affecting each perspective. 
They are often used to view the performance of organizational 
security operations. When these operations are not imple-
mented properly, the organization’s critical activities will be 
in a lower class. If not detected, or to deal with these criti-
cal activities, the organization may face potential information 
security vulnerabilities and problems.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) are significant indicators of cause in each critical activ-
ity. The KPIs defined in CHC have to be effective, efficient, 
and matched with the strategic goals. The indicators also have 
to be consistent with the principles of SMART, a way of set-
ting targets or evaluating objectives, as follows:
(1) Specific: the measurement items and results have to be 
specific to ensure consistent interpretation and the feasi-
bility of measurement.
(2) Measureable: the performance indicators will be used for 
comparison purpose on a yearly basis for the organiza-
tion; therefore, the results need to be measurable so that 
the organizations would know what and how to improve.
(3) Attainable: the consideration of the complexity of busi-
ness activities, labor and financial cost concerns, and 
time efficiency. The performance indicators should aim 
at a higher but attainable performance standard.
(4) Relevant: the performance indicators should be deter-
mined according to the proper categories and imple-
mentation data.
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(5) Time-bound: measurement of the performance indica-
tor should be time-bound so that people responsible for 
CHC would know when it can be achieved. The criteria 
can also be referred to as “timeliness.”
Driving Factors: Driving factors are the executed “result” of pres-
ent protection measures in organizations. It is the detailed 
contents of KPIs, reflecting the status of the most basic of 
all perspectives. The current performances of driving factors 
affect the scope and impact of potential security problems. 
Organizations can recognize the recent protective measures 
implementation through driving factors and locate security 
protection measures to improve the needed driving factors. 
This way, possible security incidents can be avoided.
Hierarchical Structure of Measurement Metrics
The metrics of CHC can be divided into six levels: overview, perspec-
tives, critical activity, KPI, driving factor, and raw data. Each level 
will affect the performance of the follow-up indicators, as illustrated 
in Figure 11.3.
The CHC framework uses statistical analysis methods, such as 
the Likert scale, a measurement methodology created by Rensis 
Likert, which is mainly applied in the fields of social science and 
psychology. According to different research purposes, the Likert 
scale can be divided into five or seven different scales, of which 













Figure 11.3  Measurement Metrics Hierarchy.
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data analysis, questionnaires can also be used to acquire scale val-
ues based on different responses and survey subjects to review each 
perspective in the IS field. The Likert Scale is also used for the 
data conversion into 11 levels in CHC to normalize the evaluation 
results, as shown in Figure 11.4. Without the process of normaliza-
tion, the values of each indicator would vary too much to be evalu-
ated in a consistent format.
All analysis processes in the CHC framework are designed accord-
ing to a hierarchy. In the first place, we select a group of driving 
factors from the raw data by using correlation analysis, principal com-
ponent analysis, factor analysis, and so forth. Then we conduct various 
cross-analyses to come up with the result, which are the KPIs in our 
Security Alert
Response Interval (R)
Incident Handling and Response (Critical Activity) = Security Alert Response (KPI)







































Figure 11.4  Key performance indicator (KPI) normalization.
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framework. Layer by layer, we delve further into detail to find the 
critical activities and perspectives.
The values of average and standard deviation are calculated by the 
principle of normal distribution as the benchmark for measurement. 
If the measurement result is higher than the benchmark value, we 
may consider the IS protection performance in that specific area above 
average. Equally, if the measurement result is lower than the bench-
mark, it means that the organization’s IS protection performance 
is below average and therefore needs to be reviewed and improved. 
In the CHC framework, qualitative and quantitative analyses are 
adopted to probe possible impacts and effects.
Detailed Infrastructure in CHC
As mentioned earlier, the four perspectives in Strategy Map are used 
to help organizations learn the status quo of IS protection, evaluate 
the protection performance, and identify possible security threats 
and vulnerabilities to make amendments and lower the probability 
of security incidents. In this section, we return to each perspective of 
Strategy Map and describe its detailed structure, including the char-
acterization of driving factors, KPIs, and critical activities.
Security Awareness and Education Perspective
Figure 11.5 illustrates security awareness and training. This perspec-
tive includes three critical activities: “user awareness,” “IS-related 
worker competency,” and “executive support.” Under the CHC frame-
work, personal interviews and awareness surveys will be carried out 
on general users, security personnel, and chief information security 
officer (CISO) to see whether internal staff has basic security aware-
ness, or the capability to deploy protection equipment for the orga-
nization. The perspective can also verify whether the internal staff of 
an organization is familiar with information security policy, manage-
ment process, and operational procedures to evaluate the performance 
of an IS management system.
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ISMS Establishment Perspective
As shown in Figure 11.6, the scope of this perspective goes beyond 
the certification of ISO/IEC 27001 as it inspects every security man-
agement policy, process, and procedure based on the security issues 
identified. The purpose of CHC is not to help the organization to 
achieve a security certification, but to help the organization identify 
the vulnerabilities of IS systems in order to take preventive mea-
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Figure 11.5  Security awareness and education structure.
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information systems are included in the scope of ISMS certification, 
it is essential to know how an organization would respond to security 
incidents that are outside of the scope of information security man-
agement certification.
The implementation of this perspective focuses on the issues of 
access control; IS acquisition, development, and maintenance; IS inci-
dent management; and communication and operations management. 
It is intended to ensure proper implementation of ISMS and the effec-
tiveness of IS protection measures.
Defense-in-Depth Implementation Perspective
As shown in Figure 11.7, this perspective includes three critical activ-
ities: end-user computer protection, server protection, and network 
perimeter protection. It is implemented by conducting a host exami-
nation on user’s computers and servers. End-user computer and server 
protection examination KPIs include the coverage and update of anti-
virus software, security level of user password configuration, potential 
risk of computer configuration, and whether malicious programs have 
existed in user’s computer and server. KPIs of network border secu-
rity include whether the firewall can filter or block malicious packets. 
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Figure 11.7  Defense-in-depth implementation structure.
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Protection Requisitions Perspective
This perspective (shown in Figure 11.8) includes two critical activities: 
exposed attack surface and advance incident handling and response. It 
is implemented by evaluating the organization’s website service security, 
external-service host vulnerability scanning, awareness of social engineer-
ing e-mail, and the organization’s reporting/response on IS incidents. It 
is intended to evaluate whether an organization has sufficient protection 
and response capability when encountering security threats and identify 
the blind spots and vulnerabilities to minimize security incidents.
The CHC Execution Process
When an organization wants to identify its security level, the CHC exe-
cution process includes four phases, as follows: Preparative Operation 
of Health Check, IS Protection Deployment Testing, IS Management 
System Implementation Review, and CHC Analysis and Report.
Phase 1: Preparative Operation of Health Check
The first phase provides CHC questionnaires to the responsible 
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Figure 11.8  Protection requisitions structure.
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existing ISMS, protection deployment, and the scope of CHC for 
the reference of service scope definition and sampling. In addition, 
the responsible personnel should organize the implementation of 
CHC with the schedule and the necessary items, so CHC opera-
tors can perform the check operations smoothly. The output of this 
phase is an execution plan, including the basic information survey 
and execution schedule.
Phase 2: Information Security (IS) Protection Deployment Testing
CHC operators will conduct technical measurement and testing with 
automated tools in the second phase. These tools collect information, 
such as configuration, update status, antivirus status and password 
strength, and so forth, from a PC or server, in order to examine the 
end-user computer protection, server protection, and network perim-
eter protection. Other information on PCs or servers that cannot be 
gathered automatically by tools, such as malware protection, network 
architecture design, will be examined manually on-site by CHC 
operators. In addition, end-users and IT department staff will be ran-
domly selected to fill out questionnaires designed to recognize their 
security awareness and education.
Moreover, two critical activities, “Exposed attack surface” and 
“Advance incident handling and response” are performed remotely. 
To examine the organization’s exposed attack surface, CHC opera-
tors will do a penetration test on the organization’s website and send 
out social engineering e-mails to employees to see the open and click 
rates. To check the organization’s incident handling and response, 
CHC operators select security alert response and incident handling 
records from ICST database to count the amount of alerts, report 
time, and response time.
The output of this phase is the necessary raw data for three per-
spectives, Security Awareness and Education, Defense-in-Depth 
Implementation, and Protection Requisitions.
Phase 3: IS Management System Implementation Review
In the third phase, CHC operators will interview the ISMS manag-
ers or IT staffs based on the indicators identified in the perspectives 
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of Protection Requisitions, Defense-in Depth Implementation, and 
Security Awareness and Training. The result can help CHC operators 
understand whether the organization has established the relevant or 
appropriate control measures, and determine whether an appropriate 
implementation of ISMS is in place based on the technical test results. 
By reviewing the organization’s ISMS implementation, such as access 
control, security incident management, and communication manage-
ment, CHC operators can identify deficiencies in an organization and 
make recommendations for improvement and preventive measures. 
Thus, the output of this phase are the recommendations for the ISMS 
Establishment perspective.
Phase 4: CHC Analysis and Report
In order to determine the protection performance and identify poten-
tial vulnerabilities, all the collected raw data will be normalized and 
calculated by the hierarchical structure, described earlier. The calcu-
lated results are then presented in a radar chart, as exemplified by 
Figure 11.9 that shows an example of a CHC analysis. As we can see 
most of the KPI scores are relatively high, which means the organiza-
tion’s security protection are above average. However, we also observe 
three KPI scores are relatively poor: end-user awareness, e-mail social 
engineering drill, and malware protection. We may conclude that in 
this case, the end-users may open social engineering e-mails designed 
by hackers because of a lack of security awareness, resulting in users’ 
computers being infected by malicious software. Therefore, we would 
recommend to the organization that it should enhance end-users’ 
security awareness education and training, thereby reducing potential 
security threats.
According to the calculated results, we will generate the CHC 
Summary Report. This report describes the relevance between each 
item in the radar chart and shows organizations’ security performance 
and the most vulnerable point in the current security environment. 
This provides organizational CISOs with the reference they need to 
improve protection deployment. All the CHC data are stored in a 
database as a reference to see whether the organization has made cor-
rections and improved over time.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the CHC framework that is based on 
the business concepts of Strategy Map and BSC. The framework 
helps to improve organizational security protection through internal 
and external protective mechanisms and on-site measurement. With 
CHC, organizations can identify their potential security threats and 
adopt protection solutions in advance, which in turn can strengthen 
their security level and lower costs.
ICST is currently using this framework in more than 10 gov-
ernment authorities in Taiwan. Results thus far show that in gen-
eral, government agencies achieve a higher level of security in the 
Security Awareness and Education and ISMS Establishment per-
spectives due to efforts in promoting ISO/IEC 27001. Meanwhile, 
agencies perform less well in the Defense-in-Depth Implementation 
and Protection Requisitions perspectives. This shows that govern-
ment agencies do not appropriately implement their defined ISMS. 
Specifically, we observed potential threats in three critical activities, 
“End-user Computer protection,” “Server protection,” and “Exposed 
attack surface.” The most fundamental reason comes from the mal-
ware protection and web security KPIs. Therefore, we would recom-
mend for these government agencies to strengthen the effectiveness 
































Figure 11.9  A radar chart example of Cybersecurity Health Check (CHC).
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security, and regular vulnerability scanning or penetration testing. 
With CHC, we can find the information security of government agen-
cies in the vulnerabilities and make recommendations for improve-
ment to make the decision makers, such as CISOs, understand how 
information security budgets must be used effectively.
The CHC framework was designed for public sector agencies in 
Taiwan but can be applied broadly, to government agencies around 
the world or to private sector entities. Anyone who wants to exam-
ine security with this framework can define his or her own ranking 
values, derive the most vulnerable part of the environment with the 
defined driving factors, KPIs, Critical Activities, and Perspective 
based on Strategy Map and BSC, and make the most efficient use 
of budget.
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Introduction
Around the time that Prince Henry the Navigator’s (Beazley, 1894) 
ocean fleet ignited the Age of Exploration from the harbors of 
Portugal, a famous medieval map was crafted on a copper sphere, 
marking off Terra Incognita, the unexplored territories beyond the edge 
of the then-known world. The map, now known as the Lenox Globe, 
featured an inscription of a famous Latin caution, which translates as, 
“Here be the Dragons.” The statement cloaked the unknown—both 
temporal and geographic—in the mantle of evil.
Aided by new technologies in ship design and navigation, explor-
ers of the day braved the oceans and unveiled the unknown. Rather 
than finding dragons, they discovered a new world. Over the next 200 
years, tens of thousands of people left their native lands as explor-
ers, conquerors, and colonists with a wide range of motives, including 
fame, fortune, and freedom.
It was during this period that the Maritime Domain concept 
emerged. Those ships and technologies that permitted world travel also 
became channels for transferring wealth, stimulating commercial trade, 
and transporting raw materials and precious commodities between 
countries. To protect this flow of goods, naval fleets added warships 
to control increasingly vital sea lanes. Nations that embraced this new 
domain, such as England and Spain, came to rule the oceans and, as a 
consequence, became the world’s leading military, economic, and cul-
tural powers. The imprints of these global empires remain visible today.
To many, cyberspace appears as vast and uncharted as the oceans in 
the 15th century. Government, private industry, and civil society all 
increasingly worry about the dangers manifest in this new unknown, 
what the intelligence community often refers to as the “gray world.” A 
host of bad actors—rogue states, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates, 
and hackers—use the murky shadows of a seemingly boundless cyber-
space to continually probe for weaknesses. These are the modern-day 
dragons, real or imagined.




Today we are entering the era of the Cyber Domain, which bears 
remarkable similarities to its Maritime predecessor. Both create greater 
linkages and interdependencies, between continents in the historical 
instance and computer networks in the other, which produce greater 
potential rewards while also incurring new risks. Both domains rep-
resent a medium through which something of value—whether gold 
flowing back to the Spanish Crown or global financial information 
moving at the speed of light—passes from one point to another. Those 
seeking to control the domain face similar pressures, such as govern-
ing a vast expanse, enforcing norms of behavior, protecting vulnerable 
points through which value flows (whether in the form of commercial 
goods or bits and bytes), and dealing with rogue elements eager to 
exploit vulnerabilities. Even in the modern age, lawlessness and piracy 
remain Maritime challenges, as witnessed by continuing attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden on commercial shipping by Somali pirates.
Another similarity is transformative power. Like the Maritime 
Domain, the Cyber Domain is fundamentally changing the world 
around us. It is a marketplace of ideas, innovation, and competition. 
But it is also a black market and an emerging battlefield. It is a place 
where ideas flow openly, ideas are developed in collaboration regard-
less of physical space, ideas are stolen, and ideas are censored. The 
domain also involves an incredible diversity of vested actors: national 
governments, private industry, the academic and research communi-
ties, national and international governing and standards bodies, and 
individuals. As the Cyber Domain evolves, all of them have much at 
stake, much to gain, and much at risk.
For these reasons, collaboration among actors is essential to reap 
the benefits of, and to minimize the risks inherent in, the Cyber 
Domain. For nearly 20 years, Congressional hearings, commission 
reports, think-tank and consulting studies, government assessments, 
and research findings on security in cyberspace have pointed to a con-
sistent conclusion: given the role of the private sector as a predominant 
owner and operator of cyber infrastructure, the formation of public–private 
partnerships to bridge critical gaps to counter cyber threats and mitigate 
risks, is essential. Yet, after nearly two decades of building these part-
nerships significant hurdles remain. As a 2010 General Accountability 
Office (GAO-10-628, p. 23) report noted, “While both private and 
public stakeholders report finding value in the partnership, the degree 
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to which expectations are being met varies.” The report also states 
that, “Without improvements in meeting private and public stake-
holder expectations, the partnership will remain less than optimal, 
and there is a risk that owners and operators of critical infrastructure 
will not have the appropriate information and mechanisms to thwart 
sophisticated cyber attacks that could have catastrophic effects on our 
nation’s cyber-reliant critical infrastructure.”
It is time for leaders of governments, corporations, and civil society 
organizations to move beyond the narrow public–private partnership 
model of today to a more fulsome collaboration framework that inte-
grates and includes the public sector at all levels of government, the 
private sector beyond Fortune 500 corporations, and—importantly—
civil society. To date, the United States has focused its cyber atten-
tions on national exposure to an external threat. Without question, 
this is important. But governments, corporations, and civil society 
should move beyond an examination of threats to identify, define, 
and coalesce around their overlapping vital interests.* By viewing 
their collective interests in the Cyber Domain more broadly, these 
three sectors can focus on initiatives that will improve our national 
security posture, enhance our prosperity and economic competitive-
ness, strengthen law enforcement, ensure the free flow of ideas, and 
improve the quality of life for all.
The first part of this chapter describes the root challenges associ-
ated with building public–private partnerships, outlines the contours 
of the emerging Cyber Domain, and discusses the idea of overlapping 
vital interests. The second part identifies five key areas where lead-
ers in the public sector, private sector, and civil society can initiate 
action to strengthen collaboration in cyberspace. The hope is these 
leadership strategies will inspire leaders to pursue new opportunities 
in cyberspace with the same vision, guile, and spirit as our 15th cen-
tury predecessor Prince Henry the Navigator and his contemporaries 
demonstrated in conquering Terra Incognita.
* Overlapping vital interests are present when all three sectors share a compelling rea-
son or need to address an issue of mutual concern and importance. Gerencser, Mark, 
Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, Megacommunities: 
How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global 
Challenges Together (St. Martin’s Press, New York: 2008). 
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Challenges in Building a Public–Private Partnership around Cyber
Innovations in IT, coupled with globalization, transformed business 
models. In search of commercial efficiencies, companies automated 
their critical business functions and used the Internet to enhance their 
productivity, diversify their service offerings, reach customers glob-
ally, and rapidly prototype new products amid the drive to be the first 
to market. With global connectivity, the real-time exchange of infor-
mation allowed multinational corporations to become 24-hour-per-
day operations. However, these same technologies exposed the private 
sector to new risks. The drive for efficiency resulted in a more open, 
interconnected system that offered adversaries an avenue for exploit-
ing computer networks. Events like the highly publicized electronic 
crimes of Vladimir Levin in 1995 raised awareness to the emerging 
hacker threat. From St. Petersburg, Russia, collaborating with mem-
bers of Russian organized crime, Levin accessed CitiBank’s com-
puterized cash-management system and transferred more than $12 
million to various banks worldwide, according to an Electronic Threat 
Intrusion Report from the U.S. government. CitiBank reported the 
intrusions to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Levin was eventu-
ally apprehended, and all but $400,000 was recovered. However, the 
case illustrated how the global information infrastructure provided a 
means by which individuals or groups could access and exploit com-
puter networks from anywhere in the world.
In 1997, President Clinton charged the Commission for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection with conducting an in-depth study to assess 
the scope and nature of infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities. In 
its final report, after 17 months of research, it identified seven cat-
egories of cyber threats: information warriors, national intelligence 
services, cyber terrorists, economic espionage, criminal organizations, 
institutional and recreational hackers, and insiders. It also codified 
an observation made by many experts—the importance of engaging 
the private sector in a partnership framework to mount an effective 
strategy to counter these threats. The recommendation to strengthen 
public–private partnerships has been present in nearly every study 
on cybersecurity since. For example, a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) report in December 2008 advised the 
incoming 44th President of the United States as follows: “The US 
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government should rebuild the public-private partnership on cyberse-
curity to focus on key infrastructures and coordinated preventive and 
responsive activities.” As part of its findings, it cited the need to create 
new bodies and organizations to help better coordinate cyber response 
actions across the public and private sectors.
However, the CSIS report also highlighted some critical gaps that 
had not been closed in the more than 20 years since cybersecurity issues 
first appeared on the scene in the late 1980s. Specifically, it stated:
Despite broad recognition of the need for partnership, government and 
the private sector have taken separate paths. Indeed, the so-called part-
nership as it now exists is marked by serious shortcomings. This includes 
the lack of agreements on roles and responsibilities, an obsession with 
information sharing for its own sake, and the creation of new public-
private groups each time a problem arises without any effort to elimi-
nate redundancy. As a result, the United States has a perplexing array of 
advisory groups with overlapping interests, inadequate resources, vary-
ing capabilities, and a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities. 
(pp. 43–44)
Upon taking office, the Barack Obama Administration initiated 
a comprehensive review of America’s cyber policies. The resulting 
White House Cyberspace Policy Review, published in June 2009, 
echoed the findings of the CSIS report:
Public-private partnerships have fostered information sharing and 
served as a foundation for U.S. critical infrastructure protection and 
cybersecurity policy for over a decade. …These groups perform valuable 
work, but the diffusion of effort has left some participants frustrated 
with unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities, uneven capabili-
ties across various groups and a proliferation of plans and recommenda-
tions. As a result, government and private sector personnel, time, and 
resources are spread across a host of bodies engaged in sometimes dupli-
cative or inconsistent efforts. (p. 18)
The issues outlined in the CSIS and White House reviews do, in 
many respects, describe the symptoms of a flawed public–private part-
nership model for cybersecurity. The CSIS report, for example, speaks 
eloquently to shortcomings in existing structures (such as duplica-
tive advisory bodies, overlapping roles and responsibilities); but at the 
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same time, it argues for replacing these flawed groups, organizations, 
and committees with new ones, albeit with more structure.
The typical public–private partnership model may not be the 
solution—it may be the problem. Five factors help explain why this 
approach has yet to work in the United States.
A History of Mistrust
In devising the American form of republican government, the Founding 
Fathers recognized the importance of dynamic tension between actors. 
By creating checks and balances between institutions, U.S. democ-
racy would prove more resistant to Monarchial impulses. This explains 
why they argued for the Constitutional divisions of power between 
three branches of government; between two legislative bodies; across 
federal, state, and local authorities; between Church and State; and 
others. Historically, one of the most significant tensions in American 
society has been that between private industry and government, the 
counterbalancing forces that drive the U.S. economy.
Over the past 20 years, for many private sector owners and opera-
tors of critical infrastructures, working with the U.S. government has 
meant careful consideration of the pros and cons of sharing sensitive 
information with federal agencies. In many instances, this meant shar-
ing information with agencies that also serve as their regulators. The 
fear was that sharing this information might expose industry to oner-
ous regulations or unfunded mandates to meet government security 
requirements that might exceed realistic business needs. Exacerbating 
matters, the Internet and cyberspace remain today largely unregu-
lated, and few in industry want a stronger government role in its con-
tinued development and evolution.
Realizing the tensions this creates, the U.S. government has 
consistently declared it would limit the use of regulation to address 
cybersecurity issues. For example, Presidential Decision Directive 63, 
signed by President Clinton on May 22, 1998, stated: “In seeking to 
meet our national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our criti-
cal infrastructure … we should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid 
outcomes that increase government regulation or expand unfunded 
government mandates to the private sector.” In lieu of regulation, the 
emphasis shifted to creating incentives that would encourage private 
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sector protective measures. As a consequence, the existing framework 
includes a wide range of self-regulatory mechanisms that have, in 
some instances, served to improve the nation’s cybersecurity posture.
But this is hardly fertile ground for the formation of a true partner-
ship. Industry has adopted the self-regulatory position largely to stave 
off the potential of regulation or unfunded mandates. The private-
sector argument is that industry knows these systems better than the 
government and, absent documented evidence of emerging threats, 
should assess their own levels of risk. The U.S. government mean-
while has effectively removed the threat of regulation, its primary 
“stick.” While incentives and other carrots may compel industry to 
take action, the lack of a “stick” has created years of awkward maneu-
vering between industry and government.
Recognizing these deficiencies, Congress has assumed a more 
active role. More than a dozen cybersecurity bills were introduced 
in 2010, several of which worked to strengthen government’s regula-
tory or policy role vis-à-vis critical infrastructure owners and opera-
tors. For example, the proposed Rockefeller-Snowe bill was popularly 
characterized as providing the government with an Internet “kill 
switch.” During periods of extreme duress owing to a cyber attack 
of some form, the proposed policy would give the U.S. government 
the authority to direct U.S. critical infrastructure owners and opera-
tors to shut down their portions of the network for a period of time. 
But such proposals, real or hyperbole, have reignited fears by industry 
that government may take actions that could cause dire business con-
sequences. Although the concept of a “kill switch” might viscerally 
satisfy those seeking to assume greater control of cyberspace during 
emergencies, such proposals raise legitimate questions for multina-
tional corporations, who depend heavily on an Internet-enabled global 
supply chain and global customer base, on the effects on their bottom 
lines. The proposal also raised questions in the technical community, 
where there are significant doubts regarding the ability of any single 
entity to effectively shut down the vast, distributed Internet.
Lack of a Clear Business Case for Industry
Protecting computer networks against external intrusions is an 
expensive and complex proposition. This is especially true when one 
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considers that commercial enterprises have benefited enormously from 
expanding their networks. For example, by using advanced inventory 
techniques combined with real-time access to sales information, Wal-
Mart has automated its supply chain to gain business efficiencies. 
Based on buying habits, it is able to rapidly customize its stock to meet 
demand in certain regions of the country or even in individual stores. 
Inventory costs are lower, customer preferences are satisfied, and dis-
tribution networks become more efficient. These types of efficiencies 
make for easy return-on-investment justifications.
Compare that business case with one for improved cybersecurity. 
First, the majority of cyber intrusions will be largely viewed as nui-
sances, small dollar incidents where the costs of responding can be 
easily absorbed or can be passed to customers via higher fees or prices. 
Only when these smaller events grow to a significant number and 
dramatically impact the bottom line will companies begin to take 
more significant protective measures. Second, it can be difficult for an 
organization to assess the benefits of protecting a network: how does 
an organization quantify a return on investment for a network intru-
sion that never happened because a firewall or intrusion detection sys-
tem prevented it from occurring? Paradoxically, the more effective the 
security measures, the higher the likelihood that future funding will 
be reduced as the aggregate number of intrusions and attacks appears 
to shrink. Third, the cost of IT protection is often concentrated within 
an organization (e.g., Chief Information Officer or Chief Information 
Security Officer), while the benefits of protecting networks are highly 
distributed. In other words, the entire organization benefits from good 
cybersecurity, but the bulk of the spending occurs in one cost center 
(and is often considered overhead), making cyber spending vulnerable 
to reductions. Fourth, the revelation of a cyber intrusion is not some-
thing a commercial enterprise wants. There is a business incentive for 
companies to refrain from sharing information about an attack out of 
a concern that publicity about such an event can cause bad public rela-
tions or create a negative impact on shareholder value.
One Size Does Not Fit All
Discussions of public–private partnerships to protect cyber assets 
often assume that one framework, model, or approach will work 
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universally across government and assorted industries. But an exami-
nation of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors* reveals a broad array 
of interests and assets that are unlikely to fit a universal approach. 
For example, some infrastructure assets predominantly operate at the 
“speed of light,” transmitting electrons across wires or the airwaves 
as the primary good or service (e.g., the Internet, ATM networks, 
electric power distribution). Meanwhile, “ just-in-time” infrastructure 
assets (e.g., multimodal transportation, pipelines, and medical sup-
plies) allow products, goods, and services to be moved via a global 
supply chain. But there are also immovable infrastructure assets, 
such as nuclear power plants, dams, hospitals, and chemical plants. 
Complicating matters, these disparate types of infrastructure assets:
• Typically coexist within one infrastructure sector. For exam-
ple, Federal Express has a world-class information tracking 
system that links to a global supply chain of trucks and air-
planes that connect with physical offices around the world 
and has at its core a critical transportation node in Memphis, 
Tennessee. The types of cyber and other threats each of these 
assets are subject to can vary greatly and require diverse 
solutions.
• Interact with similar assets in other infrastructures, creating 
interdependencies. Automated banking systems operate over 
a communications infrastructure that is highly dependent on 
electric power. Failure of those electric power systems requires 
the use of backup systems (diesel generators) that draw their 
supply from a global network, and that fuel must be refined at 
distinct locations before it is ready for use.
• Are regulated to various degrees and compete differently. Some 
sectors (e.g., oil and gas, air transportation) are dominated by 
a few large companies that operate in a highly regulated envi-
ronment. Others are characterized by a large number of players 
* The 18 critical infrastructures are agriculture and food; banking and finance; chemi-
cal; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; dams; defense 
industrial base; emergency services; energy; government facilities; health care and 
public health; information technology; national monuments and icons; nuclear reac-
tors, materials and waste; postal and shipping; transportation systems; and water. 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm (accessed October 25, 
2010).
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who operate in a less regulated environment (e.g., financial ser-
vices). In some infrastructure sectors, collaboration is natural, 
whereas others operate in a more competitive environment.
• Operate with different perspectives on risk. Some sectors 
were developed with a “safety” or “risk” culture. Financial 
institutions and health care organizations, for example, are 
more attuned to the risks of fraud than others. Companies 
managing nuclear and chemical plants, meanwhile, are highly 
concerned with physical security of their facilities. Each infra-
structure sector and subsector has developed its own cultural 
norms around risk and, hence, cybersecurity.
These distinctions are mirrored in the public sector. Some agencies 
operate in the world of national security threats and view cybersecu-
rity from that perspective. Other agencies are predominantly regula-
tors who are skeptical of industry actions and motives. Some come 
from a traditional law enforcement perspective or homeland security 
perspective, while others are in the civil part of the U.S. government 
and do not consider national or homeland security issues a top prior-
ity. For these reasons, one might question whether efforts to build 
“one-size-fits-all” partnership structures will ever work. Today’s part-
nership models attempt to homogenize risks (threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences) rather than accepting and embracing the inherent 
diversity of the actors responsible for cybersecurity.
Tensions between Hierarchical Reporting and Horizontal Sharing
As illustrated by the CSIS report, a common assumption in the 1990s, 
one that perpetuates today, is the idea that only through hierarchical 
reporting can one create full awareness of a cyber incident. The theory 
holds that the growing cyber threat requires a “cyber mega-center” 
in which all data about network intrusions feeds into an operational 
center where coordinated actions can be taken to minimize the risk 
and damage. In response, industry developed a host of Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) in the late 1990s that were 
intended to collect information and, if the proper protections were put 
into place, feed that data to other entities. Conceptually, these centers 
were designed like a “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention”-like 
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model where State health departments and other organizations report 
on disease outbreaks. However, each industry adopted its own unique 
approach to building an ISAC, and in recent years there have been 
numerous attempts by the Department of Homeland Security to 
standardize best practices across each of these centers.
But this approach may not be desirable. Protecting the United 
States against a cyber attack is an enormously complex activity 
involving literally millions of nodes and petabytes of data. Collecting 
that information (even if industry were inclined to provide it), sort-
ing through it, and finding anomalies would represent an enormous 
data management problem. It would also be time consuming, both in 
terms of lag times for data to be reported and in terms of efforts to 
analyze it to reveal useful patterns or trends. And once a cyber mega-
center had determined an attack was underway, it would still need to 
possess the decision velocity and legal authority to ensure that federal 
agencies, state and local entities, private companies, foreign govern-
ments, universities, research institutions, and individual citizens take 
the steps necessary to protect themselves.
Concerns about the H1N1 virus illustrate that even established 
entities find such activities to be a challenge. During the flu season 
of 2009 to 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) were the focal point for receiving information and making 
key public health determinations. The reporting process was time-
consuming, involving submissions in many differing formats, and the 
agency faced a host of issues related to states’ rights and cooperation 
with all parties. As a result, there was a lag time between when it 
needed information, received it, and disseminated it to the public. 
Compare that to the horizontal analysis performed by Google, which 
used a variety of open sources, individual entries, and algorithmic 
connections to quickly identify where influenza cases were happen-
ing—and also where new cases might be expected, based on predict-
ing certain behaviors. By creating such a horizontal sharing structure 
(“flattening” the data requirements), Google was able to quickly 
discern patterns and inform the public in a timely fashion. While 
hardly a panacea (Google’s algorithms do not possess the CDC’s 
epidemiological expertise to coordinate national response to poten-
tial outbreaks), this instance demonstrates the challenges associated 
with sharing information in real time. This experience also parallels 
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comments made in the aftermath of the 2007 distributed denial of 
service attacks on Estonia. In its after-action reports, the Estonian 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) noted that only when 
the hierarchical government reporting requirements and assistance 
had faded was the CERT able to bring the cyber community together 
horizontally to collectively combat the attacks.
Failures to Effectively and Fully Engage Civil Society
To ignore the role of civil society, both individuals and organizations, 
in the emerging Cyber Domain is to fail to understand the history 
of the Internet and the World Wide Web. The civil part of society 
has always played an important role in the evolution of cyberspace. 
Bob Kahn (ARPANET) worked with Vint Cerf, then at Stanford 
University, to create the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) that enabled networks to join together through a 
standard interface. Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina from the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois 
at Champaign–Urbana developed Mosaic, the first widely used web 
browser that allowed the web to “go global” owing to its reliability and 
relative ease of use. In 1995, Stewart Brand and Larry Brilliant founded 
The WELL, a company that many consider to be the first social net-
working site. The next year, Google began as a research project by 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, prospective PhD candidates at Stanford 
University.
The magic of the Internet’s evolution, development, and innovation 
can be traced to the values of collaboration and openness. Cyberspace 
is a man-made domain, its development driven by collaborations that 
spanned traditional public, private, and civil society. Despite this, the 
U.S. government continues to pursue a public–private partnership 
model that effectively disenfranchises many in civil society, opt-
ing instead to focus on critical infrastructure owners and operators. 
More specifically, civil society is often a euphemistic term for the 
general public, who requires greater awareness, education, training, 
and protection from cyber risks than it currently has. This narrow 
view creates a troublesome, potentially perilous blind spot. By tilting 
discussions of the Cyber Domain to security-related issues (e.g., con-
cerns about an “electronic Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11”), a number of 
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potential partners and collaborators (1) are effectively excluded from 
the dialogue owing to the lack of security clearances or access to data, 
(2) become discouraged because the security lexicon may turn off 
those in other disciplines or fields or the discussions are dominated 
by Big Government and Corporate America, and (3) self-select not 
to participate because of perceptions that the process is not open and 
transparent or that their views are not welcome. The current approach 
also fails to recognize the importance of partnering with a number of 
institutions (national, regional, international) that see the future of 
the Internet as their core mission.
However, from a U.S. perspective, a window of opportunity may 
be emerging to expand discussions around cyberspace to encompass 
its enabling aspects. The Obama Administration has actively pro-
moted the adoption of health information technology and electronic 
health records, investment in Smart Grid technologies in the elec-
tric power industry, and broadband investments. These efforts are 
viewed as critical enablers for future U.S. competitiveness and draw 
in a much wider set of organizations and individuals than traditional 
cybersecurity discussions. These enabling aspects of cyberspace may 
ultimately play as important and influential a role—if not a central 
role—as cybersecurity in driving the future of the Cyber Domain.
Changing the Game: The Emerging Cyber Domain
The U.S. government is recognizing the emergence and importance 
of the Cyber Domain. “Although cyberspace is a man-made domain, 
it has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, 
and space,” stated Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn in 
a September/October 2010 Foreign Affairs article (pp. 101–102). As 
Lynn noted, one of the three missions of the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s new Cyber Command is to work with partners within the 
U.S. government, with foreign governments, and with private indus-
try to share threat information and address shared vulnerabilities.
But as Deputy Secretary Lynn points out, the Cyber Domain is 
more than technology. It is a multidimensional domain, and no single 
entity or group can manage its complexity. In the dynamic age of 
cyber, government is not a sufficient proxy for the public interest. We 
now live in a world where users demand direct access and control over 
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information. Government can be a useful facilitator but must use the 
domain construct to put effective partnerships within reach.
The Maritime Domain offers many parallels for governments 
today as they wrestle with new cyber challenges. At the dawn of the 
new Maritime Domain, partnerships were neglected by the Spanish 
Crown. With its “first mover” advantage, Spain staked claim to an 
enormous empire and quickly moved to plunder the new world for 
gold, silver, and other natural resources to further the wealth of the 
Crown. This monarchial, mercantile strategy was not sustainable. 
With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Spain began its long 
decline while others in Europe ascended to create more sustainable 
global empires.
For example, the British took a more holistic approach. They spon-
sored corporations—such as the Massachusetts Bay Company—to 
manage the nation’s exploration activities and the resulting resources. 
These new types of businesses funded the establishment of colonies 
and had the resources necessary to allow them to wait many years 
for a financial return. Rather than focusing only on gold and silver, 
British exploration and colonization also provided opportunities for 
disgruntled elements of civil society—often religious dissenters—to 
emigrate, undertaking the perilous journey to the New World for the 
opportunity to worship their chosen God. The British were able to 
build an empire because they understood the importance of sea lanes 
for commerce and national security. Once the Royal Navy’s control of 
the seas dissipated, so did the Empire. But this was more than 300 
years after the founding of the first British colonies in the New World.
Over the past 20 years, attempts by the U.S. government to navi-
gate the emerging Cyber Domain fall somewhere between these two 
historical analogies. It has reached out to industry with the call for 
partnerships and it has invested billions in shoring up cyber defenses 
and devising new strategies to manage national risks. It has also 
created several centers of gravity in the U.S. government (e.g., U.S. 
Cyber Command, Department of Homeland Security) to manage 
cyber incidents. But these efforts do not appear sustainable over the 
long term for two reasons. First, current efforts have largely failed to 
embrace civil society, a vital player in cyberspace that has contributed 
many of the innovations and technological advances directly respon-
sible for creating this new domain. Second, while engagement exists 
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between the public and private sectors on cybersecurity, the narrow 
scope of the perceived national problem (i.e., limiting the partnership 
to countering perceived cybersecurity threats) has restricted the abil-
ity of all three elements of society—public, private, and civil society—
to define the overlapping vital interests that will enable them to more 
effectively collaborate toward common outcomes.
Moving Beyond Partnerships to a Cyber Domain Megacommunity
Success in the new Cyber Domain will require the United States 
and other countries to navigate a problem so complex and far-
reaching in its scope that no single organization or even nation can 
adequately address it unilaterally. Specifically, it will test the abil-
ity of governments to work with a multitude of other governments, 
businesses, and civil society organizations that have overlapping 
vital interests. The need for multisector involvement is especially 
great because of how seamlessly interconnected cyber systems have 
become with military power, with the delivery of services, and as a 
sociocultural phenomenon that has infiltrated every aspect of our 
lives. The most effective way to manage this convergence of interests 
is by creating partnerships across organizations, but this must occur 
without compromising each organization’s values, mission/business 
imperatives, and legal responsibilities. This type of in-depth, long-
term alliance has been dubbed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a consul-
tancy, as a megacommunity. A megacommunity is a public sphere 
in which organizations—public, private, and civil—join together to 
address a compelling issue of mutual importance. Although organi-
zations in this megacommunity may compete in other spheres, they 
act together to address a particular problem that none can solve on 
their own.
The Core Elements of a Megacommunity
A megacommunity takes advantage of pervasive information tech-
nologies (e.g., shared servers, mobile devices, satellite phones, geo-
graphic information systems, and social media) that enable people and 
organizations to communicate easily across national and organiza-
tional boundaries, sharing information and collaborating in ways not 
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possible when the cybersecurity issue first emerged. In a megacom-
munity, five core elements are crucial to effective outcomes:
• Three-Sector Involvement: the public, private, and civil sectors 
are all engaged, involved, and invested in shared outcomes.
• Overlapping Vital Interests: all three sectors share a compelling 
reason or need (what we refer to as an “overlapping vital inter-
est”) to address an issue of mutual concern and importance.
• Alliance: all three sectors demonstrate their commitment by 
establishing an organization or organizing frameworks for 
working together toward shared goals.
• Network Structure: all three sectors participate in cross-
boundary, multidisciplinary problem-solving activities that 
produce a social network that underpins true collaboration.
• Adaptability: over time, the megacommunity becomes institu-
tionalized and capable of evolving with changing conditions.
The first two elements are preconditions for the formation of a 
megacommunity, whereas the last three are features of any initia-
tive that is deliberately created to sustain a megacommunity. By its 
very nature, a megacommunity is horizontal rather than vertical or 
hierarchical, acting more as a confederation than a single authority 
commanding resources or directing participants. In addition, a mega-
community engages people at all levels among the participating orga-
nizations. This cross-organizational design makes the emergent social 
networks more dynamic and able to adapt to changing conditions, 
such as a new threat or unexpected consequence.
The Missing Ingredients in Cyberspace: Three-Sector 
Engagement and Overlapping Vital Interests
Today’s partnership structures for cybersecurity possess many of 
these features. But if one were to use the five core megacommunity 
elements to analyze shortcomings in today’s cyber partnerships in 
the United States, two gaps are immediately clear. First, as noted 
previously, there is a lack of direct three-sector involvement. While 
some civil society groups have been engaged, the partnerships first 
launched in the 1990s and managed today by the Department of 
Homeland Security largely remain federal-centric and are almost 
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exclusively driven in the private sector by the interests of Fortune 
500 companies. This approach largely neglects important commu-
nities, such as (1) state and local governments; (2) smaller compa-
nies and subindustries that are increasingly reliant on cyber systems; 
(3) the academic and research communities; (4) groups responsible 
for creating policies and standards for the Internet and communi-
cations infrastructure, such as ICANN, the Internet Engineering 
Task Force, the International Telecommunication Union, and 
others; (5) the “white hat” community of cyber professionals that 
spans nearly all of these organizations but who will self-identify as 
members of a larger community; and (6) the more than 200 mil-
lion Internet users in the United States. Only when all these par-
ties are truly invested in a common solution will the United States 
see real progress toward protecting cyberspace and mastering the 
Cyber Domain.
Second, the failure to bring all these parties together has created 
another gap, namely the lack of clear overlapping vital interests that 
naturally draw the parties together. For 20 years, the focus of the U.S. 
government has centered on cyber risks. To counter potential threats 
and mitigate risks, the government has actively sought industry data to 
develop a better assessment of the Cyber Domain. But this approach 
is self-limiting. The Cyber Domain involves more issues than sim-
ply cybersecurity—its international dimensions that reach deep into 
industry, trade, intellectual property, security, diplomacy, policy, tech-
nology, and culture. And failure to open the aperture will result in the 
failure of public–private partnerships being a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Overlapping Vital Interests in the Cyber Domain
The Cyber Domain is inherently global. Different countries may 
adopt widely diverse strategies and may see the new domain as an 
opportunity for control rather than partnership. For example, some 
countries might choose to allow rampant software piracy to continue, 
or to turn a blind eye to widespread phishing activities or hacking 
rings, because of short-term financial benefits. This, too, is nothing 
new. In the Maritime Domain, government-sponsored “privateers” 
were common through the 17th and 18th centuries, but in reality 
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they were nothing more than pirates with official blessings from their 
respective governments.
In a handful of countries today, such as China and Iran, govern-
ment control is too strong and omnipresent on the Internet for a true 
partnership between the public and private sectors and civil society. 
In such instances a megacommunity cannot exist, because all par-
ties will be bound to the interests of the government alone. However, 
the megacommunity principles can easily be applied in open societ-
ies. The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, and the subsequent interna-
tional response, provide an example. The Baltic country is so deeply 
wired that when the apparent distributed-denial-of-service attacks 
swamped the websites of critical industries and government organiza-
tions, including the Estonian parliament, banks, and media groups, 
it crippled the country’s economy for weeks. The attacks lasted a 
month and were of such scale that the Estonian government was 
unable to respond to them on its own. It asked the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) for assistance and worked with both 
the private sector and civil society throughout its response and recov-
ery. Estonia’s CERT reached out to world-renowned Internet traf-
fic and routing experts associated with nonprofit research institutes 
and foundations; several of them traveled to Estonia to assist directly 
with the country’s defense, according to an article in Wired magazine 
(Davis, 2007), an industry publication.
It took the combined efforts of the international community, indus-
try, and civil society—the megacommunity model—to help Estonia 
weather the attacks. The attacks also prompted NATO to reexamine 
its approach to cyber defense, culminating in the establishment of 
NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD) Centre of Excellence 
(COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. As of 2010, this international effort 
includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the 
Slovak Republic, and Spain as sponsoring nations. The United States 
and Turkey have also signaled their interest to join. The center con-
ducts research and training on cyber warfare, with the goal of helping 
NATO defy and successfully counter cyber threats. By focusing on 
the desire for an open, stable, and secure Internet, all parties have 
stayed true to their own values and interests, and are able to achieve 
common objectives.
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The impact of the attacks in Estonia was significant due to the 
country’s small size and its dependence on electronic communica-
tions; many other countries would have been able to defend against 
a similar attack more easily. However, the small scope of the attack 
should not be a reason to ignore the issue. This follows a pattern seen 
in existing domains: except for a few isolated battles, early warfare on 
the sea consisted mostly of minor skirmishes. We are now in a similar 
period in the Cyber Domain and a grander, decisive cyber Trafalgar 
may come sooner than expected, causing greater economic, physical, 
and logical damage than any prior event. In the international com-
munity of open societies, cooperation will be critical to defend the 
network as well as our common principles.
And the overlapping vital interest can expand to encompass a 
number of shared ideals, principles, and goals. From a U.S. perspec-
tive, all three sectors share common goals in the Cyber Domain. For 
example, it is in everyone’s interest that the Internet remains an open 
environment where ideas are shared, innovation spurred, and com-
petition promoted. From a federal government perspective, an open, 
innovative environment in cyberspace promotes our economic and 
competitiveness objectives, allows us to achieve military objectives, 
and deliver services to citizens. For large companies, it enables global, 
24-7 operations. For small businesses, an open cyberspace provides 
direct access to a global customer base. For state and local govern-
ments, cyberspace continues to help deliver services to citizens in a 
more efficient, cost-effective manner. For civil society organizations, 
such as nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations, an open 
cyberspace provides them with a global reach and endless supply of 
contributors and volunteers around the world. As such, all three seg-
ments in our society can agree on an overlapping vital interest—that 
an open, accessible Internet is good for the country, good for business, 
and good for individual citizens. This broader perspective widens the 
discourse and can create new channels for leaders in the public sector, 
private sector, and civil society to collaborate.
Leadership Strategies for Securing Cyberspace
A critical element of the megacommunity concept is the notion of an 
“initiator,” an individual (or group of individuals) who identifies the 
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overlapping vital interests that draw the three sectors together and 
moves them to action. This chapter has pointed to many difficulties 
surrounding the creation of public–private partnerships for cyberse-
curity. In particular, the failure to engage civil society is a significant 
and systemic flaw in current partnership models. But the emergence 
of the Cyber Domain is creating new windows for all three sectors to 
engage in a broader dialogue that balances the opportunities and risks 
in cyberspace. This section will describe five key levers that leaders 
can pull as initiators for a cyber megacommunity. For each lever, we 
will describe how it might influence cyberspace and offer a specific 
example of how a leader might serve to initiate action.
Lever 1: Influencing National, Regional, and Global Policy
Cyberspace is governed by a complex, multilayered web of interna-
tional organizations, national entities, and industry and volunteer 
associations, each with its own set of authorities, agendas, and areas 
of focus.* Within the U.S. government, each agency presses ahead 
with its own plan based on its narrow writ; in the private sector, each 
corporation pushes for policies that satisfy its narrow needs. Tensions 
between the public and private sectors over the U.S. government’s 
proper role in cyber governance further complicate efforts to craft 
a comprehensive plan that ties together U.S. cyber-related activities 
and encourages stakeholders in the public, private, and civil sectors to 
work together toward common goals. This complexity is mirrored at 
the international level, where differing national, regional, and trans-
national interests shape debates about Internet policy.
Regardless of the context, effective policies in cyberspace will 
require a comprehensive framework that captures the dynamic inter-
play among its many global constituencies. However, by viewing 
cyberspace as a singular domain rather than a universally amorphous 
gray area, one can envision a more orderly development of national 
and international laws, policies, regulations, norms of behavior, and 
* The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified 19 international organiza-
tions that it regarded as the most influential in the realm of cybersecurity and gov-
ernance of cyberspace. “Cyberspace: United States Faces Challenges in Addressing 
Global Cybersecurity and Governance,” (GAO-10-606), pp. 8–9.
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doctrine—or stated differently, a common context for all actors to 
engage globally on a level playing field. This is not theoretical: the 
December 2010 discussions at the United Nations about cyberspace 
and issues of Internet governance, policy, and regulation demonstrate 
a growing appetite to create such a framework. But governments 
alone cannot govern the Internet; all three sectors must maintain 
their strong roles in Internet governance policy.
Areas of potential policy collaboration across the public sector, pri-
vate sector, and civil society may prove difficult, challenging, and even 
daunting. These include launching negotiations to harmonize elec-
tronic intrusion laws and associated extradition rules; securing inter-
national agreements to reduce cyber risks (or, as noted cyber expert 
Richard Clarke suggests, cyber arms control agreements); seeking 
common legal and policy frameworks on protecting personal privacy; 
determining appropriate levels of governmental regulation of cyber-
space in a postconvergence environment; balancing concerns about 
free speech and transparency with national security needs; enforc-
ing intellectual property rights; and preserving and protecting cyber 
assets viewed as critical industrial base components. It is important to 
note, however, that expanding the engagement of governments does 
not have to translate into more governmental control and regulation. 
Business and civil society have equally vested interests in participat-
ing in policy-making processes and carry their own weight in terms of 
how public policy is set. The key is creating a common context for those 
policy discussions to occur in a structured fashion, something sorely 
lacking today in cyberspace.
A global leader, whether from the public sphere, the private sector, 
or civil society, can help all the parties better understand and recog-
nize the legitimate issues and equities of all. As noted earlier, mistrust 
exists between industry and government around sharing incident 
information. Industry fears that sharing this information will ulti-
mately result in new regulations; from the other side, government wor-
ries that industry may expose its sources and methods for collecting 
cyber threat data. But this is only one part of a larger mistrust. Those 
in civil society may worry that governmental regulation will stifle the 
open qualities of the Internet, which they view as the “secret sauce” 
that enables it to grow exponentially and empower individuals and 
communities across the globe. They may also worry about perceived 
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corporate influence over the Internet, where companies control and 
use vast amounts of data with limited or no oversight. For their part, 
governments and industry may view parts of civil society as utopian 
or naïve on matters of national security or economic competitiveness. 
This last cleavage was all-too-evident in the WikiLeaks exposures of 
2010. In that instance, those in government and industry perceived 
parts of civil society battling against their legitimate interests, both 
in terms of releasing sensitive information and via hackivist attacks 
against corporate and government websites.
As an initiator, a global leader needs to help these parties iden-
tify where their vital interests overlap and enable them to move 
closer together. In government, a leader might choose to map the 
various jurisdictional authorities spread across the U.S. government 
to gain a better collective appreciation for agencies’ responsibili-
ties—and to devise a more integrated strategy. This is a complicated 
problem in that the legal authorities and agency roles and respon-
sibilities have struggled to keep pace with the disruptive powers of 
the Internet. But failure to grasp these seams in national laws and 
policy will result in a Cartesian Circle of bad policy making by gov-
ernments. In the commercial sector, a leader may start to work with 
his or her industry to better grapple with the “system of systems” 
challenges they collectively face when operating the Internet—to 
demonstrate that securing cyber networks is more than building 
an individual business case, but an industry resiliency issue. In civil 
society, a leader might work with international organizations to 
broaden participation in this dialogue and educate global users on 
the full range of security, economic, and sociocultural issues that 
are influencing how the Internet should be governed as a common 
global good.
Lever 2: Stimulating Technology Innovation
Conventional wisdom holds that government and the private sector are 
responsible for technology breakthroughs via large-scale research and 
development efforts. Perhaps the most pervasively cited model in the 
history of humanity for innovation is the Manhattan Project. In reality, 
however, innovations can come from all three sectors and take many 
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forms, from large-scale government and corporate laboratories to the 
Library at Alexandria to suburban garages across the United States.
Consider, for example, the role civil society helped play in Prince 
Henry’s great strides in exploration. The opening of the Maritime 
Domain could not have occurred had it not been preceded by scien-
tific progress in the 14th century, particularly the development of geo-
graphical maps and the compass. Prince Henry also benefited from 
the 15th century introduction of the caravel, an improved ship with 
triangular sails that allowed for more maneuverability against the 
prevailing wind. In the 16th century, the mariner’s astrolabe became 
widely used, giving sailors a new technology to determine latitude 
using the noon position of the sun or the meridian altitude of a known 
star. These innovations all came from individuals. As the Maritime 
Domain opened up in the 16th century, Prince Henry the Navigator’s 
court quickly grew into a technological base for exploration, accord-
ing to many historians. He funded a naval arsenal, an observatory, 
and other entities that could be seen today as research centers. As a 
result, his efforts laid the groundwork for the great explorers, such as 
Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and Magellan.
New technologies are fundamental to the exploration and develop-
ment of new domains. One strategy for public sector, private sector, 
and civil society leaders is to initiate and champion the development of 
cyber regional innovation clusters. President Obama, for example, has 
placed a significant bet on the concept of regional innovation clusters 
as a competitive differentiator for the United States. The underlying 
belief is that regional innovation clusters produce high-value, high-
paying jobs in geographic concentrations and enable greater national 
competitiveness. The United States is not alone in subscribing to the 
idea of clusters, which are prevalent across Europe and emerging in 
places such as India, China, and Brazil. Growing research supports 
the idea that cluster development is greatly enhanced through inter-
connections with other clusters. When a region attracts highly skilled 
workers, academic institutions, and associated regional cultures, other 
industries and clusters are more apt to follow. Geography is at the core 
of many cluster theories, with examples including Silicon Valley, the 
Research Triangle, Hollywood, and Bollywood.
To initiate the creation of a cyber megacommunity and to identify 
overlapping vital interests, global leaders should look at how best to 
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increase the number of, and strengthen the interconnections between, 
cyber clusters around the world—to identify emerging clusters, create 
a community of these clusters that help drive technology innovation 
and development, and ensure that all three sectors are deeply invested 
in the success of these clusters. Take the coding of software, for exam-
ple. Much of the world’s software is outsourced with individual lines 
of code and segments of lines of code being developed in different 
parts of the world. A software package developed for Microsoft could 
theoretically include lines of code developed by individuals on every 
continent in the world. In the coming years, this scenario will become 
increasingly likely.
Lever 3: Rewarding Organizational and Management Practice Improvements
Sound management practices can play an important role by creat-
ing incentives for innovation. In 1707, more than 1,400 British sail-
ors died when their fleet sank in stormy weather off the coast of the 
Isles of Scilly, far north of their intended route through the English 
Channel. It was one of the greatest maritime disasters in British his-
tory. The cause was the navigators’ inability to accurately calculate 
their position. Out of this disaster arose the Longitude Act, which 
offered monetary awards for advancements made toward a practical 
way of determining a ship’s longitudinal location. Funding for the 
program, which offered a variety of prizes based on the level of con-
tribution to the solution, was the equivalent of approximately $5 mil-
lion in today’s dollars. After decades of research and development by 
numerous parties, in 1765, John Harrison was awarded the main prize 
for his work on the marine chronometer.
Based on their historical track record, award programs have proven 
a highly effective means by which to encourage industry inter-
est, investment, and innovation. Successful contemporary govern-
ment awards programs include the President’s Quality Award, the 
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Improvement Award, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s ENERGYStar Program. Each 
possesses a different desired outcome and awards structure, but all 
stimulated broader industry engagement and created incentives for the 
private sector. In many instances, corporations viewed such awards as 
market and brand differentiators. Equally important, each of these 
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awards avoided the use of what industry might view as regulatory 
or compliance mandates, enabling government to work with indus-
try and civil society toward developing and implementing commonly 
accepted—and voluntary—best practices.
In the Cyber Domain, leaders can advocate for the creation of simi-
lar awards programs that improve core business processes and educate 
other leaders on how public, private, nonprofit, and other organiza-
tions can embrace cyberspace in a smart, responsible manner. Awards 
programs can assume many forms and functions and deliver differ-
ent results. Yet, at their core, the intent is the same: motivate behav-
iors without resorting to regulation or other mandates. Consider the 
awards programs identified above. Confronted with the growing 
competitiveness, quality, and productivity challenges posed by Japan 
and the other Asian Tigers in the 1980s, the Reagan Administration 
created the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Improvement Award. 
Averse to creating a U.S.-mandated industry policy, the award strived 
to take advantage of the strengths of the free market. Designed to be 
viewed by industry as prestigious, the award created a highly rigor-
ous process to determine which manufacturers displayed best prac-
tices in manufacturing quality. The goal was to “raise the ceiling”—to 
improve U.S. quality standards. The award was crucial in helping U.S. 
industry regain its competitive edge, and has lived well beyond the 
crisis it was intended to solve. Perhaps as important, it helped create 
a new professional community and academic discipline—total quality 
management—that spans the public, private, and civil society sectors.
Conversely, the EnergySTAR program created by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency serves to reward organizations 
that meet predetermined standards. The evaluation is strictly quan-
titative and requires a less complex application and qualification pro-
cess than Baldridge. But it is also more universal, with seals going to 
many companies. In many respects, the goal of this program is best 
characterized as “raising the floor”—getting as many organizations as 
possible to a minimum level of performance. Although many organi-
zations have received EnergySTAR seals, what consumers most often 
notice are those companies that have not. In the Cyber Domain, an 
award program could offer a way for government, industry, and civil 
society to work together on specific activities, stimulating interest, 
innovation, and investment into critical research areas. It could even 
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stimulate development of a more well-defined, multidisciplinary 
community of experts who would ultimately become the champions 
for emerging technologies and best practices.
Lever 4: Developing a Cyber Workforce
The U.S. government has initiated many cybersecurity training ini-
tiatives over the years, including, most notably, the National Science 
Foundation’s Federal Cyber Scholarship program. But none has made 
a significant impact in reducing the talent gap that exists between 
the number of Americans who already have the necessary cybersecu-
rity skills and the number that is needed. Jim Gosler, Sandia Fellow, 
Visiting Scientist at the National Security Agency, and the founding 
Director of the CIA’s Clandestine Information Technology Office, 
estimates that there are only about 1,000 security people in the 
United States with the specialized security skills needed to operate 
effectively in cyberspace; he puts the need at 20,000 to 30,000. This is 
a U.S.-specific problem; in the most recent round of the International 
Collegiate Programming Contest, cosponsored by IBM and the 
Association for Computing Machinery, four Chinese universities 
placed in the top 10, while there was not a single American university 
on the list.
In a 2010 report entitled “A Human Capital Crisis in Cybersecurity,” 
CSIS recommended a four-pronged approach to developing a robust 
cybersecurity workforce: (1) promote and fund the development of 
more rigorous curricula in our schools; (2) support the development 
and adoption of technically rigorous professional certifications that 
include a tough educational and monitored practical component; (3) 
use a combination of the hiring process, the acquisition process, and 
training resources to raise the level of technical competence of those 
who build, operate, and defend governmental systems; and (4) ensure 
there is a career path as with other disciplines like civil engineering or 
medicine, rewarding and retaining those with the high-level technical 
skills. But this is not enough.
In the Maritime Domain, most training took place on the job. 
However, there were incentives for debtors to volunteer for the British 
navy or merchant navy; doing so protected sailors from creditors 
because the law forbade collecting debts accrued before enlistment. 
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The modern-day equivalent of this could be a job-retraining program 
for laid-off technology workers.
Initiatives that start in the educational system are clearly neces-
sary and valuable, but without retraining programs for mature work-
ers, it will take far too long for the United States to achieve the level 
of expertise needed to be competitive in the Cyber Domain. This 
is where global leaders as initiators are critical. These global leaders 
understand the human capital demands on their organizations, their 
industries, their regions, and their professional disciplines. They often 
direct resources and investments around education, training, and 
awareness programs. But perhaps most importantly, they are depen-
dent upon having a workforce that can deliver against their mission 
(whether public service, for profit, or nonprofit)—and building a cul-
ture that attracts and retains this workforce.
Global leaders can promote greater cyber education and training. 
One innovative example, as reported by Nextgov.com (Sternstein, 
2010), an online industry source, is a public–private consortium, 
supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, that is opening a 
research institute to retrain up to 1,000 National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) contractors who are set to be laid off 
as the space shuttle program winds down. The institute supports a 
range of educational opportunities, including noncredit courses and 
academic degrees, for periods of time from 6 months to 4 years, 
depending on the skill and experience level of the workers. Only by 
using mature workers as well as seeding the educational system will 
the United States close the technology talent gap.
Booz Allen’s own corporate experience as an initiator bears this 
out. We have launched three initiatives designed to strengthen our 
own cyber workforce, which we deploy against U.S. government 
needs in the cyber arena. First, we worked closely with the University 
of Maryland (University College) to develop the first-ever master’s 
degree program in cybersecurity. This program is designed to not 
just teach cybersecurity, but to thrive in cyberspace through distance 
learning. The University of Maryland–University College is the larg-
est distance learning program in the country with more than 90,000 
students. As a firm with a national and global footprint, having 
this span was critical. Second, we launched our own internal Cyber 
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University training program. The intent was to offer a blend of internal 
and external courses that enabled us to retrain our existing workforce 
and quickly inform new employees of our best practices. To accom-
plish this, we designed multiple potential career tracks (more than 
just technically focused) and tailored programs around those tracks. 
Finally, we sponsored an extensive internship program that included 
contests and special projects, with some of those projects turning into 
actual capabilities and services the firm has subsequently delivered to 
clients.
Lever 5: Delivering Operational Excellence
Perhaps the Holy Grail in cyberspace to date has been attaining situ-
ational awareness—a real-time wide-ranging understanding of the 
constantly changing threat environment. Tracking electrons at the 
speed of light is a challenge, but situational awareness is made more 
difficult by three factors. First, the disruptive nature of Internet tech-
nologies and associated applications make for a volatile environment 
where trends are often outdated within months. Second, the lack of 
attribution in cyberspace makes attaining situational awareness nearly 
impossible. Without matching actor and intent to a series of electrons, 
a malignancy could be quickly identified as benign and vice versa. 
Third, there is little integration across the public and private sectors; 
between differing sectors in industry; between government agen-
cies; and within industry sectors. For example, companies have little 
access to classified information about cyber threats, and there is no 
single, authoritative government source for cybersecurity information. 
At the same time, the private sector shares little with government. 
Input from civil society and academia is not always widely distributed 
to industry and government entities who could benefit from it. And 
there is no overarching strategy to encourage civil society to take part 
in addressing the most pressing cyber issues.
Industry, government, and civil society have made numerous 
attempts to improve cyber information sharing, but it has never been 
attempted within the construct of a megacommunity. Past efforts have 
failed to succeed for numerous reasons, with a “lack of trust” often 
cited as a culprit. Some have urged that an enormous cyber watch 
center be built and staffed around the clock with representatives from 
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industry, government, and civil society. Only through such expensive, 
hierarchical, labor-intensive efforts, some say, can true collaboration 
exist.
However, the need for trust is something of a red herring and has 
become a distraction that threatens to undermine information-shar-
ing efforts across the domain. In an article in the American Journal of 
Sociology, Stanford University’s Dr. Mark Granovetter (1973) offers 
evidence that a strong relationship is not necessary to productive 
exchange of information. Instead, he finds that one can reach a much 
larger and better informed audience through “weak ties.” Even though 
weak ties can be perceived as alienating, in reality they facilitate rela-
tionships between small groups, allowing for small-scale interaction 
to be translated into large-scale patterns. Weak ties are indispens-
able to individuals’ integration into communities. Strong ties, while 
they account for cohesion within small groups, actually lead to overall 
fragmentation. The Cyber Domain has already seen some measure of 
success through organic operations based on weak ties. In the fight 
against Conficker, a virulent self-updating worm that has infected 
tens of millions of computers around the world since November 2008, 
cybersecurity experts reached out to one another to form a loosely 
knit group through which they shared information and built on one 
another’s discoveries. While the Conficker worm is still propagat-
ing through unpatched machines, this group allowed participating 
experts to build on one another’s discoveries and protect their systems 
accordingly.
Global leaders can expand their own networks, and encourage 
their teams to do so as well, reaching out to colleagues across the 
three sectors. This improves information sharing in both directions—
a team with a wide network of weak ties will be better positioned to 
disseminate its own research or information and will receive critical 
updates from other groups faster and more efficiently. This requires 
a bit of a change in perspective—the fear of sharing based on issues 
such as intellectual property or bad publicity often dampens any urge 
to share. But a team with a wide network is situated well to move 
forward at the cutting edge.
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Conclusion
By viewing cyberspace as a Domain as opposed to a perpetually 
uncharted ocean, we open up possibilities for improved partnering. 
What is lacking today, however, is a common policy context for the 
diverse cyber constituencies to productively engage, the lack of which 
explains why public–private partnerships have not effectively worked 
and why vital elements of civil society seem excluded from the dia-
logue. We advocate a different approach:
• Recognize that the Cyber Domain is a global opportunity. As 
with the land, sea, air, and space domains, the Cyber Domain 
will be at once a social gathering place, a mode to accumulate 
and move wealth, and potentially a military and economic 
battlefield between rivals.
• Strategies in the Cyber Domain must mirror the technologi-
cal convergence that has inspired the growth of the Internet 
and its influence. Our laws, policies, and even cultures are 
struggling to keep pace with the disruptive nature of cyber-
space. This requires a partnership that expands beyond U.S. 
government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. Only by 
launching a more holistic, inclusive process that brings all 
governments, the private sector, and civil society together can 
we hope to master the Cyber Domain.
• Engaging these parties means finding common ground in the 
form of overlapping vital interests that draw them together. 
Consider, for example, the idea of an open Internet. While 
there are certainly national security and economic consider-
ations to factor into the meaning of an open Internet, a reality 
confronts all parties: openness has been the “secret sauce” of 
the Internet, driving its technological innovation, its explosive 
growth to all regions of the globe, and its remarkable pace of 
social adoption. Efforts to limit this openness will only serve 
to kill the Golden Goose.
• Global leaders are essential as initiators, experimenters, and 
explorers. Whether helping to devise a more holistic policy 
framework, stimulating the development of global cyber inno-
vation clusters, creating national or global awards programs 
to improve management practices, investing in education 
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programs, or striving to improve our ability to understand 
what is happening in cyberspace, leaders must step forward 
and bring these three sectors together.
In most societies, an open Internet remains in the best interest of 
all. Government leaders must work with their colleagues in indus-
try and the previously marginalized civil society on their overlap-
ping vital interests. The emerging Cyber Domain presents a window 
of opportunity to change the course of history by nurturing true 
partnerships across all three sectors based on this and other yet-to-
be-defined overlapping vital interests. As with all domains before 
it, there are numerous challenges and opportunities facing leaders. 
The United States and the world are at an important maturation 
point as the Cyber Domain replaces the Terra Incognita of the early 
days of the Internet with a new order. This presents all three sectors 
with the opportunity to define their overlapping vital interests and 
build collaborative, productive, and enduring partnerships that at 
once significantly reduce global, national, and organizational cyber 
risks while also recognizing the significance of the cyberspace as a 
global good.
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iS There a concluSion 
To cyberSecuriTy?
K I M  A N D R E A S S O N
Introduction
Cybersecurity is a moving target that evolves with such speed that it is 
difficult to capture an up-to-date picture of it. New threats, or varia-
tions of old ones, emerge every day as do strategies to defend against 
them. Parts of this volume may be out of date by the time it is pub-
lished, but that is a chance worth taking if other parts can contribute 
to our understanding of the topic. Cybersecurity is a challenge at all 
levels of government: from municipalities handling online transac-
tions to federal agencies dealing with matters of national security. It is 
also a challenge that is unlikely to go away and, as such, there does not 
seem to be a conclusion to cybersecurity. Instead, it has to continu-
ously evolve to defend against emerging threats.
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The first part of this chapter highlights some practical organiza-
tional considerations when building, or improving, cybersecurity from 
a policy perspective. The second part of the chapter provides an over-
view of two broad emerging trends that are likely to increasingly affect 
the public sector and hence its cybersecurity efforts: the movement to 
mobility and cyber warfare.
Part I: Organizational Cybersecurity
To simply build virtual walls, so called firewalls, to keep out intrud-
ers is not possible. As illustrated in the physical world, in the cases 
of the Great Wall of China and the Berlin Wall, such an approach is 
not always effective. The size or strength of these walls were useless 
when people eventually found ingenious ideas to get around them, by 
flying over them, digging under them, masquerading as someone else 
to get through them, or continuously attacking them. Like its physi-
cal counterparts, the most important aspect of cybersecurity, there-
fore, is not the technical building blocks but rather human behavior. 
People are users, implicit or explicit perpetrators, and the first line of 
defense. Because human behavior is fundamental to cybersecurity, it 
also means we can all do something to improve it.
The Role of Information
There is lots of available information to help improve organizational 
cybersecurity at all levels. International organizations, such as the 
ITU, offer several guidelines and toolkits. Public sector organiza-
tions, such as the U.S. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (MS-ISAC), which describes itself as “a collaborative organi-
zation with participation from all 50 States, the District of Columbia, 
local governments, and U.S. Territories,” provide numerous aware-
ness resources, including an annual toolkit. Private sector organi-
zations, such as the IBM Center for The Business of Government, 
provide practical advice, such as their 2011 “A Best Practices Guide 
to Information Security” report. Nonprofit organizations, such as 
the U.S. National Cyber Security Alliance, provide detailed guide-
lines, such as StaySafeOnline.org, an initiative with a comprehensive 
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resource section targeting specific audience groups. Similar initiatives 
are also created all over the world.
The problem is that more work is needed to create and maintain 
comprehensive and clearly communicated cybersecurity policies that 
are followed. As trivial as this seems, according to the 2010 Data 
Breach Investigations Report from Verizon, an American telecommu-
nications firm, 85% of confirmed cyber breaches were not considered 
very difficult, and 96% of them were avoidable by simple or interme-
diate controls. Similarly, “a high percentage of security breaches occur 
because internal users are careless or fail to follow procedures” (p. 8), 
according to an annual survey of Federal Chief Information Officers 
(CIO) in the United States in March 2010, by TechAmerica, an IT 
trade association.
Significant improvements have been made since the early days of 
the Internet, but more awareness is needed. The public and private 
sectors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society 
all have a role to play in this effort. Cybersecurity is too often left 
to IT specialists with little understanding of larger organizational 
issues or policy making while senior management members do not 
understand the technical issues involved. In this effort, a major 
challenge is to translate the latest technical terms and threats into 
something senior management, employees, and society at large can 
understand. In a 2010 study that compares the views of 320 IT secu-
rity staff (employees) in various U.S. federal agencies to one of 217 
federal IT executives, the Ponemon Institute, a consultancy, found 
that employees are more likely than executives to appreciate aware-
ness and training initiatives.
Closing the gap between IT professionals and public sector execu-
tives and policy makers is fundamental to improving cybersecurity. 
As such, organizational leaders need to ask themselves what the tech-
nical risks are and how they are being met from a policy perspective in 
order to provide people with practical guidelines that can be followed, 
the governance aspect.
It is important to begin by understanding an organization’s target 
state for cybersecurity, which is the maximum amount of risk that man-
agement can live with. In this effort an organization should account 
for both known and emerging cyber threats as well as the unknown. 
This must be balanced against public sector limitations, such as the 
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tension between transparency and privacy, as well as cost optimization 
and the potential implications of breach. Once the proper balance has 
been determined, a culture of cybersecurity must be developed and 
maintained by establishing policies and clearly communicating them 
up and down, especially as technologies and risks evolve over time.
A common problem at the organizational level is that public sector 
agencies only seek to meet minimum standards or levels of security, 
often due to cost or lack of awareness. This is similar to the issue of 
corruption where many enterprises establish baseline policy and hope 
that people follow it. But there, as with cybersecurity, organizations 
must be proactive in pushing internal guidelines and raising awareness.
Organizations can also develop a stronger cyber defense by build-
ing closer relationships and collaborate with others, including the 
private sector, to share experiences, mistakes, lessons learned, and 
other information and research. The willingness to collect, analyze, 
and share information, including about cyber incidents, is crucial to 
improve security for everyone.
Trust But Verify
Every organization has a responsibility to be proactive and establish 
policies that improve trust and confidence. In this effort, an objec-
tive system of performance assessments is needed and information 
security professionals can help by identifying key performance indica-
tors (KPIs) and translating technical terms into language that can be 
understood by management and senior policy makers. Cybersecurity, 
therefore, becomes an area in which one needs to “trust but verify,” to 
borrow a phrase from former president Ronald Reagan.
But complete deterrence and prevention is hard to maintain as new 
threats constantly emerge. The second line of cybersecurity, there-
fore, is to limit the scope of an attack if it happens by protecting data 
and minimizing damage, in regard to infrastructure as well as infor-
mation. Despite large sums of cybersecurity spending and improved 
policies, attacks occur against even the best defended systems, such as 
those of technology companies like Google or military agencies.
When it comes to the more technical aspects of protection, organiza-
tions need to again ask themselves what the risks are, and how they can 
respond if their data are compromised. For example, where does the 
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data reside, who has access to this data, and how does the data enter and 
leave the organization? 
According to the TechAmerica survey, efforts to proactively moni-
tor and protect networks can have a positive effect. For example, many 
CIOs say they do not allow removable storage devices, such as USB 
drives, and also do not support local storage. Instead, they store every-
thing remotely on protected servers. Even though a cloud computing 
environment, an emerging trend, may complicate internal efforts to 
secure the transmission of data, moving information to a centrally 
managed location can also increase security as responsibility moves 
from an individual to the central provider.
But, as discussed in the next section, the ability to secure and mon-
itor computer systems, the web environment, and any devices con-
nected to network(s) is increasingly complex due to the rise of mobility.
Part II: Emerging Trends
As external and internal public sector efficiency can vastly improve 
through use of new information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), e-government is at an exciting crossroads; however, emerging 
trends can also lead to new challenges or fresh problems in old areas. 
A host of issues are often mentioned in this regard, including mobile 
devices and a mobile workforce, cloud computing, outsourcing, vir-
tualization, and Web 2.0 tools such as social networking. For exam-
ple, “CIOs say they are challenged and frustrated by the difficulty in 
establishing the right balance between security and improved access to 
information” (p. 8), according to the annual survey by TechAmerica.
According to a survey of 217 senior-level IT executives across U.S. 
federal organizations conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2009), a con-
sultancy, the leading security risks within their organization resulting 
from various trends were the rise in unstructured data (cited by 79% of 
respondents), cyber terrorism (71%), mobility (63%), and Web 2.0 (52%).
Because this volume has already discussed several broad trends, 
such as the rise in data and Web 2.0 (Gov 2.0), this chapter seeks to 
supplement rather than duplicate those efforts. As such, the next sec-
tion delves into more detail regarding the potential ramifications of 
the move to mobility, a certain short-term trend, and the inevitable 
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rise of some form of cyber warfare and cyber terrorism, which are 
likely to have profound affects on the public sector over the long term.
Mobility: From E-Government to M-Government and from Spam to Spim
At a global level, the biggest current trend is undoubtedly the move 
from stationary to mobile computing, including the ability to browse 
the web on various devices, such as smart phones and tablets. And as 
many observers, including The Economist (Lucas, 2008), have noted, 
it is an especially exciting development because countries without a 
comprehensive ICT infrastructure can leapfrog. At the end of 2010, 
there were more than five billion mobile subscriptions in the world, 
according to the ITU, including an estimated mobile penetration 
in developing countries of about 68%. By about 2014 the number 
of mobile Internet users will surpass the number of desktop users, 
according to Morgan Stanley Research estimates (2010).
A key development in mobility is the convergence of 3G net-
works with greater bandwidth and the rise of smart phones (and 
other devices) with full-fledged operating systems and browsers that 
make mobile Internet access seamless. According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japan and 
Sweden both boost 100% 3G population coverage and others are 
catching up, including emerging markets. According to the ITU, 
about one-fifth (940 million) of all mobile subscriptions have 3G ser-
vices and 143 countries were offering such services commercially in 
2010, an increase from only 95 in 2007. The rise in mobile access is 
coupled with a decrease in cost and improved efficiency and conve-
nience for all. As such, future e- and m-government development will 
rely greatly on mobile devices.
Unsurprisingly, public sector administrators around the world are 
jumping at the opportunity to add m-government to their portfolios. 
The Singapore government portal lists more than 100 services that 
can be conducted specifically over mobile phones and countries from 
South Korea to the United States are supplementing their national 
website portals with customized mobile access points.
But mobility, broadly defined, goes beyond simply the use of mobile 
devices to also mean the ability to work remotely and, in a larger soci-
etal context, the ability to be online whenever and wherever, a mobile 
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lifestyle of sorts. The private sector, for example, has largely embraced 
remote work and the public sector is following, albeit at a slower pace.
The worldwide growth in mobile devices (phones, but also tablets 
and other devices capable of connecting to the Internet wirelessly) 
offer great opportunities but simultaneously also expose organizations 
to new threats, such as insecure wireless connections and various new 
forms of data loss.
Further, a particular problem with mobile devices is that they are 
“always on,” meaning they can connect, or stay connected, to the 
Internet at all times through 3G/4G networks or WiFi connections. 
Conversely this means someone can also attack them at any time.
Any mobile device with an Internet browser is, of course, subject to 
distributed denial of service attacks and Internet Protocol (IP) reputa-
tion schemes, but there are also particular threats developed specifi-
cally for the mobile platform, such as mobile malware, phishing, spam 
(spim), and credit attacks.
Although mobile malware has been around for some time, it is 
becoming increasingly common. According to McAfee (2010), a 
security company, there was a 46% increase in mobile malware in 
2010 compared with 2009. A particular problem with malware is also 
the rise in third-party mobile apps, which can contain malicious code. 
When users download a game, for example, they do not know whether 
or not it contains malicious code, such as a trojan. A recent develop-
ment in this area is the emergence of advanced forms of mobile mal-
ware, such as Zeus MitMo, which received a lot of attention in 2010 
as this sophisticated trojan could access the banking information of 
its unsuspecting users. Similarly, there are specific phishing attempts 
targeting mobile banking, and there is now spam on instant messag-
ing for mobile phones, also known as spim.
Telecommunications providers push security updates to many 
mobile devices, but users are relatively unaware of the ongoing battle 
and the organizations they work for are often not part of the process. 
Because of the large, and growing, numbers of mobile users, many 
of whom are unprotected or unaware of the security issues that come 
with their device, this is an area of interest to cyber criminals. As 
reported in Cisco’s 2010 Annual Security Report, as security products 
for computers continue to improve another problem is that criminals 
are likely to shift their focus to mobile devices. Further, according 
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to a February 2011 report from AdaptiveMobile, an industry source, 
mobile device information is increasingly at risk due to an increase in 
the sophistication of attacks.
Although mobile users can put themselves and their data at risk, 
it is also an organizational problem as public sector agencies must 
extend its cybersecurity strategy to include mobile devices in order to 
protect the information that can be accessed through such appliances. 
Like their stationary counterparts, such organizational initiatives 
should include comprehensive and clearly communicated policies that 
are enforced in areas such as the establishment of secure transmis-
sions, implementation of security on the devices themselves, aware-
ness and training, preparedness, providing a list of approved apps, 
data loss prevention (DLP), and a central backup of data.
But the complexity of extending cybersecurity to various mobile 
devices is likely to increase as the implications of the rise of mobil-
ity for the public sector are greater than simply protecting individual 
handsets and managing back-up procedures. The move to mobility will 
ultimately mean that we are all connected all the time and, as illustrated 
by the ITU figures, increasingly so globally. From a broader perspective 
then, the public sector needs to work with network and service opera-
tors to develop a secure architecture and enable monitoring and filtering 
of traffic, as well as continuously enhancing governance policies and 
guidelines within the organization.
Cyber Warfare Is Coming to a Device Near You
Coming back to where we started the volume: Because of its benefits, 
ICTs are embraced by the public sector in the form of e-government. 
But with our increasing reliance on the Internet, fueled by global 
interconnectivity, the rise of mobility and the development of “The 
Internet of Things,” tech speak for connecting everything to the 
Internet, including everyday objects, it is only a matter of time before 
we are completely dependent on the Internet and, as such, the risks 
rise exponentially.
It does not matter if it is a device designed to browse the Internet, 
such as a computer, tablet, or mobile phone, a gadget converted into 
a browsing machine, such as InternetTV (IPTV) or a video game 
console, or an everyday object that is now being connected through 
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“The Internet of Things,” they are all susceptible to attack and in case 
of disruption, can negatively affect productivity.
As President-elect Barack Obama noted at a Summit on 
Confronting New Threats, in West Lafayette, Indiana, on July 16, 
2008, “Every American depends—directly or indirectly—on our sys-
tem of information networks. They are increasingly the backbone of 
our economy and our infrastructure; our national security and our 
personal well-being. But it’s no secret that terrorists could use our 
computer networks to deal us a crippling blow.”
Carl von Clausewitz, the German military strategist, remarked that 
“[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means” (p. 87). 
So too, has cyberspace, or the fifth domain as it is known in policy 
circles, increasingly become the platform for policy, which will eventu-
ally translate into some form of cyber warfare. Because cyberspace is 
unregulated and provides anonymity, the “fog of war,” as the unpre-
dictability of war is known, has taken a new turn.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the London-based 
think tank that is the world’s leading authority on global security, 
explained in the press statement for the 2010 Military Balance, an 
annual assessment of global military activities:
The IISS agrees with the growing consensus that future state on state 
conflict may be characterised by the use of so-called asymmetric tech-
niques. Chief among these may be the use of cyber-warfare to disable 
a country’s infrastructure, meddle with the integrity of another coun-
try’s internal military data, try to confuse its financial transactions or to 
accomplish any number of other possibly crippling aims. Despite evi-
dence of cyber attacks in recent political conflicts, there is little appre-
ciation internationally of how properly to assess cyber-conflict.
Everyone is at risk: from democracies, who generally want to 
keep information open (WikiLeaks being one obvious exception), 
to authoritarian regimes, who generally want to keep information 
under lid. According to Jim Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, 
Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), there is a delicate balance between 
the benefits of participating in the online global network and the risks 
of increasing access to information, which can create offline political 
pressures. 
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For example, while some say the cyber domain is “borderless,” as 
Lewis points out, there are borders in cyberspace too as the online 
environment is dependent on physical infrastructure, operated by 
various business entities that can support, or disrupt, the network. It 
is an important point because, as demonstrated by Egypt during the 
uprisings there, a country does have some ability to shut down parts of 
the Internet within its territory, hence the idea behind the U.S. “kill 
switch” proposal that would enable it to stop incoming traffic during 
attack. But the argument of our economic and social reliance on the 
Internet, stressed by industry executives and libertarians alike, won 
out and the idea never materialized, though it shows the potential 
importance of innovation in resilience.
In another example, as illustrated by a 2009 article in The New 
York Times, some, such as Nick McKeown, a Stanford engineer, have 
proposed another radical suggestion: to scrap the current Internet and 
build a new version. This is, of course, highly unlikely, and even if it 
happens, other negative cyber consequences could arise (or return in 
new forms). Until otherwise announced, therefore, it is likely we will 
have to adjust to cybersecurity.
Stuxnet may have been the first instance of a cyber attack with phys-
ical consequences but it certainly will not be the last. Governments 
around the world will respond by establishing cybersecurity opera-
tions and participating in international dialogue. In regard to the 
former, defensive measures have been only one side of the equation 
as many countries race to establish also offensive capabilities as illus-
trated by, among others, China and the United States. In part because 
of the proliferation of offensive capabilities, there is growing agree-
ment about the need for online rules of conduct to reduce the risk of 
cyber warfare and establish norms for when it occurs.
As reported in the Financial Times in early 2011, the foreign secre-
tary in the United Kingdom, William Hague, explained the growing 
importance for doing so by pointing to three attacks against British 
interests, including one targeting his office, which is set to host a con-
ference on the topic in 2011 “to lay the basis for a set of standards on 
how countries should act in cyberspace.”
Broad international agreement and cooperation will help in miti-
gating nonpolitical threats (typically financially motivated, such as 
cyber crime, intellectual property theft, and fraud, but also hacking 
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for fun or retribution; for example, from a disgruntled employee). It 
will be a lot harder to deal with politically motivated threats that are 
state organized or state supported (such as cyber warfare, cyber terror-
ism, espionage, and hacktivism, the hacking for political purposes).
In this battle, Gopai Khanna, a senior fellow at the Technology 
Leadership Institute (TLI) at the University of Minnesota and for-
merly the CIO for the State of Minnesota, argues that open societies 
are in a better position to tackle the challenge than their adversaries 
because of their innovation. For example, many countries and organi-
zations are setting up cyber competitions that seek to raise awareness 
around cybersecurity and stimulate interest in such careers, the U.S. 
Cyber Challenge being one example. But if organizations are to meet 
the politically motivated cybersecrutiy challenge, more innovation at 
all levels is still needed.
The Conclusion That Wasn’t
It is likely that cyber attacks will increase in both frequency and scope. 
Malware, insider jobs, botnets, and DDoS attacks will rise in sophis-
tication and continue to cause financial and reputational damage in 
addition to being disruptive.
But the real threat is coming from highly advanced forms of cyber 
espionage, terrorism, and ultimately warfare with both online and 
offline consequences.
Advanced persistent threat (APT), for example, as implied by its 
name, is a highly advanced form of threat, typically an act of espionage 
or attack, that is distinguished by the resources, intent, and engineer-
ing aspects behind it that make it likely to be the work of a state or 
state-sponsored entity, and that have recently evolved into a concern 
for the private and public sectors alike, as illustrated by Stuxnet.
Cybersecurity is a global problem that requires a global response; but 
it is also a local problem that requires a local response. Governments 
and public sector organizations around the world must meet the 
cybersecurity challenge, including, as illustrated above, across three 
key areas: at the organizational level, in regard to mobility, and in 
preparation for cyber warfare.
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